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Abstract   
  
Cloud computing enables location-independent access to data and plays a significant 
role in a “linked-up” healthcare environment. Having cloud computing can improve 
the availability of patient medical records but there is the need to have the right 
processes in place to realise the benefits of cloud-enabled services. Potential benefits 
include rapid provisioning and interconnectivity of electronic resources to enhance 
data availability, and big data analytics help analyse patient data to provide the right 
intervention to the right patient at the right time through linking the collaboration and 
communication among healthcare institutions in different locations. Assunção et al. 
(2015) provided a vision that cloud computing would become the fifth utility, which 
will offer essential computing services for daily use. 
 
Despite the known benefits of cloud computing, the Ministry of Health (MoH) in 
Oman is hesitant to adopt cloud computing in patient services in healthcare because of 
perceived risks. There is therefore the need to understand the perception of different 
types of risks in adopting cloud computing in healthcare in Oman, such as security, 
management, technical, legal, privacy and other types of risks. To this end, a 
preliminary interview was conducted with stakeholders and two sets of questionnaires 
were issued to public and healthcare professionals in order to understand their 
perception of the risks in adopting cloud computing as a service in healthcare. The 
findings identified data security, confidentiality, integrity and availability as primary 
concerns. Therefore, an effective methodology is required to manage those concerns.   
  
This research focuses on information security risk management within the healthcare 
industry. It introduces a methodology, Managing Security Risk-Business Process 
Modelling (MSR-BPM), as an approach to manage the identified risks. The MSR-
BPM approach is built on ISO 27005 processes to help organisations prioritise, 
manage and treat the identified risks. The primary purpose is to enhance the 
communication of information security risk in healthcare processes, which can be 
improved by combining risk registers and business process modelling. A risk register 
documents the assessment of risk with appropriate countermeasures. BPM visualises 
the risks, activities, roles, security goals and countermeasures in the process models to 
promote a shared understanding of risks to decision makers and stakeholders.  
  
Finally, the MSR-BPM approach was evaluated through a scenario covering stages in 
the Integrated Care Pathway for breast cancer. This scenario was chosen because it has 
been used by previous researchers within the School of Computer Science and 
Informatics at Cardiff University. An evaluation that covered the set of ISO 27005 
processes was produced to create a survey for experts in risk management, business 
process modelling and healthcare. The experts agreed that combining risk registers 
with business process modelling improved the communication of information security 
risk in healthcare processes when compared to using risk registers only.  
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1.1 Introduction  
 
Information security is an issue of growing importance in recent years and is discussed 
on the agenda of governing boards and directors (Subramaniam et al., 2011; Rasid et 
al., 2017). It is viewed as a critical aspect of an organisation's information security risk 
management where timely identification, assessment and management of risks are 
linked with the achievement of its goals and objectives (Subramaniam et al., 2011). 
As organisations adopt new technologies, they need to update risk management 
processes to mitigate the identified risk with minimum loss.  
 
Healthcare systems are trying to improve their services and enhance collaboration 
among medical institutions and hospitals, such as by sharing medical imaging and 
data. Also, the adoption of digital patient records, increased regulation, provider 
unification and the increasing need for information exchange between patient, 
providers and payers, all point towards the need for better information security. Patient 
data can be easily stored in virtual archives that are accessible by different healthcare 
providers; thus, facilitating data-sharing and significantly reducing local storage 
requirements. A potential solution can be through utilising cloud-computing services 
as a technology mechanism that enhances the communication between different 
locations (Ren et al., 2017). However, this solution may raise different types of risks. 
Patient data security and privacy issues arise from the use of cloud systems for 
confidential personal data.  
 
Using cloud computing in healthcare can bring many benefits to healthcare providers 
and patients. The current healthcare system in Oman has short-comings in many areas: 
(i) it does not support a patient-centric approach, (ii) it does not allow a patient to 
access his/her medical records online and, (iii) it does not facilitate a patient in seeking 
treatment from other healthcare providers (i.e. does not enable information-sharing 
between healthcare providers). Adopting cloud computing can provide a potential 
solution to address all these limitations.  
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However, healthcare providers in Oman are hesitant to use cloud computing in 
healthcare services. Security risks in using cloud computing in the delivery of 
healthcare services is the main barrier. One of the objectives of this research is to 
investigate how Omani stakeholders perceive cloud computing. Also, it seeks to 
understand the challenges and key risk factors that affect cloud computing adoption 
for healthcare provision in the public and private sector. There are a broad range of 
different types of risks, such as management, technical, legal and security risks. The 
perception of risks identified include Data Security, Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability as well as Privacy, Human, Complex and Cost risks within the Omani 
context.   
 
Risk Management Standards provide general guidelines to help organisations address 
risks and promote mitigation solutions. Also, those standards provide examples to help 
organisations comply with its rules.  This research focuses on; the business context 
through ISO/IEC 38500 for Corporate Governance of Information Technology, Risk 
Management, (ISO 31000), Information Security Management Systems (ISO 27000) 
and Information Security Risk Management (ISO 27005). Risk management standards 
provide a wide range of guidelines with useful examples for addressing risks . 
However, they are high-level generic guidelines, which may represent a challenge for 
organisations to implement in their specific domains. In addition to the risk 
management standards, there are various approaches to manage risks, such as Risk 
Register (RR), Operational Critical Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE), 
and Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA). In the healthcare system, Risk 
Registers are widely used to prioritise and manage risks but there are limitations, such 
as not visualising the risk location for stakeholders.  Therefore, there is a need for 
effective risk management approaches to address risks in moving to new technology, 
such as cloud computing, in the current healthcare system. 
 
This research focuses on information security risk management; stakeholder 
perceptions in Oman identified Data Security, Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability are the major concerns of this research. It is, therefore, necessary to 
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consider information security management standards and approaches to address these 
concerns.  
 
This research presents a methodology, Managing Information Security-Business 
Process Modelling (MSR-BPM), which links the use of Risk Register with Business 
Process Models to address risks associated with healthcare. A risk register documents 
the assessment of risk with appropriate countermeasures. BPM visualises the risk 
activities, security goals and countermeasures in the process models to promote a 
shared understanding of risks to decision makers and stakeholders. Also, MSR-BPM 
is enriched with stakeholder perceptions of risks. The approach has been evaluated by 
a range of experts using Integrated Care Pathway (ICP) scenario to test its 
effectiveness in the healthcare industry.  
 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives  
 
Healthcare information systems use a variety of applications and infrastructures to 
improve the quality of healthcare services. Cloud computing enables location-
independent access to data and plays a significant role in a “linked-up” healthcare 
environment. Having cloud computing not only improves the availability of patient 
medical records, but it also means having the right process in place to enhance the 
healthcare information system with advanced technological services to improve the 
patient treatment, avoid multiple tests and link the collaboration and communication 
among healthcare institutions in different locations. However, data security represents 
the main barrier in adopting cloud computing as a service (Masrom and Rahimli, 
2015). Hence, the healthcare sector needs an effective risk management framework to 
reduce risk to an acceptable level.  In addition, there is an issue with approaches to 
enhance communication within different locations. Therefore, the aim of this research 
is to:  
Develop a methodology to manage risks which improves the communication of 
information security risk in healthcare processes 
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The research objectives are: 
1. To survey the literature to understand the benefits, challenges and risks 
associated with utilising cloud computing in healthcare and how 
relevant it is to the healthcare context in Oman. 
 
2. To understand stakeholders’ perceptions of risks in utilising cloud 
computing in the delivery of healthcare services. 
 
3. To understand the framework and techniques used to manage risks and 
business process modelling to visualise risks.  
 
4. To develop an approach to address the stages of Information security 
risk management (ISO 27005) process and determine how to combine 
both the risk register and business process models to communicate the 
information security risks . 
 
5. To identify healthcare scenarios to explain the need for migrating 
healthcare services to cloud computing and applying it to the identified 
scenarios.  
 
6. To evaluate the proposed approach by experts across the field of risk 
management, business process management and healthcare, through an 
Integrated Care Pathway scenario.  
 
To achieve these aims and objectives, it is necessary to study cloud computing 
benefits, as well as the challenges and risks of using cloud computing as services in 
healthcare. In addition, it will be necessary to study risk management standards, and 
especially Information Security Management Systems (ISO 27000) and Information 
Security Risk Management (ISO 27005).  
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1.3 Research Hypothesis  
 
Information security management represents an important element in any 
organisation. Healthcare information security management widely uses risk register to 
document and prioritise risk. Risk register provides an assessment of risks with 
appropriate countermeasures. However, it has limitations as it does not visualise the 
risk location for stakeholders. Thus, an effective information security risk 
management approach is necessary to provide a holistic view of any anticipated risks 
and visualize risks in the process models in order to promote a shared understanding 
of risks among decision makers and stakeholders. Therefore, the research hypothesis 
is as follows: 
The communication of Information Security Risk in Healthcare processes can be 
improved by combining risk register and business process modelling to visualise 
risks in healthcare process and achieve a shared understanding of these risks for 
stakeholders 
1.4 Research Scope  
 
In many developing countries, there is the need to have medical care and resources, 
such as professional doctors and nurses, financial support and community care 
(Alagoz et al., 2010). However, there are security concerns and so healthcare providers 
need to search for advanced and economical solutions to solve this problem. Adopting 
cloud computing is likely to provide benefits in addressing these problems but there 
are anticipated risks in using cloud computing as a service. These risks require an 
effective approach to address them.  
 
This research focuses on the business context through ISO/IEC 38500 for Corporate 
Governance of Information Technology, Risk Management (ISO 31000), Information 
Security Management Systems (ISO 27000) and Information Security Risk 
Management (ISO 27005). It observes each standard’s usefulness, methods and 
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theoretical background. Also, the research observes various methods and techniques 
used within information security risk management as a tool to reduce risk to the lowest 
level. Risk Register (RR), Operational Critical Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) and Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) are widely used in the 
healthcare system, but there are limitations in their use. Therefore, the focus of this 
research is to find an appropriate approach for an effective communication of 
information security risk within healthcare systems; thus, enhancing communication. 
 
This research centres on information security risks to address the potential risks in the 
current systems and cloud computing. It will be suggested that combining Risks 
Register with Business Process Modelling can assist with traceability of the risks. The 
ISO 27005 Information Security Risk Management Process was followed at each 
stage in detail, which helped to structure the thought process about the security risks 
and ensure that each activity in the process had been addressed.  ISO 27005 was 
chosen as it is an international information security standard which is widely used to 
manage risks.  The MSR-BPM approach highlights the importance of enhancing the 
use of a risk register with business process modelling to provide a more effective way 
to communicate risks. However, there are limitations concerning the use of Risk 
Register and business process as the list of risks tends to grow leading the business 
process modelling to have overcrowded symbols of risks. Therefore, there is a need 
for a multidisciplinary team to have an open discussion regarding which level they 
need to address the risks in certain situations. The link between the growing list of 
risks and BPM will be addressed in Chapter 6 in detail.  
 
The main contribution of this research is its attempt to develop MSR-BPM 
methodology to identify and manage security risks. The approach links the use of risk 
register with BPM rather than using a risk register only. The MSR-BPM approach is 
validated through an integrated care pathway for breast cancer treatment to verify its 
usefulness and significance in a realistic scenario. Experts from risk management, 
business process modelling and healthcare were involved in the validation process.  
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1.5 Contribution of the Thesis  
 
This inter-disciplinary research contributes to the domain of Information Security 
Risk Management and Health Informatics by:  
1. Providing a comprehensive study about the perception of different types of 
risks (Security, Management, Technical, Legal, Privacy and Other types of 
risks) in adopting cloud computing as a service in the delivery of healthcare 
services within the Omani context. 
 
2. Creating a comprehensive Generic Reference Risk Register to address risks of 
migrating cloud computing in healthcare. The Reference Model of Information 
Assurance & Security (RMIAS) (Cherdantseva, 2014) was used as a basis to 
include risk name, description, impact, likelihood, risk level, security goals, 
and countermeasure. Traceability was added to show risk location. Also, the 
Generic Reference Risk Register table includes various types of risks, such as 
security, management, technical, legal and cloud computing risks. The 
relevance of each of the identified risks to the Omani context is also provided. 
 
3. Providing an extension to Secure*BPMN (Cherdantseva, 2014) by adding risk 
representation. It is important to visualize the risks in BPM diagram for 
stakeholders and decision makers.  
 
4. The main contribution of this research relates to creating a methodology, 
Manage Security Risk-Business Process Modelling (MSR-BPM), to visualise 
risks in a healthcare process and promote a shared understanding of the risks 
for stakeholders. It follows Information Security Risk Management (ISO 
27005) processes to improve the communication of information security risk 
management by combining risk register and business process modelling. A risk 
register documents the assessment of risk with appropriate countermeasures. 
BPM visualises the risk activities, security goals and countermeasures in the 
process models to promote a shared understanding of risks to decision makers 
and stakeholders.  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
9 | P a g e  
 
These contributions are discussed and justified in the conclusion chapter (section 8.3). 
 In addition, the author has participated in several conferences, notably: 
 
• Aseela Al Harthi, Wendy Ivins, Omer Rana (2015) ‘Perception of security 
using cloud computing in the delivery of healthcare services in Oman and 
Saudi Arabia’. 1st International Saudi Health Informatics Conference 
Emerging Trends and Technologies in Health Care. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
 
• Aseela Al Harthi, Wendy Ivins, Omer Rana (2017) 'Perception of security 
using cloud computing in the delivery of healthcare services in Oman'. 7th 
Conference Pharmacy Care: “Towards Professional Excellence in Pharmacy” 
Al Bustan Palace Hotel, Muscat. Oman.  
 
• Aseela Al Harthi, Wendy Ivins, Omer Rana (2017) 'Perception of security 
using cloud computing in the delivery of healthcare services in Oman.' 
Speaking of Science: “An Interdisciplinary Conference for Natural and 
Applied Scientists” 4th May, 2017, Cardiff, UK. 
 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The remaining chapters will outline the thesis structure.  
Chapter 2:  provides background information about cloud computing in healthcare. It 
highlights the general definition of cloud computing and how it can be customised for 
the healthcare industry.  It discusses various examples related to adopting cloud 
computing in healthcare. In addition, it presents the strategic importance of adopting 
cloud computing as a service through listing its benefits and performing a SWOT 
analysis. Also, anticipated risks are discussed in regard to management, technical, 
legal and security risks. In addition, the importance and relevance of each risk were 
explored in detail.   
 
Chapter 3:  this chapter explores the stakeholders’ perception of risk in Healthcare 
Systems in Oman. In addition, it presents the mixed research methods (qualitative and 
quantitative) that were used to collect data. A preliminary interview with stakeholders 
was performed and two sets of questionnaires were issued for public and healthcare 
professionals in order to understand their perception of adopting cloud computing as 
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a service in healthcare. Data analysis was performed by using an advanced statistical 
method (SPSS). Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was used to investigate the 
interrelationships between items, reduce their number and form them into constructs. 
In addition, each statement was carefully analysed to identify stakeholder perception. 
Radar Charts were used to visualize the public and healthcare professionals’ 
perception and an analysis was performed regarding whether they agreed or disagreed. 
In addition, research validation was conducted through an interview with H. Dr. Ali 
Talib Al Hinai, Undersecretary for Planning Affairs in Ministry of Health. The 
outcome will emphasise the need to find an effective risk assessment methodology to 
overcome various risks identified. The findings are reflected upon and 
recommendations and suggestions are made for the Omani government. 
 
Chapter 4:  presents the management of information security risks as the research 
problem. It discusses the business context through ISO/IEC 38500 for Corporate 
Governance of Information Technology, Risk Management standard (ISO 31000) as 
it is widely used in managing risks. In addition, Managing Information Security (ISO 
27000) and Information Security Risk Management (ISO 27005) is discussed to 
understand the mechanism in managing information security risks. A critical analysis 
of the tools and techniques for each standard is presented. Tools and techniques for 
managing risks in healthcare are explored. A review of Information Security is 
presented as a major concern to address in this research. The role of process modelling 
prospected in risk management framework is considered. 
Business Process Modeling (BPM) is discussed as a widely used modelling technique, 
especially in healthcare, and is used to model information security in healthcare 
processes. 
 
Chapter 5: this chapter introduces an approach for managing information security 
risks. It includes three contributions of this research. Firstly, it discusses the creation 
of a comprehensive Generic Reference Risk Register Table. In addition, it explains 
the expansion of Secure*BPMN (Cherdantseva, 2014) by adding risk representation 
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to it. Thirdly, it discusses the creation of an approach, Managing Security Risk-
Business Process Modelling (MSR-BPM), to visualise risks in a healthcare process 
and promote a shared understanding of the risks for stakeholders. A reflection is 
provided based on the challenges and difficulties faced while developing the MSR-
BPM approach. 
 
Chapter 6: introduces the application of MSR-BPM approach through a hypothetical 
case study scenario which was used during the preliminary interview in Chapter 3. It 
utilises MSR-BPM approach as a way to manage risks based on ISO 27005 process in 
two ways: this research approach and the stakeholders’ consideration. Also, it presents 
the choice of communication mechanism by looking at a current situation with 
potential risk and cloud computing as a solution to enhance the collaboration and 
communication between an Omani hospital and German hospital. It addresses the 
anticipated risks with cloud computing based on the approach used in this research.  
 
Chapter 7: presents an evaluation of MSR-BPM approach through specific research 
undertaken within the Computer Science and Informatics at Cardiff University which 
uses Integrated Care Pathway (ICP) for breast cancer treatment. It has many potential 
risks, and the process involves multiple locations as well as stakeholders. Information 
Security Risk Management (ISO 27005) processes and a number of quality criteria are 
adopted to design a set of survey questions for experts who have experience in one or 
more of Risk Management, Business Process Modelling and Healthcare. Reflections 
are offered on the MSR-BPM approach based on ISO 27005 processes. Advantages, 
limitations and future work which could be carried out based on this research are 
discussed. 
 
Chapter 8: summarizes the key aspects of the research and assesses the achievements 
against the aims and objectives. It provides a reflective analysis based on the extent to 
which the research hypothesis was achieved. 
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2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides a background of cloud computing in healthcare. It highlights the 
cloud computing definition in general and how it can be defined within the context of 
the healthcare domain. It presents various examples of using cloud computing in 
healthcare. In addition, it illustrates the strategic importance of adopting cloud 
computing as a service by highlighting its benefits and performing a SWOT analysis. 
Then, it examines potential risks and threats of providing cloud computing as a service 
in the delivery of healthcare services, such as management, technical, legal and 
security risks. These potential risks were summarised in risk register. The risk register 
was expanded to highlight the relevance and importance of identified risks according 
to the Omani context.  
 
2.2 Cloud Computing in Healthcare  
 
This thesis will consider the problem of using cloud computing as a service in the 
healthcare industry in Oman, which is discussed further in Chapter 3. Therefore, a 
brief overview of cloud computing is needed to clarify its role. The often cited 
definition from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), by Mell 
and Grance (2011) explains that, “Cloud computing is a model for enabling 
ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service 
provider interaction”.   
 
Cloud computing in healthcare can be defined as an application-oriented and services-
based infrastructure where Health-IT resources are pooled, allowing services to be 
widely deployed or rapidly shared in response to changing healthcare business and 
regulatory requirements (e.g. networks, servers, storage, applications and services) 
(Liu & Park 2013). Figure 2-1 represents the NIST definition of cloud computing. It 
focuses on computing resources that can be accessed from anywhere and at any time 
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and can be monitored online (Ren et al., 2017). It pinpoints five characteristics of cloud 
computing, three service models and four deployment methods.  
 
 
Figure 2-1 NIST Definition of Cloud Computing 
 
The NIST definition of cloud computing is relevant to the healthcare domain in many 
areas. The essential characteristics of cloud computing can be customized to 
healthcare to provide rapid provisioning and interconnectivity of electronic resources 
(Shini et al., 2012; Liu & Park, 2013; Uta, 2014; Devadass et al., 2017), enhanced data 
availability (Shini et al., 2012; Ahuja, 2012; Mxoli et al., 2014; Masrom & Rahimli, 
2014; Devadass et al., 2017), improved patient quality of service and reduced overall 
healthcare costs (Shini et al., 2012; Ahuja, 2012; Mxoli et al., 2014; Masrom & 
Rahimli, 2014). Table 2.1 discusses further benefits in detail. 
 
In addition, a study by Youssef (2014) proposed a framework for secure Health 
Information Systems (HISs) based on big data analytics in mobile cloud computing 
environment. As can be seen in Figure 2-2, the framework provides a high level of 
integration, interoperability, and sharing of EHRs among healthcare providers, 
patients and practitioners. The cloud permits fast Internet access, sharing, and 
provision of EHRs by authenticated users. Big data analytics helps analyse patient data 
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to provide the right intervention to the right patient at the right time. The proposed 
framework applies a set of security constraints and access control that guarantee 
integrity, confidentiality, and privacy of medical data. The ultimate goal of the 
proposed framework is to introduce a new generation of HISs that are able to provide 
healthcare services of high quality and low cost to patients using this combination of 
big data analytics, cloud computing and mobile computing technologies (Youssef, 
2014). 
 
 
Figure 2-2 A Framework for EHR Based on Mobile Cloud Computing and Big Data 
Analytics 
Source: (Youssef, 2014) 
 
Of particular interest was the use of cloud computing in healthcare in Oman. 
Regarding service models, the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Oman uses Infrastructure 
as a service to host the ministry website.  In addition, it uses Software as a Service 
(SaaS) in Al Shifa project to allow patients to book/cancel an appointment with a 
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healthcare establishment as long as they are registered with online services. According 
to Zhang et al. (2017), using Cloud Service Models in healthcare will solve the big 
data and storage problem that currently represents a challenge in terms of handling 
and processing. The technologies of cloud and big data can be used to enhance the 
performance of the healthcare system so that patients and practitioners can then enjoy 
various smart healthcare applications and services (Zhang et al., 2017). 
 
Healthcare organisations can use deployment models such as Hybrid to use two or 
more cloud models to maintain the privacy of their data. The next section will discuss 
detailed examples regarding the use of cloud computing in healthcare domain.  
 
2.3  Examples of Cloud Computing in Healthcare  
 
The UK government is observing the use of cloud computing to allow its National 
Health Service (NHS) patients to access their Electronic Health Records (EHR). The 
NHS Future Forum was proposed in 2011 to advise the government on its health 
reforms. It was believed that there would be major financial benefits because fewer 
visits would be required to the medical centres and hospitals for consultation, and 
repeat prescriptions could be made online (Barrow, 2011). From 2009 to 2011, 
London’s Chelsea and Westminster hospital piloted cloud-based healthcare (Sultan, 
2014). They presented the first cloud prototype in Europe through an e-health project 
known as Data Capture and Auto Identification Reference (DACAR). It is a stack of 
software components and services that addresses common e-health application 
requirements, such as authorisation, data capture, data integrity and confidentiality. 
DACAR is cloud PaaS infrastructure (known as Flexiant Cloud Orchestrator) that 
provides tools to facilitate the development, integration and deployment of an e-health 
SaaS solution (Sultan, 2014). The system allows close and trusted circles of friends or 
relatives to access patients' data buckets (i.e., physical memory storage locations). If 
that data goes beyond trusted circles, the patient’s family can be alerted, and this will 
allow them to go and check their physical conditions. With the arrival of wearable 
technology, such operations (as depicted in Figure 2-3) can be performed by wrist or 
eye-based devices such as Google Glass or Apple's iWatch (Sultan, 2015). 
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Figure 2-3 Pilot e-Health System at Chelsea and Westminster Hospital (London) 
Source: (Sultan, 2015) 
 
A study proposed a cyber-physical system for patient-centric healthcare applications 
and services, called Health-CPS, built on cloud and big data analytics technologies 
(Zhang et al., 2017). This system consists of a data collection layer with a unified 
standard, a data management layer for distributed storage and parallel computing, and 
a data-oriented service layer. The results of this study show that the technologies of 
cloud and big data can be used to enhance the performance of the healthcare system 
so that humans can then enjoy various smart healthcare applications and services 
(Zhang et al., 2017). The contributions of Health-CPS can be summarized as follows; 
1) a unified data collection layer for the integration of public medical resources and 
personal health devices is presented; 2) a cloud-enabled and data-driven platform for 
the storage and analysis of multisource heterogeneous healthcare data is established; 
and 3) a healthcare application service cloud is designed, which provides a unified 
application programming interface (API) for the developers and a unified interface for 
the users (Zhang et al. 2017). Figure 2-4 represents the Health-CPS architecture. 
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Figure 2-4 Heath-CPS Architecture 
Source: (Zhang et al., 2017) 
 
Using cloud computing technology has led to patient monitoring services that are 
dynamically scalable and universally accessible. One example is a suicide risk 
scouting prototype that functions by predicting mental states in the cloud environment 
(Alam et al., 2014). The system collects patient disease symptoms through a wireless 
body area network (WBAN) and then analyses the collected data in the healthcare 
cloud platform with the patient’s history of disease, habits and genetics. Predicting 
mental states using some tiny sensors and cloud computing technology is a novel 
initiative to monitor patients presenting a suicide risk as well as those suffering from 
mental disorders (Alam et al., 2014). 
  
A framework of an m-Health monitoring system (MHMS) based on a cloud computing 
platform (Cloud-MHMS) is proposed to support remote health monitoring, addressing 
health data integration and interoperation among various medical agencies (e.g. 
community hospitals and Class-A large hospitals). The multiple tenant data storage 
and access methods are designed to protect health data security and privacy (Xu et al., 
2017). Similarly, Xu et al. (2017) linked the data model to represent health data and 
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connect them to open life data to supply background knowledge semantically to 
improve data interoperability (Xu et al., 2017). 
 
Cloud computing in healthcare is suitable for managing medical data effectively, as 
well as being flexible and scalable in terms of access to e-Health services. Healthcare 
professionals will be able to attend to their patients from any location at any time. In 
addition, it will improve data quality operations, such as reducing the need to duplicate 
patient records stored in multiple databases (Devadass et al., 2017). 
 
By considering the above examples of using cloud computing services in healthcare, 
it is hoped that this will provide an understanding of its usefulness as well as 
investigating the strategic importance of adopting cloud computing. The next section 
will discuss the strategic importance of cloud computing by exploring its benefits and 
performing a SWOT analysis to help decision-makers gain a clear picture of potential 
internal and external factors that may affect the adoption of cloud computing. 
 
2.4 Strategic Importance of Cloud Computing in Healthcare  
 
2.4.1 Benefits of Cloud Computing 
 
Healthcare information systems use a variety of applications and infrastructures to 
improve the quality of healthcare services and cloud computing enables location-
independent access to data and plays a significant role in a “linked-up” healthcare 
environment. Improving the availability of patient medical records is the primary 
objective; however, this must be in the context of particular security constraints. 
Assunção et al. (2015) provided a vision that cloud computing would become the fifth 
utility, which will provide the essential computing services for daily use. Cloud 
computing in healthcare can be defined as an application-oriented and services-based 
infrastructure, where Health-IT resources are pooled, allowing services to be widely 
deployed or rapidly shared in response to changing healthcare business and regulatory 
requirements (Liu & Park, 2013). Also, one of the significant advantages of using 
cloud computing in healthcare services relates to supporting energy saving and 
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moving to green computing. It will reduce electricity expenses and resources required 
to cool computers within data centres (Devadass et al., 2017). 
 
Furthermore, using cloud computing in small hospitals represents an excellent 
opportunity to overcome current obstacles, such as not having internal IT staff to 
maintain and service in-house infrastructure for laboratories and medical practices. 
Thus, reducing infrastructure expenses and IT repairs can mitigate various difficulties 
in terms of EHR adoption (Schweitzer, 2011; Zhang, 2010). On the other hand, 
hospitals that are more prominent observe cloud computing as an opportunity to 
provide ample data storage for IT applications. From the IT manager’s perspective, 
cloud computing can provide the scalability, flexibility and cost efficiency required 
within the infrastructure (Barua et al., 2011). 
 
Chen et al. (2012) emphasised the extensive benefits of using cloud computing in 
healthcare services. They highlighted that cloud computing provides the necessary 
infrastructure for electronic health records because of its flexibility and accessibility. 
 
Cost saving is one of the essential advantages of using the cloud computing model 
(Cervone, 2010). Operational duties and transactions are moved to the cloud service 
provider which is then responsible for on-going maintenance of the hardware used by 
the cloud. Marston et al. (2011) pointed out that cloud computing reduces costs by 
balancing capital costs with operational costs. As for the healthcare provider, they can 
benefit from lowering the cost of a wide range of IT software licences which need to be 
purchased on an annual basis to avoid any service interruption. 
 
Deploying a cloud-based solution in the healthcare domain could address many of the 
existing limitations, such as those outlined in Table 2-1 . 
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Benefits 
Sources 
 
Support and enable a patient-centric 
healthcare system.  
Barua et al. (2011); Li et al. (2010); 
Devadass et al. (2017) 
Promote enhanced data availability due 
to the allocation of more resources to 
avoid data being offline (e.g. redundancy 
servers), implementation of disaster 
recovery and continuity practices. 
Shini et al. (2012); Ahuja (2012); 
Mxoli et al. (2014); Masrom & Rahimli 
(2014). 
Devadass et al. (2017) 
Support rapid provisioning and 
interconnectivity of electronic resources. 
Shini et al. (2012); Liu & Park (2013); 
Uta (2014); Devadass et al. (2017) 
Allow scalable and elasticity demand for 
e-Health services. Healthcare 
professionals will be able to attend to 
their patients from anywhere at any 
time. 
Ahuja (2012); Liu & Park (2013); Mxoli 
et al. (2014); Devadass et al. (2017) 
Enable IT departments (at healthcare 
institutions) to reduce reliance on in-
house expertise in data security. The key 
elements of security can be left to 
specialists at the data centre via Service 
Level Agreements that can be 
periodically audited. 
Liu & Park (2013); Masrom & Rahimli 
(2014); Devadass et al. (2017) 
 
Improve data quality operations, such as 
reducing the need for duplicate patient 
records currently stored in multiple, 
independently managed databases. 
 
Shini et al. (2012); Uta (2014); 
Devadass et al. (2017) 
Improve the patient quality of service 
and reduce overall healthcare costs. 
Shini et al. (2012); Ahuja (2012); 
Mxoli et al. (2014); Masrom & Rahimli 
(2014). 
 
Complement value-based, patient 
centric care and help reduce 
administrative burdens as well as 
benefiting billing and reimbursement 
processes through the Cloud-based 
interoperability. 
Medical White paper (2018) 
Table 2-1  Examples of Key Benefits in a Cloud-based Healthcare System 
 
2.4.2 SWOT Analysis for Using Cloud Computing in Healthcare Sector 
 
Currently, the healthcare sector has to plan to move to the cloud computing 
environment to enhance communication within healthcare establishments and 
facilitate accessibility to patient records. Thus, it is necessary to identify the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats concerned with the adoption of cloud computing 
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services. SWOT analysis is a strategic planning method to evaluate the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats that are involved in a project (Masrom and 
Rahimli, 2015). It considers the internal and external factors which encourage or 
discourage project objectives. Table 2-2 shows the results of SWOT analysis 
performed for cloud computing in the healthcare sector (AbuKhousa et al., 2012; 
Bamiah et al., 2012; Masrom and Rahimli, 2015; Devadass et al., 2017). 
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Strengths  
• Using cloud computing in healthcare 
can lead to cost reduction because 
start-up expenditure is not required 
(Masrom and Rahimli, 2015). 
• Flexibility and resilience in disaster 
recovery by enhancing data availability 
due to the allocation of more resources 
to avoid data being offline (Devadass 
et al., 2017). 
•  Maintenance cost reduction as most of 
the maintenance is provided by cloud 
provider (Devadass et al., 2017). 
•  Energy saving as it involves 
decreasing the additional cost of 
energy consumption because cloud is 
based on the network environment so 
mainly allows for energy consumption 
to be decreased (Masrom and Rahimli, 
2015). 
•  User-friendly because people are 
aware of smartphone applications 
(Masrom and Rahimli, 2015).   
•  Ease of access to the patient’s records 
anytime and anywhere leads to 
increased collaboration among doctors 
and patients, so the quality of services 
to patients will be improved (Bamiah et 
al., 2012; Devadass et al., 2017). 
Weaknesses 
• Many hospitals do not have Internet 
connection to connect to the cloud, so 
it is very hard to implement cloud 
computing. Internet connection is a 
fundamental requirement for 
connecting to the cloud and using 
cloud services. Therefore, without 
Internet, the implementation of cloud 
computing for health sector is 
impossible (Masrom and Rahimli, 
2015). 
• Employee readiness to accept and use 
new technology within the work 
environment is necessary (Lian et al., 
2014; Alkhater et al., 2017). 
• IS staff need to have sufficient 
knowledge, awareness and skills to 
adopt cloud computing (Lian et al., 
2014).  
• Technology readiness, existence of the 
IT infrastructure and human resources 
can affect the implementation of cloud 
technology (Alkhater et al., 2017). 
 
Opportunities 
• Trainees are afforded more 
opportunities to learn new technology 
where cloud computing healthcare is 
provided (Masrom and Rahimli, 
2015).   
•  Because cloud computing is provided 
by a third party, if any problems occur, 
the cloud provider expert will provide 
a quick solution without interruption to 
the hospital service (AbuKhousa et al., 
2012). 
 
Threats  
• Data security of patient data kept and 
processed in the cloud is very sensitive 
and valuable so security in the cloud is 
very important. It is, therefore the main 
barrier in adopting cloud computing in 
the healthcare sector (AbuKhousa et al., 
2012)  
• Fears and worries about the PATRIOT 
Act in U.S influence the decision of EU 
cloud customers in using the cloud as a 
service (Berry and Reisman, 2012).  
• Transferring health data among various 
legal and regulatory jurisdictions is very 
critical and requires deep understanding 
of cloud outsourcing contracts (Iyer & 
Henderson, 2012).  
Table 2-2 SWOT Analysis for Cloud Computing in the Healthcare Sector 
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The results of the SWOT analysis revealed that the healthcare sector could make 
significant progress with the cost reduction model and increase the quality of services. 
Lower investment in the infrastructure, easy and fast access and optimising resources 
are all benefits of the cloud computing solution for the healthcare sector.  In terms of 
migrating health care services to the cloud, Software as Services (SaaS) and 
Infrastructure as Service (IaaS) will be widely used and implemented because they can 
be customised according to the health center’s needs and patient requirements. 
 
2.5 Risks of using Cloud Computing in Healthcare  
 
Adopting cloud computing presents various risks which need to be addressed before 
the adoption process. Therefore, developing strategies or a framework to enhance 
security can directly influence cloud computing’s adoption rate. Also, if cloud 
computing for healthcare is to be fully utilized, various issues will need to be 
considered.  According to Liang et al. (2017), some of those issues are related to 
management, technical, security and legal risks. Each one of these needs to be 
addressed in detail. Therefore, risk management standards were studied to understand 
the techniques used in managing risks. 
 
2.5.1 Management Risks    
 
Health care management is one of the top priority areas in many developed countries. 
There is an increased demand to help those countries, especially those with an 
increased population who require medical care and resources such as professional 
doctors and nurses, financial support and community care (Sultan, 2014). Such 
circumstances encourage many health providers to search for advanced and economic 
solutions to address this growing problem. Cloud computing is likely to provide a 
suitable solution for these issues. However, there are risks and challenges associated 
with the adoption of cloud computing.  
 
The use of cloud computing for personalised medicine requires active management of 
vast and sensitive datasets. Vast datasets are characteristic of the big data landscape 
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that exists today. As data sets continue to grow, it is increasingly challenging to 
maintain privacy for genomic data that is shared across computer networks (Chow-
White et al., 2015). In addition, to manage the challenges associated with extensive 
data sets, other issues exist, such as operating the versatility across different 
environments, scaling to accommodate large data centres, automating to create self-
managed environments, and integration of non-cloud products into the cloud 
architecture (Joseph and Brown, 2017). Personalized medicine involves collaboration 
across different entities, so overcoming some of the managerial challenges is vital for 
continued growth and success (Joseph and Brown, 2017).  
 
Another management challenge can be seen in employee readiness to accept and use 
new technology within the work environment. It is important that senior management 
provides positive leadership and support to accept cloud computing as a new service 
because it will encourage employees to embrace it as a new way of increasing the 
quality of work (Lian et al., 2014; Alkhater et al., 2017). Therefore, senior 
management plays a significant role in the acceptance of new technology at the 
organisational level. Support from senior management is necessary for executing 
change and facilitating the adoption of the cloud technology in enterprises. In addition, 
the IS staff need to have sufficient knowledge, awareness and the necessary skills to 
adopt cloud computing, so that organisations will have more confidence throughout 
the adoption process (Lian et al., 2014).  
 
According to Alkhater et al. (2017), another challenge relates to technology readiness; 
the existence of the necessary IT infrastructure and human resources which can affect 
the implementation of cloud technology. Access to cloud services depends on internet 
connectivity. Therefore, a good internet connection, high bandwidth and internet 
speed all play an important role in an organisation’s decision to employ cloud services. 
Prior studies have concluded that organisations that have a robust technical 
infrastructure and the necessary technical skills are more likely to employ a new 
technology (Alkhater et al., 2017).  
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In summary, the key potential risks in terms of management are related to senior 
management support, human readiness, technology readiness and employee awareness 
in terms of cloud computing services and internet connection speed.  
 
2.5.2 Technological Risks 
 
The technology issue plays a significant role in terms of adopting any new technology 
in any organisation. Regarding adopting cloud computing in healthcare services, 
patient data security and privacy is one area of considerable concern. Rubin (2010) 
pointed out that it is necessary to address six significant points of risk related to health 
IT structure before adopting cloud computing within health care services. Those were: 
regularity risk, performance, intellectual property, liability, business continuity and 
enforcement (Rubin, 2010). Regularity risk includes encrypting data and preventing 
unauthorised access.  
 
Chang et al. (2007) discussed how IS complexity and compatibility will affect IT 
adoption (Lin et al., 2012 ; Liu, 2011). The alignment of IT in large organizations is 
inherently complex. For cloud computing to deliver real value, it must be aligned to 
the enterprise rather than simply being a platform for simple tasks, such as application 
testing or running product demos. Therefore, the issues around migrating application 
systems to the cloud and satisfying the requirements of key system stakeholders must 
be explored. These stakeholders include technical, project, operational and financial 
managers, as well as the engineers who are going to be developing and supporting the 
systems. Cloud computing is not simply a technological improvement of data centres, 
but a fundamental change in how IT is provisioned and used (Hosseini et al., 2012). 
Therefore, the adoption of cloud computing will change the work of various system 
stakeholders in the enterprise, and this will require considerable effort (Hosseini et al., 
2012). 
 
Another challenge can be seen in the system support that will change because 
administrators will no longer have complete control of a system’s infrastructure. Their 
work could increasingly involve contacting cloud providers and waiting for them to 
investigate system problems. Such a scenario was reported by Jesper whose 
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application came under a denial of service attack and it took over 16 hours before the 
problem was fixed (Hosseini et al., 2012). Jasper application was running on Amazon 
EC2. 
Medical information systems, such as Picture Archiving and Communication systems 
(PACS), Hospital Information System (HIS) and Radiological Information Systems 
(RIS), are unique in nature. How to migrate these systems with the cloud computing 
platform is also a critical factor that organizations need to consider (Lian et al., 2014). 
This is because system compatibility is another critical factor from the technical 
perspective. Having cloud computing compatibility with existing systems or 
applications in the hospital will help make the adoption of cloud computing 
technology feasible (Lian et al., 2014). Cloud-based solutions have the potential to 
enable behavioural health providers to adopt state-of-the-art Electronic Health 
Records (EHR) without incurring fixed costs associated with installation (Carneal et 
al., 2017). This is because EHR represents a critical tool for collecting, managing and 
sharing healthcare services information (Carneal et al., 2017). 
 
Costs of the new IT investment play a significant role when hospitals decide to adopt 
cloud computing technology. This is because establishing a cloud computing platform 
requires different types of investment in such areas as hardware, software and system 
integration. The organisation can find costs related to these kinds of projects to be 
enormous due to the variable nature of the expenses (Lian et al., 2014). Understanding 
the operational costs of clouds is complicated because the cloud’s utility billing model 
is a shift from capital to operational budgeting, and utility billing has a certain degree 
of uncertainty that makes it complex to estimate compared to hardware acquisition. 
The uncertainty relates to: (i) the actual resources consumed by a system, which are 
determined by its load; (ii) the deployment option used by a system, which can affect 
its costs as resources such as bandwidth are more expensive between clouds compared 
to bandwidth within clouds; and (iii) the cloud service provider’s pricing scheme, 
which can change at any time. The consequence is that decision makers are faced with 
significant uncertainty regarding the best provider and whether cloud adoption is more 
cost effective than other, more traditional forms of IT provisioning, such as co-location 
(Hosseini et al., 2012).  
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In addition, the interoperation represents a huge problem in dealing with patient 
records. Interoperability is the ability of two or more systems or components (for 
example, two or more medical informatics systems) to exchange information and use 
the information that has been exchanged (Lupse et al., 2018). While interoperability 
is paramount to an efficient system of care and more accurate patient diagnoses, there 
is some reluctance and fear around embracing technological change (Medical White 
paper, 2018).  
 
Government agencies, including the Health and Human Services (HHS) and the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), have continued their 
unrelenting efforts to promote the adoption and popularization of EHRs. These 
agencies focus on proposing and enforcing new standards to facilitate the 
interoperability and security of health information, including the Health Level Seven 
(HL7) international healthcare informatics interoperability standards. Because of the 
limits of interoperability and security, no single vendor can provide a comprehensive, 
dominant solution serving both hospitals and smaller outpatient clinics (Jin and Chen, 
2015).  
 
Another challenge can be seen in maintaining Health Level-7(HL7) in cloud-based 
environment. HL7 refers to a set of international standards for transfer of clinical and 
administrative data between software applications used by various healthcare 
providers. It was designed to enable interoperability of healthcare information within 
large hospitals. HL7’s focus has been extended to consider the risks of new 
technologies such as Internet of Things (IoT) and mobile combined with Cloud. A 
study by Lubamba and Bagula (2017) addressed the issue of interoperability between 
fog and cloud computing platforms. The results reveal that, for the lightweight devices 
used by fog infrastructures, “outband” transport over WiFi with edge data translation 
into HL7 records is a better option than “in-band” transport. Therefore, integrating 
HL7 into cloud-based environment represents a challenge which needs to be 
considered in further research (Lubamba and Bagula, 2017).   
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2.5.3 Legal Risks 
 
The legal issue represents a vital part in the adoption of any new technology due to the 
rules and regulations involved in using it. Managers and decision-makers need to 
update their knowledge and understand the various legal aspects associated with it. 
Also, healthcare is a highly regulated industry as it needs to follow strict traceability, 
authority and auditability guidelines. Berry and Reisman (2012) emphasised the 
importance of a legal and regulatory framework as a vital area of consideration for 
policymakers within the healthcare and IT industry. For example, one key area to 
consider would be whether to allow personal health data to be transmitted abroad 
where authorities have different jurisdiction over the data. Therefore, cloud customers 
need to be fully aware of the rules regarding where their data is held (Berry and 
Reisman, 2012). Although cloud providers guarantee data protection in data centres 
stored outside of Europe, there are fears regarding how the PATRIOT Act in the U.S 
will influence the decision of EU cloud customers to use the cloud as a service (Berry 
and Reisman, 2012). Thus, one of the crucial challenges for U.S cloud providers is to 
confirm that cloud customers’ data cannot be accessed through the PATRIOT Act and 
that cloud customers’ data will not be accessed as part of intelligence gathering 
activities. On the other hand, the US has entered the "Safe Harbour" agreement that 
allows U.S cloud providers to self-certify that they meet the necessary requirements 
of the EU Directive (Berry and Reisman, 2012). 
 
The U.S and the EU are working on a legislation framework of outsourcing 
preparations for using cloud computing models and this presents a further challenge 
as the responsibility between cloud providers and cloud clients becomes unclear 
(Conbody, 2013). The framework on health management, medical data access and 
storage capacity will consider how all stakeholders can meet the different conditions 
and circumstances to permit compliance. The role of cloud contracts that fall within 
IT outsourcing is significant as well as the roles of cloud clients and cloud providers. 
Transferring health data among various legal and regulatory jurisdictions is absolutely 
critical and requires a deep understanding of cloud outsourcing contracts (Iyer and 
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Henderson, 2012). Those kinds of attitude outspread further than cloud client-provider 
association to comprise thoughtful facts and ideas of regulation and compliance 
(Seddona and Currie, 2013). 
 
Even though the U.S and the EU have varying features of cloud policy, both agree 
regarding the security and privacy of personal data. To create a regulatory framework, 
they encourage the cloud client and cloud provider to consider individual 
responsibility and accountability and work as a business partner (Seddona and Currie, 
2013). 
 
A survey by Deloitte in 2013 showed that inadequate data security and risk of data 
availability, open compliance and legal issues, and the risk of losing governance or 
control over data were the primary challenges facing cloud adoption (Shirazi et al., 
2017). Compliance, audit and legal issues around data transfer between different 
jurisdictions require careful consideration, especially in terms of how data can be 
audited and logged as per various security compliance requirements. Legal matters 
represent aspects related to judicial conditions and law, such as multiple data locations 
and privilege management. Shirazi et al. (2017) highlight that it is necessary to address 
issues related to forensic and investigation shortcomings in cloud  as there is currently 
no regulation in place to determine how to keep track of the use of the cloud system 
and what is required to be audited and logged (Shirazi et al., 2017). Given that cloud 
computing is a relatively new technology, the cyber laws do not yet cover the 
requirements posed by it (Shirazi et al., 2017). 
 
The lack of legal and judicial requirements and laws also represents a challenge that 
needs to be considered from a different angle when operating in cloud environments, 
especially in the healthcare domain. Legal issues have a much more comprehensive 
impact and expose data to a higher level of risks in cloud environments as opposed to 
traditional environments (Shirazi et al., 2017). 
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2.5.4  Security Risks  
 
Using cloud computing in healthcare services can make them vulnerable to potential 
security threats. Security threats could stem from virtualization, which introduces new 
vulnerabilities and there could be conflicts between customers and cloud providers 
who are both attempting to strengthen their security procedures (Hosseini et al., 2012). 
 
To protect patient health information, the United States Department of Health & 
Human Services established the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) to forbid unauthorised access to information (Osterhaus, 2010). It covers 
security principles for protecting electronic health information and individual privacy. 
In particular, HIPAA subsection 506 of 164 includes the use of electronic health 
information to carry out treatment, payment or health care operation (45 Public 
Welfare Department of Health and Human Services, 2007). 
 
To support the software engineering effort to establish security requirements from 
regulations, Breaux et al. (2006) presented a methodology to abstract access rights and 
responsibilities directly from regulation texts (Breaux, 2006). They applied this 
method specifically to HIPAA Privacy Rule. Maxwell et al. (2010) presented a 
manufacture rule framework that software engineers can use in specific compliance 
requirements for software. They applied the framework to check iTrust, an open 
source electronic medical records system, for agreement with the HIPAA Security 
Rule.  
 
Due to the exceptional value of Protected Health Information (PHI), third-party 
storage servers are a target for hackers and this may lead to a breach in the PHI (Li et 
al., 2013). Li et al. (2013) emphasise the importance of having fine-grained data access 
control methods that work with semi-trusted servers to ensure patient data security and 
privacy. They recommended encrypting the data before outsourcing to the cloud. The 
PHI owner should decide how to encrypt their files and who will have access to each 
file only. Those who have the decryption key will be able to access the file. Also, it 
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allows a patient to revoke access privileges whenever needed at any time (Mandl et 
al., 2001). 
 
Data security encompasses issues related to confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of data. Confidentiality and integrity of data transmission needs to be guaranteed, not 
only between enterprise storage and cloud storage, but also among different cloud 
storage services. In other words, confidentiality and integrity of the entire transfer 
process of data should be ensured (Shirazi et al., 2017). Several studies identify data 
security as a major concern. For instance, a survey by Forrester in 2013 indicated that 
50% of businesses in Europe and North America view security as the number one 
reason for not adopting a cloud solution (Shirazi et al., 2017). Another survey by 
Deloitte in 2013 revealed that 78% of IT managers considered that a lack of trust in 
security was the most significant barrier to the adoption of cloud technologies. In 
another survey by KPMG in 2014, it was shown that security and data privacy were 
identified to be of higher concern than cost when adopting a cloud solution (Shirazi et 
al., 2017). Therefore, it is necessary to have a security mechanism or risk management 
standard which addresses these potential risks within the cloud environment. 
 
2.5.5  Summary of Risks  
 
A summary of management, technical, legal and security risks is presented in 
Table-2-3. The table illustrates the risk description, impact, likelihood, 
countermeasures as well as the relevance and importance of each risk to the Omani 
context. 
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No Risk 
Type 
Risk Description Impact  Likelihood  Risk mitigation  How important this risk is to the 
healthcare context in Oman  
1 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Employee resist change to use 
new information technology (Lian 
et al., 2014; Alkhater et al., 
2017)..  
 
 
High High Organisational:  
Government and senior 
management need to provide 
positive leadership and support for 
employees to accept cloud 
computing as a new service 
because it will encourage 
employees to embrace it as a new 
way of increasing the quality of 
work  
High – this risk has a significant role in the 
success or failure of a project. Healthcare 
organisations need to arrange awareness 
training workshops for employees to accept 
the change and gain benefits of the new 
service of information technology  
2 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
IS staff need to have sufficient 
knowledge, awareness and the 
required skills to adopt cloud 
computing (Lian et al., 2014). 
 
 
 
Medium Medium  Human Oriented:  
Arrange for training courses to 
provide enough knowledge of 
skills needed to deal with cloud 
computing  
Medium-  Ministry of Health (MoH) in 
Oman has launched cloud infrastructure to 
host the ministry’s website. MoH needs to 
provide a training course for IS staff to deal 
with cloud computing. The medical data is 
owned by a hospital, used by a doctor and 
custodian by other hospital. Thus the 
training courses are needed for data 
owners, custodians and users.  
3 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
 
Maintain privacy for genomic 
data especially with the blending 
of genomics with Internet 
technologies which are shared 
among the network (Chow-White 
et al., 2015). 
 
 
Medium Medium Technology:  
Provide Single Sign On to 
registered users.  
Low- It is critical to assure the privacy of 
patient data among shared network. 
However, the genomic data is not dealt 
with in Oman currently.  
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4 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Ensure IS infrastructure deliver 
the right quality of service. 
  
High High Organisational:  
Organisations need to operate the 
versatility across different 
environments; scaling to 
accommodate large data centres; 
automating to create self-managed 
environments; and integrating of 
non-cloud products into the cloud 
architecture  
(Joseph and Brown, 2017). 
 
Low -  In Oman there is Oman Data Park 
(ODP) and Information Technology 
Authority (ITA) who provide IS 
infrastructure, and smooth the transfer 
process. ODT and ITA act like data centre. 
According to Royal Decree, it is not 
allowed to hold data in a cloud outside 
Oman. Thus, risks of storing data abroad 
are low.  In addition, ODT and ITA are 
compliant with the data centre standard and 
properly accredited with ISO 20000 for IT 
service Management, ISO 27001 for 
information Security Management System.   
5 
M
an
ag
em
en
t Technology readiness, existence 
of the IT infrastructure and human 
resources (Alkhater et al., 2017) 
 
  
Medium Medium  Organisational:  
Organisations need to check their 
resources in terms of IT 
infrastructure and humans; 
whether they can be used to 
implement e-Gov cloud.   
Medium- this is risk relevant to Oman 
because we have the IT infrastructure 
However, human readiness is an issue in 
hospitals as there is a lack of local expertise 
of cloud infrastructure.   
6 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
High bandwidth and internet speed 
play an important role in an 
organisation’s decision to employ 
cloud services. 
High High Organisational  
Organisations need to have a 
robust technical infrastructure 
and the necessary technical 
skills to adopt new technical 
services.  
High- this is relevant to Oman as hospitals 
in the capital already have fibre -optic 
installed whereas as hospitals in the rural 
areas suffer from low connection speed. 
Thus, there is a need to enhance internet 
connection with suitable bandwidth to be 
able to accept the new technical service.   
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7 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
 
IS complexity and compatibility 
will affect IT adoption (Lin et al., 
2012 and Liu, 2011).  
For instance, migrates medical 
information system such as 
(PACS), (HIS) and (RIS) (Lian et 
al., 2014). 
 
 
 
High  High  Organisational:  
Organisations need to check the 
alignments of IT application 
systems to the cloud to check 
system compatibility in cloud. 
Having cloud computing 
compatibility with existing 
systems or applications in the 
hospital will help make the 
adoption of cloud computing 
technology feasible (Lian et al., 
2014),(Lin et al., 2012 and Liu, 
2011). 
 
High – because Oman depends on some 
abroad vendors there is risk of complexity 
between two venders. In addition, 
compatibility issues will raise as two 
different vendors systems might not be 
compatible with each other. In addition, 
Oman has shortage in the in-house experts 
who are needed to deal with medical 
information systems such as PACS, HIS 
and RIS. 
8 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Losing control of a system’s 
infrastructure  
Medium Medium  Organisational:  
Before the adoption process, 
administrator can identify the 
system support in the service level 
agreement (SLA). 
Low-  it depends on the package that the 
ministry will choose (a service or 
infrastructure ) as there are different plans 
suggested to each customer according to 
their needs. Those services are provided in 
Oman through Oman data Park (ODP) and 
Information Technology Authority 
(ITA).Thus, it depends on the requirement 
and facilities that MoH needs.   
 
Discussed further in Chapter 6 
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9 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Costs of the new IT investment 
play a significant role (Lian et al., 
2014). 
  
Low Low Organisational:  
Cloud Provider need to calculate 
the operation costs as adopting 
cloud computing requires different 
types of investment in such areas 
as hardware, software and system 
integration. The cost can be 
enormous due to the variable 
nature of the expenses (Lian et al., 
2014). 
 
Not relevant to MoH because its main 
concern will be on uploading and accessing 
the medical data whereas Cloud Providers 
(ODP and ITA) are responsible for 
calculating the costs.  
10 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Interoperation of healthcare 
systems such as maintaining HL7 
in cloud-based environment (Jin 
and Chen, 2015; Lubamba and 
Bagula, 2017; Medical White 
Paper, 2018).  
 
High  High  Technology:   
Use cloud middleware to ease 
interoperability issues. 
 Because of the limits of 
interoperability and security, no 
single vendor can provide a 
comprehensive, dominant solution 
serving both hospitals and smaller 
outpatient clinics (Jin and Chen, 
2015).  
 
High – Healthcare in Oman currently uses 
the ICD system to record patients’ 
diagnoses and send ICD messages using 
the local cloud provider; on the other hand, 
global hospitals use HL7 to communicate 
with other healthcare providers. Thus there 
is a risk of interoperability issues between 
Oman healthcare and international 
healthcare providers which can affect the 
availability of records. 
 
Discussed further in Chapter 6 
 
11 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Risks of new technologies such as 
IoT and mobile combined with 
cloud (Lubamba and Bagula, 
2017).  
 
Low  Low  Technical:  
Infrastructure to support the 
impeded system for IoT. 
 
Organisational: 
Those risks need to be added to 
risk register. 
Low- not relevant currently because IoT 
not implement yet. However, there is a 
need for Oman to revise the risk 
management approach once they adopt IoT. 
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12 
L
eg
al
 
 
Risk from changes of jurisdiction 
because the Legal and regulatory 
framework of where data is held 
tends to change according to rules 
and regulation within the 
custodians’ country 
(Berry & Reisman, 2012). 
 
 
High  High  Legal: 
cloud customers need to be fully 
aware of the rules regarding where 
their data is held (Berry and 
Reisman, 2012). 
Low- in Oman Cloud provider (ODP and 
ITA) hold all the data centrally according 
to Royal Degree.  
13 
L
eg
al
 
IT outsourcing is significant as 
transferring health data among 
various legal and regulatory 
jurisdictions is absolutely critical 
and requires a deep understanding 
of cloud outsourcing contracts 
(Iyer & Henderson, 2012). 
Regulations and compliance need 
to be considered (Seddona and 
Currie, 2013). 
 
High High Organisational:  
Provide high level of security with 
encryption to avoid any leakage 
during the transferring process.  
Low – in Oman is low because it stores 
data centrally. 
14 
L
eg
al
 
Address issues related to forensic 
and investigation shortcomings in 
cloud as well as lack of legal, 
judicial requirements and laws 
(Shirazi et al., 2017). 
 
 
Medium Medium  Legal:   
Organisations need to consider 
when operating in cloud 
environments, especially in the 
healthcare domain. Rules and 
regulations need to be expanded to 
provide more comprehensive 
impact and expose data to higher 
level of risk in cloud environment 
(Shirazi et al., 2017). 
.  
Not relevant in Oman currently. In the 
future, if there is a case which requires 
exchange of data abroad then there is a gap 
the legal judicial laws which need to be 
updated according to the case adopted.  
 
Discussed further in Chapter 6 
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15 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Security and privacy of medical 
data from any threats or 
attacks are one of the main reasons 
that prevent many enterprises from 
employing cloud services 
(Seddona and Currie, 2013). 
 
Very 
high 
Medium  Organisation:  
There is a need to decide high 
level of protection in the SLA to 
avoid any medical data leakage 
Low-  storing the data centrally minimize a 
lot of risks. Also, ODP and ITA-cloud are 
responsible of managing the data.  
 
 
 
16 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Third-party storage servers are a 
target for hackers that may lead to 
a breach in the PHI (Li at al., 
2013). 
 
 
High  Medium Technical: 
Encrypt all medical records 
before outsourcing to the cloud 
(Li et al., 2013).  
Low- ODP and ITA- Cloud are 
experienced in data security.  The details 
can be specified as part of SLA 
17 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Data security encompasses issues 
related to confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of data. These 
should be ensured not only in an 
enterprise storage and cloud 
storage, but also between different 
cloud storage services (Shirazi et 
al., 2017). 
 
High High Human oriented: 
Transactional processes need to be 
carried out by security experts to 
make sure that there is no illegal 
activity 
High – it will be high in Oman because it is 
dealing with three objectives of patient 
data: confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability.  
 
 
 
18 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Loss of Encryption Keys: 
The loss or compromise of 
cryptographic keys used for 
encryption, authentication or 
digital signatures can lead to data 
loss, denial of services, or 
financial damages. 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Technical:  
There are various ways to restate 
keys. One alternative is through 
using PKI. This mechanism 
assures the activation of the key in 
a secured channel. Another 
alternative is via the usage of a 
mobile SIM card which enables a 
one-time password to be used in 
the activation process. 
Low as ODP and ITA-Cloud follow high 
security standards as ISO 20000 and ISO 
27000 which provide sense of assurance 
and security. However, if the risk happens 
with ODP and ITA-Cloud as they are 
service provider then the level of risk will 
change to be high 
 
 
Table-2-3 Summary of Risks 
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2.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter provided a background context related to the use of cloud computing in 
healthcare. It presented examples of using cloud computing in the healthcare industry. 
In addition, it emphasised the strategic importance of adopting cloud computing as a 
service through stating its benefits as well as performing a SWOT analysis for decision 
makers to consider prior to the adoption process.  
 
Reviewing the literature helped in identifying various types of risks in using cloud 
computing as a service. However, further work needed to be done to understand how 
those risks are relevant and important to the Omani context. Therefore, the importance 
and relevance of each risk were explored in detail.   
 
The next chapter will investigate stakeholders’ perception of risk in utilising cloud 
computing in the delivery of healthcare services in Oman. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss stakeholders’ perception of risk in utilising cloud computing 
in the delivery of healthcare services in Oman. It will present an overview of the 
healthcare process for primary care in health centres. It will also discuss future projects 
within the Ministry of Health (MoH, 2017).  
 
An overview of current cloud computing in Oman will be discussed as a potential 
service to overcome the current limitations of the healthcare systems in Oman. A 
mixed approach methodology was used; qualitative and quantitative methods were 
used for collecting data. A preliminary interview with stakeholders was held and two 
sets of questionnaires were provided for public and healthcare professionals to 
understand their perception in adopting cloud computing as a service in healthcare. 
The Undersecretary of Planning Affairs in the Ministry of Health was interviewed to 
evaluate the findings of the questionnaires. The outcome emphasises the need to find 
an effective risk assessment methodology to overcome various risks identified. 
Finally, the findings will be reflected upon and recommendations for the Omani 
government in terms of areas for improvement will be provided.   
 
3.2 Healthcare in Oman 
 
The Ministry of Health (MoH) in Oman provides healthcare services to citizens and 
residents through various health care centres and hospitals. Existing information 
systems within hospitals and health centres are fragmented. For example, the existence 
of health records in different databases across healthcare establishments as well as the 
terminologies and codes used to define medical services such as diagnosis and 
radiology and laboratory investigations complicate efforts to achieve efficient and 
effective healthcare delivery. 
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The Ministry has spearheaded four initiatives to resolve the fragmentation of 
healthcare information systems. The first initiative is the Development of Smartphone 
Applications (DGIT), which involves the launching of several health-related mobile 
applications (apps), including “e-health portal” and “e-services” which allow for the 
searching of drug prices and pharmacies based on location, as well as managing 
hospital appointments and viewing medical records (MoH, 2017). The second 
initiative is Consolidating and Standardizing the Database of Diagnosis, Radiology 
and Laboratory Tests (CSDDRLT) to unify the different databases and standardise the 
identification codes to facilitate seamless communication between healthcare 
providers with the aim of reducing misinterpretations (MoH, 2017). The third 
initiative is Selection and Purchase of International Standards for Connecting 
Databases and Diagnostic Radiology and Laboratory Tests (SPISCDDRLT). Once 
terminologies and codes used in the diagnosis, radiology and laboratory databases 
have been standardized and consolidated in the CSDDRLT initiative, the 
terminologies and codes will be mapped to known coding standards system (e.g 
International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision, Clinical Modification  (ICD-
10-CM) to ensure that the healthcare information system is compliant with 
international norms and facilitating communication with healthcare providers outside 
Oman (MoH, 2017). The fourth initiative is Disaster Recovery (DR), which is 
designed to improve data availability when a particular data centre is not operational 
due to cyber attacks, natural disasters or other reasons (MoH, 2017).  
 
The Ministry has introduced Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud services hosted 
by the Government’s Information Technology Authority (ITA) (MoH, 2017). 
Building on the ITA’s IaaS cloud, Oman’s MoH implements the "Al-Shifa" project, 
where a patient can book and cancel a medical appointment online 24/7. Patients can 
also request their medical report and pay online before collecting the medical report 
in person. However, it appears that Oman’s MoH has not fully utilised the cloud 
platform in the delivery of healthcare services (MoH, 2017).   
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The current healthcare system in Oman is mainly non-cloud based and has short-
comings in many areas: (i) Oman’s current healthcare system does not adopt Health 
Level Seven (HL7) which represents an interoperation barrier to communicate with 
other countries. (ii) it does not support a patient-centric approach, (iii) it does not allow 
a patient to access his/her medical records online and, (iv) it does not facilitate the 
process of a patient seeking treatment from other healthcare providers (i.e. it does not 
enable information-sharing between healthcare providers). Therefore, patients do not 
have online access to health records outside the country even in situations that require 
urgent medical treatment (e.g. accidents during an overseas trip). Also, there is a 
significant number of expatriates (46%) in Oman. These expatriates may need to 
access their medical health records when they travel home. Currently, healthcare 
workers, such as medical practitioners, do not have access to a patient’s medical 
history stored within a different healthcare establishment, which can potentially result 
in fatal outcomes (e.g. a medical doctor is not aware whether the unconscious patient 
admitted to the emergency department is allergic to a particular medication or not).  
 
According to the National Centre for Statistics & Information in Oman (NCSI, 2017), 
the country’s population is 4, 558, 196 comprising 2, 490, 462 Omani citizens (54%) 
and 2, 114, 508 expatriates (46%), as of 13th April 2017. The Internet penetration rate 
in Oman is approximately 80% (3,646,557 users), but only 17, 000 users reportedly 
access health services online. 
 
Using cloud computing in healthcare (e.g. Cloud-based Electronic Health Records: 
CEHR) can bring many benefits to healthcare providers and patients, and address 
existing limitations in the conventional healthcare system.  
 
While the above discussed limitations can be addressed using a cloud-based solution 
such as CEHR, healthcare providers in Oman are hesitant to migrate to the cloud. 
Therefore, this research investigates how Omani stakeholders perceive cloud 
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computing and seeks to understand factors that affect cloud computing adoption for 
healthcare provision in Oman.  
 
3.3 Research Methodology  
 
Cloud computing is an emerging technology in Oman. Therefore, it is necessary to 
conduct an empirical study to collect further information to define the problem clearly. 
The research methodology used in this research is performed in six stages as shown in 
Figure 3-1. These are research problem identification, research aims, research 
questions, interviews, questionnaires and research evaluation. 
 
Figure 3-1 Research Methodology Stages 
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3.3.1. Research Problem: a literature review was conducted to understand cloud 
computing’s background and identify the key benefits of 
adopting cloud computing in healthcare delivery.   
3.3.2. Research Aim: the research aim was to “Understand the perception of risk in 
adopting cloud computing in the delivery of healthcare 
services”. 
3.3.3. Research Question: the main research question is “What are the factors 
preventing Oman from adopting cloud computing in the 
delivery of healthcare services?” 
3.3.4. Data Collection: a mixed approach was adopted using qualitative and 
quantitative methods for collecting data.  
Qualitative: semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven 
interviewees who were chosen based on their experience in 
healthcare provision in Oman. They were chosen as an orientation 
sample who have a general idea of using cloud computing in the 
delivery of healthcare services.  
 
Quantitative: two questionnaires were designed; the first was 
designed for the public end-users to determine their perception of 
security in terms of using cloud computing to deliver healthcare 
services. The second questionnaire was for healthcare professionals 
and managerial end-users to determine their perception of security 
when using cloud computing in the delivery of healthcare services, 
and their perceptions of organisational and environmental factors that 
may affect cloud computing adoption. This will be addressed further 
in section 3.6 . 
 
3.3.5. Research Validation: to validate the findings of the preliminary interviews and 
questionnaires and understand the primary security concerns 
from the decision-makers’ point of view, an interview with 
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H. Dr. Ali Talib Al Hinai, Undersecretary for Planning 
Affairs in Ministry of Health in Oman, was conducted.  
 
3.4 Data Collection: Qualitative Semi-structured Interviews  
 
The literature was carefully reviewed regarding the challenges that might prevent 
organisations from adopting cloud computing as a means of bringing about 
technological improvement in data centres and how IT is provisioned and used. Table 
3-1 provides justification for all parts of the interview questions. The full set of 
interview questions is available in Appendix A.1. In addition, Appendix A.2 provides 
a glossary of technical terms, which was provided for the interviewees. 
Items Justification 
Part 1: Meeting aim 
 
A short summary about the meeting aims 
and the research objectives is provided. 
Part 2: Role in the organisation  To understand the candidate’s role and 
responsibility within an organisation.  
Part 3: Management perspective To understand management’s attitude 
regarding adopting cloud computing as a 
service in healthcare in Oman and to 
understand management support and 
staff readiness to use cloud computing 
within their workplace.  
Part 4: Security (data storage, process, 
transfer, access control, procedure) 
To understand organisation’s security 
awareness of the security concerns in 
using cloud computing.  
Part 5: Privacy To understand non-disclosure and cloud 
provider access to stored data.  
Part 6: Technical understanding To understand organisation’s technical 
knowledge when cloud providers face 
technical issues preventing them from 
providing the service. 
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Part 7: Legal understanding To understand organisation’s awareness 
of legal requirements. 
Part 8: Risks not specific to cloud To understand organisation’s readiness 
to face risks not specific to cloud 
computing. 
Part 9: Further recommendations As cloud computing is an emerging 
technology in Oman, it is necessary to 
establish connections from experts in the 
field. 
Table 3-1 Justification of the Interview Questions 
 
Each interview lasted an average of 35 minutes. Table 3-2 presents the demographic 
details of each interviewee. The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed 
verbatim. Appendix A.3 to A.9 represent the interview transcript for the orientation 
sample. The transcripts were then analysed to identify the factors that influence the 
adoption of cloud computing in the delivery of healthcare services. In the semi-
structured interviews, a hypothetical case study was used to frame the discussion and 
obtain insights into the seven interviewees’ perceptions.  
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Participant Age 
Group 
Role Job 
Tenure 
Interview 
Format 
Questions 
asked 
CC01 35-49 Head of Genetics 
Department in 
Sultan Qaboos 
University 
More 
than 5 
years 
Face-to-
face 
Parts 
1,2,3,5 and 
9 
CC02 35-49 Associate Professor 
in Behavioral 
Medicine 
Department in 
Sultan Qaboos 
University 
More 
than 5 
years 
Face-to-
face 
Parts1,2,3,5 
and 9 
CC03 20-34 Manager of G-
Cloud project in 
Information 
Technology 
Authority 
More 
than 5 
years 
Face-to-
face 
All parts 
CC04 20-34 Director of eHealth 
in Ministry of 
Health in 
Department of 
Information 
Technology 
More 
than 5 
years 
Face-to-
face 
All parts 
CC05 20-34 Assistant Professor, 
Science College at 
Sultan Qaboos 
University 
1-5 
years 
Feedback 
via e-mail 
All parts 
CC06 35-49 Assistant Professor 
and healthcare 
consultant and 
manager 
More 
than 5 
years 
Feedback 
via e-mail 
All parts 
CC07 35-49 Consultant at 
Gartner 
More 
than 5 
years 
Feedback 
via e-mail 
All parts 
Table 3-2 Demographics of Interviewees 
 
3.5 Hypothetical Case Study 
 
The case study assumes that an Omani resident (either citizen or expatriate), say 
Patient A, suffers from a malignant head tumour and requires an urgent medical 
procedure to be carried out. For the medical procedure, say surgery, patient A decides 
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to travel to a foreign country, say Germany, to carry out the surgery because there is a 
lack of resources in Oman as only one hospital can perform those kinds of surgeries. 
Therefore, patients tend to travel to a foreign country if they are unable to schedule 
urgent surgery in a suitably short timescale. Patient A is unable to access the medical 
records stored in Oman’s healthcare establishments; thus, the hospital in Germany has 
to conduct various medical tests and procedures (e.g. x-ray examinations). Unless the 
patient remains in Germany after the surgery, collaboration and communications 
between the healthcare workers in both Germany and Oman will be required to provide 
seamless follow-up post-surgery care. This is currently not possible in the existing 
Omani healthcare system.  
 
3.5.1 Findings  
 
Interviewees were generally positive about utilising cloud computing in the delivery 
of healthcare services but a number of concerns were raised as presented in the 
remainder of this section.  
 
3.5.1.1 Human Factors  
 
Human factors include the attitude, perception and the willingness of (human) users 
in terms of accepting and adopting new technologies, and, as noted by the 
interviewees, there could be a range of reactions to any consumer technologies. For 
example, interviewee CC07 explained that resistance to change could be an inhibiting 
factor as, “Asking someone to give up part of their job is always difficult and human 
nature shows that a defensive position is often taken as people do not like change”. 
While enhancing the job with better technology represents an advantage for the 
organisation, losing control is another barrier which needs to be addressed. The system 
administrator will lose part of the control over their system when they move to cloud-
based one as they will not control where data is stored or processed. Although they 
can specify their preferences in the service level agreement, in satisfactory level, they 
will not have the same degree of control as they would in an ordinary legacy system. 
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The research findings also suggested the need to educate relevant stakeholders, such 
as those in the healthcare systems and governments, about the benefits of deploying 
cloud computing in the delivery of healthcare services (CC01, CC02, CC05, CC06, 
CC07). For example, interviewees CC05 and CC07 noted that, “Migrating partially 
to cloud computing will give medical team a chance to inspect the reality of what cloud 
can and cannot do” (CC05) and “Many departments welcome use of cloud based 
applications as they frequently offer more modern capabilities, frequent upgrades 
keeping the functionality current and they are not waiting on IT to deliver this” 
(CC07). 
 
In asking about the department reaction for migrating to a cloud service provider and 
how the level of access to their data will be different in the cloud compared with the 
current system, it was clear that there will be many challenges which need to be 
addressed. 
 
The IT professional skills need to be updated and refreshed to deal with the new 
services. The cloud computing services offer several advantages to IT professionals 
that can enhance their overall capabilities due to easy access to several expensive 
information technology enabled resources which would otherwise not be affordable in 
a traditional computing environment. Therefore, this can result in improved flexibility 
and efficiency leading to higher overall performance in the job. The superior benefits 
and inherent characteristics associated with perceived usefulness made cloud 
computing services more acceptable. Hence, service providers need to focus on 
designing cloud computing solutions that meet IT professionals' requirements for 
improving their productivity and performance (Sharma et al., 2016) 
 
In addition, IT professionals need to be aware of potential risks and challenges, so they 
will know how to act to reduce the anticipated challenges. One of the interviewees 
suggested that the government should consider, “Providing certification and workshop 
to understand workflow of cloud system to eliminate potential challenges such as 
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incompatibility issues, security and privacy issues, reliability issues, availability 
issues and network connectivity issues etc.” (CC06). 
 
It is also essential that all stakeholders (e.g. healthcare professionals and patients) have 
confidence and trust in the security of their data in the healthcare cloud network 
(CC04). 
 
3.5.1.2 Technological Factors 
 
Technological factors include risks relating to the underlying technologies, such as 
vulnerabilities in the cloud infrastructure that can be exploited by an attacker. Echoing 
findings from Lian et al. (2014), data confidentiality, integrity, availability and 
security are key concerns raised by the interviewees.  
 
According to CC01, CC02, the general consensus is that medical doctors support the 
migration of healthcare services to the cloud. However, they also reinforced the need 
to ensure confidentiality of patient medical information (e.g. medical history). This is 
not surprising as leakage of information, such as HIV-positive and mental illness, may 
jeopardise the patient’s employment and social status. For example, it was explained 
that, “…Because confidentiality is a crucial issue. Patient care is different from other 
cases. Some people do not like others to know their condition or their diagnosis of 
certain disease because of social stigma or something like that as it can affect their 
work and social states in the community. So this should be considered crucial 
actually.” (CC02) 
 
One of the key benefits of migrating healthcare services to cloud computing is to 
maximise the provision of healthcare services to patients and reduce inefficiencies. 
Another potential benefit is increased research collaboration and information sharing 
with other healthcare researchers, such as the scenarios raised in the hypothetical case 
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study. Similar sentiments were shared by CC01 and CC02. For example, it was noted 
that: 
“...the security for the patient’s secrets and states should be kept confidential. But it 
is a good idea to communicate with other colleagues in other hospitals and other 
countries.  To exchange idea and opinion about certain conditions and cases.” 
(CC02) 
 
From CC02’s comments, a paradox of confidentiality and availability arise. On the 
one hand, there is a need to have patient records available for other colleagues to 
exchange ideas. On the other hand, anonymisation and information partitioning are 
important to maintain the privacy and confidentiality of a patient’s file. According to 
Sahi et al. (2018), data confidentiality and privacy are somewhat similar, since 
hypothetically, no one is supposed to see the data. Once data securely arrives at the 
core network, its protection, privacy preservation, processing, and proper distribution 
takes place. Access control, user anonymity, and other privacy preservation 
requirements need to be met. At this point, a distinction is made between those who 
are allowed access to health records and those who are not. In addition, a distinction 
arises between who is allowed to see patient-centric information (name, ID number, 
etc.) and who is allowed to see healthcare centric information (Protected Health 
Information) (Sahi et al., 2018).  
 
Interviewees (CC01, CC02) also remarked that it is important for prospective 
healthcare cloud providers to ensure data-at-rest encryption, data portability, data 
integrity and backup. Data backup is particularly important, for example, during times 
of natural disaster, as it helps to ensure that medical doctors and other allied health 
workers have access to patient and other crucial information when their own system 
is down. One of the interviewees, however, raised concerns that a data recovery plan 
may not be provided by-default: 
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“They have to come with the first request: what they want. If you are ministry X, then 
you would know you need a backup. You would know any cluster environment. And 
you are probably looking for Data Recovery service. So you put that as requirement 
as it does not come as default so you’ve got them all.”(CC03) 
 
One interviewee (CC03) explained that Oman’s Information Technology Authority 
(ITA) adopts the International Information Security Standard (ISO 27001), and 
explained that there are concerns about the data being hosted in overseas cloud servers: 
“..at this point we do not have data outside. It is all in Oman 
because of security promising it should be in Oman. As I said at 
the beginning we have to follow the government security rule that 
information security rules released in 2013. But it been released 
by our security advisor division in ITA.” (CC03) 
 
According to Oman policies, Oman prohibits hosting any kind of data for the 
government sector in public Clouds (Microsoft, Google, or any free or commercial 
cloud service existing outside Oman). However, there are various partners providing 
such services in Oman, for example (Oman Data Park (ODP) and Information 
Technology Authority- G-Cloud (ITA G-Cloud), or other private partners existing in 
Oman. The data are stored in the cloud based on the service type and requirements of 
the customers whether they are requesting IaaS (Infrastructure-as-a-Service), PaaS 
(Platform-as-a-Service) or SaaS (Software-as-a-Service). However, to maintain 
confidentiality, integrity and availability in cloud services, there should be NDA (Non-
Disclosure Agreement) form signed between two parties (service owner & service 
requester) to reserve rights at both ends. 
 
 In terms of the backups, whether stored in Oman or abroad, a representative from ITA 
(Information Security Department) team responded thus: “Backups are all maintained 
in Oman too as long as confidentiality of data should be kept in a secure zone and 
unreachable by unauthorized entities. They believe maintaining backups for any 
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country shouldn’t be externally because this shall threat the data integrity, 
confidentiality and availability. Maintaining the data policy during natural disaster 
might be exist in Ministry of National Economy (MoNE) because they are handling 
backup side so whatever is implemented there, it will be under their responsibility”. 
 
Another interviewee (CC06) also emphasised the importance of having in place sound 
data security measures, which are in compliance with the relevant standards.  
 
3.5.1.3 Organisational Factors 
 
Organisational factors include a range of organisational conditions, such as 
management support, organisational resources, and organisation culture. A number of 
interviewees noted that their organisations recognised that implementing healthcare 
cloud services in the country can provide benefits, such as scalability, cost-efficiency 
and enhanced healthcare services and enhanced quality of experiences (CC01, CC03, 
CC05, CC06): 
“Ah.. it’s fantastic idea and something that we will be moving to it in any way. We 
can’t avoid it; technology is improving at high speed and we are already moving to 
it in other fields and areas. And healthcare is also already moving to it.” (CC01) 
“I do agree about that this will be defiantly a big jump in terms of 
quality in healthcare in Oman in terms of benefits and adequate 
resources.” (CC03) 
 “Migrating healthcare services to clouds becomes more and more  
attractive IT option to cut costs, support on-demand provisioning, 
diversify infrastructures, and obtain higher levels of flexibility and 
security.” (CC05) 
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3.5.1.4 Environmental Factors 
 
A number of interviewees cited the timeliness of introducing cloud services to the 
delivery of healthcare services, due to the interest of the government. For example, 
one interviewee (CC04) mentioned the Al Shifa project. This project seeks to 
implement an electronic service that allows a user to access his/her medical record 
through the ministry portal (www.moh.gov.om), which is hosted within G-Cloud: 
“We are not providing eHealth services in terms of health services. We are providing 
e-services in terms of just communicating with health establishment. To request an 
appointment or can cancel an appointment or reschedule an appointment. We do not 
store the medical records of a patient online.” (CC04). 
 
The interviewee also cited other ongoing government initiatives in this area by using 
Al Shifa project. Al Shifa project can gather all fragmented patient health records in 
one place. It does not store patient medical records online, but it facilitates ease of 
access to patient records within different health establishments:  
“The ID card does not store the medical history. It is read from Archive of health 
information system through the portal. And it read chart by chart it doesn’t read a 
combination of both records so far. Because still did not unified the patient record. 
We will be doing in stages later.” (CC04) 
 
The ID card represents the civil identification number which all citizens and residents 
are required to have whenever they visit the health centre for medical treatment. 
Therefore, it is a unique identification per person and no one will have the same 
number. 
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A summary of the interviews’ findings is presented in Table 3-3 according to the 
factors, opportunities, challenges and sources from the interviews.  
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Factors Opportunities 
 
Challenges Source from 
Interview 
Human Save a lot of time to take care of the patient’s 
health. 
Medical teams tend to resist change and new information 
technology. 
CC05,CC06  
CC07 
Increase research collaboration with other 
researchers in a similar field of the patient’s 
case or treatment plan. 
Both healthcare professionals and patients must trust the cloud 
network security to protect personal data for it to work. 
CC05 , 
CC06 ,CC07 
Give medical teams a chance to inspect the 
reality of what cloud can and cannot do. 
Medical doctors support migrating healthcare services to cloud 
computing subject to the confidentiality and integrity of patients’ 
data. 
CC02, CC05 
CC06,CC07 
Technology Speed up the treatment plan for patients due to 
the secure connection and data availability.  
 
Medical teams place emphasis on the availability of medical 
information during any natural disaster that might occur.  
CC01,CC02 
Having access to the right medical information and information 
belonging to the right patient. 
CC01,CC02 
Data in the cloud will be stored locally in 
Oman. 
 
Data security and confidentiality are  of a primary concern. 
 
CC01,CC02, 
CC03 
Users must use strong passwords and authentication measures. CC01,CC02, 
CC03 
Cloud providers should provide backup, encrypt data, make it 
portable and provide data integrity. 
CC01, CC02 
CC03 
The cloud provider must ensure data security measures to prevent 
unauthorized access, and protect accurate and reliable patient 
data. It should assure availability, confidentiality, and integrity of 
CC01,CC02, 
CC03 
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electronic protected health information through a series of 
administrative, physical and technical safeguards. 
Organisational Cloud computing quickly brings in whole 
economies of scale with most cloud services 
providers charging on a pay as you go basis, 
thereby eliminating wastage of unused 
resources. 
Will top management support cloud computing migration? CC01,CC03, 
CC05, CC06 
Achieve scalability, cost-efficiency, and higher 
performing healthcare services. 
Are there adequate resources to migrate healthcare services to 
cloud computing? 
CC01,CC03, 
CC05 ,CC06 
Educating and training medical teams about 
cloud benefits. 
Will the perceived benefits of utilizing cloud computing reduce 
operating costs in healthcare? 
CC05 ,CC06 
Provide certification and workshops to 
understand the workflow of the cloud system to 
eliminate potential challenges such as 
incompatibility issues, security and privacy 
issues, reliability issues, availability issues and 
network connectivity issues.  
CC05 ,CC06 
Environment Having unified medical records as one of the 
government policies.  
Medical/clinical data are not hosted in the government cloud. CC04 
Table 3-3 Summary of Interviews Findings 
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The interviews’ findings reveal that there is a positive attitude regarding the benefits 
of using cloud computing but there are various risk factors; human, technology, 
organisation and environment, that need to be investigated further. The next task is to 
conduct a detailed questionnaire for public and healthcare professionals/managers to 
identify stakeholders’ perceptions regarding these risk factors. 
 
3.6 Data Collection: Quantitative - Creating Questionnaires 
 
To determine perception and/or concerns of the public and healthcare professionals in 
utilizing cloud computing for healthcare services, two sets of questionnaires were 
created for the public in Appendix B.2 and health care professionals in Appendix B.3. 
Both questionnaires are written in English and Arabic. The steps- from one to seven- 
explain the processes carried out in creating both questionnaires. Table 3-4 presents 
the justification for each part.  
Step 1: A brief introduction about the researcher (i.e. researcher’s name, university 
name) and the length of the questionnaire with the expected time is given. In 
addition, a short definition of cloud computing is included.  
Step 2: Explains the objectives of the research.  
Step 3: Confidentiality and privacy guarantee was essential to obtain participant 
trust and clarify that their opinion will be utilized for academic research only.   
Step 4: The survey started with demographic questions to increase response rates 
and lower drop-out rates, as recommended by Teclaw et al. (2012). 
Step 5: After the demographic questions, the structure of the questionnaire 
proceeded with questions about the perception of adopting cloud computing 
services in the delivery of healthcare, as shown in Table 3-4. 
Step 6: Questions were underpinned with a review of the existing literature (ENISA, 
2012; Mxoli et al., 2014) to validate research aims and objectives for every 
concept.   
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Step 7: Finally, both questionnaires were translated from English to Arabic in order 
to improve the quality of response. Thus, the participants could view each 
statement in English and Arabic.    
 
Items Justification 
Part 1: Demographic questions To increase response rates and lower drop-out 
rates as recommended by Teclaw et al. (2012). 
Part 2: Yes/No questions about IT 
experience and cloud computing 
awareness 
To classify those who have IT experience and 
knowledge about cloud computing services. 
Part 3: Internet Based Services To recognise to what extent participants use 
internet-based services within their work or 
daily activities. 
Part 4: Human  To detect human readiness and willingness to 
use cloud computing in healthcare. Also, to 
view their perception of privacy.  
Part 5: Privacy To seek information about privacy perceptions 
regarding their personal details, credit card 
details and health records details. 
Part 6: Technology To understand participants’ perceptions and 
concerns about the use of cloud computing in 
the delivery of healthcare services 
(confidentiality, integrity, availability, data 
security, complex, compatibility and cost). 
Part 7: Organisational  
(for healthcare professionals only) 
To identify healthcare professionals’ 
perceptions in migrating healthcare services to 
cloud computing (regarding various issues such 
as relative advantage, top management support, 
adequate resource and benefits). 
Part 8: Environmental  
(for healthcare professionals only) 
To identify healthcare professionals' perceptions 
in terms of government policy and perceived 
technical competence. 
Table 3-4 Questionnaire Structure 
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The questionnaires designed to collect data for this research were divided into eight 
parts. The questions in each section had an alpha character and a numeric number, the 
former indicating which section (T=Technology; H=Human, P=Privacy, I=Internet 
Based Services, O=Organisational and E=Environmental) and the latter being a simple 
sequence.  
 
The questions were adopted from Lian et al. (2014), who investigated the critical 
factors that affected the decision to adopt cloud computing technology in developing 
countries, specifically in Taiwan's hospital. The questions used in Human, 
Technology, Organisational and Environmental parts are adopted in this research. 
 
In addition, Wijaya et al. (2014) discussed Indonesian awareness of health records 
stored in cloud computing through a survey. The survey conducted consisted of three 
components (hospital’s IT staff, patients who have an IT background, and patients 
who do not have an IT background). The Yes/No questions, Internet-based services 
and Privacy questions of Wijaya et al. (2014) were adopted in this research.  
 
Singh et al. (2014) used a survey to identify factors related to the organizational 
information security because technical solutions alone are not sufficient to address the 
information security challenge. It has been argued that organizations also need to 
consider the management aspects of information security. Hence, this research 
adopted ‘top management support’ for the organisational questions’ parts (the same 
questions are used by Lian et al. (2014)). 
 
Chang et al. (2007) investigated factors affecting the adoption of electronic signature 
in hospitals. They used a framework of Technology–Organization–Environment 
(TOE) in IS discipline for adopting an innovative technology and indicated the critical 
factors that affect the adoption decision. TOE is consistent with the theory of 
innovation adoption in technological characteristics and internal and external 
characteristics of the organization (Chang et al., (2007). In this research, the questions 
on the adequate resource and government policy were adopted from Lian et al. (2014). 
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Appendix B.1 provides a full justification of the main purpose of each question and 
adopted sources for each section. There were two questionnaires; Public questionnaire 
(Appendix B.2) which consisted of parts 1 to 6 and Healthcare professional 
questionnaire (Appendix B.3) which consisted of two extra parts: 7 and 8.  
 
Both questionnaires were created using Google Forms, which resulted in a URL link 
for each questionnaire. The URLs were then distributed through social network 
services (WhatsApp) on the 8th January 2016. WhatsApp was chosen because it is one 
of the most widely used instant messenger applications with more than one billion 
users (Rösler et al., 2018). It represents an important part of daily life to easily 
communicate with multiple participants at the same time via group chats on 
smartphones. It allows sharing of text messages and attachments, such as images or 
videos for both direct communication and group communication (Rösler et al., 2018). 
Although WhatsApp provides end-to-end encryptions, it has many security and 
privacy issues which need to be addressed. For instance, by using WhatsSpy tool, it is 
possible to track the online activity of every WhatsApp user around the world by 
continuous monitoring of the current online status. In addition, the user has no 
capability to change that setting, thus currently possessing no countermeasure against 
this form of tracking (Rottermanner et al., 2015). This research used WhatsApp as a 
distribution method to reach the maximum number of participants only. The 
participant followed a link which led to the questionnaire. They did not complete it in 
the WhatsApp itself. 
 
A brief description was provided for the participants stating which URL to use. For 
instance, the general public are eligible to participate in the Public questionnaire, 
Appendix B.2) and those who work in the healthcare are eligible to participate in the 
Healthcare professional questionnaire (Appendix B.3).  
 
In addition, the Office of the Advisor for Academic Affairs was contacted in order to 
obtain permission to distribute both questionnaires via official emails within Sultan 
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Qaboos University for students and staff as well as for Sultan Qaboos Hospital 
(Appendix B.4).  
 
Data collection concluded in June 2016.  According to Hair et al. (2010), a sample size 
should be 100 or more to obtain a loading factor of 0.5 in order to be considered as 
being of practical significance. Therefore, a kind reminder was sent out every two 
weeks to encourage participants to fill out the questionnaires. A total of 400 members 
of the public and 150 healthcare professionals participated in the survey. Appendix 
B.5 represents the demographic data of both sets of respondents.  
 
3.7 Data Analysis and Results 
 
3.7.1 Reliability and Validity 
 
The data was saved in Microsoft Excel, and coded before importing to IBM SPSS 
version 23 for statistical analysis. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was used to 
validate the developed dimensions in order to determine whether the sample was 
adequate. In addition, EFA can be used to examine the interrelationships between 
items, reduce their number, and form them into constructs (Hair et al., 2010). Hair et 
al. (2010) explained that even though a factor loading as low as 0.3 and 0.4 is 
acceptable, a loading factor value greater than 0.5 is essential for practical 
significance.  
 
Using EFA to analyse the responses to questions in Parts 3, 4, 5 and 6 resulted in ten 
constructs (Appendix D.1) with new groupings for Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability with a factor loading of 0.928. The Internet-Based Services were 
segregated into three groups, namely: Internet Based Services with a factor loading of 
0.681, Social Network with a factor loading of 0.500, and Business Network with a 
factor loading of 0.500. Similarly, Complexity and Cost were grouped together as one 
construct with a factor loading of 0.882. Data Security and Compatible remain in the 
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same construct, as suggested in the literature (Lian et al., 2014). A new construct was 
created, namely: Cloud Provider with a factor loading of 0.607. Table 3-5 presents the 
factor loading and sampling adequacy for each construct. As the measure of sampling 
adequacy of all constructs exceeded the minimum acceptable value of 0.5, it implies 
that variables under each construct are sufficiently inter-correlated.  
 
The reliability of EFA was measured by calculating Cronbach’s alpha, which is a 
reliability coefficient measure that ranges from 0 to 1. Cronbach’s alpha is calculated 
using the formula: 
ncorrelatioaverager
itemsofnumberNwhere
rN
rN
=
=
−+
=
)*)1(1(
.

 
 
For a variable to be considered reliable, its Cronbach’s alpha must be above 0.7 
although a value between 0.6 and 0.7 is acceptable in a preliminary study (Hair et al., 
2010; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). As observed from Table 3-5, most of the 
constructs were considered reliable since their Cronbach’s alpha values range from 
0.607 to 0.946. Social Network and Compatible constructs were removed since their 
values were below 0.6. Appendix B.6 presents the rotated component matrix for public 
and healthcare professionals.  
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No Construct Item Factor 
loading 
Sampling 
Adequacy 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
(α) 
1 Data Security T14 0.595  
0.955 
 
0.946 2 T15 0.739 
3 T16 0.730 
4 T17 0.809 
5 T18 0.841 
6 T19 0.867 
7 T20 0.862 
8 T21 0.777 
9 T22 0.796 
10 T23 0.806 
11 T24 0.644 
12 Confidentiality, 
Integrity, Availability  
T3 0.592 0.928 0.919 
13 T4 0.670 
14 T5 0.766 
15 T6 0.750 
16 T7 0.753 
17 T8 0.838 
18 T9 0.788 
19 T10 0.797 
20 T11 0.741 
21 T12 0.630 
22 Complex & Cost T25 0.635 0.882 0.897 
23 T26 0.636 
24 T27 0.611 
25 T28 0.638 
26 T29 0.556 
27 T33 0.652 
28 T34 0.657 
29 T35 0.654 
30 Internet Based 
Services 
I4 0.626 0.681 0.686 
31 I5 0.598 
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32 I7 0.713 
33 P4 0.658 
34 Privacy P1 0.791 0.689 0.681 
35 P2 0.813 
36 P3 0.564 
37 P5 0.652 
38 Business Network I6 0.734 0.500 0.718 
39 I8 0.735 
40 I2 0.609 
41 Human  H2 0.725 0.500 0.725 
42 H3 0.650 
43 Cloud Provider T1 0.610 0.500 0.607 
44 T2 0.628 
Note: * Cronbach’s alpha level α ≥ 0.9 is considered to be an excellent indicator of internal consistency 
** Cronbach’s alpha level 0.7 ≤ α < 0.9 is considered to be a good indicator of internal consistency 
*** Cronbach’s alpha level 0.6 ≤ α < 0.7 is considered to be an acceptable indicator of internal 
consistency (Choo  et al., 2015) 
 
Table 3-5 Factor loading and Cronbach’s Alpha for Public and Healthcare Professionals 
 
The findings from the analysis of the healthcare professionals’ data for parts 7 and 8 
are presented in Table 3-6. Constructs with a factor loading of less than 0.6 were 
removed. Initial groups mostly remained the same with the exception of the 
environmental factors as two items were excluded. Appendix B.7 represents the 
rotated components for healthcare professionals.  
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No Construct Item Factor 
loading 
Sampling 
Adequacy 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
(α) 
48 Benefits O12 0.783 0.923 0.953 
49 O13 0.739 
50 O14 0.825 
51 O15 0.813 
52 O16 0.742 
53 O17 0.788 
54 O18 0.832 
55 O19 0.789 
56 O20 0.701 
57 Gov. Policy E1 0.628 0.821 0.876 
58 E4 0.710 
59 E5 0.746 
60 E6 0.773 
61 Adequate Resource O8 0.563 0.753 0.837 
62 O9 0.636 
63 O10 0.561 
64 O11 0.507 
65 Top Management 
Support 
O4 0.708 0.826 0.898 
66 O5 0.766 
67 O6 0.785 
68 O7 0.765 
69 Relative Advantage O1 0.810 0.756 0.913 
70 O2 0.811 
71 O3 0.818 
Table 3-6 Factor loading and Cronbach’s Alpha for Healthcare Professionals 
 
Four academics were consulted to independently verify that the techniques were 
applied appropriately and that the results were valid and reliable. The assistance of Dr. 
Asma Al Zidi and Dr. Sujeet Kumar Sharma from Sultan Qaboos University, Dr. K. 
Srinivasan from Higher College of Technology and Dr. Andreas Artemiou from 
Mathematics School at Cardiff University are acknowledged.  
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3.7.2 Radar Chart 
 
Radar chart is one of the most widely used methods for evaluation (Shaojie et al., 
2017). The most distinct characteristic of radar chart is its intuitive visualization 
through which the status of the evaluated object can be displayed intuitively (Shaojie 
et al., 2017). The author selected the radar chart to visualise the perceptions of the 
public and healthcare professionals regarding each statement via numerical 
proportions.   
 
3.7.2.1 Construct for Radar Chart  
 
Once the validity and reliability of the results were established, basic Excel analysis 
was conducted to identify the perceptions for all statements in each construct. 
Responses such as ‘not applicable’ and not answered responses for both surveys were 
excluded because the numbers were small (around 10% within public and 5% among 
professionals). Then, the percentage of agree (strongly agree + agree) against the 
percentage of disagree (strongly disagree + disagree) was compared. The remaining 
percentage relates to those responses that neither agreed nor disagreed, but these are 
not shown in the table (Appendix B.8 for Public and healthcare professional common 
parts and Appendix B.9 for Healthcare professionals).  Radar figures were used to 
present the results for each construct. For example, in Data Security construct, the 
radar chart ( Figure 3-2 ) includes all questions loaded based on SPSS analysis. Table 
3-7 represents the percentage response for Data Security.  
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Data Security Public % 
Agree 
Professional 
% Agree 
Public % 
Disagree 
Professional 
% Disagree 
T14: Cloud computing technology provides a 
secure channel for transferring medical data 
across different sites.   
56 69 14 12 
T15: When using cloud-computing technology, 
there is a risk of your medical data being stolen. 
50 45 23 30 
T16: You do not think it is safe to use cloud-
computing technology in healthcare because of 
security concerns. 
43 44 29 26 
T17: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is a significant risk of data loss. 
45 44 32 27 
T18: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data being misused by 
the cloud computing provider. 
53 59 19 22 
T19: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of unauthorized data 
access. 
65 62 18 21 
T20: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of unauthorised data 
manipulation i.e. data fraud. 
60 51 20 27 
T21: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data exposure to other 
users of the cloud service. 
61 57 19 24 
T22: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of losing control over 
data location. 
55 53 21 29 
T23: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data theft via external 
attacks such as hacking. 
68 61 11 16 
T24: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data being accessed by 
government departments outside of healthcare. 
60 55 23 25 
Table 3-7 Sample of Response Percentage for Data Security Construct 
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3.7.2.2 Analysis of Data Security Construct  
 
In the Data Security Figure 3-2, T14 presents the potential readiness of the participants 
in terms of using cloud computing as a secure channel for transferring medical data 
across different sites. T15 to T24 present an agreement range of 43 to 68% from the 
public compared to 44 to 69% of professionals that implied high security concerns, 
which require mitigation and an approach to eliminate those concerns. There are 
differences regarding the concerns of professionals and the public in terms of 
percentages for higher concerns and lower concerns, but it highlights the similar 
highest concerns, such as data theft, unauthorised data access, data exposure to other 
users in the cloud, data being misused by the cloud provider and data being accessed 
by other governments outside of the healthcare domain. In addition, there are three 
low concern risks at a range of 43% for the public compared to 45% for professionals 
when using cloud computing in healthcare, such as stolen medical data, security 
concerns and significant data loss. 
 
 
Figure 3-2 Data Security 
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3.7.2.3 Analysis of Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability Construct  
 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability constructs in the radar chart include all 
questions from the questionnaire apart from T1, T2 and T13. By using Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA), T1 and T2 generate a new construct, namely Cloud 
Provider.T13 was dropped because its loading factor was below 0.5. As Figure 3-3 
shows, there is a mutual agreement between the public and professionals regarding the 
various security concerns in using cloud computing in the delivery of healthcare 
services. It demonstrates the willingness of the healthcare establishment in terms of 
best practices in relation to Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (C.I.A) in their 
current systems. The main role of C.I.A is to help manage data security issues by 
having the right policies within an organisation. It is clear from Figure 3-3 that there 
is a broad agreement between professionals (60% to 75%) and the public (63% to 
72%) about the security practices that need to be implemented in the healthcare 
system.  However, there is less agreement (13% of the public compared to 20% of 
professionals) regarding the security measures implemented in healthcare services as 
well as risk assessments within the current healthcare systems. This implies that there 
will be issues if they move to the cloud because there will be real risks which need to 
be addressed professionally.  Thus, it is necessary to ensure that a risk assessment plan 
is conducted within healthcare systems in terms of the data security being 
implemented. If there is no risk assessment conducted within the healthcare systems, 
then there will be challenges when moving to cloud-based systems.  
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Figure 3-3 Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
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The Complex and Cost Figure 3-4 reveals significant uncertainty among the public 
and healthcare professionals. For instance, professionals believe that the skills 
required to use cloud computing in healthcare are too complex for people to use.  
Hence, it can be seen as a threat which needs a mitigation approach. In contrast, the 
public perception is that they strongly disagree with the view that learning cloud 
computing is time consuming; rather they view it as an opportunity to improve 
healthcare services in Oman. Moreover, T34 presents interesting aspects as 
professionals are not sure that cloud computing is cost effective when utilized in 
healthcare services because the cost of maintaining cloud technology is higher than 
maintaining the current system. Hence, dealing with Complexity and Cost is an 
important issue that needs to be carefully considered.  
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Figure 3-4 Complex & Cost 
 
3.7.2.5 Analysis of Privacy Construct  
 
The Privacy Figure 3-5 shows the perceptions of the public and professionals and their 
intention to share their details online. Both strongly disagree (84% of the public and 
86% of professionals) with sharing their credit card details online as well as sharing 
their personal details. They are less resistant to share business details but they are ready 
to share their education details. Hence, it indicates the highest privacy concern 
regarding the sharing of their credit card details. 
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Figure 3-5 Privacy 
 
3.7.2.6 Analysis of Human Construct  
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Figure 3-6 Human 
 
3.7.2.7 Analysis of Compatible Construct  
 
As for the Compatibility Figure 3-7, healthcare professionals and the public have a 
mutual agreement (range of 47% to 60% for the public and 55% to 67% for 
professionals) that cloud computing is compatible with health care services, values 
and goals as well as the current infrastructure.  
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Figure 3-7 Compatible 
 
Radar charts were not created for Internet-based services, business networks and cloud 
providers as these hold insufficient responses with regards to validity and reliability. 
 
3.7.2.8 Analysis of Relative Advantage Construct (Healthcare 
Professional) 
 
The Relative Advantage Figure 3-8 reveals healthcare professionals’ positive (range 
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Figure 3-8 Relative Advantage 
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The Top Management Support Figure 3-9 interprets management support in an 
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Figure 3-9 Top Management Support 
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The Adequate Resource Figure 3-10 explicitly identifies healthcare professionals’ 
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Figure 3-10 Adequate Resource 
 
3.7.2.11 Analysis of Benefit Construct (Healthcare Professional) 
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Figure 3-11 Benefit 
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Figure 3-12  Environmental 
 
3.8 Research Validation  
 
The findings from the preliminary interviews and questionnaires illustrate the 
perceptions of risk within the Omani context. According to the interviews conducted, 
the main barriers for utilizing cloud computing in healthcare services are the 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of patients’ medical records, as stated by 
CC01 and CC02. In addition, the questionnaires findings highlighted the key concerns 
regarding Data Security as well as Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Complex 
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out that MoH used cloud computing as infrastructure as a service by hosting the 
ministry’s website in the cloud. The online system provided various services to 
patients but in different phases. For example, services included applying for tender or 
discharged summary and allowing patients to book and cancel appointments. 
However, a patient cannot view his/her medical record online for security concerns. 
He strongly emphasised the need for a high security mechanism to release patient 
records: “…There is a need for organized security mechanism which permits viewing 
patient record online. In UK it is not allowed for patient to view their medical records 
online. In U.S it is not allowed too but in Canada patient can have access to his 
medical records online”. In addition, he highlighted the importance of rules and 
regulations in each country which control privacy regulations when it comes to 
disclosure of patient records: “…. Each country differs than other country according 
to rules and regulations. With us here in Oman, it is not allowed to view patient 
medical records except for authorized people”.  
 
In addition, H.Dr. Ali Al Hinai pointed out that access control is restricted among 
hospital staff according to their role and job responsibilities: “Clinical pharmacy 
cannot view all patient records, and administrator staff cannot view patient records. 
Each staff according to their roles and responsibilities. The only person can view 
patient medical record is the consultant if the patient under his name of treatment 
people. He can view the treatment plan for the patient, any surgical conducted and 
medication. However, the consultant cannot view the administrative work such as 
budget for the hospital or any financial issues”. 
 
A hypothetical scenario was provided of a woman from Germany going to the U.S to 
attend a conference but her taxi was hit by another car. She was unconscious in the 
emergency unit. The doctors prescribe a medicine she is allergic to. Luckily, the 
doctors are able to access her smartphone, which indicates her medical history; the 
doctors changed the medicine which could have killed her. 
 
H.Dr. Ali, comments, “there is a different to put medical records online or to put it in 
cloud. The risk is too high in cloud. Using Al Shifa system there is an internal server 
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in ministry of health. The risk will be internal but when you put it in cloud there will 
be external risks from hackers from anywhere. It is fine to provide services online to 
book or cancel appointment even if it hacked by someone it is not major concerns. But 
having patient file is top secret. If you put patient file in cloud there is high risk of it 
being hacked. The cloud provides good services except for patient file”. 
 
He also mentions Al Shifa software: “Al Shifa provide different services for citizens 
and residents excluding patient medical records. Currently the citizens and residents 
can use their ID card to give hospital or health centre authority to view his medical 
record when he need treatment. At later stage there will be central database which 
unify patient file in one place”.  He refers to one of the future projects discussed in 
section 3.2 (Consolidating and Standardizing the Database of Diagnosis, Radiology 
and Laboratory Tests (CSDDRLT) within MoH to unify the different databases and 
standardise the identification codes to facilitate seamless communication between 
healthcare providers with the aim of reducing misinterpretations.   
 
H.Dr. Ali AlHinai was asked to rank the main security concerns regarding technology 
factors according to their importance when utilising cloud computing services in 
healthcare in the future.  The first were related to privacy and data security as he 
indicated. Second, he prioritised internet-based services followed by complexity and 
cost. The third concern was confidentiality, integrity and availability of patient 
medical records followed by provider control and business application and social 
network.  
 
3.9 Reflection on Results  
 
The results were considered from the preliminary interviews conducted with seven 
different stakeholders, the questionnaire feedback from 150 healthcare professionals, 
400 patients’ perceptions, Radar Chart and the interview with the Undersecretary for 
Planning Affairs in MoH. Several important points were identified. 
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The questions statements for public and healthcare professional’s questionnaires were 
adopted from Lian et al., (2014) which investigated the critical factors that affected 
the decision to adopt cloud computing technology in a Taiwan hospital. Wijaya et al. 
(2014) discussed Indonesian awareness of health records stored in cloud computing 
and it was interesting to find out the responses based on the user’s IT background and 
those who do not have the IT background through Yes/No questions. In addition, the 
Internet based services and privacy questions statements were adopted. Since technical 
solution alone was not sufficient ,Singh et al., (2014) and Chang et al., (2007) 
investigated the organisational factors which can affect information security The 
questions statement for top-management-support, adequate resources and government 
policy was used in Lian et al. (2014) research. The reliability and validity of questions 
were checked through factor loading and Cronbach’s Alpha. As a result of this process, 
some of the questions were dropped.  
 
The results demonstrated readiness to utilize cloud computing as a service in 
healthcare but showed an awareness of a range of threats that will require a mitigation 
approach to address. In addition, the results focused on the need to plan and implement 
security measures as well as conducting risk assessments to avoid any loss of 
information. Having the risk assessment implemented on a regular basis will help 
healthcare establishments to mitigate risks when moving to the cloud-based system. 
Moreover, Complexity and Cost concerns illustrated an important aspect to deal with 
the skills and time limits required to use cloud computing and learn how to benefit 
from cloud services within healthcare respectively. In addition, the findings 
highlighted that cloud is viewed by stakeholders as cost effective when maintaining it 
compared to the current system. 
 
The Data Security radar chart and the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability chart 
clearly shows that the public and healthcare professionals are in mutual agreement 
about the security issues on what to agree and disagree on. A paradox arises between 
'privacy and security' and 'confidentiality, integrity and availability'. In e-healthcare, 
conditions of confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, non-repudiation 
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and others need to be met. Without this privacy, it will not be possible to gain patient 
trust in the system. On the other hand, sharing medical records between healthcare 
practitioners requires access to patient records online. Therefore, a distinction is made 
between those who are allowed to access health records and those who are not (Sahi 
et al., 2018). 
 
In contrast, it is hard to identify stakeholders’ perceptions in the Complex and Cost 
chart as it presents high uncertainty between what they agree and disagree on. 
Although the percentages are different, the shapes are similar among the agreements 
and disagreements. The professionals perceived learning cloud computing as being 
time-consuming. In addition, in T34, professionals observed maintaining cloud 
computing as being costly compared to 20 percent less among the public. Similarly, 
the Privacy chart shows a similar proportion regarding the agreement and 
disagreement issues among the public and healthcare professionals. It was surprising 
to see that the public and healthcare professionals are less resistant to sharing their 
medical records compared to their credit card details. They both agree to sharing their 
education details online.   
 
Looking at the Human chart and Compatibility chart, there is a clear separation 
between agreement and disagreement, which indicates that the public and 
professionals agree on the same concerns. Therefore, based on the radar chart, there is 
a need for security measures to be considered as a high priority. There are different 
security threats, which require a methodology framework to help understanding how 
to address management threats, such as human readiness and senior management 
support.  
 
Although Information Technology Authority (ITA) follows the International standard 
of Information Security Management Systems (ISO 27000) security guidelines, the 
undersecretary did not approve hosting the patient medical records online, even if the 
hosting cloud is within Oman, due to security risk concerns.  
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The statistical information obtained from questionnaires presents a wide range of 
factors that affect cloud-computing adoption.  It provides an in-depth study of the 
perception of risks in healthcare when adopting the cloud. This is important as it 
provides the basis for other anticipated risks in the area that will require further 
investigation. Those factors can form the basis for other research within different 
fields, such as SMEs, Telecommunication and Education.  
 
Due to time constraints, this thesis will investigate the security risks as it is the main 
concern identified from the preliminary interviews with stakeholders, questionnaires 
and the interview with the Undersecretary. Therefore, this thesis will focus on 
developing a risk assessment methodology that can address security threats. Other 
types of risks, such as managerial risks, top management support and employee 
readiness, can be addressed in future work. 
 
As a recommendation for the Omani government, this research highlights the need for 
training and awareness workshops for citizens and residents in order to raise awareness 
of security threats when utilising cloud computing services. Increasing the awareness 
level of security threats may reduce the security risks as individuals would be cautious 
of data breaches of their data. In addition, the cloud provider needs to be certified by 
the local government to gain customer trust through empowering the service level 
agreement and security service level agreement. 
 
3.10  Conclusion 
 
To understand the current situation in Oman regarding cloud computing usage, a 
mixed research methodology approach was used.  Six stages: research problem, 
research hypothesis, research questions, interview, questionnaire and validation were 
implemented. First, to identify the research problem, domain analysis on cloud 
computing background was carefully studied. The researcher was able to gain deep 
understanding of cloud computing benefits as well as anticipating various risks when 
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utilizing it in healthcare. Second, preliminary interviews helped to understand the 
current situation in Oman and enhanced the need to administer questionnaires for the 
public and healthcare professionals to understand their perceptions of security risks 
(Data Security, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Complexity, Cost, Privacy and 
Compatibility) when utilizing cloud computing in the delivery of healthcare services. 
The comprehensive statistical information obtained from these questionnaires 
provided a basis for further investigation within different industries, such as SMEs, 
Telecommunication and Education 
 
In order to validate the results obtained, an interview was conducted with H.Dr. Ali 
Talib Al Hinai, Undersecretary for Planning Affairs in Ministry of Health. The 
outcome supported the findings of the questionnaires and guaranteed the validity and 
accuracy of the respondents’ responses. Also, the interviewee highlighted the need for 
an effective security risk assessment methodology to overcome the identified security 
concerns. Hence, there is the need to have an effective risk framework methodology 
to address those risks. Although Information Technology Authority (ITA) follows 
International Standard for ISO 27000 to identify many security risks, it does not 
specifically address the healthcare domain.   
 
There is a need for an organisation to have an effective risk management approach to 
manage risks. If the organisation does not have a clear understanding of where risks 
are encountered, then there might be a problem related to not having awareness of 
risks. Organisations adopt risk management standards which provide assurance that 
the organisations are following those standards which provide techniques and 
procedures to manage the risks.  
 
Chapter 4 provides a review of the standards, methods and tools that are used to 
manage risks to understand strengths and limitations to move forward and provide a 
method which provides a shared understanding of risks.   
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Although there are international standards which help manage risks by providing a 
generic framework, the key limitation is that the standards themselves do not explore 
in sufficient detail how to visualise those risks. 
 
The next chapter will also discuss Business process modelling and will review 
methods that have been used to help visualise risks. 
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4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will present managing information security as the research problem. It will 
discuss the business context through ISO/IEC 38500 for Corporate Governance of 
Information Technology and Risk Management standard (ISO 31000) as it is widely used 
in managing risks. In addition, Managing Information Security (ISO 27000) and 
Information Security Risk Management (ISO 27005) will be discussed to understand the 
mechanism in managing information security risks. A critical analysis of the tools and 
techniques for each standard will be presented. Tools and techniques for managing risks 
in healthcare, such as Risk Register (RR), Operational Critical Threat and Vulnerability 
(OCTAVE) and Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA), will be explored. An 
analysis of those techniques based on the ISO 27005 stages was performed to identify 
their limitations as well as the most appropriate tool to use. The Risk Register was found 
to be the most appropriate. It is also widely used in healthcare despite the difficulty to 
visualise risks in a large risk register document.  
 
In addition, a review of Information Security will be presented as a major concern to 
address. The role of process modelling prospected in risk management framework will be 
considered. 
 
Business Process Modeling (BPM) is a widely used modelling technique, especially in 
healthcare, and will be used to model information security in healthcare processes. It was 
ascertained that to better understand the risks, it would be necessary to enhance the 
communication of risks in process modelling. To identify a solution for the problem, Risk 
Register and Business Process Model were combined. 
 
There is a need for an effective risk management approach that manages risks by 
providing visibility and shared understanding of risk. In this thesis, it is proposed that 
combining the Risk Register with Business Process Modeling (BPM) can be more 
effective in communicating the information security risks which will be addressed in 
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Chapter 5. The remainder of this chapter will explore BPM and highlight how BPM has 
been used to model security.  
 
4.2 Corporate Governance of Information Technology (ISO 38500) 
 
ISO/IEC 38500 is an international standard for Corporate governance of information 
technology published jointly by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (Mayer et al., 2015; Mahy et 
al., 2016). The objective of ISO/IEC 38500:2015 is to provide guiding principles for 
members of governing bodies of organizations (which can comprise owners, directors, 
partners, executive managers, or similar) on the effective, efficient, and acceptable use of 
information technology (IT) within their organizations (Mayer et al., 2015; Mahy et al., 
2016). It also provides guidance to those advising, informing, or assisting governing 
bodies (Mayer et al., 2015). The governance of IT is considered as a subset of 
organizational governance (or corporate governance). ISO/IEC 38500:2015 is applicable 
to all types of organizations (i.e. public and private companies, government entities, not-
for-profit organizations), whatever their size and regardless of the extent of their use of 
IT (Mayer et al., 2015).  
 
The primary advantage of the ISO/IEC 38500:2008 IT governance framework is its 
assurance that accountability is clearly assigned for all IT risks and activities. This 
specifically includes assigning and monitoring IT security responsibilities, strategies and 
behaviours so that appropriate measures and mechanisms are established for 
reporting and responding in relation to the current  and planned use of IT such as meeting 
the latest data protection requirements for encryption  of all portable devices such as 
laptops and memory sticks used to store and transmit personal data (Van Haren 
Publishing, 2018). 
 
However, there are two constraints of the ISO/IEC 38500:2008. 1) Outsourcing: some 
requirements are so specific to the managers of IT. That is these requirements cannot be 
imposed on the managers of the company if their IT is outsourced. In cases such as these, 
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the requirements will need to be secured in the contract with the supplier of IT services. 
2) Applying the standard in isolation: ISO 38500 is not ‘one size fits all’. It does not 
replace COBIT, ITIL, or other standards or frameworks, but rather it complements them 
by providing a demand-side-of-IT-use focus (Van Haren Publishing, 2018). 
 
The main tasks to be followed by IT governing bodies, represented in Figure 4-1, are: 1) 
Evaluating the current and future use of IT. 2) Directing preparation and implementation 
of strategies and policies to ensure that the use of IT meets the business objectives. 3) 
Monitoring conformance to policies, and performance against the strategies (Mayer et al., 
2015).  
 
 
Figure 4-1  Model for Governance of IT 
Source: (Mayer et al., 2015) 
 
As ISO 38500 covers governance of information technology which includes assigning 
and monitoring IT responsibilities, there is a need for a system that focuses on managing 
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risks. ISO 31000 for organisational risk management was introduced for organisational 
risk management, which will be explained further in the next section.   
 
 
4.3 Risk Management (ISO 31000) 
 
To understand the mechanism of managing the identified risks, risk management 
standards were carefully studied. Risk management standards set out a particular set of 
strategic processes that start with the general objectives and aims of an organisation. They 
help to identify risks and promote the mitigation of risks through the best practice.  Risk 
management standards are a guide to help ensure that risk management is carried out 
consistently. Standards usually include guidelines and examples to facilitate the 
compliance of organisations. They have been designed to facilitate the implementation of 
risk management processes. These standards contribute to providing an international 
consensus on how to deal with specific risks, and they offer advice on how to address 
them according the best practices in the field. Risk management standards help 
organisations to implement strategies that are tried, tested, and proven to work.  
 
Risk management is a fundamental concern in any organisation to manage uncertainty by 
identifying and understanding risk and modifying it where necessary. Some researchers 
consider risk management as a tool to avoid threats and identify opportunities (Spikin, 
2013). Lubka (2002) indicated that risk management acts as a way of helping the company 
to achieve its goals. The ISO 31000 Risk Management Standard has been widely used to 
help organisations to systematically and comprehensively manage diverse types of risk 
by offering a universal framework, “to assist the organisation to integrate risk 
management into its overall management system” (ISO, 2009a, p. 9).  Therefore, the ISO 
31000 standard provides guidance for making risk management central to the success of 
an organisation and for making it an integral part of critical processes such as planning, 
management and governance (Gjerdrum and Peter, 2011). Organizations are encouraged 
to adopt management models that consider the increasing diversity and complexity of 
risks (Lalonde and Boiral, 2012).  
 
According to the ISO 31000 standard, each organisation should identify all the risks 
concerning the organisation's objectives that are designed to achieve its mission. One of 
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the primary goals set out by the ISO 31000 standard is to continually improve risk 
management in organisations based on a generic model that is intended to adapt to a wide 
variety of risks (Lalonde and Boiral, 2012). Woody et al. (2006) identified risk 
management as the ongoing process involved in identifying, assessing and judging risks, 
taking actions to mitigate or anticipate them and monitoring and reviewing processes. 
Thus, performing risk management is considered as a vital tool to continuously observe 
damages and identify opportunities.  
 
Lalonde and Boiral (2012) suggest that risk management should be seen as a practice-
based approach; a strategy that managers do and not a strategy that managers have. In this 
regard, managers must question their assumptions regarding the implementation of such 
a standard taking into account the specificities of their internal and external organisational 
environment and remaining cautious in its monitoring. Also, Gordon et al. (2009) pointed 
out that instead of looking at risk management from a silo-based perspective, the trend is 
to take a holistic view of risk management. Hence, each organisation in various sectors 
(i.e. Health, Telecommunication, Transportation and Banks) has to design its risk 
management framework that includes practices, processes and resources that enable risk 
management.   
 
According to ISO 31000, risk management consists of three steps: (i) identification, (ii) 
assessment, and (iii) prioritisation of risks, that aims to minimise, monitor and control the 
probability and impact of unfortunate events (Lam et al., 2015). ISO 31000 risk 
management activities are based on the Plan-Do-Check-Act model. By using the PDCA 
model, the Plan phase will establish ISMS policy, objectives, processes and procedures 
relevant to managing risk and improving information security to deliver results under an 
organisation's overall strategies and goals. The Do phase will implement and operate the 
ISMS policy, controls, processes and procedures. The Check phase will assess and 
measure process performance against ISMS policy, objectives and practical experience 
and report the results to management for review. Finally, the Act phase will maintain and 
improve the ISMS by taking corrective and preventive actions based on the results of the 
internal ISMS audit and management review or other relevant information to achieve 
continual improvement of the ISMS.  
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The ISO 31000 provides guidelines but does not suggest specific procedures or metrics 
by which an entity should apply and/or measure risk management (Lalonde & Boiral, 
2012; Spink et al., 2016). Therefore, a methodology framework is needed to manage 
various types of risks within an organisation.   
 
 
Figure 4-2  Risk Management Perspectives 
Source: BS ISO 31100:2011 
 
ISO 31000 categorises activities into three risk management perspectives ( Figure 4-2) 
which are strategic, change and operational. The strategic aspects focus on the future 
direction of the organisation. Strategic risk is a process performed by senior management 
for identifying, assessing and managing risks and uncertainties. As an organisation 
attempts to achieve its strategic objectives, both internal and external events can create 
risks that prevent an organisation from achieving its objectives (Taylor, 2013). The future 
plan could be included in the strategic objectives’ level where activities to understand 
risks associated with entering new services are expanding the existing services through 
enhancements and mergers, enhancing infrastructure are highlighted (Taylor, 2013).  
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As for Change aspects, they focus on the process of turning a strategy into an action 
including projects and change management. Change management is an important part of 
every successful project. Project risk management focuses on opportunities and threats 
within a project. Risks associated with change are an outcome that causes 
a change whether that change has a benefit or an adverse effect on the running of a 
business. Each change made is a risk .  
 
Operational aspects include day-to-day operations including people, processes and 
information security. Operational risk management is defined as a continual cyclic 
process which includes risk assessment, risk decision-making, and implementation of risk 
controls. These should result in acceptance, mitigation, or avoidance of risk (Taylor, 
2013).   
 
ISO 31000 focuses on a system for managing organisational risks by providing guidelines 
for identifying the internal and external context. It provides a framework for managing 
all kinds of strategic change and operational risks on a company-wide level. However, 
ISO 31000 does not offer any specific advice about information security risk. Therefore, 
ISO 27000 is necessary for managing information security risks. ISO 31000 and ISO 
27000 are compliant with each other. ISO 27000 family of international standards focuses 
on managing information risk.  In addition, ISO 27005 is a standard that provides 
guidelines for information security risk assessment and treatment. It provides the 
knowledge to identify assets, threats and vulnerabilities to assess the consequences and 
probability and to calculate risk. Also, it is completely compliant with ISO 31000. ISO 
27000 and ISO 27005 will be explained further in the next section.  
 
4.4 Managing Information Security Risk (ISO 27000) 
 
Managing information security risks plays a significant part within any organisation or 
industry which needs to be managed professionally. The ISO/IEC 27000 series of 
standards are internationally recognised and broadly implemented Information Security 
(InfoSec) standards. The series were established by a joint committee of the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Electronic Commission 
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(IEC). They cover InfoSec management, InfoSec risk management, implementation of 
InfoSec Management Systems (ISMS), measurements and metrics of ISMS. 
 
In 2000, ISO adopted BS7799, which represent the standards that were published by the 
British Standard Institute in 1995 under the name ISO/IEC 17799. BS7799 was grounded 
on the Code of Practice for Information Security Management, which was established by 
the Department of Trade and Industry and was closely linked with leading UK 
organisations. In 2007, ISO/IEC 17799 was combined in the ISO/IEC 27000 series as the 
ISO/IEC 27002. The ISO 27001 contains the specifications for an information security 
management system (ISMS). The ISO 27002 outlines the code of practice for information 
security control for reducing risks; ISO 27003 details information on security 
management system implementation guidance; ISO 27004 covers information security 
system management measurement. The ISO 27005, however, presents a methodology 
independent ISO standard for information security risk management. 
 
According to ISO 27000, information security consists of “the policies, procedures, 
guidelines, and associated resources and activities, collectively managed by an 
organisation, in the pursuit of protecting its information assets. An ISMS is a systematic 
approach for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining 
and improving an organisation's information security to achieve business objectives. It is 
based upon a risk assessment and the organisation's risk acceptance levels designed to 
treat and manage risks effectively. Analysing requirements for the protection of 
information assets and applying appropriate controls to ensure the protection of these 
information assets, as required, contributes to the successful implementation of an ISMS” 
(ISO 27000: 2016). 
 
According to Humphreys (2008), ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 controls provide 
comprehensive coverage of the organisational requirements for managing risk across the 
business involving people, information, processes, services, IT and physical assets. The 
origins of the ISO27001 (BS ISO, 2005a) and 27002 (BS ISO, 2005b) standards were 
informed by the work of the UK DTI and BSI (Gillies, 2011). The ISO27001 standard 
provides a model for “establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, 
maintaining and improving an Information Security Management System (ISMS)” (ISO, 
2005a; Gillies, 2011). The ISO27000 series of standards have only been slowly adopted. 
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Evidence regarding the barriers to adoption suggests that the approach is overly 
complicated and costly for many small organisations (Gillies, 2011). Risk management 
is a significant element which an organisation needs to perform to guard its assets. If an 
organisation does not know the risks it faces, it will not be able to implement adequate 
protection. Humphreys (2007) emphasised that assessing risks includes identifying the 
assets. Once the risks have been determined, a risk register should be created to record 
these risks according to their severity as well as details of the risk type, the estimated 
impact and other information that will be useful to build up a risk profile for the 
organisation (Humphreys, 2008).   
 
Wright (1999) indicated that risk management is a process of establishing and 
maintaining information security within an organisation. The measure of risk assessment 
through information security risk assessment is considered effective when an organisation 
can respond appropriately and cost effectively to protect information. In 2001, Reid and 
Floyd devised the “risk analysis flow chart” and emphasised that an organisation should 
assess the threats and vulnerabilities of its information assets. The primary objective of 
any organisational control is to lower the risk to an acceptable level. Hence, joining risk 
assessment and risk control places information security risk at an acceptable level. 
 
An information security risk evaluation is part of an organisation's activities for managing 
information security risks. Alberts et al. (2003) pointed out that during the application of 
the Operational Critical Threat and Vulnerability (OCTAVE) approach, an analysis team 
identifies the organisation's information security risks, analyses the risks to determine 
priorities and plans the needed improvement by developing a protection strategy for both 
the organisational development and risk mitigation to reduce the risk of the organisation's 
critical assets. By using the OCTAVE approach, an organisation makes information 
protection decisions based on the expected risks of the organisation’s confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of vital information-related assets (Alberts et al., 2003). 
OCTAVE is an evaluation activity, not a continuous process. Thus, it has a defined 
beginning and end.  
 
According to Rukh and Malik (2017), ISO 27001 standard framework was applied to 
resource management in a real-world organisation. The results of this mapping show that 
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all clauses of ISO 27001 standard, except Clause 6, are fully applicable to resource 
management. Clause 6 is partially relevant due to information security-specific controls. 
These results suggest that an organisation can use ISO 27001 standard framework to 
improve performance and efficiency in other management areas if needed and to mature 
their process (Rukh and Malik, 2017).  
 
4.5 Information Security Risk Management (ISO 27005)  
 
Information Security Risk Management (ISO27005) defines risk management as 
“coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation with regard to risk” (p. 8) 
and describes the risk management process as ‘a continuous process of systematically 
identifying, analysing, treating, and monitoring risk throughout the life cycle of a product 
or service' (p. 8) (Alshaikh, 2014). ISO 27005 provides guidelines for an organisation to 
support the requirements of information security management (ISMS) according to ISO 
27001. ISO 27005 has been created to support ISO 27001 by providing more details on 
the concepts and methods behind the risk assessment process. It also provides four options 
for risk treatment namely: accept/retain the risk, avoid the risk by modifying or avoiding 
the planned activity that causes the risk, transfer the risk by insurance or by contracting 
out the risk, and reduce the risk by implementing a system of internal controls 
(Humphreys, 2008). However, it does not provide any particular method for information 
security risk management. It depends on the organisation to identify their approach to risk 
management according to their scope of ISMS. ISO 27005 applies to managers and staff 
involved with information security risk management within an organisation. As 
Stoneburner et al. (2002) and Whitman & Mattord (2010) emphasised, information 
security managers have the crucial responsibility for managing information security risk 
within an organisation by employing risk management practices (Alshaikh, 2014).  
 
According to a study conducted by Lisiak-Felicka and Szmit (2014), the main reasons for 
not implementing ISMS are lack of funds, lack of sufficient knowledge and lack of time. 
To achieve the successful implementation of ISMS, it is crucial to continue raising 
employees’ awareness at all levels of the organisation and facilitate their respective 
practical preparation (Lisiak-Felicka and Szmit, 2014).  
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Risk Management Standard (ISO 31000) and Information Security Risk Management 
(ISO 27005) complement each other. While ISO 31000 represents the organisational 
structure of the risk management process, the ISO 27005 is focused on information 
security risk management process, which is consisting of: context establishment, risk 
assessment, risk treatment, risk acceptance, risk communication and consultation, and 
risk monitoring and review. Figure 4-3 represents an illustration of the information 
security risk management process.   
 
 
Figure 4-3 Illustration of Information Security Risk Management Process 
 
As Figure 4-3 illustrates, information security risk management process can be iterative 
for risk assessment or risk treatment activities. An iterative approach to conduct risk 
evaluation can increase the depth and detail of the evaluation at each iteration. The 
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iterative approach provides the right balance between minimising the time and effort 
spent in identifying controls while still ensuring that high risks are appropriately assessed. 
 
In an ISMS, establishing the context, risk assessment, developing the risk treatment plan 
and risk acceptance are all part of the “Plan” phase. In the “Do” phase of the ISMS, the 
actions and controls required to reduce the risk to an acceptable level are implemented 
according to the risk treatment plan. In the “Check” phase of the ISMS, managers will 
determine the need for revisions of the risk assessment and risk treatment in light of 
incidents and changes in circumstances. In the “Act” phase, any actions required 
including an additional application of the information security risk management process 
are performed. Table 4-1 summarises the alignment of ISMS and Information Security 
Risk Management Process.   
 
 
Table 4-1 Alignment of ISMS and Information Security Risk Management Process 
 
 
This research focuses on the “Plan” phase, which looks at different ways of planning for 
managing risks. In establishing the context, it will collect all relevant information about 
the organisation to identify the scope and boundaries of information security risk 
management to ensure that this information is considered in the risk assessment. Also, 
the gathered information should identify the organisational environment it operates in as 
well as how relevant it is to the information security risk management process.   
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During risk assessment in the information security risk management process, there are 
internal processes such as risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. Risk 
identification will produce an output list of business processes to be risk-managed, a list 
of identified risk types and sources, a list of all existing and planned controls in their 
implementation and usage status and a list of incident scenarios with the consequences 
related to assets and business processes. Risk analysis will produce a list of assessed 
implications of an incident scenario concerning assets and impact criteria, the likelihood 
of incident scenarios (quantitative or qualitative) and a list of risks with the value levels 
assigned. Risk evaluation will produce a list of risks that are prioritised according to risk 
evaluation criteria regarding the incident scenarios that led to those risks.  
 
Risk treatment options should be selected based on the outcome of the risk assessment, 
the expected cost of implementing these options and the expected benefits from these 
choices. Figure 4-4 shows ISMS’ four options of risk treatment.   
 
 
Figure 4-4  Risk Treatment Option 
 
The four options of risk treatment are not equally exclusive. Sometimes the organisation 
can benefit significantly from a mixture of choices, such as reducing the likelihood of 
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risks, reducing their consequences, and sharing or retaining any remaining risks 
simultaneously. In practice, risk treatments can efficiently address more than one risk 
(e.g. information security training and awareness). A risk treatment plan should identify 
the priority order in which individual risk treatments should be applied and their 
timeframes (ISO 27005, 2011). 
 
4.6 Analysis of the Different ISO Standards and Methodologies  
 
There are many methodologies used to manage risk management. This section will 
provide an analysis of various standards; ISO 38500 for IT governance, organisational 
risk management methods based on ISO 31000 and an analysis of information security 
risk management methods based on ISO 27000 family of international standards. It will 
investigate the techniques these methods use to manage risks. A summary of each section 
is presented in a table which represents the name of the methods, how they are used, 
which ISO they are built on, advantages, limitations and which techniques they used to 
manage risks. 
 
4.6.1 ISO 38500 IT Governance  
 
Figure 4-5 presents the most common IT governance framework: Control Objectives for 
information and related technologies (COBIT) and how it aligns with other best practice 
frameworks, such as:  
• Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), which is based (ISO 
20000) on managing services in an organisation.  
• PRINCE2/PRINCE2 Agile, which is used to manage new projects at high level.  
• Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) is used as a reference for 
managing effectively.  
• The Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) is a process model that 
promotes behaviours that lead to improved performance. 
• The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) aids designing, planning, 
implementing, and governing an enterprise’s information technology 
architecture.  
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Figure 4-5  COBIT 5 For Risk of Other Standards and Framework 
Source ISACA website, COBIT 5 
 
COBIT 5 has several components that includes (ISACA, 2018): 
• Framework, organises IT governance objectives and good practices of the IT 
domains and processes, and links them to business requirements. 
• Process descriptions such as a reference process model and common language for 
everyone in an organization. The processes map shows responsibility areas related 
to planning, building, running and monitoring. 
• Control objectives provide a complete set of high-level requirements to be 
considered by management for effective control of each IT process. 
• Management guidelines help assign responsibility, agree on objectives, measure 
performance, and illustrate the interrelationship with other processes. 
• Maturity models assess maturity and capability per process and help to address 
gaps. 
Table 4-2 represents Governance framework method. 
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Name of 
Method 
Type of risk it 
manage  
What is it? Use Advantage Limitations Methods used for 
managing risks 
COBIT Governance 
framework  
  
 
 
COBIT (Control 
Objectives for 
Information and Related 
Technologies) is a good-
practice framework create
d by the International 
Professional Association 
ISACA for Information 
Technology (IT) 
Management and IT 
governance. 
The purpose of COBIT is to 
provide management and 
business process owners with 
an information technology (IT) 
governance model that helps 
in delivering value from IT 
and understanding and 
managing the risks associated 
with IT. 
 
It uses ISO  
38500  
It has two 
processes 
which cover 
the 
governance 
domain and 
management 
domain 
High level 
guidelines and risk 
management are 
embedded within 
its processes.  
COBIT 5 for risk (domain 
APO12 Manage Risks) 
provides more extensive 
guidance and includes areas 
that are not covered by ISO 
31000, such as IT risk 
governance and 
management.  
COBIT 5 for 
Risk addresses a 
comprehensive number of 
categories of IT risk, 
whereas ISO/IEC 27005 
focuses specifically on 
information security risk. 
(Astuti et al., 2017) 
Table 4-2  Governance Framework 
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4.6.2 Organisational Risk Management Methods  
 
Some of the common methods in organisational risk management will be presented with 
a brief explanation. A comparison between Control Objectives for information and related 
technologies (COBIT) and Information technology Infrastructure Library, PRINCE2 and 
PRINCE2 Agile is presented. Then, a discussion regarding which technique each of these 
methods used to manage risks is provided.  
 
COBIT and ITIL have been used by information technology professionals in IT Service 
Management (ITSM). When used together, COBIT and ITIL provide guidance for the 
governance and management of IT-related services in enterprises whether those services 
are provided in-house or obtained from third parties such as service providers or business 
partners (Năstase et al., 2009). 
 
ITIL could be seen as the way to manage the IT services across their lifecycle while 
COBIT is concerned with how to govern the enterprise’s IT in order to generate the 
maximum creation of value by the business, enabled by IT investments, while optimizing 
the risks and resources (Năstase et al., 2009). COBIT 5 describes the principles and 
enablers that support an enterprise in meeting stakeholders’ needs, specifically those 
related to the use of IT assets and resources across the whole enterprise. ITIL describes 
in more detail those parts of the enterprise’s IT that are service management enablers 
(such as process activities and organizational structures). COBIT is broader than ITIL in 
its scope of coverage (Năstase et al., 2009). 
 
The distinction between the two is sometimes described as follows: “COBIT provides the 
‘why’; ITIL provides the ‘how.’” (Năstase et al., 2009).  It is more accurate to state that 
enterprises and IT professionals who need to address business needs in the ITSM area 
would be well served to consider using both COBIT and ITIL guidance (Năstase et al., 
2009). Leveraging the strengths of both frameworks, and adapting them for their use as 
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appropriate will aid in solving business problems and supporting business goals 
achievement. 
 
While ITIL improves existing services, PRINCE2® is used to develop projects that 
introduce new IT and services within organisations. PRINCE2® is a flexible method 
which guides one through the essentials of managing successful projects regardless of the 
type or scale used. It is built upon seven principles, themes and processes, and it can be 
tailored to meet specific requirements (Axleos, 2018). 
 
 In addition, PRINCE2 Agile® is not a replacement, but rather an extension of the 
PRINCE2® qualification.  It has been designed to teach the fundamentals and purpose of 
combining PRINCE2® with Agile methodology.  Combining them both provides 
scalability within corporate management processes (Axleos, 2018).  Both PRINCE2 and 
Agile were developed as part of the technology industry to streamline the way projects 
are handled. However, PRINCE2 is gradually becoming a part of other industries whereas 
Agile’s flexibility allows technical projects to evolve over time.  
 
Management of Risks (M_o_R®) is a route map for risk management, which is bringing 
together principles, an approach, a set of interrelated processes, and pointers to more 
detailed sources of advice on risk management techniques and specialisms (Axelos, 
2018). It also provides advice on how the principles, approach and processes should be 
embedded, reviewed and applied depending on the nature of the objectives at risk 
(Axelos, 2018). It also forms the framework for risk management in PRINCE2 and 
PRINCE2 Agile®. It is compliant with ISO 31000. In addition, it is embedded with ITIL 
and PRINCE2 depending on whether it is managing risks in services or within projects.  
 
In terms of techniques used to manage risks, COBIT has developed COBIT 5 for Risk, 
which uses APO12 Manage Risks. Figure 4-6 illustrates the scope of COBIT 5 for Risk. 
It shows that COBIT 5 for Risk focuses on applying the COBIT 5 enablers to risk through 
the risk function perspective (i.e., how to use COBIT 5). Also, it enables an effective and 
efficient risk governance and management function. It provides high-level guidance on 
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how to identify, analyse and respond to risk through the application of the core risk 
management processes in COBIT 5 and use of risk scenarios.  The output is a document 
containing a list of IT risk assessment and risk control justifications which can be used as 
a reference document in managing risks associated with IT processes (Astuti et al., 2017). 
Table 4-3 represents a summary of methods that address organisational risks. 
 
 
Figure 4-6  COBIT 5 for risk 
Source: Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA)  
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Name of 
Method 
Type of risk it 
manages  
What is it Use Advantage Limitations Methods used for 
managing risks 
M_o_R Risk 
Management 
Organisational 
risk  
 
 
M_o_R is a route map for 
risk management. It can 
help organizations 
identify, assess and 
control risks and put in 
place effective 
frameworks for making 
informed decisions. 
It also provides advice on how 
the principles, approach and 
processes should be 
embedded, reviewed and 
applied depending on the 
nature of the objectives at risk. 
 
It aligns with ISO 31000 
 
•   
It has four main process 
steps, which describe the 
inputs, outputs and 
activities involved in 
ensuring that risks are 
identified, assessed and 
controlled by using Risk 
register  
 
Source : 
(www.axelos.com). 
ITIL  
Service/ 
Operational 
management 
 
 
 
 
ITIL (Information 
Technology Infrastructure 
Library) is the most 
widely accepted approach 
to IT service management 
in the world. ITIL can 
help individuals and 
organizations use IT to 
realize business change, 
transformation and 
growth. 
 
 
ITIL contains a comprehensive 
set of best practices for IT 
service management (ITSM) 
that are used to develop and 
execute IT service 
management to suit the needs 
of the business. 
 
It also aligns with ISO 20000. 
and has risk management 
within it  
 
• Manage 
business risk 
and service 
disruption or 
failure. 
• Improve and 
develop 
positive 
relationships 
with your 
customers by 
delivering 
efficient 
services that 
meet their 
needs. 
It is descriptive and 
not prescriptive so 
it needs internal 
processes in place 
to align with all its 
benefits. 
 ITIL depends on 
how knowledgeable 
and willing the 
people that use it 
are. If they have a 
poor understanding 
of ITIL/ITSM, then 
the framework will 
not reach its 
maximum 
potential. 
Mapping of M_o_R 
processes in ITIL sub-
processes to manage risk 
Source :  
(Vilarinho and da Silva, 
2011) 
 ITIL Risk 
Management sub-processes 
called Business Impact and 
Risk Analysis uses risk 
register to prioritize lists of 
risks which must be 
subsequently addressed. 
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• Establish 
cost-effective 
systems for 
managing 
demand for 
your services. 
• Support 
business 
change whilst 
maintaining a 
stable service 
environment. 
ITIL is weak in the 
risk management 
field. 
PRINCE2 
  
Project risk  
 
  
Providing guidance that 
gives individuals and 
organizations the 
essentials of running a 
project; PRINCE2 is easy 
to learn and a flexible 
method that can adapt to 
all types of projects. 
 
 
It is a de facto process-based 
method for effective project 
management. Used extensively 
in the UK Government. 
PRINCE2 is also widely 
recognised and used in the 
private sector, both in the UK 
and internationally. 
 
 
It uses management of risk 
framework which aligns with 
ISO 31000 
 To increase 
quality of the 
finished 
products, 
efficient 
control of 
resources, 
avoidance of 
either "heroic" 
(under-
regulated) or 
"mechanistic" 
(over-
regulated) 
working, and 
increased 
confidence 
among the 
project team. 
Considered 
inappropriate for 
small projects or 
where requirements 
are expected to 
change. 
Use Risk Management 
procedure which uses Risk 
Register  
as a tool for capturing and 
maintaining information of 
identified risk. 
 
Source : (Tomanek, and 
Juricek, 2015) 
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PRINCE2 
Agile 
Project risk  
 
 
 
PRINCE2 Agile® is the 
world’s most complete 
agile project management 
solution, combining the 
flexibility and 
responsiveness of Agile 
with the clearly-defined 
framework of 
PRINCE2®. 
It provides structure, 
governance and controls when 
working with agile concepts, 
methods and techniques. 
Designed to help professionals 
tailor management controls 
when working in an agile 
environment; the new product 
will help the practitioner 
understand PRINCE2 
governance requirements 
clearly and comprehensively as 
well as the interface between 
PRINCE2 and agile ways of 
working. 
 
It uses management of risk 
framework which aligns with 
ISO 31000 
It allows for 
seamless 
integration 
with 
PRINCE2® 
and 
is therefore 
applicable to 
any type of 
projects.  It 
makes use of 
common 
terminology 
across 
disciplines 
(meaning that 
the language 
used to deliver 
the course will 
be like that 
used in 
PRINCE2®). 
 Uses Risk Management 
procedure which uses Risk 
Register as a tool for 
capturing and maintaining 
information of identified 
risk .(Tomanek, and Juricek, 
2015) 
Table 4-3  Organisational Risk 
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4.6.3 Methods of Managing Information Security Risk 
 
There are numerous methods for managing information security risks and each method 
has its strengths and limitations. Some of the common methods for managing information 
security risks will be presented with a brief explanation. For this research, EBIOS, 
MEHARI, OCTAVE, MAGERIT, NIST SP800, CORAS were examined based on ISO 
27000 family of International Standards.   
 
EBIOS stands for Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité - 
Expression of Needs and Identification of Security Objectives. EBIOS is a 
comprehensive set of guides dedicated to Information System risk managers. Originally 
developed by the French government, it is now supported by a club of experts of diverse 
origins (ENISA, 2018). It is a method for analysis, evaluation and action on risks related 
to information systems. It generates a security policy adapted to the needs of an 
organization and it has compliance with ISO 27001. EBIOS has a limitation, however, as 
the documentation available is in French. Therefore, it has not been widely adopted 
outside of French speaking countries (Gritzalis et al., 2018). In addition, it does not make 
use of scenarios, but rather follows a structured approach to identify and evaluate risk 
components. This offers the advantage of a relatively flexible and exhaustive risk analysis 
compared with other methods such as MEHARI, which are less flexible and use scenarios.  
 
MEHARI is a method for risk analysis and risk management developed by CLUSIF (Club 
de la Securite de l'Information Francais). It has compliance with ISO 27001 and ISO 
27005 (Gritzalis et al., 2018). MEHARI aims to provide a set of tools specifically 
designed for security management, which comprises a set of managerial actions. It also 
provides guidelines related to security assessment (Syalim et al., 2009). The steps to 
conduct risk assessment include: Identifying risk, Evaluation of natural exposure, 
Evaluation of dissuasive and preventive factors, Evaluation of protective, palliative and 
recuperative factors, Evaluation of the potentiality of risk to occur, Evaluation of the 
consequences of the risk event actually happening, Evaluation of impact and impact 
reduction, Global risk evaluation to the organisation and Decision on whether the risk is 
acceptable. MEHARI provides supplementary documents for risk assessment (Syalim et 
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al., 2009). It also provides step-by-step guides which are lacking in other framework such 
as the NIST 800 and ISO 27000 series.  
 
Another method, called MAGERIT, separates assets into nine categories and uses a scale 
with values from minimum to very high for the likelihood of realization of a threat. 
MAGERIT is a risk analysis and management methodology for information systems 
developed by CSAE (Consejo Superior de Administracion Electronica). It is compliant 
with ISO 27001 and ISO 27002. However, MAGERIT has a disadvantage as it does not 
make use of the concept of vulnerability (Gritzalis et al., 2018). 
 
NIST800-30 is a risk management guide for information technology systems 
recommended by the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST). It has 
compliance with ISO 27001. It is a technical risk assessment. Organizational 
vulnerabilities and controls only come into play after the risks inherent in the IT 
infrastructure are addressed unlike the ISO 27005 where existing controls precede the 
vulnerability analysis.  In NIST SP 800-30, risks to the IT infrastructure need to be 
identified from the ground up before incorporating mitigation afforded by the existing 
controls (Blank and Gallagher, 2012). 
  
The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) 
approach defines a risk-based strategic assessment and planning technique for security.  
The primary benefit of OCTAVE is related to connecting organizational objectives to 
information risk assessment and vulnerability management. For this reason, OCTAVE is 
developed as a flexible and self-modified approach to be customized for different 
organizations by their small IT teams and business (Amini and Jamil, 2018). This model 
can be integrated with other models and used as a hybrid model which would appear to 
be a significant opportunity for cloud computing. However, unfortunately, documenting 
all requirements and characteristics of this integrated approach, makes this model more 
complex for distributed and massive computing environments. The method for threat 
classification and identification is another disadvantage of the OCTAVE model (Amini 
and Jamil, 2018). 
 
CORAS is a method for conducting security risk analysis.  CORAS was developed under 
the Information Society Technologies (IST) program. One of the main objectives of 
Chapter 4: Managing Information Security Risks in Healthcare  
119 | P a g e  
 
CORAS is to ‘develop a framework that exploits methods for risk analysis, semi-formal 
methods for object-oriented modeling, and computerized tools, for a precise, 
unambiguous, and efficient risk assessment of security critical systems’ (Vorster and 
Labuschagne, 2005). It has compliance with the ISO 27001 and ISO 31000 process 
(Gritzalis et al., 2018). However, the calculation and reasoning likelihoods in some cases 
may be complex and difficult due to the uncertainty of the risk analysis (Tran, 2017). In 
addition, it only supports modeling risks on-the-fly and there is a lack of features for 
translating the model into sentences and calculating and reasoning likelihoods (Tran, 
2017). Table 4-4 represents a summary of IT security system risks methods. 
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Name of 
Method 
Type of risk it 
manages  
What is it Use Advantage Limitations Methods used for 
managing risks 
NIST SP800-
30 
IT Security 
System Risk  
 
 
NIST SP 800-30 is a 
standard developed by the 
National Institute of 
Standards and 
Technology. Published as 
a special document 
formulated for 
information security risk 
assessment, it pertains 
especially to IT systems. 
It has been widely used 
for information security 
risk assessment globally, 
and is relevant to any 
business with an IT 
component. 
 
To inform decision makers and 
support risk responses by 
identifying:  
(i) relevant threats to 
organizations or threats 
directed through organizations 
against other organizations; 
 (ii) vulnerabilities, both 
internal and external, to 
organizations;  
(iii) impact (i.e., harm) on 
organizations that may occur 
given the potential for threats 
exploiting vulnerabilities; and 
(iv) likelihood that harm will 
occur.  
 
It has compliance with ISO 
27001 
It allows for 
mapping of 
vulnerabilities; 
it is-
quantifiable in 
technical 
terms – 
according to 
the context of 
each security 
requirement. 
NIST SP 800-30 is a 
technical risk 
assessment. 
Organizational 
vulnerabilities and 
controls only come 
into play after the 
risks inherent in the 
IT infrastructure are 
addressed. 
NIST SP800-30 performs 
Risk management processes 
including: (i) framing risk; 
(ii) assessing risk; (iii) 
responding to risk; and (iv) 
monitoring risk. Also, it 
includes the risk assessment 
and the information and 
communications flows 
necessary to make the 
process work effectively. 
EBIOS IT Security 
System Risk  
  
 
EBIOS (Expression des 
Besoins 
et Identification des 
Objectifs de Sécurité - 
Expression of Needs 
and Identification of 
Security Objectives). 
EBIOS is a 
comprehensive set of 
guides dedicated to 
Information System risk 
It is a method for analysis, 
evaluation and action on risks 
relating to 
information systems. It 
generates a security policy 
adapted to the needs of an 
organization.  
 
It has compliance with ISO 
27001. 
It follows a 
structured 
approach to 
identify and 
evaluate risk 
components. 
This gives it 
the advantage 
of a relatively 
flexible and 
exhaustive risk 
EBIOS has a 
limitation as the 
documentation is 
available in French, 
therefore it has not 
been widely 
adopted outside of 
French speaking 
countries (Gritzalis 
et al., 2018). In 
addition, it does not 
EBIOS has several steps, 
such as; identify risk, risk 
analysis, risk treatment, 
evaluation and study the 
context. The results can be 
recorded and summary 
documents will be produced 
(ENISA, 2018).  
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managers. Originally 
developed by the French 
government, it is now 
supported by a club of 
experts of diverse origins 
(ENISA, 2018). 
analysis, 
compared with 
other methods. 
 
make use of 
scenarios. 
MEHARI IT Security 
System Risk  
  
 
MEHARI is a method for 
risk analysis and risk 
management developed 
by CLUSIF (Club de la 
Securite de l’Information 
Francais).  
Risk analysis methods  
 
It has compliance with ISO 
27001 and ISO 27005 
(Gritzalis et al., 2018). 
  It has several steps: to 
identify risk, evaluation, 
and impact. Then it provides 
a risk assessment document  
(Syalim et al., 2009). 
OCTAVE IT Security 
System Risk  
 
 
The Operationally Critical 
Threat, Asset, and 
Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) approach 
defines a risk-based 
strategic assessment and 
planning technique for 
security.  
 
 OCTAVE approach has three 
phases; each phase is broken 
down into processes. Each 
process has certain activities 
that must be completed. Within 
each of these activities, 
different steps must be taken in 
order to achieve the desired 
outputs. The final result is that 
risk decisions can be based on 
the threat profile of different 
assets. Each threat profile 
contains information on which 
mitigation decisions can be 
based (Vorster and 
Labuschagne, 2005). 
 
It uses ISO 27000 
The primary 
benefit of 
OCTAVE is 
connecting 
organizational 
objectives 
to information 
risk 
assessment 
and 
vulnerability 
management. 
For this 
reason, 
OCTAVE is 
developed 
as a flexible 
and self-
modified 
approach to be 
Documenting all 
requirements and 
characteristics of 
this integrated 
approach makes 
this model more 
complex for 
distributed and 
massive computing 
environments. The 
method of threat 
classification and 
identification is 
another 
disadvantage of 
OCTAVE model 
(Amini and Jamil, 
2018). 
 
OCTAVE has several 
phases to perform: Risk 
identification, Risk 
analysis, Risk evaluation, 
Risk assessment, Risk 
treatment, Risk acceptance, 
and Risk communication. 
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customized for 
different 
organizations 
by their small 
IT teams and 
business. 
MAGERIT IT Security 
System Risk  
 
 
MAGERIT is related to 
risk assessment methods  
This separates assets into nine 
categories and uses a scale with 
values from minimum to very 
high for the likelihood of 
realization of a threat. 
MAGERIT is a risk analysis 
and management methodology 
for information systems 
developed by CSAE (Consejo 
Superior de Administracion 
Electronica). 
 
It is compliant with ISO 27001 
and ISO 27002 
 MAGERIT has a 
limitation as it does 
not make use of the 
concept of 
vulnerability 
(Gritzalis et al., 
2018). 
It manage risks through risk 
identification, risk, analysis, 
risk  assessment, risk 
treatment and risk 
evaluation (ENISA, 2018). 
CORAS IT Security 
System Risk   
CORAS is a method for 
conducting security risk 
analysis.  CORAS is a 
model-based method for 
conducting security risk 
analysis. It provides a 
customized graphical 
language for threat and 
risk modelling. 
CORAS was developed under 
the Information Society 
Technologies (IST) program. 
One of the main objectives of 
CORAS is to ‘develop a 
framework that exploits 
methods for risk analysis, 
semi-formal methods for 
object-oriented modeling, and 
computerized tools, for a 
precise, unambiguous, and 
efficient risk assessment of 
 The calculation and 
reasoning 
likelihoods in some 
cases may be 
complex and 
difficult due to 
uncertainty in risk 
analysis (Tran, 
2017). 
It only supports 
modeling risks on-
the-fly and there is a 
The CORAS method 
provides a 
computerised  tool designed 
to support documenting, 
maintaining and reporting 
analysis results through risk 
modelling. 
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security critical systems’ 
(Vorster and Labuschagne, 
2005; Gritzalis et al., 2018). 
 
It has compliance with ISO 
27001 and ISO 31000 process. 
lack of features for 
translating the 
model to sentences 
and calculating and 
reasoning 
likelihoods. 
Table 4-4 IT Security System Risk 
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4.7 Managing Information Security Risk in Healthcare  
 
Healthcare organisations consider patient information security among their top priorities. 
Modern healthcare is focused on providing the integrated Patient-Centred (PC) approach 
to provide holistic treatment care for the patient. This requires enabling PC flow of 
information within different healthcare providers. As a result, the Care Team (CT) can 
securely access the required information held in the system. Burnap et al. (2012) pointed 
out the importance of the information owner ensuring that information is not obtained by 
third parties for use beyond the agreed purpose of sharing information. They also stress 
that this information should not remain accessible to collaborators once the initial sharing 
is complete (Burnap et al., 2012) to avoid security risks. Securing patient information is 
part of the patient’s safety initiatives that require healthcare providers to focus on 
prevention through better risk management. Yeandle et al. (2013) emphasised the 
importance of performing a risk assessment process and considering the resulting 
documentation within healthcare to help people understand their own risk better, develop 
a capacity to reflect in the moment and form links between current risks and their 
experiences and relationships, both past and present (Yeandle et al., 2013).  
 
An organisation has to choose a typical risk classification system and select known names 
such as “risk domain”, “risk area”, or “risk categories”. Regardless of the terminology, 
the primary purpose is to identify risks across the full continuum of the organisation by 
categorising them into common types. Classifying risk into domains will help ensure that 
nothing is omitted. Common risk areas identified in healthcare include operations, 
hazards and financial, strategic, regulatory, technological and human capital risks.  
Traditional risk management has concentrated on categories of risk silos and how a 
particular risk might affect one aspect of organisational healthcare such as insurance 
costs.  Although recognising such risks is a step in the right direction, stopping the 
analysis after a particular risk is identified may paint an incomplete picture (American 
Society for Healthcare Risk Management, 2011). Also, traditional risk management fails 
to take into account the effect of one risk upon another. Understating the relationship 
between risks allows for better employment of resources (people, money, time, ideas) and 
prevents repetition of effort. However, the impact of risk on one another has not been 
addressed. For instance, reducing the professional labour pool is likely to create a 
demanding and stressful work environment that, in turn, promotes weak areas in the 
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workplace. Different relationships between risks can be found in patient safety, consumer 
satisfaction, work-related injuries and productivity. Thus, the relationships between risks 
need to be recognised and analysed to support the core organisational goals such as 
providing safe and quality patient care.  
 
According to the American Society for Healthcare Risk Management (2011), it is vital 
that organisations do not abandon the traditional risk management model, but rather 
expand upon this and refine it so that it may be applied to all risks. A more modern 
approach to the risk management model must employ a cross-disciplinary strategy to risk 
management (American Society for Healthcare Risk Management, 2011). The primary 
goal of risk management approaches is to highlight enormous risks to the entire enterprise 
whether those risks are regularly encountered within the hospital or other healthcare 
settings or they have never been considered. Once those risks are identified, the 
organisation is better able to determine an appropriate methodology to mitigate those 
risks.  
 
Different risk management techniques commonly used in the healthcare industry are 
considered and discussed in detail in the next section.  
 
4.7.1 Risk Register  
 
Many organisations use a Risk Register to document the assessment of risk with 
appropriate countermeasures within an organisation. Risk Register is one of the essential 
tools in information security risk management. It is a valuable tool for documenting and 
prioritising, managing and treating identified risks facing an organisation.  Patterson and 
Neailey (2002) defined risk register as "primarily a tool which has enabled the risks 
within a project to be documented and maintained irrespective of geographical location, 
and has provided the platform for the reduction and mitigation plans to be developed for 
the high-level risks within the project". Also, there are various statements which describe 
the role of ‘Risk Register'. Williams (1993) states that ‘the risk register... has two primary 
roles. The first is that of a repository of a corpus of knowledge…The second purpose of 
the risk register is to initiate the analysis and plans that flow from it'. Thus, risk register 
should be used to keep track of the different risks within projects (Williams, 1993). Also, 
Chapman and Ward (1997) pointed out that to allow for documentation of the sources of 
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the risk, their responses and classification, the risk register identification phase involves 
compiling a list, log or register (Chapman and Ward, 2003). Hence, they recognise that 
the documentation produced through the utilisation of Project Risk Management can be 
considered as a ‘by-product...rather than a central concern' (Chapman and Ward, 2003). 
 
Moreover, Ward (1999) provided a more comprehensive vision by identifying that the 
purpose of the summary risk register is to help the project team review project risks on a 
regular basis throughout the project’ (Ward, 1999). On the other hand, Barry (1995) uses 
the risk register as ‘a comprehensive risk-assessment system’ (Barry, 1995). Thus, risk 
register is used as a formal method of identifying, categorising and quantifying the risks 
and providing the means for developing a cost-effective tool for controlling the risks. 
Carter et al. (1995) offer a very detailed version of a ‘risk register', and they point out that 
‘the RISKMAN Methodology calls for a simple database of the risks in a project to be 
constructed from day one' (Carter et al., 1995). In summary, having a complete risk 
register allows management to prioritise, manage or treat risks they are facing. Also, a 
risk register can ensure that everyone involved in the project understands the risks; hence, 
a mitigation plan is created for the most severe risks. 
 
As an example of using risk register in healthcare, Desai et al. (2014) conducted a study 
to determine risk factors associated with perioperative mortality in patients undergoing 
Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm (AAA) repair nationally and used these risk factors to create 
a scoring system and a risk register to determine the mortality rate based on risk scores. 
The analysis used the National Inpatient Sample (NIS) from 2000 to 2010. A discriminant 
analysis was used to predict in-hospital mortality once the predictor variables were 
identified using a multivariate analysis. A risk register was created using established rates 
of rupture for various AAA sizes and estimating the average mortality for those patients. 
This risk was then compared with the in-hospital mortality risk using discriminant 
analysis to make recommendations on minimising the overall mortality rate as a function 
of aneurysm size and predictors of mortality. This study demonstrates that not all patients 
with AAA between 5 and 5.5 cm are candidates for surgery. Higher-risk patients may 
benefit from Endovascular Aneurysm Repair (EVAR), and those patients with smaller 
aneurysm sizes and few risk factors may benefit from observation. Women, patients with 
renal failure, and anticoagulated patients have a higher risk of the in-hospital mortality. 
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Patients who undergo EVAR have significantly lower in-hospital mortality rates 
especially those patients who have a ruptured AAA (Desai et al., 2014). 
 
At Virginia Mason hospital in Seattle (U.S), a patient safety reporting system was used 
to provide reports of risk and harm from the front line of patient care. To quantify and 
prioritise safety opportunities, a risk register system was developed and implemented. 
The basic risk register concepts were refined to provide a systematic way to understand 
risks reported by staff. The risk register uses a comprehensive taxonomy of patient risk 
and algorithmically assigns each patient’s safety report to 1 of 27 risk categories in three 
major domains (Evaluation, Treatment, and Critical Interactions). For each category, a 
composite score was calculated by event rate, harm, and cost. The composite scores were 
used to identify the "top five" risk categories, and patients’ safety reports in these 
categories were analysed in greater depth to find recurrent patterns of risk and associated 
opportunities for improvement (Mansfield et al., 2015). 
 
The top five categories of risk were easy to identify; they had distinctive "profiles" of 
rate, harm, and cost. The ability to categorise and rank risks across multiple dimensions 
produced insights that were previously not available. These results were shared with 
leadership; thus, served as an input for planning quality and safety initiatives. This 
approach provided actionable information for the strategic planning process while  
strengthening the Virginia Mason culture of safety (Mansfield et al., 2015). Therefore, 
the quantitative patient safety risk register serves as one solution to address the challenge 
of extracting valuable safety lessons from large numbers of incident reports and could 
profitably be adopted by other organisations (Mansfield et al., 2015). 
  
As a practice of using risk register in the UK, The Trust Risk Register is used in London 
North West Healthcare for documenting risks. It is reviewed by the Executive Team, 
updated monthly and presented to the Integration Board to monitor risks post-merger and 
the Clinical Performance and Patient Experience Committee to provide assurance on 
patient safety and quality of services. The Risk Register status is formally reported to the 
Audit Committee and Trust Board and external bodies to provide assurance.  
 
Kingston Hospital uses risk register to document different types of risks. Risks are 
escalated to the Corporate Risk Register (CRR) at a score of 8+. This has resulted in 
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identifying a large number of risks at a detailed level on the CRR (Kingston Hospital 
NHS Foundation Trust, 2017). 
 
NHS Shetland uses risk register to enhance the staff knowledge of the types of risks that 
are likely to cause harm. Therefore, each department’s log of all the risks recorded on the 
Datix system is referred to as a Risk Register. Each Manager/Head of Department is 
responsible for maintaining this register, ensuring the risk information it contains is up-
to-date and that review dates have not expired. Heads of Departments must identify any 
high or very high-level risks believed impossible to manage at a departmental level or 
any risk that could adversely affect achievement of the Board’s objectives or present a 
large loss to the organisation and bring these to the immediate attention of the relevant 
Director. Such risks will then be submitted by that Director to the Risk Management 
Group (RMG) to be considered for inclusion in the Corporate Risk Register. The RMG 
reviews the Corporate Risk Register every eight weeks, and regularly reports to the Board 
(Oxley, 2015) 
 
Cardiff and Vale University Health Board (2017) use the Corporate Risk and Assurance 
Framework (the CRAF) which brings together the corporate risk register and assurance 
framework into one single document.  It provides assurance on the delivery of the core 
purpose of “Caring for People; Keeping People Well” through robust risk management 
processes. A risk register is a documented and prioritised log of the overall assessment of 
a range of risks facing an organisation.  The risks shown within the CRAF have been 
identified following an assessment of the principle risk of achieving or not achieving 
strategic objectives.  The risks have been taken from a number of sources such as Clinical 
Board Risk Registers. By completing the risk register, the organisation can then work on 
how the risks they are facing can be prioritised or managed.  The CRAF is updated on a 
bi-monthly basis to reflect the periodic review of Clinical Board and corporate risk 
registers.  Regular exception reports are provided to the Board and the relevant 
Committee (Cardiff & Vale University Health Board, 2017). 
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4.7.2 Operationally Critical Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE)  
 
Operationally Critical Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) represents 
another alternative technique for managing risks in healthcare. According to Woody 
(2006) and Coleman (2004), three healthcare organisations of different scales and 
geographic locations decided to use OCTAVE as a risk assessment tool. A key component 
of OCTAVE is the interdisciplinary structure of the analysis team which enables 
healthcare organisations to create sound and efficient security policies (Woody, 2006; 
Coleman, 2004). OCTAVE methodology is well documented and is structured into three 
phases. OCTAVE phase one formulates information relating to the organisation and its 
business practices. Phase two is geared towards asset-based information security and 
technical vulnerability assessment. Phase three offers analysis of information gained 
during phases one and two, and forms a roadmap for long-term organisational protection 
strategies and mitigation plans to address midterm vulnerabilities relating to critical assets 
(Woody, 2006; Coleman, 2004). 
 
Although the processes in each step are structured and well defined, there is enough 
elasticity to permit tailoring of the approach to meet the unique requirements of each 
organisation adequately. The differences and similarities observed during the three risk 
assessments strongly support the concept of a decentralised decision-making approach to 
information security in the healthcare industry. There were similarities found among 
organisations such as the merging of biomedical systems and network information 
systems, which exposed mutual threats and concerns that may be dominant throughout 
the industry regardless of the geographic location or size of the organisation. Applying a 
standard industry-recognised methodology to identify these risks offers due diligence to 
the process while allowing organisations to justify their choices by considering their 
unique conditions and differing capabilities to moderate these risks (Woody, 2006; 
Coleman, 2004). The same risk could be evaluated and prioritised differently by an 
organisation of a different scale. The limited resources of many organisations and the 
time needed to implement effective protection strategies has affected the decision that 
risks need to be mitigated, deferred or accepted. Thus, when prioritising risks for 
mitigation, the impact of the risks to the organisation should be considered (Woody, 2006; 
Coleman, 2004). 
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4.7.3 Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
 
Another commonly used risk management method implemented in healthcare is Failure 
Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) (Vincent and Honeck, 2004). According to DeRosier 
et al. (2002), the engineering community has used the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) technique as a proactive evaluation of vulnerabilities technique. FMEA focuses 
on processes that manufacture products and involves the calculation of a risk priority 
number through a three-variable equation where each variable is scored from one to ten. 
Medical device manufacturers use this process when evaluating their equipment 
(DeRosier et al., 2002). Chiarini (2012) used FMEA as a risk analysis tool to show an 
improved situation concerning the health and safety of nurses and physicians by 
calculating contamination as a risk of the activity and its causes inside the pharmacy 
department of an Italian hospital.  
 
According to Quality-One (2015), FMEA is an assessment tool, but it does not eliminate 
risks. Although FMEA was useful as a risk analysis tool, it has many limitations including 
its bias toward severity ratings, its ever-increasing list of possible failure modes, and 
complexity of use as it is only as good as the members of the FMEA team using it 
(Quality-One, 2015).  
 
To eliminate the weaknesses of FMEA, Health Failure Mode Effect Analysis (HFME) 
was proposed by the National Centre for Patient Safety (NCPS) with assistance from the 
Tenet Health System (Dallas). HFMEA is a 5-step process that uses an interdisciplinary 
team to evaluate a healthcare process proactively. The team uses process flow 
diagramming, a Hazard Scoring Matrix, and the HFMEA Decision Tree to identify and 
assess potential vulnerabilities. The HFMEA Worksheet is used to record the team’s 
assessment, proposed actions, and outcome measures. HFMEA includes testing to ensure 
that the system functions efficiently and new vulnerabilities have not been introduced 
elsewhere in the system (DeRosier et al., 2002).  
 
Li et al. (2017) investigated whether the healthcare failure mode and effect analysis 
(HFMEA) is a valid proactive method to apply to chemotherapy administration in the 
Chinese oncology inpatient setting. A multidisciplinary team created a flow diagram of 
the chemotherapy administration process. Possible failure modes were identified and 
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assessed using a hazard-scoring matrix. Using a decision tree, failure mode 
recommendations were made. Chemotherapy error rates before and after the HFMEA 
were compared. The results showed that five failure modes were identified with high 
hazard scores, and 15 recommendations were made. After the intervention, the 
chemotherapy error rate decreased significantly from 2.05% to 0.17%. Thus, the 
complexity of intravenous chemotherapy makes it vulnerable to error, and severe 
consequences. Multiple errors can occur during the ordering, preparing, compounding, 
dispensing, and administering of chemotherapy. The process of HFMEA helped reduce 
the chemotherapy error rate in Chinese hospitalised patients. The failure modes with the 
highest hazard score apparently resulted from the communication and organisation 
problems (Li et al., 2017).  
 
Indeed, communication problems may often hide unclear or unshared responsibilities, 
roles, and procedures. One of the most significant challenges is the fear of negative 
consequences; nurses in China were found to be reluctant to report nursing errors. The 
low report rates of nursing errors may influence the results. Two critical factors arise here. 
First, it is likely that in underreporting results from fear of accusation, the nurses’ 
satisfaction with the process is an indication that this transparent, collaborative, and 
consultative process reduces fear and encourages more honest responses. Second, the 
involvement of the interprofessional team underscores the shared nature of shared 
responsibility for errors and that errors are best detected early and reported to the team so 
they can act quickly, without individuals feeling fear of recrimination (Li et al., 2017). 
 
4.8 Comparison of Risk Management Tools in Healthcare  
 
Other risk management tools exist, such as Cause and Effect; these tools are called 
Ishikawa Diagrams and are also known as Fishbone. It is used to systematically list the 
different causes that can be attributed to a problem (or an effect). A cause-and-effect 
diagram can aid in identifying the reasons why a process goes out of control. However, 
the diagram, like other problem-solving techniques, is a heuristic (verifying) tool. In 
addition, the final diagram does not rank causes according to their importance and nor 
does it assess a particular aspect of the risk. 
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Another tool called Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a deductive (top-down) method of 
analysing system design and performance. It involves specifying a top event to analyse 
followed by identifying all of the associated elements of a system that could cause that 
top event to occur. FTA is an effective “lead-in” to robust experimental design techniques 
but it does not provide risk assessment.  
 
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) have emerged as a powerful tool for avoiding 
costly product performance failures. Both product/design FMEA and process FMEA can 
help improve product reliability and reduce design and manufacturing costs. FMEA is a 
bottom up approach to failure mode analysis. It is an inductive process, which is 
performed after the detailed design phase of the project is complete. FMEA is a method 
to evaluate possible ways failures can occur in a design, process, system, or service. 
FMEA uses teams to improve the design, product, process, and/or service. However, 
again, it does not assess risk and it depends on the effectiveness of the team performing 
it.  
 
The most common techniques for managing information security risk in healthcare were 
examined in this research. These are Risk Register (RR), Operationally Critical Threat 
and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) and Failure Modes and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA). Risk Register is widely used to document risk assessment in the NHS in UK. In 
addition, three healthcare organisations have adopted OCTAVE as a risk assessment tool 
because it forms part of the interdisciplinary structure of an analysis team which enables 
health organisations to create efficient security policies. Failure Modes and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) is widely used in healthcare as a risk management tool as discussed in 
section 4.6.3.  
 
Therefore, Risk Register (RR), Operationally Critical Threat and Vulnerability 
Evaluation (OCTAVE) and Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) were chosen to 
be examined based on the ISO 27005’s main stages. A comparison table was created to 
decide which tools are the most appropriate to use as shown in Table 4-5. Risk Register 
was the most appropriate method to consider because it is compatible with all the stages 
in the ISO 27005. Risk Register is widely used technique to manage risks as seen in its 
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adoption by a range of approaches such as COBIT, ITIL, PRINCE2 and PRINCE2 Agile. 
The next section will discuss Risk Register benefits and limitations in depth 
.
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ISO27005 OCTAVE Risk Register FMEA 
Establish Context  
 
Phase one: formulate 
information related to the 
organisation and its business 
practices. 
Helps to report and communicate 
risks within an organisation. 
FMEA works smoothly through the 
development phases of an investigation of 
past failures and creates preparatory 
documents, for instance, Failure Mode 
Avoidance past (FMA) failure. 
Risk 
Assessment 
 
Risk 
Identification  
Phase two: asset-based 
information security and 
technical vulnerability 
assessment. 
Identify risk name with a short 
description.  
Helps to identify risk type Security 
(S), Management (M), Technical 
(T) and Legal (L) by name.  
 
Use risk priority number (RPN) to be 
calculated. The RPN is the multiplication of 
three factors: the “occurrence” (O), the 
“severity” (S) and the “detection” (D).  
 
RPN negatively changes team behaviour 
because teams select the lowest numbers to 
get below the threshold rather than the 
actual risk requiring mitigation. 
 
Risk Analysis 
 
 It identifies risks Level.  
Risk Evaluation  
 
 It identifies Impact and Likelihood. 
Risk 
Treatment  
 
Risk 
Modification 
Phase three offers analysis of 
information gained during 
phases one and two and forms 
a roadmap for long-term 
organisational protection 
strategies and mitigation plans 
to address midterm 
vulnerabilities relating to 
critical assets.  
It identifies the countermeasure in 
detail. 
FMEA is an Assessment Tool, and it does 
not eliminate problems. 
Risk Retention 
(accepting) 
Risk Avoidance  
Risk Sharing 
Monitoring & Review Gap Countermeasure or action column 
will show any changes or 
modification in the risk.  
Gap  
Communication  and 
Consultation  
 
Gap Countermeasure or action will 
show the communication with 
relevant parties to handle the risk. 
Gap 
Table 4-5  Comparison Between Managing Information Security Risk Techniques in Healthcare
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4.9 Risk Register Benefits and Limitations  
 
Risk register is an important component of the overall risk management framework. 
It is a tool that helps to track risks as they occur and can be created during the early 
stages of a project. From the analysis in section 4.7, it can be seen that Risk Register 
represents an essential element of different methods such as COBIT, MoR, ITIL, 
PRINCE2 and PRINCE2 Agile. A risk register is used to identify, assess, and manage 
risks down to acceptable levels through a review and update process.  
 
The main benefit of risk register is that it records the details of all risks that have been 
identified, as well as provides an analysis of their severity and an action plan regarding 
how those risks can be treated to mitigate the risks. The risk register database can be 
viewed as a management tool for monitoring the risk management processes within 
the project. In addition, in Project Management Body of Knowledge project 
management, risk register is repeated in all the phases. For instance, risk register is 
created as an output from phase two to identify risks. In the third phase, perform 
qualitative risk analysis, risk register is updated as an output. In phase four, perform 
quantitative risk analysis, risk register is used as an input and is updated as an output. 
Similarly, for phase five, plan risk response and phase six, monitor and control risks, 
risk register is used as an input and update during the phases to be produced as an 
output. Thus, it represents an active living document during the whole project. 
 
Furthermore, risk register represents the heart of our proposed methodology for 
managing information security risk which will be discussed in Chapter 5.  However, 
there are limitations which need to be addressed. Having a large risk register to 
document risk assessment with appropriate countermeasures is not yet sufficient. It 
lacks visibility of the process and a shared understanding of risk associated with each 
role. Thus, it is necessary to enhance the risk register document through visualising 
the whole process especially when there is a complicated process that includes roles, 
processes, activities and multiple locations when different organisations are involved.  
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4.10 Information Security  
 
Information security needs to be discussed in a wider context. Due to time limitation, 
it is not possible for this research to address all of the different perceptions of risks. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, this thesis will investigate security risks as the main concern 
identified from the preliminary interviews, questionnaires and undersecretary 
interview. Therefore, the scope of the remaining thesis will focus on developing risk 
assessment methodology that can clearly identify and represent information security 
risk.  
 
Information security represents a valuable asset to any organisation that requires 
protection (Hong et al., 2003). Security combines systems, operations and internal 
controls to guarantee the integrity and confidentiality of information and operational 
processes within an organisation (Hong et al., 2003). Security is primarily achieved 
by controlling physical access to system components that are unique and use 
proprietary communication protocols (Awan et al., 2016). There is a wide range of 
information security definitions that are summarised in Table 4-6. 
 
Author/ 
Year 
Information Security definition 
Finne 
(2000) 
The protection of information assets from accidental or intentional 
but unauthorised disclosure, modification, or destruction, or the 
inability to process that information. 
Pipkin 
(2000) 
The process of protecting the intellectual property of an organisation. 
 
Goluch et 
al. (2008) 
A risk management discipline, whose job is to manage the cost of 
information risk to the business. 
Anderson 
(2003) 
Emphasised a well-informed sense of assurance that information 
risks and controls are in balance. 
Venter and 
Elo (2003) 
The protection of information and minimising the risk of exposing 
information to unauthorised parties. 
Table 4-6 Summary of Various Information Security Definitions 
 
Within the context of this research, it is believed that these definitions are not 
expansive enough to address information security. It is more than an intellectual 
property (Pipkin, 2000), managing cost (Goluch et al., 2008) and unauthorised parties 
access (Venter and Elo, 2003). Although these authors identified essential aspects of 
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information security, their definitions are not broad enough as they are focusing on a 
particular problem rather than information security as a whole.  
 
It is essential to consider information security not just as a technical issue, but also as 
a managerial issue. Kazemi et al. (2012) emphasised that information security is not 
only a technical matter, but a fundamental management issue; its primary purpose is 
to create a secure information environment. Whitman and Mattord (2012) supported 
this view by recognising that information security’s purpose is to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information assets whether in storage, 
processing, or transmission. This is achieved via the application of policy, education, 
training, awareness, and technology (Whitman and Mattord, 2012) 
 
With the increased use of information technology by different parties such as IT 
specialists accessing information facilities, non-IT specialists conducting regular 
operations and members of the public as users using information technology through 
the internet, the threat of unauthorised users increases. Hence, one of the vital concerns 
is to have effective and efficient information security management within the 
organisation. Chahino and Marchant (2010) emphasised Information Security as a 
discipline governing the framework for the continuous cycle of safeguarding 
information and ensuring related regulatory compliance. In addition, Shostack (2012) 
pointed out that information security is the assurance and reality that information 
systems can operate as intended in a hostile environment.  
 
Whitman and Mattord (2010) highlight that information security, in general, can only 
be implemented through a process of institutionalisation (Alshaikh, 2014). They 
propose a security system development lifecycle (SecSDLC) consisting of six phases 
(Investigation, Analysis, Logical Design, Physical Design, Implementation, and 
Maintenance and Change) designed to implement an information security project in 
an organisation. These phases allow collaboration among IT managers, business units, 
and information security experts to rigorously design, develop, implement, and 
operate an information security program. Unlike traditional system development life 
cycles that employ the waterfall approach, the SecSDLC is an iterative process which 
enables agile and flexible changes during the design, development, and 
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implementation of the security program (Alruwaili and Gulliver, 2015).  However, 
one of the disadvantages of SecSDLC is that it is interpreted as a waterfall model. The 
waterfall model does not allow changes to be made to the previously completed stage. 
Therefore, it would be implemented with missing/faulty requirements or mistakes 
committed at any stage of system development. Fixing such mistakes is not easy; it is 
costly and leads to late delivery of the requested system (Sekgweleo, 2018). 
 
However, SecSDLC is an iterative approach which is similar to a spiral model. The 
emphasis of the spiral model is to evaluate risks, which are used as a source for 
decision making to further develop the system. This approach makes it possible for 
organisations to save costs since it is cheaper to identify problems and risks in the 
early stages of the systems’ development. It also makes it possible to enhance or make 
changes to the requirements up until the acceptable system is delivered to the users 
(Sekgweleo, 2018). 
 
Therefore, there is a trade-off between the flexibility and security approach lifecycle. 
In a complex system, it is hard to address all security issues within it whilst 
maintaining flexibility. Prior to initiating an information security program, it is 
advised that organizations have clear security policies and compliance requirements 
(Alruwaili and Gulliver, 2015). It is the company’s responsibility to choose a suitable 
approach which can be tailored according to its need.  
 
In this research, it is believed that using the risk management standards as they are 
does not provide enough guidance; therefore, it is important to have a shared 
understanding of the processes within the context where security is being applied. The 
role of process modelling prospected in risk management framework will be 
considered. The next section will provide an overview of Business Process Modelling 
(BPM) which has been used to model information security in healthcare processes. 
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4.11 Business Process Modelling (BPM)  
 
Business Processes Modeling (BPM) represents an important part of an organisation 
because having an effective business processes is vital in sustaining competitiveness 
(De Sousa, 2014). It plays an essential role in two ways. The first functions at the 
operational management level: conducting and improving how the business is 
operated. Second, BPM is essential for software developers as they need a business 
process to capture the necessary requirements for software creation and design. BPM 
can reduce the distance between the users of the systems and its developers (De Sousa, 
2014).  
 
At the business process level, customers, end users, and business analysts can express 
their security needs. Rodríguez et al. (2007) proposed integrating security 
requirements through business process modelling through BPMN. In addition, 
Secure*BPMN was introduced (Cherdantseva, 2014) to cover security requirements 
in BPM. Thus, Business Processes can be defined as a set of procedures or activities 
that collectively keep track of a business objective or policy. Also, it represents a 
feasible solution to address the environment’s complexity and the speed required for 
new products as well as the growing number of involved actors in the activities of the 
organisation (Rodríguez et al., 2007).  
 
An enhanced definition of Business Process Modelling (BPM) is, “a collection of 
activities that takes one or more kinds of input and creates an output that is of value 
to the customer” (Stavrou et al., 2014; Gritzalis et al., 2014). It consists of a set of 
activities and tasks that, together, fulfil an organisational goal. By modelling activities 
and functions processes within an organisation, it can provide a holistic approach and 
improve the understanding of goals within the workplace. BPM can reduce costs and 
offer competitive products and services (Stavrou et al., 2014). Furthermore, BPM has 
increasingly been recognised as a driver for innovation (Rosemann, and Brocke, 
2015). According to Aagedal et al. (2002), using BPM to model risk assessment is 
motivated by several factors; risk assessment requires correct descriptions of the target 
system, its context and all security features. The modelling technology improves the 
precision of such description; the latter is expected to improve the quality of risk 
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assessment results (Aagedal et al., 2002). In addition, the graphical style of BPM 
furthers communication and interaction between the stakeholders involved in a risk 
assessment. This is expected to improve the quality of results, and also accelerate the 
risk analysis process since the danger of wasting time and resources on misconceptions 
is reduced (Aagedal et al., 2002). Modelling technology facilitates a more precise 
documentation of risk assessment results and assumptions on which their validity 
depend. This is expected to reduce maintenance costs by increasing the possibilities 
for reuse (Aagedal et al., 2002). Modelling technology also provides a solid basis for 
the integration of assessment methods that should improve the effectiveness of the 
assessment process (Aagedal et al., 2002). Aagedal et al. (2002) point out that 
modelling technology is supported by a rich set of tools from which the risk analysis 
may benefit, such as improving quality and reducing costs. It also increases 
productivity and facilitates maintenance. This provides a basis for tighter integration 
of risk management in the system development process, which may considerably 
reduce development costs and ensure that the specified security level is achieved 
(Aagedal et al, 2002). Therefore, the Aagedal et al. (2002) findings represent a solid 
basis for using modelling in managing risks.  
  
4.12 Examples of Using BPM to Model Security  
 
Rodríguez et al. (2007) proposed integrating security requirements through business 
process modelling. They emphasised the importance of capturing security 
requirements within business process modelling through notations that must be 
supported by a set of graphical concepts that allow for the security semantics to be 
represented (Rodríguez et al., 2007). BPMN offers orientation to the business analyst 
domain since it represents an opportunity to capture security requirements at a level 
of abstraction. They presented the BPMN meta model with core elements and 
extensions that allow security requirements to be incorporated into Business Process 
Diagrams that will increase the scope of the expressive ability of business analysts. 
With this extension, business analysts will be able to express security requirements 
from their perspective. Moreover, it will be possible for security experts to refine such 
requirements for software developers to be able to include them in the end product. 
They applied this approach within a typical health-care business process (Rodríguez 
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et al., 2007). However, this approach has limited expressiveness as it does not take 
into account the information flow of business processes, and it does not decouple the 
specification of the policy from the modelling of the security solutions that the process 
implements. 
 
Saleem et al. (2012) extend BPMN with security objectives for Service-Oriented 
Architecture (SoA) applications. They include a set of security concepts in BPMN 
such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, traceability, and auditing. However, the 
language does not separate policies from security solutions in the processes. 
Moreover, their work is specific for the SoA domain (Salnitri et al., 2017) 
 
Wolter et al. (2009) propose a modelling language for business processes and business 
security goals that should be used to graphically define security specifications. They 
also developed a framework which transforms security goals in security policies 
specified in XACML and Rampart (Salnitri et al., 2017). The framework automatically 
extracts specifications of security mechanisms which enforce the security goals, but it 
does not permit security experts to compose security goals; therefore, it does not 
permit the creation of complex security policies (Salnitri et al., 2017).  
 
Wolter and Schaad (2007) propose an extension of BPMN for specifying task-based 
authorization constraints. Their approach includes a graphical extension of BPMN as 
well as a formalization of task-based authorization constraints. Their approach permits 
the specification of dynamic resource allocation such as dynamic separation of duty 
and role-based resource allocation. Their approach is focused on authorization 
constraints on executors of tasks. In addition, it is not possible to use this approach to 
specify other security aspects such as availability or integrity (Salnitri et al., 2017). 
 
SecureBPMN (2012) extends BPMN with access control and information flow 
constraints. It uses the hierarchical structure of the organization in which the business 
process will be executed to help security designers to define security properties such 
as the binding of duty and separation of duty. However, SecureBPMN is limited in 
that it does not specify other central security aspects, such as confidentiality or 
availability (Salnitri et al., 2017). 
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Alsalamah (2014) looked at the security requirements of the patient-centric by using 
workflow. She focused on providing different security levels while the information is 
shared across healthcare organisations holistically. She modelled the access control 
permission. On the other hand, this research will focus on risk modelling and enhance 
the communication mechanism among stakeholders.   
 
Cherdantseva (2014) developed Secure*BPMN. The semantics of Secure*BPMN 
were based on the Reference Model of Information Assurance and Security (RMIAS). 
RMIAS is based on the ISO 27001 and is intended for communicating Information 
Assurance and Security (IAS) concepts to business experts and other non-technical 
audiences. It reflects a shared understanding of IAS and it is suitable for an approach 
to IAS in a multidisciplinary team. The syntax of Secure*BPMN was designed 
specifically for human understanding and communication improvement purposes 
(Cherdantseva, 2014). Also, Secure*BPMN added additional security classes like 
Secure Swimlane, Secure Swimlane location, Access Permission, Information 
Taxonomy, Security Goals and Countermeasures. 
 
Conforti (2014) developed an operational approach for the management of risks 
related to executable business processes in near real-time. It incorporates elements of 
risk in all stages of the lifecycle of executable business processes. His work contributes 
to creating a more effective link between the fields of Business Process Management 
and Risk Management. He developed a working BPM system with risks expressed 
formally and managed dynamically in the workflow. The approach was implemented 
over the YAWL system and evaluated through the use of artificial and real-life data. 
(Conforti, 2014). 
 
Jakoubi et al., (2010) presented a methodology enabling the risk-aware modeling and 
simulation of business processes. The term ‘risk-aware business process management’ 
is understood as the integration of a risk perspective into business process 
management. In addition, their work provides a readable overview of academic 
research on integrating risk management into BPM (Jakoubi et al., 2010). 
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Koster (2009) proposed an evaluation method for Business Process Management 
products. This method was developed by creating a framework on BPM by analysing 
the state of the literature regarding BPM. This framework contains literature and 
criteria that have been extracted by the literature in the field. 
 
Although other researchers used risk modeling in an algorithmic way using 
quantitative approaches to risk, our approach is qualitative and focuses on representing 
risk within Business Process Modelling. It ensures that it is linked with risk register to 
document the risk assessment. This research will address the application of Managing 
Security Risk-Business Process Modelling in the next chapter.  
 
4.13 Reflection  
 
There has been an extensive range of standards and normative documents presenting 
risk management and risk assessment methodologies for IT systems over recent years.  
Studying the ISO 38500 for the IT governance framework was important as it helps in 
understanding business requirements. The ISO 38500 for the IT governance 
framework helps to ensure that accountability is clearly assigned for all IT risks and 
activities. It encompasses assigning and monitoring IT security responsibilities, 
strategies and behaviours.  
 
In addition, it is important to understand the different methodologies based on the ISO 
31000 for organisational risks to be aware of the different methods available for 
managing system risks. Also, the ISO 27000 family of standards was addressed to 
observe the different methods used in managing information security risks.  
 
It is not easy for the practitioners to know what technique to use because there is a 
wide range of standards that hold different methods and techniques, which can be 
applied at different levels depending on the scope of an organisation. Thus, a 
comparison section for different ISO standard methods was needed to understand how 
each method works, how it is used, which standard has compliance, advantages, 
limitations and what technique are used by each method to manage risk.  The 
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effectiveness of these standards and methods in supporting practitioners of risk 
management will depend on the organisation and how often these standard techniques 
are carried out. For instance, the ISO 31000 is used for organisational risk and ISO 
27000 is used for information security risk.  
 
There are limitations in the use and application of different tools and techniques in 
managing risks. For instance, ISO 27000 requires continuous subjective input by the 
stakeholders to calculate potential risks. Hence, it requires subjective, human-based 
qualitative inputs, which could potentially lead to inaccurate and inconclusive results 
(Awan et al., 2016). Also, the main research challenges relate to the application of the 
ISO 27000, which is a high-level guideline in the healthcare domain. It does not 
provide detailed step-by-step guidance or advise on which technique to use. 
Operational Critical Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) was used in Risk 
Management (ISO 31000) and in the healthcare domain to minimise the identified 
risks. However, it is not practical for the entire process within the ISO 27005 because 
it does not cover all the stages for monitoring and review, and communication and 
consultation.  
 
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is more of an analysis tool for risks. It 
does not address how to manage the identified risks. The risk register can be used in 
all the stages of the ISO 27005 processes within the healthcare industry to document 
and prioritise risks, but its limitation is that it does not visualise the risks in a process. 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop an effective approach which can address risk and 
enhance communication among stakeholders and locations. 
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4.14  Conclusion  
 
Information security risk management represents a critical element within any 
organisation; hence, it requires deep understanding and awareness in terms of what 
the best approach is according to the organisation’s aims and objectives. Therefore, 
studying IT governance framework (ISO 38500), Risk Management (ISO 31000), 
Managing Information Security Standard (ISO 27000) and Information Security Risk 
Management Standard (ISO 27005) helped in understanding and identifying various 
types of risk management methods and techniques that are implemented in multiple 
industries. 
 
As the focus of this research is the healthcare industry, common tools used to manage 
risks were observed and critically analysed. Those tools were: Risk Register (RR), 
Operational Critical Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) and Failure 
Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA). A comparison table based on ISO 27005 was 
created to understand which method was applicable for the research domain. From the 
comparison table, Risk Register was considered as the most appropriate tool to use 
because it was compatible with all the ISO 27005 processes. However, there are 
limitations in the use of Risk Register to document the risk assessment as it does not 
visualise the risks at process level.  
 
Business Process Modelling (BPM) was considered as a tool for understanding risks 
and enhancing communication within different locations. This chapter discussed 
various examples related to using BPM in healthcare. Although other researchers 
addressed security requirements and meta model (Rodríguez et al., 2007) and risk 
modelling through algorithmic approach (Jakoubi et al., 2010), this research proposes 
a different approach to using risk register to document risk assessment and represent 
risks in a business process modelling by visualising risks within a process and 
providing a shared understanding of risks for stakeholders.  
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In Chapter 5, Managing Security Risk-Business Process Modelling (MSR-BPM) will 
be introduced as an effective approach to manage risks by combining Risk Register 
and Business Process Modelling (BPM).  In Chapter 6, MSR-BPM approach will be 
applied in the healthcare domain to identify risk assessments and security goals in 
depth. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter proposes an approach to effectively manage risks by addressing visibility 
and shared awareness of risk. It introduces using a Reference Model of Information 
Assurance and Security (RMIAS) (Cherdantseva, 2014) to develop Generic Reference 
Risk Register Table. The methods analysis in Chapter 4, section 4.7 shows that the 
risk register represents an essential element of many methods. These methods tended 
to adopt various techniques to produce the risk register document to help decision 
makers within an organisation. However, there are limitations in using the Risk 
Register alone as it lacks risk visibility within a process.  
 
The Methodology was enhanced to explicitly represent risk. Secure*BPMN 
(Cherdantseva, 2014) was expanded by adding risk representation to it. The main 
processes in Information Security Risk Management (ISO 27005) were used as a basis 
to combine Risk Register and Business Process Modelling as an approach to manage 
security risks. This chapter will also explain the procedure taken to create Managing 
Security Risk – Business Process Modelling (MSR-BPM) as an approach to manage 
risks. 
 
The central purpose of using MSR-BPM is to help organisations prioritise, manage 
and provide options for treating the identified risks as well as provide a shared 
understanding of risks according to the stakeholder role, whether it is a process or 
activity risk. In addition, the approach provides traceability of risks to monitor risk 
modification and location. The use of MSR-BPM is reflected upon to explore the 
challenges that might occur during the implementation process as well as identify its 
limitations and potential usage in different industries.  
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5.2 Using RMIAS to Develop a Generic Reference Risk Register 
Table 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Information Security Management Systems (ISO 27001) 
is the most widely used security risk management standard; it is implemented in 163 
countries. ISO 27001 provides high-level guidelines for managing security risk, but it 
is complex and lacks detailed guidance. Using the ISO 27001 standard source 
document alone is, therefore, not sufficient to implement effective information 
security management systems (ISMS) for organisations. Detailed guidelines are 
required as various processes and controls are merely described in the standard without 
detailing the "how to" implement for practitioners. Providing detailed guidance for 
standards surfaced as a need to facilitate better understanding and to encourage wider 
adoption (Al-Ahmad and Mohammad, 2012). 
 
Therefore, an effective methodology is necessary to manage security risks holistically. 
Thus, research on the available literature was conducted to identify a framework; ISO 
27001 was adopted as a basis to expand the method. Reference Model of Information 
Assurance & Security (RMIAS) (Cherdantseva, 2014) is based on Information 
Security and Information Assurance standards and ISO/IEC 27000 family of 
standards; hence; RMIAS was adopted as part of the methodology framework. The 
RMIAS is the culmination of the analysis of the Information Assurance and Security 
(IAS) literature. It is a synthesis of the existing knowledge of the Information 
Assurance and Security (IAS) domain. It is intended for communicating IAS concepts 
to business experts and other non-technical audiences. It works at the level of high 
abstraction ignoring issues such as technical, legal or other issues, with which a non-
technical, non-security and business audience may be unfamiliar (Cherdantseva, 
2014). 
 
Also, the RMIAS is generic as any reference model should be. It tries to cover the 
aspects of IAS, which are relevant to the majority of organisations. This indicates that 
the RMIAS requires adaptation when being applied in the context of a particular 
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organisation. The RMIAS is flexible and allows organisation-specific adjustments 
(Cherdantseva, 2014). Hence, it can be adapted to the healthcare industry. 
Furthermore, the structure of the RMIAS is flexible to permit extensions, which may 
be necessary due to changes in an environment, society and technology. The current 
dimensions may be extended; for instance, new security goals, new types of security 
countermeasures may be added to the RMIAS or the information taxonomy may be 
extended and even new dimensions may be introduced (Cherdantseva, 2014).  
 Figure 5-1 depicts RMIAS framework, which has four dimensions:  
• Security Development Life Cycle Dimension (top left quadrant) demonstrates 
the progression of IAS along the Information System Development Life Cycle 
(ISDLC), 
• Information Taxonomy Dimension (top right quadrant) shows the 
characteristics of the information being protected, 
• Security Goals Dimension (bottom right quadrant) outlines the set of eight 
security goals; also referred to as the IAS-octave, 
• Security Countermeasures Dimension classifies security countermeasures. 
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Figure 5-1 The Reference Model of Information Assurance & Security (RMIAS) 
 
The RMIAS, starting from the top right quadrant, point out (1) what information an 
organisation has and needs to protect (the information taxonomy dimension), (2) what 
must be achieved in terms of security for each piece of information (the security goals 
dimension), (3) how the identified goals may be attained (the security countermeasures 
dimension) and (4) the cycle of security activities ensuring that the concepts of the 
other three dimensions are sufficiently addressed at every stage of the life cycle (the 
security development lifecycle dimension) (Cherdantseva, 2014). 
 
The four dimensions of the RMIAS do not overlap and do not duplicate each other. 
RMIAS starts from the top left quadrant. An organisation defines its current stage of 
the security life cycle and then goes over the other three dimensions to come back to 
the next stage of the life cycle. At the stage of requirements engineering, an 
organisation inventories its information assets, establishes and prioritises security 
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goals and selects security measures. At the stage of security design, an organisation 
ensures that all information assets, goals and measures identified in the previous step 
are consistently incorporated into and addressed by the system models. At the stages 
of implementation and management/monitoring, it must be ensured that (1) all 
countermeasures are implemented and function as designed and (2) the established 
security goals are achieved for every category of information (Cherdantseva and 
Hilton, 2014). 
 
The discussion provided by Cherdantseva and Hilton (2014) can be interpreted as a 
waterfall method. An organisation will move through four quadrants of the security 
system development lifecycle once. However, we need to be aware that the security 
system can be delivered in an iterative way and, in that case, an organisation will go 
through each of these four quadrants in each iteration rather than going through each 
phase of the life cycle in a sequential way.  
 
According to Salnitri et al., (2014), RMIAS is the result of an analysis and 
classification of security aspects proposed by a reference model on information 
assurance and security because it provides the most comprehensive set of security 
aspects. In addition, the RMIAS is used to help the organisation to revise the 
Information Security Policy Document (ISPD) to reflect the new circumstances 
because it undertook major changes to its business (Cherdantseva and Hilton, 2014). 
 
Although RMIAS provides a comprehensive view of information security, it did not 
cover risk management in detail.  Risk analysis is marked in RMIAS underneath the 
yellow arrow on the right-hand side (see Figure 5-1) to prioritise security goals. 
According to Cherdantseva and Hilton (2014) “The RMIAS is not Risk Analysis (RA) 
methodology, but it points out an important place of RA in the IAS domain and 
articulates the requirements towards an RA methodology which should assist with the 
creation of a detailed inventory of information and facilitate the prioritisation of 
security goals”. Risk analysis is a critical area in any domain; therefore, it needs to be 
addressed carefully and holistically. RMIAS did not address risk management in detail 
nor produce risk register as an output. The proposed approach in this research will 
address this gap.  
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RMIAS was used as a basis to structure the proposed process. Security Development 
Life Cycle Dimension (the top left quadrant) was replaced with the Information 
Security Management System (ISMS) processes in Figure 5-2 . It is believed that a 
risk management process is more appropriate because we are looking at risks that 
relate to a particular scenario or operational process rather than looking at the whole 
security system development life cycle. 
 
The proposed approach will use risk management process from ISO 27005 because it 
is an appropriate methodology for our domain to improve the ongoing process at the 
operational level to provide a shared awareness of security risk. 
 
Figure 5-2 Information Security Risk Management ISMS Processes 
 
RMIAS was used to develop a generic risk register table to document the risk name 
and risk description. The structure of the risk register was used to determine the 
taxonomy of risk information such as risk identification, risk analysis and risk 
evaluation. 
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The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) was 
used as a trusted source to identify the impact, likelihood and risk level for each risk 
because the researcher did not have the domain knowledge for risk evaluation. Table 
5-1 provides a sample of risk evaluation. This is an important analysis as it will show 
the decision makers which risk is critical and requires immediate mitigation and which 
risk is not significant to be managed. Other risks can be shared or transferred to another 
party. 
 
No 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/Description Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding patient 
confidential information and 
compliance . 
Very 
High       
Medium High  
Description Guaranteeing 
security in storing medical 
health records and 
safeguarding it with key 
regulations.  
 
Table 5-1  Sample of Risk Evaluation to Risk Register 
 
As RMIAS was applied to structure our thinking in creating the risk register, it was 
also used to identify security goals applicable to each risk because it addresses all the 
security goals in ISO 27000. Thus, a new column for security goals will be added to 
the risk register table. Having security goals within the risk register table may help in 
determining the countermeasure needed to modify the identified risk.  
 
Afterwards, a new column for security countermeasures was added to identify the 
adequate countermeasure for each risk. In some risks, more than one countermeasure 
is needed, for instance, technical and organisational. The details of each 
countermeasure will be discussed further in Chapter 6 when applying the hypothetical 
scenario. At this point, it can be clearly seen that RMIAS was used as a basis for 
creating a risk register table that lists the risk name, risk evaluation, security goals and 
security countermeasure. 
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Since the healthcare industry is focus of this research, Health Informatics-Information 
security management in health (ISO 27799:2008) and Health Informatics-Information 
security management in health (ISO 27799:2016) were utilised for identifying 
appropriate countermeasures such as information security document and access 
control policy. 
 
Forty-six risks of different types were identified through the literature published by 
the European Union Agency for Network Information Security (ENISA, 2012), Latif 
et al. (2014) and Mxoli et al. (2014). These risks could be categorised as Security, 
Management, Technical and Legal risks. Each risk’s name is briefly described, and 
customised according to the situation. In addition, each risk is critically evaluated 
according to healthcare context in the Government of Oman by using one of the two 
Omani cloud computing providers: Oman Data Park (ODP) or Information 
Technology Authority - Cloud (ITA-Cloud). ODP and ITA-Cloud hold the ISO 20000 
(IT service management) and ISO 27001 (Information Security Management System) 
certifications. These certifications confirm that ODP and ITA-cloud have an advanced 
IT service management that matches a globally recognised standard. In addition, they 
have Tier 3 certified “TIA 942 rating” and 24/7 Security Operations Center (ODP, 
2019).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Ministry of Health (MoH) in Oman uses cloud computing 
infrastructure to host the ministry’s website. It does not provide electronic health 
records to the patient. However, Cloud computing can provide the necessary future 
infrastructure for electronic health records because of its flexibility and accessibility. 
It can be utilized as a central repository for hospitals as it is capable of providing 
hospitals with the necessary on demand services, better authentication/authorization 
and data backups. In addition, it will allow scalable and elasticity demand for e-Health 
services. Healthcare professionals will be able to attend to their patients from 
anywhere at any time. Despite the wide range of benefits for using cloud computing 
services, there are risks relating to the project set up. Examples of these risks include 
Change Project Risks that arrive from migrating to the cloud, Operational Level Risks 
associated with the cloud Infrastructure managed by ODP and ITA-Cloud and 
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Operational Level Risks that will be managed by hospitals. The three types of risks 
will be discussed in general at this stage and they will be included in the generic 
reference risk register table which can be found in Appendix C. 
 
Although the initially discussed risks from the literature represented different types of 
risks, such as Management, Legal, Technical, and Security risks, the mapping process 
of survey questions in Chapter 3 (Appendix B) identified various risks such as 
Internet-based services, Human, Privacy, Technology, Organisational and 
Environmental risks in detail. Thus, an extra column was added for the perceived risks. 
This process showed that many survey questions were found in the literature (Mxoli 
et al., 2014; Latif et al., 2014) and this represented a major concern regarding risks. 
Table 5-2  represents a sample row of the updated risk register table. 
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No. 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/Description Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Risk 
Perception 
Security 
Goal 
Security Countermeasure 
 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding patient 
confidential information 
and compliance.  
Very 
High       
Medium High  Confidentia
lity  
 
Confident
iality  
Integrity 
Accounta
bility 
Auditabili
ty 
Technical: Dr. must have 
the right authentication and 
authorisation based on his 
role in storing medical 
health records and 
safeguarding them with key 
security regulations.  
 
Description :Risk of 
hospital staff disclosure 
of patient confidential 
information to someone 
else at the diagnose 
process.   
 
Sources: Mapped from Enisa 2012 Management interface compromise (manipulation, 
availability of infrastructure)  
ISO27799:2008 
7.8.1.2 Access control policy  
The organisation's policy on access control should be established by predefined roles of 
associated authorities which are consistent with, but limited to, the needs of that role. 
The access control policy, as a component of the information security policy framework 
described in  7.2.1 Information security policy document, 
shall reflect professional, ethical, legal and subject-of-care-related requirements and 
should take account of the tasks performed by health professionals and the task’s 
workflow. 
The importance of 
this risk to the 
healthcare context in 
Oman 
Medium- within Oman, hospital medical staff tend to reveal medical information to family 
members or a friend without recognising that this action is considered a breach of security. 
Thus, there is a need to raise awareness regarding disclosing patient information.   
 
Table 5-2  Sample Row of Updated Risk Register 
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The Risk Register table was updated after each stage, which resulted in the 
development of a comprehensive Reference Generic Risk Register (Appendix C). The 
Reference Generic Risk Register is one of the contributions of this research. 
 
The Reference Generic Risk Register document includes a range of different risks (46 
risks). A sample of management risk is illustrated in Table 5-3, a sample of security 
risk is presented in Table 5-4, a sample of technical risk is shown in Table 5-5 and a 
sample of legal risk is demonstrated in Table 5-6. 
 
However, there are limitations related to the generic reference risk register as it lacks 
visibility due to the size of the risk register table. In addition, it is too generic and high 
level so it can only be used for reference but not to a specific context. This is a concern 
as although ODP and ITA-Cloud have expertise in managing information security 
risks and utilising standards such as ISO 27000, this is not the case in the hospitals. 
The hospitals therefore need a more effective mechanism to gain a shared awareness 
of the security risks in their business processes to promote more effective 
communication of these risks.  
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No. 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/ Description Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Risk 
Perception 
Security Goal Countermeasure 
23 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Reduced staff productivity.  
 
Gap Gap Gap Technical 
Competence 
Accountability  Human Oriented:  
Ensure that experts 
are not dismissed. 
Involve them in the 
migration project ,so 
that they get a sense 
of ownership. 
Provide training in 
cloud technology and 
enable staff to learn 
new skills. 
Description During the migration 
and changes to staff work and jobs, 
uncertainty leads to low staff self-
esteem and nervousness spread in 
the organisation. 
 
 
The importance of this risk to 
the healthcare context in 
Oman 
Medium- the move to cloud will be a huge change to the hospital infrastructure. Thus, it needs 
careful consideration of the time and training needed to put the new system infrastructure in 
use. This risk has a critical effect on the work productivity as it can reduce the daily 
achievements by not keeping track on the daily work plan.  
Table 5-3  Sample of Management Risk 
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No. 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/Description Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Risk Perception Security Goal Countermeasure 
11 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Data protection risks 
Ref: Enisa,2012 
  
High 
Ref: 
Enisa,20
12 
 
High 
Ref: 
Enisa,2012 
 
High  
Ref: 
Enisa,
2012 
 
Data Security Confidentiality  
Privacy 
 Cryptography 
Technical 
Authorisation  
Authentication 
Legal  
 
Description Processing data in 
another country may 
experience difficulties 
regarding data protection 
legislation. In some cases, it is 
even considered unlawful by 
the data protection authority. 
Ref: Enisa, 2012 
Sources: 
ISO27799:2008 7.12.2.2 Data protection and privacy of personal information 
In addition to following the guidance given by ISO/IEC 27002, organizations processing 
personal health information should manage informational consent of subjects of care. 
Where possible, informational consent of subjects of care should be obtained before personal 
health information is e-mailed, faxed, or communicated by telephone conversation, or 
otherwise disclosed to parties external to the healthcare organization. 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- According to Royal Degree, data stored centrally in Oman. It would be managed by 
ODP and ITA-Cloud. Thus it reduces the complication of rules and regulation of saving 
sensitive data abroad. This risk can be high when it moves outside Oman (this will be 
discussed further in Chapter 6). 
Table 5-4  Sample of Security Risk 
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No. 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/Description Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Risk 
Perception 
Security 
Goal 
Countermeasure 
41 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Network Breaks 
Description: Loss of Internet 
connectivity due to failures at the 
Cloud Customer’s site or the 
Internet service provider, 
temporarily reduced network 
bandwidth on the path between 
Cloud Customer (CC) and Cloud 
Provider (CP), and disruptions in 
the global Internet routing 
infrastructure leading to the loss 
of the network path between CC 
and CP, and failures of the CP’s 
Internet connectivity. 
Medium Medium Medium Availability  
   
Availability  
Integrity  
Technical: use multiple 
cloud providers in 
different locations to 
ensure data protection 
and minimise the loss. 
This will require 
additional costs. 
 
The importance of this risk to 
the healthcare context in 
Oman  
This depends on the communication speed which is provided by the telecommunication 
companies as hospitals in the capital might have fibre optic; however, rural hospitals are still 
using dial-up 56kps which does not work with cloud. Therefore, only hospitals that have fibre 
optic can use the cloud computing service. and state in the service level agreement the 
condition of network break.  
 
Table 5-5 Sample of Technical Risk 
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No. 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/Description Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Risk 
Perception 
Security 
Goal 
Countermeasure 
43 
L
eg
al
 
Risk from changes of jurisdiction 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
Medium 
 
Medium  
 
Out of scope 
 
Gap Legal: 
cloud customers need to 
be fully aware and 
understand the rules 
regarding where their 
data is held (Berry and 
Reisman, 2012). 
Description: the Legal and 
regulatory framework of where 
data is held tend to change 
according to rules and regulation 
within the custodians country 
(Berry & Reisman, 2012). 
  
The importance of  risk to the 
healthcare context in Oman 
Low- in Oman, Cloud providers (ODP and ITA-Cloud) hold all the data centrally according to 
Royal Degree. However, there is a need to set up legal agreement between MoH and ODP or 
ITA-Cloud in case of communicating with an international hospital.  
Table 5-6 Sample of Legal Risk 
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Having cloud computing as a motivating example helped to improve the understanding of risks, 
level of abstraction, security goals as well as creating a risk register with comprehensive 
countermeasures. It is useful to separate the identified risks into risk management perspectives 
(Figure 4-2). These are strategic risks, change project risks and operational risks which will be 
managed differently within an organisation. The risks can be categorised into the following: 
• Change project risks associated with introducing cloud computing into the hospital. 
• Operational risk associated with central cloud infrastructure managed by ODP and ITA-
Cloud. 
• Operational risks with the hospital  
 
The scope of this research will focus on operational risks associated with the business process 
(see Table 5-7). For instance, Identity and Access Management relate to having the right access 
to the process. On the other hand, Economic Denial of Service is a Central Infrastructure Risk 
which can affect the entire system within the hospital.  
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Change Project Risks associated with 
introducing cloud computing 
 
Operational Level Risks associated 
with cloud Infrastructure managed by 
ODP and ITA-Cloud 
 
Operational Level Risks associated 
with hospital 
 
  
• Loss of Governance  
• Interoperability Issues 
• Managing System Deployment  
• Multi-tenancy  
• Resource Exhaustion  
• Reduce staff productivity  
• Data Lock In  
 
 
• Economic Denial of Service. 
• Insecure deletion of data. 
• Network Breaks  
• Loss of Backup 
• Loss of Encryption Key. 
• Social Engineering Attacks. 
• Temporary Outages  
• Data Loss and Leakage  
• Modifying Network Traffic  
• Federated Authentication  
• Physical Intrusion  
• Software Intrusions  
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
Attacks.  
 
• Malicious Insider  
• Identity & Access Management 
• Third Party access 
• Lack of ICT skills. 
• Language Barrier. 
• Data Protection 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-7  Summary of Different Level Risks 
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The next section will discuss the main contribution of this thesis, namely Managing 
the Security Risk-Business Process Model (MSR-BPM) approach as a way to manage 
security risks within a process. The approach focuses on Security Risks as these were 
the main area of concern that was discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
5.3 Managing Security Risk-Business Process Model (MSR-BPM) 
Approach 
 
The limitations of the approach discussed in section 5.2 led to the need to enhance the 
methodology to ensure the visibility of risks and provide a shared understanding. The 
researcher applied an enhanced methodology to combine risk register and BPM to 
create a new approach to manage risks. The proposed approach, Managing Security 
Risk-Business Process Model (MSR-BPM), combines risk register and business 
process modelling for managing risks. A risk register documents the assessment of 
risk with appropriate countermeasures. BPM visualises the risks, activities, roles, 
security goals and countermeasures in the process models to promote a shared 
understanding of risks to decision makers and stakeholders. It is important to visualize 
the risk location in a process or activity level especially when there are different 
locations involved.  
 
Secure*BPMN (Cherdantseva, 2014) was considered because it uses Business Process 
Modelling to model security. Secure*BPMN meets the necessary characteristics of 
security modelling as it features easy-to-learn and easy-to-use graphical Information 
Assurance Security (IAS) modelling notation, which is accessible by all members of 
a multidisciplinary team, irrespective of the area of their expertise. It is based on a 
shared understanding of the IAS domain among the members of a multidisciplinary 
team. In addition, the semantics of Secure*BPMN is based upon the Reference Model 
of Information Assurance and Security (RMIAS). RMIAS is based on ISO 27001 and 
intended for communicating Information Assurance and Security (IAS) concepts to 
business experts and other non-technical audiences. It reflects a shared understanding 
of IAS and is, therefore, suitable for an approach to IAS in a multidisciplinary team. 
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The syntax of Secure*BPMN was designed specifically for human understanding and 
communication improvement purposes (Cherdantseva, 2014). However, 
Secure*BPMN did not model risk or discuss the risk management concept.  
 
Secure*BPMN (Cherdantseva, 2014) was extended by adding risk representation to 
enhance the methodology to explicitly manage information security risks within an 
organisation. The approach will be based on ISO27005’s main Information Security 
Risk Management processes and combines risk register and business process 
modelling to Manage Security Risks-Business Process Modelling (MSR-BPM). The 
emphasis of the MSR-BPM approach is focused on the importance of both 
documenting the risks and countermeasures in the risk register as well as visualising 
the whole process in the Business Process Models to identify security risks within 
every process and activity to enhance shared awareness and understanding of risks. 
Therefore, it will provide an effective way of visualising and documenting risks with 
the healthcare processes to help staff have a shared understanding of the identified risk 
and the appropriate countermeasures associated with their roles in the process. 
 
Some might argue that it may be sufficient to add a risk representation to 
Secure*BPMN, but this would be missing the risk register. Having a risk register 
document is a very important element within MSR-BPM approach as it maintains 
records of the risk name, type, location as well as a suitable countermeasure. It 
enhances the understanding of risk and maintains a record when a risk is mitigated or 
modified. Having Secure*BPMN on its own does not really help in understanding the 
risk, particularly in terms of providing the details of the countermeasure needed in 
place. Therefore, a risk register is significant as it provides an in-depth analysis of the 
risk and countermeasure in detail.  Also, risk registers are widely adopted in the 
healthcare domain. Hence, BPMN and risk register are needed to provide a holistic 
view regarding how to manage risk.  
 
To clarify the contribution of this thesis, a comparison table was created, showing 
BPMN, Secure*BPMN and MSR-BPM in Table 5-8.  
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 BPMN Secure*BPMN MSR-BPM 
Roles √ As BPMN As BPMN 
Locations √ As BPMN As BPMN 
Activities √ As BPMN As BPMN 
In flow √ As BPMN As BPMN 
Security Goals  √ As Secure*BPMN 
Risks   √ 
Countermeasures  √ As Secure*BPMN 
Risk Register    √ 
Traceability    √ 
Table 5-8  Comparison Table between BPMN, Secure*BPMN and MSR-BPM 
 
Table 5-8 highlights the contribution of this thesis through combining Risk Register 
and Secure*BPMN to create a new methodology MSR-BPM to visualise risks 
graphically within business processes. MSR-BPM helps to address the operational 
risks perspective (see Figure 4-2) through understanding operational risks more 
holistically as it represents day-to-day operational activities, which include people, 
processes and information security. Secure*BPMN helps to identify security concerns 
within processes but it does not explicitly represent risk. The risk register can identify 
what the risks are and what actions need to be taken. However, it does not include the 
people and processes needed in place. Therefore, MSR-BPM is an integrated approach 
which considers the operational risks holistically as it includes a process diagram and 
risk register.  
 
MSR-BPM represents the link between people, business processes, IT and security 
concerns as important issues to manage risks. Also, the way of representing the risk 
within the triangle shape (Figure 5-4) to distinguish different types of risks as security, 
management, technical, legal and clinical. In addition, MSR-BPM represents the 
requirements needed to manage risk within the IT system by showing the risk location, 
creating the risk register and having a traceability column to easily track any changes 
within the risk identified. This combination of methods emphasises the novelty of 
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MSR-BPM as an integrated approach to manage risks within a business processes 
model.  
 
Figure 5-3 illustrates the MSR-BPM approach. Each stage of MSR-BPM will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section. In addition, the application of the approach 
will be discussed through a hypothetical scenario in Chapter 6 and then this approach 
will be evaluated in Chapter 7.  
 
Chapter 5: Methodology Framework  
170 | P a g e  
 
M
S
R
-B
P
M
BPM annotated 
with 
countermeasure
Start
Identify Risk
BPM annotated 
with risk
Generate Risk 
Register 
Updated Risk 
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 BPM Diagram
Literature 
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Define 
Security Goals
BPM annotated 
with risk level
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Countermeasure
ENISA
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    Risk Register
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-Security goals
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-Risk description
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- Risk impact
-Risk likelihood
-Risk level
Update Risk register
-Countermeasures
  
Figure 5-3 MSR- BPM Process 
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5.3.1 Establish Context  
 
At this stage, it is necessary to understand and represent the workflow within the 
scenario. Collecting information for the situation being investigated will help in 
modelling activities and tasks processes within an organisation; it can provide a 
holistic view of the process. It will show the process involved as well as activities, 
Swimlane, inflows and locations. In addition, it will help in terms of learning about 
the artefacts involved, processes, activities, events and location. Creating BPM 
diagram is important to visualise the whole process. Thus, the output of this stage will 
be a business process modelling diagram, which will view the current situation with 
the right level of abstraction and infrastructure.  
  
5.3.2 Identify Risk  
 
Risk identification is a vital stage to determine what could happen to cause a potential 
loss and to gain insight into how, where and why the loss might occur. It involves the 
identification of risk sources, events, their causes and their potential consequences 
(ISO 27005:2011). Secure*BPMN (Cherdantseva, 2014) was used to understand and 
identify the security requirements. Secure*BPMN helped to deal with security issues 
at the stage of security requirements engineering and provided a view of security 
matters in business process models; for instance, access control permission within the 
different locations. Therefore, MSR-BPM will expand Secure*BPMN by adding risk 
management to it.  
 
Following a review of the literature (ENISA, 2012; Hosseini, 2013; Mxoli et al., 2014; 
Latif et al., 2014), various types of risks were identified; security, management; 
technical and legal risks. These were addressed in the preliminary interview and 
questionnaire. Further risks were identified to cover clinical risks.  
 
The triangle shape for road hazards was adopted to represent the risk in BPM diagram. 
Then, Google Search Engine was used using the risk name as a keyword search; Figure 
5-4 shows the various types of risk. Figure 5.4a represents security risks with a 
padlock. Figure 5.4b represents management risk with a human and padlock. Figure 
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5.4c illustrates the technical risk with a gear. Figure 5.4d identifies legal risk. Figure 
5.4e identifies clinical risk. The following shapes in Figure 5-4 are useful to visualise 
the risk in BPM diagram. It will assist in recognising the risk type and location either 
in the process or at the activity level. 
 
 
Figure 5-4 Risks Types 
 
This thesis will focus on security risk (Figure 5.4a). Risk types b-e are out of the scope 
of this research due to time constraints but will be useful to explore in future research. 
Process models will only include security risks.  
 
5.3.3 Generate Risk Register  
 
By using the literature to identify risk types, a risk register was created to list the risk 
type, name and a brief description to explain the risk associated with the roles in detail. 
A sample of a generated risk register is shown in Table 5-9. 
No. 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/Description 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-9  Sample of Risk Register 
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5.3.4 Risk Evaluation 
 
Risk evaluation is an essential process as it shows the extent to which the 
vulnerabilities were known, and to understand the nature of risk. With the use of 
selected methods or approaches, risk evaluation is used to compare the estimated risks 
against the risk evaluation criteria that were defined during the stage of context 
establishment to assist in deciding the risk treatment to be undertaken. Decision 
makers will use risk evaluation criteria to make sure that decisions are consistent with 
defined external and internal information security risk management context and take 
into account the objectives of the organisation and stakeholder views. These decisions 
are mainly based on the acceptable level of risk. However, consequences, likelihood, 
and the degree of confidence in risk identification and analysis should be considered 
as well. Risk evaluation uses the understanding of risk obtained by risk analysis to 
make decisions about future actions. Decisions should include whether an activity 
should be undertaken and priorities risk treatment according to the estimated levels of 
risks. 
 
The risk register table will be updated by adding three columns: risk impact, likelihood 
and risk level. The BPM diagram will be updated by using colours. The MSR-BPM 
did not adopt the Traffic Light Protocol classification outlined in Jensen et al. (2016), 
but reproduced it again as in column 4 in Table 5-10 to identify risk level for security 
risk.  
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1.Traffic 
Light 
Proposal 
Labels 
2.Colour  
3.Traffic 
Light 
Proposal 
Classification  
4.MSR-BPM  
Risk Label 
5.MSR-BPM 
Classification Schema  
 
Red 
Highly 
Sensitive  
Red-High Risk 
 
Amber Sensitive 
 
Amber-Medium Risk  
 
Green  
Normal 
Business 
 
Yellow-Low Risk 
 
 
White Public  
 Green-Opportunity 
Risk  
Table 5-10  Information Classification Scheme 
 
In addition, the perception of risk may change according to the stakeholders’ team 
involved in the discussion as it will be presented through the application scenario in 
Chapter 6. MSR-BPM approach is useful, as it will visualise the perception of risk in 
the risk register and BPM diagram.  
 
5.3.5 Define Security Goal  
 
Reference Model of Information Assurance & Security (RMIAS) (Cherdantseva, 
2014) was used as an input to define security goals. There are eight security goals 
adopted from Information Security Management Systems (ISO 27000): 
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Accountability, Authenticity/Trustworthiness, 
Auditability, Non-repudiation and Privacy. Information security management in 
health (ISO 27799:2008) adopted the same security goals as an essential element for 
healthcare information security. The central purpose of a security goal is to help with 
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the identification of security countermeasures needed to mitigate threats of a particular 
type (Cherdantseva, 2014). Therefore, the risk register table was updated by adding a 
security goals column. The BPM diagram adopted Secure*BPMN notation form to 
visualise the security goal for each risk. Each risk might have one or more security 
goals, depending on its type. Table 5-11 shows the updated risk register with security 
goals.  
 
No. 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/ 
Description 
Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
level  
Security Goal 
 
 
     
   
Table 5-11 Updated Risk Register with Security Goal 
 
5.3.6 Identify Countermeasure  
 
After evaluating the risk level and security goals, Information Security Management 
Systems (ISO 27000), Information Security Management in Health (ISO 27799:2008 
and 2016) and Risk management standard (ISO 31000) were used to identify the 
appropriate countermeasures for each risk. Also, the countermeasure symbols defined 
in Secure*BPMN (Cherdantseva, 2014) were adopted to update BPM diagram with 
countermeasure symbols. Figure 5-5 represents countermeasure shape and name. The 
risk register table was updated by adding a countermeasure column.  
 
 
Figure 5-5 Countermeasure Shape and Name 
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5.3.7 Update Risk Register with Traceability 
 
At this stage, a challenge of tracking the changes in terms of risk persists. For instance, 
some risks may be classified as low but cause another risk to occur. Thus, it is 
necessary to locate risk changes easily. As such, a risk register will be used as an input 
to add a traceability column to facilitate the referencing of risk location, especially 
when there are different organisations involved. BPM diagram visualises the position 
of risk, whether it is in a process, activity level or inflow. Section 6.2.7 provides a 
clear example of an updated risk register with traceability.  
 
Although MSR-BPM helps to provide traceability across the different organisations 
and disciplines, it does not provide provenance. The concept of provenance is applied 
to data and information generated within a computer system. The provenance of an 
item of data is represented in a computer system by some suitable documentation of 
the process that produced the data, called process documentation. This documentation 
can be complete or partial; it can be accurate or inaccurate; it can present conflicting 
or consensual views of the actors involved; it can be detailed or not. Provenance is 
investigated in an open, large-scale systems typically designed using a service-
oriented approach (Kifor et al., 2006). Provenance information can be a resource for 
“reflection-in-action” during analysis, supporting collaboration between analysts, and 
it can help trace data quality and uncertainty through the analysis process. It can also 
act as a resource after the event, supporting the interpretation of claims, audit, 
accountability, and training (Xu et al., 2015). 
 
In healthcare, Agent-oriented cooperation techniques and standardized electronic 
healthcare record exchange protocols can be used to combine information regarding 
different facets of a therapy received by a patient from different healthcare providers 
at different locations. Provenance-awareness enables users to trace how a particular 
result has been produced by identifying the individual and aggregated services that 
produced a particular output. This helps users to gain an integrated view of the 
treatment process executed by distributed autonomous agents, and to be able to carry 
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out audits of the system to assess whether, for a given patient, the proper decisions 
were made and the proper procedures were followed (Kifor et al., 2006). However, 
provenance can be addressed in future research since it is beyond the scope of this 
research. To some extent, the risk and countermeasures can be expanded broadly as 
this research did not cover the clinical risks and other elements from a management 
perspective, which can be added as future research as well. In the current research, the 
focus is centred on security risks.  
 
MSR-BPM can be adopted within different industries, such as Telecommunications, 
Banks, and Education, as it is suited to managing complicated processes. When there 
is a risk within the process, it is hard to show especially when there are multiple 
organisations involved in the process. MSR-BPM helps to show traceability across 
different institutions and disciplinaries, such as in the Integrated Care Pathway (ICP) 
for breast cancer that will be discussed in Chapter 7 where the MSR-BPM approach 
is being evaluated. 
 
5.4 Anticipated Benefit of Combining Risk Register with BPM 
 
There are many benefits of combining risk register with business process modelling 
in MSR-BPM. Table 5-12 illustrates these features in detail.  
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No Risk Management Processes  
ISO27005:2011 standard Overview  
 
Risk Register Table 
Business Process 
Modelling (BPM) 
1 Establish Context  
 
The external and internal context for 
information security risk management 
(ISRM) should be established. This 
involves setting the basic criteria necessary 
for information security risk management, 
defining the scope and boundaries, and 
establishing an appropriate organisation 
operating the information security risk 
management. 
 
Helps to report and 
communicate risks 
within an organisation. 
 
Contributes to showing 
staff roles and location 
so staff can gain a 
shared understanding of 
risk in the process. 
 
  
2 Risk Assessment 
 
 
Risk 
Identification  
Risk identification is to determine what 
could happen to cause a potential loss and 
to gain insight into how, where and why 
the loss might occur. It involves the 
identification of risk sources, events, their 
causes and their potential consequences.  
 
Identifies risk name 
with a short 
description.  
 
Helps to identify risk 
type Security (S), 
Management (M), 
Technical (T) and 
legal (L) by name.  
Identify risk’s name in 
different stages; process, 
activities and flow 
dependency.  
 
Helps to identify risk 
type S, M, T  and L by 
symbol. 
Risk 
Analysis 
 
Risk analysis may be undertaken in varying 
degrees of detail depending on the 
criticality of assets, extent of vulnerabilities 
known, and prior incidents occurring in the 
organisation.  
The process comprehends the nature of risk 
and determines the level of risk. 
It identifies risks’ 
level. 
It shows different risks’ 
level through colour 
indication (e.g. red, 
amber, yellow and 
green).  
Risk 
Evaluation  
 
The process of comparing the results of 
risk analysis with risk criteria to determine 
whether the risk and its magnitude is 
acceptable or tolerable. 
It identifies Impact and 
Likelihood. 
Does not show. 
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3 Risk Treatment  
 
Risk 
Modification 
The level of risk should be managed by 
introducing, removing or altering controls 
so that the residual risk can be reassessed 
as being acceptable. 
It identifies the 
countermeasure in 
detail. 
Indicates 
countermeasure symbol 
and name. 
Risk 
Retention 
(accepting) 
The decision on retaining the risk without 
further action should be taken depending 
on risk evaluation. 
Risk 
Avoidance  
The activity or condition that gives rise to 
the particular risk should be avoided and a 
process added to effect the treatment. 
 
Risk Sharing The risk should be shared with another 
party that can most effectively manage the 
particular risk, depending on risk 
evaluation and additional risk-mitigation 
processes inserted.  
4 Monitoring & Review  
 
Risks and their factors (i.e. the value of 
assets, impacts, threats, vulnerabilities, the 
likelihood of occurrence) should be 
monitored and discussed to identify any 
changes in the context of the organisation 
at an early stage and to maintain an 
overview of the complete risk picture. 
Update Risk Register 
to find risks associated 
with change. 
Update process to 
clearly visualise how 
risks altered due to 
change. 
5 Communication and Consultation  
 
 
Risk communication is an activity to 
achieve agreement on how to manage risks 
by exchanging and sharing information 
about risk between the decision-makers and 
other stakeholders. The information 
includes, but is not limited to, the 
existence, nature, form, likelihood, 
severity, treatment, and acceptability of 
risks. 
 Roles, activities location 
and storage are shown in 
model. 
Gives all parties a 
shared understanding of 
risk. 
Table 5-12 Benefits of Using Risk Register with BPM
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5.5 Reflection   
 
It was a challenge to use RMIAS to create a Risk Register table because the scope 
covered all stages in the Security Development Life Cycle (SDLC). The approach is 
concerned with managing risk so it became necessary to change the SDLC (top left 
quadrant) to ISMS Processes. In addition, there was the need to change Information 
Taxonomy Dimension (top right quadrant) to risk information taxonomy in terms of 
risk identification, risk assessment and risk analysis.  
 
In addition, various challenges were faced in creating the MSR-BPM approach. It was 
recognised that Secure*BPMN was a strong candidate for modelling security concerns 
but the process required a lot of research. First, the researcher was unfamiliar with 
Business Process Modelling technique that represents a vital part in developing the 
approach. Therefore, Information Technology Object Management Group Business 
Process Model and Notation (ISO 19510:2013) was studied in order to understand the 
basic requirements for creating BPMN diagram. If the stakeholders do not have 
experience in using BPM or the help of an experienced business analysist, then it can 
be a barrier to adopting MSR-BPM. Therefore, a multi-disciplinary team among the 
stakeholders is needed to gain a holistic view of risks and capture multiple different 
perceptions.  
 
Risk Modelling and Risk Register were added as an extension to Secure*BPMN. 
Then, Dr. Wendy Ivins and Dr. Yulia Cherdantseva were requested to validate the 
BPM diagram, based on their knowledge and expertise in the area. Confirmation was 
required from Dr. Yulia Cherdantseva that the extensions were compatible with her 
approach. Dr. Cherdantseva did not address risk management in RMIAS or 
Secure*BPM. However, she showed where it is applicable to address in the IAS 
domain and indicated the requirements for a Risk Analysis methodology which should 
assist with the creation of a detailed inventory of information and facilitate the 
prioritisation of security goals. She agreed with the addition of risk representation as 
an extension to Secure*BPMN. In fact, Dr. Cherdantseva was one of the evaluators of 
the MSR-BPM approach, in Chapter 7; she provided constructive comments and 
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positive feedback. She highlighted certain areas for improvements which were 
incorporated into the methodology presented. The use of a risk register did not feature 
in her approach.  
 
Difficulties were faced in creating the MSR-BPM approach in the healthcare context, 
as this was not a familiar area of knowledge and expertise for the researcher. 
Therefore, there was a close liaison with healthcare practitioners within health centres 
in Oman. In addition, searching for risk symbols was a challenge as these are intended 
to be clearly understandable for the general public with different backgrounds. 
Adopting the triangle shape based on road hazards was the closest option to reality as 
the general public, whether drivers or pedestrians, are aware of road signs. In terms of 
the inter-shape, the most applicable and simple symbol was chosen to reflect the risk 
type as discussed in 5.3.2. MSR-BPM approach can identify new risk categories 
according to the problem domain. As an example from the healthcare context, the 
restriction of file access may prevent or delay important information from being 
disseminated within multi-disciplinary teams meeting in different locations; this will 
delay the treatment plan for the patient, and, as consequence, it may impact on 
patients’ wellbeing.  
 
The limitation of MSR-BPM approach in the current research is that it does not address 
the clinical, legal, technical, organisational and environmental risks in detail and this 
will be addressed in future research. It was identified that clinical risks can be added 
to the process but the original research did not address this area.  
 
Extensive research was conducted to gain a deeper understanding of the cloud 
computing domain and healthcare. However, the knowledge and expertise gained was 
quite limited to a theoretical background only. Therefore, it is important to validate 
the approach based on the advice of experts in risk management, business process 
modelling and healthcare.  
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MSR-BPM approach is useful when there is a complicated process that handles 
multiple locations and stakeholders because it can identify the risks in each process; 
this will be evaluated in Chapter 6. Besides, MSR-BPM helps to provide traceability 
across the different organisations and disciplines, but it does not provide provenance. 
Provenance in healthcare represents an innovative approach to trace events in complex 
distributed processes, dependencies between such events, and associated decisions by 
human actors. Provenance can be addressed as part of future research. Traceability 
will be revealed in the application of the methodology through a hypothetical case 
study scenario in Chapter 6.   
 
There are other ways to represent risk register by adding other columns, such as risk 
ID, risk mitigation action, risk owner, progress in action, risk dependencies and risk 
status. Organisations should adopt MSR-BPM to fit the way that they represent risk 
tables in their organisation. However, it is strongly recommended to add a column for 
risk location within their risk register to easily link the diagram to the table.   
 
The Managing Security Risk-Business Process Modelling (MSR-BPM) approach has 
been developed to address risks in the context of healthcare. However, it can be 
broadly used in any industry that would benefit from modelling risks, such as 
Telecommunications, Education, Banks and Oil and Gas risks. The MSR-BPM 
approach can provide a shared understanding of risks among stakeholders as well as 
enhance communication between different locations, as will be explained in detail in 
Chapter 6.   
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 5 proposed an approach to manage risks by addressing visibility and shared 
awareness of risk. It introduced using Reference Model of Information Assurance and 
Security (RMIAS) (Cherdantseva, 2014) to develop a Generic Reference Risk 
Register Table. It also helped to determine the taxonomy of risk information as risk 
identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. A generic reference risk register table 
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was developed as a contribution of this research that identified forty-six risks from the 
literature. These risks were categorised as Security, Management, Technical and Legal 
risks. Also, it used ENISA (2012) as a trusted source to identify the impact, likelihood 
and risk level for each risk. RMIAS limitations were examined and ISMS processes 
were used as a basis for developing different approaches. A risk register document 
was created to provide the assessment of risk with appropriate countermeasures. It also 
included information about the Omani context and how relevant each risk is to 
healthcare in Oman. This can serve as a useful reference if Oman decides to adopt 
cloud computing to enhance the workflow within and between hospitals.  
Nevertheless, there were limitations related to using risk register alone as it lacks risk 
visibility within a process.  
 
The methodology was enhanced to represent risks explicitly in business process 
models. Secure*BPMN (Cherdantseva, 2014) was expanded by adding risk 
representation to it. The proposed methodology used the main processes in 
Information Security Risk Management (ISO 27005) as a basis to combine Risk 
Register (RR) and Business Process Modelling (BPM) to manage security risks. 
Managing Security Risk-Business Process Modelling (MSR-BPM) approach was used 
to visualise risks in a healthcare process and promote a shared understanding of these 
risks for stakeholders. 
 
The anticipated benefits of RR and BPM are listed in Table 5-12 to show the 
effectiveness of combining them. This will be further explained in Chapter 7.  The 
stages of creating MSR-BPM approach are presented in Figure 5-3 to reveal the 
different stages in its development.  
 
The MSR-BPM approach was reflected on to explain the challenges in creating the 
approach. This research purely focuses on security risk; however, MSR-BPM can be 
broadly used within any industry to show all of the complicated processes involved. 
Applying MSR-BPM approach is useful to determine risks, especially when multiple 
organisations are participating in the process. Also, it helps in showing traceability 
across the different organisations and disciplines, as will be shown in the application 
of the methodology through a hypothetical case study scenario in Chapter 6.   
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Chapter 6 will present the application of MSR-BPM approach through a hypothetical 
case study scenario which was used in the preliminary interviews in Chapter 3. It will 
illustrate all stages of MSR-BPM in detail. In addition, it will identify the risks in the 
current situation and in using cloud computing as a solution for enhancing the 
workflow between two hospitals 
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6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will introduce the application of the methodology through a hypothetical 
case study scenario that was used during the preliminary interview in Chapter 3. It will 
utilise the MSR-BPM approach to visualise risks in a healthcare process and promote 
a shared understanding of the risks for stakeholders. Each stage of the MSR-BPM will 
be addressed in two ways. Firstly, the approach used by the author in this research for 
modelling the scenario will be discussed and, secondly, it will be anticipated how a 
group of stakeholders might model the approach in practice. In addition, it will identify 
the risks in the workflow in the current situation and compare the risks in using cloud 
computing as a solution for enhancing the workflow between two hospitals.  
 
The Ministry of Health (MoH) in Oman are still in the early stages in cloud computing 
adoption. The ministry uses cloud computing as infrastructure as a service (IaaS) to 
host the ministry’s website in the cloud. Chapter 3 section 3.8 highlighted the 
perceptions of security concerns of patients’ medical records were a key barrier to 
adopting cloud computing services.  
 
Applying MSR-BPM approach to the hypothetical case study scenario represents a 
theoretical exercise to prepare Oman for the advent of cloud computing systems into 
Omani environment in the future. It demonstrates the value of using MSR-BPM 
approach to identify and manage security risk.   
 
6.2 Hypothetical Case Study Scenario 
 
To examine MSR-BPM approach, a hypothetical case study was used during the 
interview in Chapter 3. The case study assumes that an Omani resident (either citizen 
or expatriate), say patient A, suffers from severe headaches and goes to the health 
centre for treatment. When the doctor diagnoses patient A, he suspects that he is 
suffering from a head tumour. Therefore, he refers him to a hospital to see a senior 
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specialist. The senior specialist requests that further investigation is carried out, such 
as blood test and MRI. The results reveal that the patient suffers from a malignant 
head tumour and requires an urgent medical procedure, say surgery, to be carried 
out. The patient decides to travel to a foreign country, say Germany, to carry out the 
surgery because they are unable to schedule urgent surgery in a suitably short 
timescale due to a lack of resources in Oman. 
 
If patient A is traveling on government expenses to carry out the surgery abroad, then 
the foreign treatment department will contact the international hospital on his behalf 
and send a copy of his medical report via e-mail. If patient A is travelling on his own 
expenses, then he has to contact the international hospital himself. 
 
Although patient A has a hard copy of his medical report, the international hospital 
doctor (Germany) is unable to access the medical records stored in Oman’s 
healthcare establishments; thus, the hospital in Germany has to conduct various 
medical tests and procedures (e.g. x-ray examinations). Unless patient A remains in 
Germany after the surgery, collaboration and communication between the healthcare 
workers in both Germany and Oman will be required to provide seamless follow-up 
post-surgery care. This is not currently possible in the existing Omani healthcare 
system.  
  
A generic workflow of patient pathway was created to understand the steps in the 
health centre which can be found in Appendix D.1. Then hospital workflow was 
developed to understand the processes and activities as shown in Figure  6-1. 
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Figure  6-1 Generic Workflow in Oman Hospital 
 
In this research, we will use MSR-BPM approach (as shown in Figure 5-3) to address 
each stage in patient A’s BPM diagram. This will be discussed in two ways: first, how 
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the scenario was modelled in this research and, secondly, how this could be addressed 
in practice. To do this, it will be assumed that relevant stakeholders, namely patient 
representatives, clinicians, Information Technology Authority- Cloud (ITA-Cloud) 
security analyst, Omani government representative and a representative from the 
external hosting data centre will work with a business analyst to apply MSR-BPM.  
 
For this research, the focus will be on the surgery performed abroad as the surgery 
cannot be done within a reasonable time frame in Oman. Therefore, patient A will 
request a hard copy of his medical report as well as a copy of the MRI reported on CD 
and make travel arrangements to go to the German hospital. He will give this report to 
the doctor in the German hospital. Patient A’s BPM diagram will be presented in 
Figure- 6-2. 
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Figure- 6-2  Patient BPM Diagram 
 
The team will gather to discuss the process that the patient has to follow in order to 
have the surgery performed abroad. Therefore, MSR-BPM steps will proceed as 
follows. 
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6.2.1 Establishing the Context  
 
6.2.1.1 Author’s Approach 
Firstly, it was necessary to establish the context in the healthcare domain. There are 
commonly used processes for checking the patient. Healthcare professionals cannot 
create a pathway for every patient, but we are using patient’s pathway as an example 
workflow to help us think through exactly what is happening.  
 
A business process model was developed for patient’s pathway in the Oman Hospital. 
Figure 6-3 illustrates patient’s pathway in BPM diagram which was generated from 
the current process based on the scenario input.  
 
BPM diagram will present the Oman hospital at the process level, and the core 
activities are; Referral form received; Transfer to Senior Specialist clinic; Request 
more tests; Discuss the results with patient and suggest surgery; Surgery cannot be 
scheduled in a reasonable timeframe and Patient decides to travel abroad to perform 
the surgery.  
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Figure 6-3 Patient’s Hospital BPM 
 
6.2.1.2 Consideration for Stakeholder Team of MSR-BPM 
 
In practice, the stakeholder team would not model each patient’s pathway 
independently. However, they can use a scenario such as the one above to help them 
personalise the process and consider risk for a particular case. The stakeholder team 
will have different perceptions of patient’s pathway and may add different processes 
or activities based on their knowledge and experience from practice. The stakeholder 
team may start to identify the risks within the common process. In addition, they need 
to be careful not to overload the modelling diagram with symbols for every activity.   
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6.2.2 Identify Risk 
 
6.2.2.1 Author’s Approach 
 
Security risks were considered which relate to data security, confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of patient medical records. The Reference Generic Risk Register Table 
(Appendix C) was used to identify the security risks for the hypothetical scenario.  
 
Secure*BPMN was adopted to understand the security requirements within the 
healthcare context. For instance, who can access the patient healthcare records? Will 
the patient be able to view his/her medical record online, and what are the threats 
associated with the process, activity or flow at each stage? The access permission will 
not be explored in detail in this thesis as it has already been addressed in another 
research (Burnap et al., 2012; Cherdantseva, 2014).  
 
Malicious insiders were considered as a potential risk within a process level as it can 
apply to the whole process. An employee who has high access privileges could abuse 
their role by utilising the granted rights to leak classified and sensitive data. Similarly, 
safeguarding patient information is applicable for the whole process.  
 
In terms of activity risks, Identity theft risk, was considered in relation to the referral 
form received. Identity theft means using another person's name and personal 
information in order to obtain confidential details. For instance, a person might pretend 
to be the patient to know the status of the referral form without the patient permission 
which would breach patient confidentiality. In addition, Identity access management 
risk was considered in Request more tests activity. A doctor might use another 
username and password to gain access to highly sensitive patient information which 
is beyond his access roles privileges. Also, Disclosure of patient results risk was 
identified in Discuss the results with patient and suggest surgery. A nurse might pass 
the results to the patient without doctor approval which may lead to a critical 
misunderstanding of the real situation of the patient.  
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In addition, there are sub system risks such as Insecure deletion of data and System 
unavailability. The Insecure deletion of data occurs when a patient requests to delete 
his data from hospital database, they cannot delete the entire disk as it shared by other 
users too.  As for System unavailability risk, there is a possibility of a fault or issue 
that affects the availability of the hospital systems, and this can be a major issue in an 
emergency situation where a doctor or nurse needs to access or updated patient 
information in the database. 
 
The process risks and activity risks were modelled in BPM by creating the triangle 
shape. The visualisation of risks helps to provide a shared understanding of risks 
according to the staff roles and responsibilities. Figure 6-4 represents the identified 
risks.  
 
 
 
Figure 6-4 Identify Risk in patient’s Hospital Process 
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6.2.2.2  Consideration for Stakeholder Team of MSR-BPM 
 
The stakeholder team will have different perceptions in terms of determining the risks 
based on their knowledge and experience. The team has to discuss the level of 
abstraction and access control for all stakeholders involved at every stage. It is a 
challenge for the team to openly discuss the different opinions regarding access control 
from the clinician’s and the patient representative’s point of view. A clinician might 
not be willing to allow patient medical records to be available online. On the other 
hand, the patient representative may like to have the medical records accessible online 
to seek another practitioner’s opinion and save unnecessary expenses of re-doing some 
of the medical tests, such as MRI scans. The explicit modelling of risks encourages 
the teams to discuss the different options of access control before assigning access 
permission. Therefore, the team has to assign the access control level for various 
stakeholders involved in the process according to their role and responsibilities. 
 
6.2.3 Generate Risk Register  
 
6.2.3.1 Author’s Approach 
 
At this stage, a risk register table was created (Table  6-1) that lists the risk name and 
a brief description according to the staff role and responsibilities for the Oman 
Hospital. The full set of possible risks in the risk register is listed in Appendix D.3.1.  
No 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/ Description 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding Patient A primary investigation health record in Oman 
Hospital. 
Description: Safeguarding patient’s health record in Oman Hospital 
with key regulations.  
 
2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 Malicious Insider.  
Description: The risk of staff members in Oman Hospital misusing 
patient medical information. 
 
Table  6-1  Oman Hospital Risk Register 
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6.2.3.2 Consideration for Stakeholder Team of MSR-BPM 
At this stage, the stakeholder team needs to create risk register table of the identified 
risks. They have to provide a short description for each risk.  
 
6.2.4 Evaluate Risk 
 
6.2.4.1 Author’s Approach 
 
ENISA (2012) was used as guidelines to evaluate the risk impact, likelihood and level 
of identified risk. For instance, Safeguarding Patient Information will be classified as 
high-level as it can cause other complications such as disclosure of patient medical 
data to someone else which violates the patient right to privacy. Malicious Insider Risk 
will be classified as a high-level risk as it can cause serious damage to the entire 
process. For instance, accessing records of patients that they are not treating or altering 
patient data to cover a mistake they have made. Figure 6-5 is updated with security 
risk level and classified using colours. Also, the risk register table will be updated with 
the impact, likelihood and risk level. Table 6-2 shows a sample of patient A’s 
evaluated risk. 
No 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/ Description Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding Patient A primary 
investigation health record in 
Oman Hospital. 
Description: Safeguarding 
patient A’s health record in 
Oman Hospital with key 
regulations.  
 
Very 
High 
Medium  High 
2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Malicious Insider.  
Description: The risk of staff 
members in Oman Hospital 
misusing patient A medical 
information. 
 
Very 
High 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Table 6-2 Oman Hospital Updated Risk Register with Evaluated Risk 
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Figure 6-5 Evaluate Risk Level in patient’s Hospital Process 
 
6.2.4.2 Consideration for Stakeholder Team of MSR-BPM 
 
The stakeholder team will have a broad discussion to evaluate each risk according to 
their experience and knowledge. As an ITA security analyst, the malicious insider risk 
may be classified as medium-level risk because they find a solution such as apply 
Authorization, Authentication and Auditing (AAA) enforcing strong passwords creation. 
Only authorised parties are granted access, ensuring that users do not gain access to other 
users’ data for Identity access management risk to reduce the risk level from high within 
ENISA (2012) to medium. On the other hand, a patient representative might have a 
different perception and classify the same risk as low based on their confidence in the 
security measures and practices implemented within healthcare.  
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A patient representative might emphasise the importance of patients being able to 
access their medical records online to facilitate the process of having a second opinion 
and reduce expenses incurred through unnecessary tests. On the contrary, a member 
of administration from the government may perceive the risk of data protection as high 
risk, therefore, they will not be willing to upload patient medical records online. Thus, 
different stakeholders may have different perceptions in terms of evaluating the risk 
level. 
 
Modelling the whole process may help different stakeholders to reach a shared 
understanding of risk and come to an agreement. If there is a disagreement, then they 
will proceed with the higher risk level rather than the low-risk level. 
 
6.2.5 Define Security Goals 
 
6.2.5.1 Author’s Approach 
 
At this stage, Reference Model Information Assurance & Security (RMIAS) 
(Cherdantseva, 2014) was used to identify security goals for each risk. Following 
RMIAS model is helpful in choosing the appropriate security goal as well as updating 
the risk register table by adding a security goal column. Table 6-3 presents the updated 
risk register with security goals.  
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No 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/ 
Description 
Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Security Goal 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding Patient 
A primary 
investigation health 
record in Oman 
Hospital. 
Description: 
Safeguarding 
patient’s health 
record in Oman 
Hospital with key 
regulations.  
 
Very 
High 
Medium  High Confidentiality  
Accountability 
2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Malicious Insider.  
Description: The risk 
of staff members in 
Oman Hospital 
misusing patient 
medical information. 
 
Very 
High 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Confidentiality  
Accountability 
Authenticity & 
Trustworthiness 
Table 6-3 Oman Hospital Updated Risk Register with Security Goals 
 
Figure 6-6 shows the updated BPM diagram for Oman Hospital with security goals. 
In this research, it emphasises the importance of visualising the risk with security goals 
to enhance the understanding of risks. In addition, adding the security goals within the 
risk register table may help in assigning the appropriate countermeasures to mitigate 
the risks. Therefore, it will be useful to have the security goals in both the risk register 
and BPM diagram. However, it may add more complexity to the diagram.  
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Figure 6-6 Identify Security Goals in patient’s Hospital Process 
 
6.2.5.2 Consideration for Stakeholder Team of MSR-BPM 
 
The team discusses the various security goals that they are trying to achieve associated 
with each risk. The IT analysis expert may take the lead and explain the security goals 
for the identified risk based on their knowledge and expertise. The discussion about 
security goals provides an opportunity to place emphasis on what they are trying to 
achieve and whether the security goals may be usefully added or not to the BPM 
model. 
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6.2.6  Identify Countermeasure  
 
6.2.6.1 Author’s Approach 
 
Information Security Management in Health (ISO 27799:2008 and 2016), Information 
Security Management Systems (ISO 27000) and Risk Management (ISO 31000) were 
used to identify the appropriate countermeasure for each risk in BPM by using 
Secure*BPMN symbols. It also enhances the risk register table with a detailed 
explanation of the necessary countermeasures (Figure 6-7). Table 6-4 illustrates 
Malicious Insider Risk which can have three countermeasures :1) Technical to specify 
the access control policy for each member in the hospital according to their roles and 
responsibilities, 2) Human: the hospital must provide security training workshops for 
all members to enhance their awareness of possible threats, 3) Organisation: the 
hospital has to notify all members of the security policy implemented 
 
The full set of updated risk register table for Oman Hospital with various 
countermeasures needed to mitigate the identified risk can be found in Appendix 
D.3.1. 
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Risk Name/ 
Description  
Impact 
Likelih
ood 
Risk 
Level 
Security 
goal 
Countermeasure  
Malicious 
Insider:  
Description:  
The risk of staff 
members in 
German 
Hospital 
misusing patient 
medical 
information. 
 
Very 
High 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Confident
iality  
 
Accounta
bility 
 
Authentic
ity & 
Trustwort
hiness 
Technical Specify the 
access control policy 
for each member in the 
hospital according to 
their roles and 
responsibilities. 
 
Human: Hospital 
must provide security 
training workshops for 
all members to 
enhance their 
awareness of possible 
threats.  
 
Organisation: 
Hospital has to notify 
all members of 
security policy 
implemented.  
 
Table 6-4 Patient’s Hospital Updated Risk Register with Countermeasures 
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Figure 6-7  Patient’s Hospital BPM Updated with Risk Countermeasure 
 
6.2.6.2 Consideration for Stakeholder Team of MSR-BPM 
 
At this stage, the stakeholder team may consider security goals from the previous step 
to discuss the suitable countermeasures needed for each risk. They will utilise their 
practical knowledge, such as via an ITA security specialist, in identifying the 
appropriate countermeasures for each risk. A potential risk may have more than one 
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countermeasure. For example, a Malicious Insider Risk may have three 
countermeasures and these may be technical, human and organisational, as shown in 
Table 6-4.  
 
6.2.7 Updated Risk Register with Traceability 
 
6.2.7.1 Author’s Approach 
 
At this stage, the MSR-BPM approach was used to develop the risk register as an input 
to add an extra column to show traceability, which is not commonly listed in the 
ordinary risk register table. It is necessary for management at operational level to be 
able to trace the risk at different locations, especially when there are multiple 
organisations involved in the whole process. Table 6-5 represents a sample of the risks 
listed in the Oman Hospital. The full table is available in Appendix D.3.1.  
6.2.7.2 Considerations for Stakeholder Team of MSR-BPM 
 
The stakeholder team may consider using MSR-BPM approach as an input to add an 
extra column for traceability that is useful in operational management to identify any 
change in these risks.  
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N
o 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/Description Impact 
Likelih
ood 
Risk 
Level 
Security Goal 
Countermeasure 
 
Traceability 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding Patient A 
information  
 
Description: Safeguarding 
patient A’s health record in 
Oman Hospital with key 
regulations  
Very 
High 
Medium  High Confidentiality  
Accountability  
Technical: 
implementing 
several layers of 
authentication such 
as user login, 
administration 
privilege based on 
their roles and need 
to access the data to 
secure health data 
records adequately. 
Oman 
Hospital 
 
Process risk  
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2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Malicious Insider:  
Description  
The risk of staff members 
in Oman hospital misusing 
patient medical information 
 
Very 
High 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Confidentiality  
Accountability 
Authenticity & 
Trustworthiness 
Technical: specify the 
access control policy 
for each member in the 
hospital according to 
their roles and 
responsibilities. 
 
Human: hospital must 
provide security 
training workshop for 
all members to 
enhance their 
awareness of possible 
threats.  
 
Organisation: hospital 
has to notify all 
hospital staff of 
security rules and 
regulations 
implemented in place.  
Oman 
Hospital 
 
Process risk 
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3 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Identity Theft  
Description: The fraudulent 
practice of using another 
person's name and personal 
information in order to 
obtain confidential details. 
High 
 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
Confidentiality 
 
Technical: 
authentication based 
on smart card or 
certificate. Physical 
identification and 
activation required: 
user finger print. 
Identity theft requires 
obtaining the card and 
the PIN number to 
access any system. 
End user must have the 
liability to ensure his 
PIN number is 
protected. 
Oman 
hospital 
 
Activity: 
Referral 
form 
received  
Table 6-5  Oman Hospital Updated Risk Register with Traceability 
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6.3 Current situation  
 
In the current healthcare system, as shown in Figure 6-8, there is no cooperation 
between the Oman and German hospital. Therefore, a patient will need to request a 
printed report from the Oman hospital before travelling abroad to Germany. The 
Omani government is currently exploring the extent to which cloud computing could 
offer a solution. Al Shifa project utilises cloud-computing infrastructure but it does 
not extend to medical records, as discussed in Chapter 3. There are broad benefits for 
offering cloud computing as discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.4.   
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Figure 6-8 Current Situation in Oman Hospital 
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However, there are various potential risks in this process (as shown in Figure 6-9), 
such as loss of hard copy report, third party access, not getting the full set of the 
medical report, data protection, imposter using another patient report. If the patient 
undergoes surgery in the German hospital, there is no follow-up between the German 
and Oman hospital to ensure patient wellbeing. It will involve additional risks when 
following-up patient health or side effects after conducting the surgery. Also, there is 
a risk of not understanding the language used in the medical reports as it will be written 
by default in German, whereas it is written in English in the Oman hospital. Appendix 
D.4 represents BPM for patient process with risk evaluation, security goals and 
countermeasures. Table 6-6 illustrates possible risks that might occur within the 
current situation. Therefore, there is the need to have an effective risk management 
approach to help both patients and clinicians to overcome these risks. 
 
 
Figure 6-9 Patient Process with Potential Risks 
 
Chapter 6: Application of The MSR-BPM Methodology  
 
212 | P a g e  
 
N
o 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/Description Impact Likelih
ood 
Risk 
Level 
Security Goal Countermeasure 
 
Traceability 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Third Party Access 
Description: there is a risk 
of third party accessing the 
hard copy of patient medical 
report without any 
permission.  
Very 
High 
Very 
High 
Very 
High 
Confidentiality  
Availability 
Human Oriented: 
patient must secure the 
hardcopy report in safe 
bag or in safety box 
which needs a code to 
open to avoid any 
unauthorised access. 
Oman 
Hospital  
 
Activity- 
Receiving 
hard copy of 
medical 
report and 
CDs of 
several tests 
performed  
2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Record Could be Lost or 
Stolen 
Description: there is a risk 
of patient losing the 
hardcopy report.  
 
 
Medium Medium Medium Availability  Human Oriented: 
patient A should keep 
a scanned copy of the 
hard copy report in 
their email or in secure 
flash memory with 
security code. 
Oman 
Hospital  
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3 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Data Protection: 
Description: patient needs 
to secure their hard copy 
report and CDs of 
performed results in secure 
place. 
  
High 
 
High 
 
High  
 
Confidentiality Human Oriented: 
patient should keep 
their record in locked 
bag and pin code 
needed to access to 
avoid unauthorised 
access.  
Oman 
Hospital  
 
4 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Getting the Full Set of 
Report 
Description: there is a risk 
that printer will run out of 
paper and the printout is not 
the full set of the report. 
 
Medium Medium Medium Availability  Human Oriented: 
patient needs to double 
check the page 
numbers of report and 
ensure that they have 
the full set. 
Oman 
Hospital  
5 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Imposter Another Patient 
Record 
Description: there is a risk 
of patient collecting another 
patient report by mistake. 
 
 
Medium Medium Medium Availability  Human Oriented: 
patient needs to double 
check personal details 
on the report before 
leaving the hospital to 
avoid any instance 
where imposter has 
used other patient 
details. 
Oman 
Hospital  
Table 6-6  Patient Process Risk Register Table 
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6.4 Cloud Computing Solution  
 
This section will explore the use of cloud computing as a potential solution to enhance 
the communication and collaboration between different hospitals. Also, it will enhance 
access to medical records, improve convenience for patients whilst reducing overall 
health costs. However, there are risks associated with the adoption of cloud computing 
as discussed in Chapter 3. From the preliminary interviews conducted in Chapter 3, 
the main findings from the questionnaires and interviews highlighted concerns relating 
to data security, confidentiality, integrity and availability, complexity and cost as 
critical factors preventing the adoption of cloud computing as a service within the 
healthcare industry. Having secure effective communication is an essential element to 
consider in order to exchange sensitive data.  
The generic risk register helped to identify high- level countermeasures for healthcare 
context in Oman as discussed in Chapter 5. Many of these risks would be addressed 
as part of the project to migrate to the cloud computing.  
 
For the scenario mentioned in section 6.2, there is a need for an agreement to be in 
place between Oman and Germany for exchanging data. It will be assumed that the 
Oman Hospital (OH) will use one of the two Omani cloud computing providers: Oman 
Data Park (ODP) or Information Technology Authority - Cloud (ITA-Cloud), both of 
which are certified by government of Oman (Figure 6-10). The likely infrastructure of 
cloud computing has been discussed in Chapter 5.  
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Figure 6-10 Oman Cloud 
 
It will be assumed that the Germany Hospital (GH) uses certified cloud from Germany 
(Figure 6-11). Cloud provider companies in German follow data protection certificates 
such as Trusted Cloud data Protection Profile (BSA, 2019). Also, it uses international 
security standards and certification to protect their cloud services. It incorporates 
international standards including ISO/IEC 27018, ISO/IEC 27017 and ISO/IEC 27002 
(BSA, 2019). The patient and clinician trust will be encouraged to use accredit cloud 
computing provider services in both countries.  
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Figure 6-11 Germany Cloud 
 
As for scenario in Chapter 3, the patient decided to travel to Germany for treatment. 
In Germany Hospital (GH), doctors requested the patient to provide medical history 
about his case to utilise it with their investigation.  Thus, the patient will contact Oman 
Hospital (OH) to gain access permission for his medical records stored in cloud in 
Oman.  
 
The Oman Hospital (OH) will contact ODP or ITA-Cloud to gain an access for the 
patient. ODP or ITA-Cloud will need the patient resident ID number card in order to 
utilise Primary Key Infrastructure (PKI) service to ensure the true identity of a patient. 
This will allow a patient to access services which are available on cloud systems by 
providing authentication and authorisation.  
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The authentication and authorisation process will be provided through Federation 
Access Management (FAM). Federated Access provides a secure method of 
authorisation which uses authentication by the user's own institutional login process. 
FAM is utilised to allow access for doctors from multiple hospitals to obtain access to 
networks (e.g Shibboleth). As explained earlier ODP or ITA-Cloud and Germany 
cloud provider must be certified to host the patient medical records online. ODP or 
ITA-Cloud is responsible for defining access privilege. In Oman, this was integrated 
using Oman National Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) either by citizens using their 
own ID or Mobile tokens to access health services.  
 
After receiving the access to medical records, the patient will share his records with 
concerned hospital in Germany. Figure 6-12 illustrates the patient pathway within OH 
to gain permission to access his medical record. 
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Figure 6-12 Patient pathway within OH for cloud permission 
 
The patient travels to Germany for treatment (Figure 6-13). At GH, doctors will 
request further examinations.  Doctors can view the patient medical records available 
on cloud hosted in Oman through patient permission access. Then treatment is 
provided to the patient from GH. The patient requests his medical records to be 
uploaded to the cloud in order to be accessed for follow up in Oman. Thus, doctors in 
GH requested an access for the patient from the cloud provider in Germany. The 
disclosure of patient data will be through authentication and authorisation process. 
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Upon receiving access to the Germany Hospital (GH), patient allow access to doctors 
in Oman to view his medical records provided by Germany hospitals for further follow 
ups.  
 
 
Figure 6-13 Patient Treatment Pathway in Germany 
 
According to risk management perspective discussed in Chapter 4 (Figure 4-2), there 
are different types of risks in each level which need to be considered. The Strategic 
level will include the governance strategic plan to set up the procedure for exchanging 
medical data between Oman and other foreign countries (in this case Germany) 
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according to the rules and regulations. Different issues may occur such as Risk from 
changes of jurisdiction because the legal and regulatory framework of where data is 
held tends to change according to rules and regulation within the different jurisdictions 
(Berry & Reisman, 2012). Germany will be subject to General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) rules and regulations and Oman according to Royal Degree.  
Thus, patient and clinical staff in both countries need to be aware of the changes to the 
legislation regarding where their data is held (Berry and Reisman, 2012). Another risk 
can be in IT outsourcing to ODP, ITA-Cloud and Germany cloud provider because 
transferring health data among various legal and regulatory jurisdictions is absolutely 
critical and requires a deep understanding of cloud outsourcing contracts (Iyer & 
Henderson, 2012). Regulations and compliance need to be considered (Seddona and 
Currie, 2013). There is also a need to provide high level of security with encryption to 
avoid any leakage during the transferring process. 
 
A risk arises from the need to facilitate Third-party access. Collaboration is needed 
between MoH in Oman and The Federal Ministry of Health in Germany to exchange 
patient sensitive data. They need to set up arrangements and measures that must be 
applied, and agree the service levels to be achieved. The arrangements for compliance 
auditing of the third parties, and the penalties would also be determined. These will be 
defined in information exchange agreements that specify the minimum set of controls 
to be implemented. This is strategic risk managed by MoH. 
 
At project level a key consideration is the Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) infrastructure in both countries, and whether they have the right 
capabilities for the information technology to allow data exchange. Healthcare in 
Oman currently uses the ICD system to record patients’ diagnoses and send ICD 
messages using the local cloud provider; on the other hand, global hospitals use HL7 
to communicate with other healthcare providers. Thus, there is a risk of 
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interoperability issues between Oman healthcare and international healthcare 
providers which can affect the availability of records. 
The adoption of Health Level 7 version 2.5 by MoH in Oman is recommended to be 
used to solve the interoperability issue between OH and international healthcare 
providers. It allows interoperability between electronic health record systems, practice 
management systems, laboratory IT systems, dietary, pharmacy and billing systems. 
It serves as a vehicle for different healthcare IT systems, applications and data 
architectures operating in diverse-system environments to communicate with each 
other. It is designed to support a central patient care system, as well as a more 
distributed environment where data resides in departmental systems (International, 
2019). 
 
Further project level risks include lack of IS staff knowledge about the importance of 
migrating to cloud service. IS staff need to have sufficient knowledge, awareness and 
the required skills to adopt cloud computing (Lian et al., 2014). Therefore, it is 
important to arrange for training workshop prior the migration process to explain the 
anticipated benefits for staff to enhance their awareness and understanding. Hospitals 
in Oman and Germany need to ensure IS infrastructure delivers the right quality of 
service in terms of technology readiness, existence of the IT infrastructure and human 
resources.  Also, IS complexity and compatibility will affect IT adoption because they 
need to check the alignments of IT application systems to access the electronic records 
and applications in both hospitals. Having cloud computing compatibility with 
existing systems or applications will help make the adoption of cloud computing 
technology feasible in the hospital. 
 
Also, there are critical projects level risks associated with introducing cloud 
computing risks that need to be considered such as Loss of governance which can 
occur by moving to cloud computing service as a hospital will not have full control 
over their data. Thus, both hospital (OH and GH) will lose control of a system’s 
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infrastructure. Therefore, the hospital's IT department will need to mediate with ODP 
and ITA-Cloud to negotiate and agree in detail in the Service Level Agreement (SLA) 
roles and responsibilities before cloud adoption process. To avoid any 
miscommunication in future.  This would specify the exact type of control needed over 
their data in cloud. 
 
In addition, Reduced staff productivity risk may occur. As the process moves from 
paperwork to cloud based it will cause reduced staff productivity during the migration 
and changes to staff work and jobs. Uncertainty can result in low staff self-esteem and 
nervousness spreading in the organisation. A suggested countermeasure is to ensure 
that experts are not dismissed and involve them in the migration project so that they 
get a sense of ownership. In addition, the hospital should provide training in cloud 
technology and enable staff to learn new skills. 
 
At Operational process level there are risks for day-to-day operation which have been 
discussed earlier in section 6.2.2. These are Malicious insider, Identity theft and 
Identity access management. However, when the context changes to security risks in 
using cloud computing in the healthcare industry there are further operational process 
risks that need to be considered. Data protection as the patient needs to secure his PKI, 
whereas in Germany hospital, there is a need for GDPR compliance as patient needs 
to give consent for accessing his records. Thus, clinical staff need to be trained about 
the consequences of GDPR in terms of accessing the records and disclosure of patient 
sensitive information.  
 
In addition, there are operational level risks associated with cloud infrastructure 
managed by ODP and ITA-Cloud and are applicable for this scenario such as Insecure 
deletion of data. If patient requests to delete his data from hospital database, cloud 
provider cannot delete the entire disk as it is shared by other users too. There is also 
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needed to manage the deletion of data in both hospitals in Oman and Germany as well 
as data stored about the patient with cloud providers in both countries. 
 
Also, Federated authentication represents delegating authentication to patient A 
through Oman hospital and Germany Hospital that use Software as a Service (SaaS). 
ODP or ITA-Cloud would need to provide access to patient to view his medical data 
in a secure mode in the cloud.  The patient will not be able to gain access to other 
user’s data.  
 
Further risk can be in Social engineering attacks if another person attempts to obtain 
confidential information by pretending to be the patient. Hence, there is a need for 
Security awareness training for clinical staff to ensure information security of the 
patient. For instance, the clinical staff need to ask personal questions such as date of 
birth or address line before providing confidential information.  
 
From this discussion, Figure 6-14 illustrates all those risks and Table 6-7 identifies 
different risks in detail with suggested countermeasures. In addition, the importance 
and relevance to healthcare context in Oman is addressed.   
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Figure 6-14  Cloud Computing BPM with Risks 
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No Risk 
Type 
Risk Description Impact Likelihood  Risk 
Level 
Security Goal Countermeasure 
 
Traceability 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Data Protection as the 
patient need to secure his 
PKI 
whereas in Germany 
hospital, there is a need 
for GDPR compliance as 
patient needs to give 
consent for accessing his 
records. 
 
 
High 
 
High 
 
 
High Data security  Human Oriented patient should keep 
his PKI safe to avoid unauthorised 
access. 
 
Technical:  
Doctor and clinical staff need to have 
access based on their role and they 
should protect 
Patient medical information from 
unauthorized access.  
 
Organisational: there is a need for 
training workshop for clinical staff 
about the consequence of breaching 
GDPR rules and regulations to 
enhance their awareness of security in 
dealing with patient files.  
Oman Hospital  
 
Cloud Storage  
 
Operational 
Risk 
How importance this 
risk to healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- ODP and ITA-Cloud store the data centrally in Oman according to Royal Degree thus it reduces the 
complication of rules and regulation of saving sensitive data abroad.  
 
As for Germany cloud provider it has to follow GDPR rules and regulations 
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2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Insecure Deletion of Data 
if patient A requests to 
delete his data from 
hospital database, cloud 
provider cannot delete the 
entire disk as it is shared by 
other users too. There is 
need to manage the deletion 
of data in both hospitals in 
Oman and Germany. 
 
Very 
high 
Medium  High  Integrity Legal: signing Service Level 
Agreement for critical data to destroy 
data as per user requirement. 
Oman Hospital  
 
Cloud Storage  
 Strategic risk 
– setting up 
SLAs IT 
Infrastructure 
risk – 
managing data 
deletion   
How importance this 
risk to healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium-  a ministry need to specify in the service level agreement with ODP and ITA-Cloud the policy for 
deletion of data and how long for such action can take. 
 
The Germany cloud provider has the right measures in place according to GDPR regulations 
 
3 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Identity and Access 
Management as cloud 
providers in need to 
implement security 
practices to access records 
as well as supporting 
privacy guidelines. Thus 
hospital staff in both 
hospital will have access 
according to their roles and 
responsibility. They are not 
allowed to access any data 
beyond their authority. 
 
Very 
High 
Medium  Medium Confidentiality 
 
Technical: apply Authorization, 
Authentication and Auditing (AAA) 
enforcing strong passwords creation. 
Only authorised parties granted 
access, ensuring that users do not gain 
access to other users’ data. 
 
Oman hospital  
 
Operational 
process risk  
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How importance this 
risk to healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium – This is managed by ODP and ITA-Cloud. The Germany cloud provider has the right measures in 
place according to GDPR regulations.  
 
4 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Third Party Access 
represents in collaboration 
is needed between Oman 
Hospital and Germany 
Hospital to exchange 
patient A sensitive data.  
Very 
High 
Very High Very 
high  
Confidentiality  
Availability 
Organisational: 
MoH in Oman and The Federal 
Ministry of Health in Germany need 
to set up an arrangements and 
measures that must be applied 
and/complied with for service levels 
to be achieved. the arrangements for 
compliance auditing of the third-
parties, and the penalties that will 
apply should any of these not be 
honoured. Information exchange 
agreements that specify the minimum 
set of controls to be implemented 
must also be used. 
 
Oman Hospital 
 
Cloud Storage  
 
Strategic risk 
How importance this 
risk to healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- ODP and ITA-Cloud hosted the data standalone centrally in Oman. However, MoH will need to sign an 
agreement with Germany hospital to exchange medical data which will change the impact to Medium level.  
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5 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Federated Authentication 
delegating authentication to 
patient A through Oman 
hospital and Germany 
Hospital that use SaaS. A 
Cloud provider in each 
hospital can provide access 
to patient A through the 
hospital to view his medical 
data in a secure mode in the 
cloud. 
High High High Confidentiality 
 
Technical: only authorised parties 
granted access, ensuring that users do 
not gain access to other users’ data. 
For example, single sign on, federated 
identity.  
 
 
Oman Hospital 
 
Operational 
Process risk 
How importance this 
risk to healthcare 
context in Oman 
 
High- in Oman authority is given according to the role and responsibility. Thus, patient A can request his PKI 
from hospital to obtain an access to his medical data. Each hospital needs to ensure that their cloud provider 
enforces security measures. 
 
6 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Social Engineering Attacks 
Patient A family members 
or friends may attempt to 
obtain confidential 
information by pretending 
to be someone else. 
High 
 
Medium  
 
Medium  
 
Privacy Human Oriented:  
Security awareness training needs to 
be performed to ensure information 
security. 
For all staff within hospitals. 
 
Oman Hospital 
 
Operational 
Process risk 
How importance this 
risk to healthcare 
context in Oman 
High- in Oman there is lack of awareness of security programs. There is a need for mitigation strategy to deal 
with those kinds of risks within cloud environment. thus, ODP and ITA-cloud need to provide security training 
workshop for hospital staff.  
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7 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Loss of Governance can 
occur by moving to cloud 
computing service as a 
hospital will not have full 
control over their data. 
Thus both hospital (OH and 
GH) will losing control of a 
system’s infrastructure 
 
Medium Medium  Very 
high 
Data Security 
 
Organisational:  
Clarify in detail in the Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) roles and 
responsibilities before cloud adoption. 
To avoid any miscommunication in 
future.  
  
Use Service Level agreement to 
address the exact type of control 
needed over their data in cloud.  
 
Oman Hospital 
 
Strategic risk 
How importance this 
risk to healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- according to Oman Data Park (ODP) and Information Technology Authority-Cloud (ITA-Cloud) each 
Ministry has to sign off service level agreement which indicates the type of control required over their data 
centre locally and how to act in case of emergency.  
 
8 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Interoperability Issues  
This is technical risk 
which causes security risk 
as healthcare in Oman 
uses ICD system on the 
other hand, German 
hospital uses HL7. 
 
Medium Medium High  Data Security 
Availability 
 
Organisational : 
Use HL7 version 2.5 to ease the 
interoperability issues 
Oman Hospital 
 
Cloud Storage 
 
Project risk- 
migration to 
HL7 
How importance this 
risk to healthcare 
context in Oman 
High – Healthcare in Oman currently uses ICD system to record patient diagnoses and sends ICD message 
using the local cloud provider; on the other hand, global hospitals use HL7 to communicate with other 
healthcare provider. Thus there is risk of interoperability issues between Oman healthcare and international 
healthcare provider which can affect the availability of records 
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9 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Malicious Insider 
represents the risk of staff 
members misusing patient 
medical information. 
 
Very 
high 
Medium  High  Confidentiality 
Data Security 
Availability 
Technical: specify and implement the 
access control policy for each member 
in the organisation according to their 
roles and responsibilities. 
 
 Human: organisation must provide 
security training workshop for all 
members to enhance their awareness 
of possible threats.  
 
Organisational: Management in each 
organisation has to notify all members 
of security policy implemented 
 
Oman Hospital 
 
Operational 
Process Risk  
How importance this 
risk to healthcare 
context in Oman 
High - this risk is applicable in every organisation as staff members may misuse their work rule in finding 
unauthorised information.  
 
10 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Reduced staff productivity.  
As the process move from 
paper work to cloud based 
it will cause reduce staff 
productivity during the 
migration and changes to 
staff work and jobs, 
uncertainty leads to low 
staff self-esteem and 
nervousness spreading in 
the organisation. 
 
Medium Medium Medium Integrity  Human Oriented:  
Ensure that experts are not dismissed 
and involve them in the migration 
project so that they get a sense of 
ownership. Provide training in cloud 
technology and enable staff to learn 
new skills. 
Oman Hospital 
 
Project Risk 
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How importance this 
risk to healthcare 
context in Oman 
High- the move to cloud will be huge change to hospital infrastructure. Thus, it needs careful consideration 
about the time and training needed to use new system infrastructure. This risk has critical effect on the work 
productivity as it can reduce the daily achievement by not keeping track on the daily work plan.  
 
Table 6-7 Cloud Computing Risk Register Table 
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The choice of technology and the erection of governance frameworks to assure 
security, privacy, availability used to share information across locations has a 
significant impact on the risks that will be encountered. Having cloud computing as a 
potential technical solution might facilitate better communication and collaboration 
between two countries, but it can also raise different types of risks. These risks and 
associated countermeasures will need to be considered, along with the costs and 
benefits, when the MoH decides whether they want to extend cloud computing to 
enable the sharing of patient records. 
 
6.5 Reflection  
 
It was challenging to decide the right level of abstraction based on the scenario input. 
In the first attempt of modelling (Appendix D.2), it identified that the patient was 
suspected to be malignant and required surgery as the only core activities in the Oman 
hospital. Appendix D.2.1 presented the risk register table for first modelling. It shows 
similar risks between the Oman and German Hospital. This is unlikely to happen as 
we do not really know how the German Hospital processes patient data. However, the 
remodel discussed in Figure  6-1 identified several activities which may occur in the 
Oman hospital. In addition, the identified risks differ from the first modelling attempt 
and the current modelling as it identified a wider set of risks. The level of abstraction 
has a direct impact on the number of risks that are identified. For instance, in the first 
modelling, the key risks were safeguarding information and malicious insider in Oman 
hospital. In the remodel, although it identified common risks as safeguarding 
information, identity and access management and malicious insider, it also identified 
more risks, such as Identity theft, Identity access management, Disclosure of patient 
results, Insecure deletion of data and System unavailability.  
 
It is challenging to the extent to which we need to model every process. There are 
common processes which can be applied to many patient journeys. For instance, the 
patient pathway may start by checking in with the receptionist and then via the nurse 
checking blood pressure, weight and height. Afterwards, the patient will be called by 
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the doctor. It is challenging to include every step the patient goes through, as over time 
we will have inconsistencies as different multidisciplinary teams have different ideas 
regarding how the process should be carried out. This may result in having different 
processes with different activities and there will be different risks encountered as well. 
It makes more sense to have a subprocess with risks which identify the locations. The 
use of a subprocess for common process can help us in dealing with both models 
becoming over complicated and also ensure more consistency when these activities 
are carried out in different locations. Therefore, the common processes need to be 
modelled separately.  
 
Although there is a wide range of benefits in adopting cloud computing as a service in 
health care, the identified list of risks may represent a barrier. Even though we 
maintained a risk register with suggested countermeasures, there are other types of 
risks which might occur. As we identify countermeasures, other dependency risks 
might occur too. For instance, language barrier is considered as a clinal risk, but it can 
also cause a security risk as more people are involved in a process. If there is a need 
to use a third party to provide translation, then security risks need to be considered, 
such as using a certified translator in order to maintain the privacy of the patient 
record.  
 
There are limitations of MSR-BPM approach in addressing the technical aspect. Multi-
tenancy and compartmentalization represent hidden risks that are not visualised easily. 
However, the cloud provider is required to ensure that consumers may not access other 
users' information due to multi-tenancy. Cloud service providers should use effective 
encryption methods to guarantee data isolation between clients. Multi-tenancy and 
compartmentalization need to be added to the generic reference risk register table. 
However, those kinds of risks would be addressed by ODP and ITA-Cloud as it will 
provide the infrastructure and services for accessing the patient information.  
 
Another challenge related to modelling cloud computing relates to inclusion of the 
risks of the infrastructure, as the diagram becomes very complex. As the infrastructure 
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itself is unlikely to change from process to process, it would be preferable to model 
the human activity workflow separately from its technical aspects. This separation of 
concerns is a practice used in Enterprise Architecture, where the infrastructure 
architecture is modelled separately from business architecture. The infrastructure 
architecture would primarily be the concern of ODP and ITA-Cloud, in close 
collaboration with the IT staff in the hospitals. Therefore, we did not include the 
infrastructure aspect in Chapter 7 when we evaluated MSR-BPM approach for the 
Integrated Care Pathway (ICP) for breast cancer. 
 
If the enterprise architecture approach was used to underpin the migration to cloud 
then: 
1) The Ministry of Health would take primary responsibility for governance and 
strategy. 
2)  ODP and ITA- Cloud would take primary responsibility for infrastructure, 
information and application architecture so they can migrate hospitals systems 
and services into the cloud.  
3) Hospitals would have the primary responsibility to the business architecture 
and understanding how organisations and process would need to adapt to the 
migration to the cloud.   
This has been illustrated in Figure 6-15. 
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Figure 6-15 Enterprise Architecture 
Adapted from : ( medium.com, 2017) 
 
 
There are limitations in using Risk Register and Business Process Modelling as 
documenting the list of risks tends to grow which will be reflected in the business 
process modeling by having overcrowded symbols (for example Figure 6-7) of risks. 
Hence, there is a need for a multidisciplinary team to have an open discussion 
regarding which level they need to address the risks in certain situations.  
 
In order to address the complexity in the diagram, it would be better to separate out 
the different perspective risks: Strategic risks which covers governance aspects, 
Project risks which handle the migration to cloud computing and Operational risks 
which covers day-to-day operation in hospital level. This is in addition to separating 
out the risks with managing the IT Infrastructure, that was discussed earlier.  
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Figure 6-16 shows the different dimensions that would need to be addressed for 
managing risks when migrating to the cloud. MSR-BPM approach is primarily focused 
in identifying security risks in the hospital’s business processes at operational level. 
However, it does identify some of the risks that will need to be managed at strategic 
and change project level. Clinical risk is out of the scope of this research but it can be 
addressed during the modelling process. However, this would need to be addressed in 
future work. Strategic risks and change project risks can be considered among the 
future work to expand ISO 31000. 
 
 
Figure 6-16 Different Dimensions for Managing Risks 
 
Therefore, there is a need for another scenario at operational level which deals with a 
day-to-day business process to evaluate MSR-BPM integrated approach. It is not 
possible to evaluate MSR-BPM integrated approach in Oman because risk 
management are not used within healthcare sector.  
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6.6 Conclusion  
 
Chapter 6 presented the application of the MSR-BPM methodology and this was 
considered in two ways; from the author’s approach as well as being considered from 
the potential stakeholder team’s response. MSR-BPM stages were applied to the 
hypothetical scenario, based on Information Security Risk Management (ISO 27005) 
processes. The risks from prospective stakeholder teams may vary according to their 
knowledge and expertise in practice. The stakeholder team needs to discuss their 
perceptions regarding the identified risks based on their knowledge and expertise in 
the field. There is the need for a multi-disciplinary team to include a business analyst 
as a stakeholder to ensure the successful implementation of MSR-BPM approach 
because of BPM’s technical terms. Also, an information security practitioner is needed 
to be able to identify the security risks and suggest countermeasures to address those 
risks.  
 
It was found that the choice of mechanism used to communicate and transfer medical 
records between different locations has its own risks. Consideration of risk 
management perspectives helped to identify different types of risks such as strategic 
level risks, project level risks which need to be considered as part of the migration to 
the cloud computing.  
 
The multidisplinary team will apply MSR-BPM approach to identify the potential 
risks. The different perception of risks may identify conflicting ideas during the 
discussion. Therefore, MSR-BPM does not focus solely on representing the risks 
through BPM, but it also enhances the communication mechanism through the 
discussion of hidden aspects of identified risks. Consequently, the risks are made 
explicit and transparent to all stakeholders. Where there are different perceptions of 
risks, these should be openly discussed when applying the approach.  
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Chapter 7 will present an evaluation of the MSR-BPM approach using Integrated Care 
Pathway (ICP) for breast cancer in the UK because it has many potential risks, and the 
process involves multiple locations as well as various stakeholders. In addition, 
experts are consulted who have experience in Risk Management, Business Process 
Modelling and also Healthcare Professionals to validate the MSR-BPM approach.  
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7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will fulfil one of the objectives of this research to evaluate the MSR-BPM 
approach. It was not possible to make contact with sufficient experts in risk 
management, business process modelling and healthcare in Oman to validate the 
approach and therefore it was decided to apply the MSR-BPM approach to a scenario 
relevant to a UK healthcare context. Therefore, the MSR-BPM approach was applied 
on an Integrated Care Pathway (ICP) for Breast Cancer. The ICP has been used in 
various research projects within Computer Science and Informatics at Cardiff 
University. It has many potential risks which provides opportunities for managing risk 
because of multiple locations and a range of stakeholders.  
 
Information Security Risk Management (ISO 27005) processes were adopted and a set 
of software product quality criteria to arrange a set of survey questions for experts who 
have experience in one or more of Risk Management, Business Process Modelling and 
Healthcare Professionals. The validation process was done through watching a video 
for approximately 11 minutes followed by a set of survey questions. The findings were 
analysed and a reflection on the MSR-BPM approach by highlighting its advantages, 
limitations and recommendations for future work was provided.  
 
7.2 Comparing MSR-BPM with Other Research Work  
 
There is a need for another scenario to address the operational level risks within a 
business process. Hence, the Integrated Care Pathway (ICP) for breast cancer was 
chosen as it shows the processes, roles, activities and different locations. Therefore, 
ICP for breast cancer represents a realistic scenario to critically evaluate MSR-BPM 
integrated approach at the operational level within a business process which deals with 
day-to-day operations. ICP for breast cancer was chosen as it has been evaluated with 
other research from Computer Science and Informatics at Cardiff University.  
Although such research used the same Integrated Care Pathway for breast cancer, there 
are differences in their contributions, and these are outlined as follows:  
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• Omnia Allam (2006) looked at the communication issues occurring between 
GPs and members of the cancer care teams. In her research, she created the 
specification of a system which overcame many of the communication 
problems by providing a common Electronic Patient Record (EPR) to supply 
the required information for all the healthcare providers involved. She did not 
address risk modelling of the communication process.  
 
• Alysia Skilton (2012) proposed a conceptual model which uses care team 
meta-data to track and manage team members’ and professional roles as a 
means to meet the broader range of requirements of the patient-centric 
approach beyond the Electronic Patient Record (EPR) held in Cancer Network 
Information System (CaNISC). She did not address communication or risk in 
her model.  
 
• Burnap et al. (2012) used the same scenario to discuss access permission 
between different locations. They presented a system that enhances the way 
access control technology was deployed so that information owners retain 
control of their access control and privacy policies, even after information has 
been shared. However, they did not address risk management or risk modelling 
within their work. 
 
• Workflow for Integrated Care Pathway (WffICP) (Alsalamah, H 2012) used 
the automated patient-centric system, but it did not show any visibility of risks 
within the systems. The proposed WffICP system acts as a central hub for the 
heterogeneous systems. This means it is not connected into the Clinical 
Information Systems (CIS) but is used to capture and forward information to 
and from each of these systems while linking the captured information to create 
a fuller record for a patient. Therefore, it can inter-operate with different 
systems independent of their underlying structure, provided a wrapper is 
provided. The WffICP system acts as a middle layer that lies between the user 
interface layer and the CIS’s interface layer (Alsalamah, H 2012). Therefore, 
WffICP did not address or visualise risks within the system.  
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• Secure Healthcare Collaborative Environment (SHarE) (Alsalamah, S. 2014) 
proposed a broader context of security by providing an information sharing 
and security context. This approach is a comprehensive and holistic way to 
address security in collaboration with multiple points of control.  It uses BPM 
in the development of SHarE, which is a successful prototype system. It 
provides a high-level information security design conceptual model and 
defines a common collaboration-driven information security goal that meets 
the needs of information sharing and security contexts in Patient-Centric Care. 
At the middle level of the security design, it identifies information security 
threats to this goal and controls that can help address these risks to achieve that 
goal (Alsalamah, S. 2014). SHarE did not focus on risk management but rather 
the access control according to the user roles. 
 
The MSR-BPM integrated approach has been expanded from Secure*BPMN to model 
risk and specify management approach through a risk register. By modelling 
Integrated Care Pathway for breast cancer, the MSR-BPM can show the risks at an 
operational level of roles, responsibilities, activities, process and locations in this 
business process.  
 
7.3 Breast Cancer Treatment Scenario  
 
The importance of using ICP for breast cancer treatment scenario was discussed in 
section 7.2. The scenario is as follows:  
 
The treatment pathway starts with the patient visiting the GP in a GP surgery after 
noticing any of the breast cancer symptoms. The GP then examines the patient and 
collects some information about the abnormality observed, the patient's clinical 
history, and clinical examination details. This information is stored in the GP's system. 
If the suspicion of malignancy is negative, then the patient will be discharged.  
However, if it is positive then the patient is referred to a local hospital (name it 
Hospital 1) for a breast cancer specialist to conduct further tests. A letter with a 
summary of the information collected is passed to Hospital 1.  
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In Hospital 1, an oncologist requests more tests to determine whether the patient has 
breast cancer or not. These tests include examination (by a Breast Cancer Nurse 
Specialist), blood test (by a Haematologist), imaging-mammography, ultrasound, and 
MRI (by a Radiologist), and fine needle aspiration and biopsy (by a Pathologist). The 
results of these tests (assuming they were carried out in the same hospital) will feed 
into the oncologist's system to determine the type of cancer, the stage and grade of 
cancer if the patient was diagnosed with breast cancer. The oncologist should then 
discuss this thoroughly with the patient and inform the GP.  
 
To plan treatment for the patient, her case is referred to a Multi-Disciplinary Team 
(MDT) to review for a discussion. Hospital 2 hosts the MDT meetings and must ensure 
that the information necessary for effective team functioning and clinical decision-
making is available at each meeting. Therefore, Hospital 2 requests the patient’s 
information from Hospital 1. The MDT recommends a treatment plan (let us say in 
this case scenario, surgery was planned for the patient). Then Hospital 2 should 
inform Hospital 1 about the treatment plan and recommendations and pass on any 
relevant documents. 
 
If Hospital 1 is the local hospital and does not have sufficient facilities to perform the 
surgery, then it refers the patient to a better-equipped hospital, Hospital 3, to perform 
the necessary surgery. This will require that Hospital 1 shares all relevant information 
of the patient with Hospital 3. In Hospital 3, after surgery, more information will be 
collected and recorded in the surgeon’s system, and a surgery summary will be 
provided to Hospital 1.  
 
Following the surgery, the patient’s case is discussed in another MDT review, and this 
means Hospital 2 (hosting the meetings) will request all the patient’s case notes and 
reports from both Hospital 1 and Hospital 3, compare it with the previous MDT 
meeting notes kept at Hospital 2 in order to devise an updated treatment plan and 
recommendations after the surgery. If the team suggests no further treatment, then the 
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patient will be discharged and should follow up with the Breast Screening Programme 
for a regular check-up for any recurrence. 
 
The ICP for breast cancer in UK was used because it is a complex, and realistic process 
covering multiple locations and stakeholders. The modelling of the central IT 
infrastructure will be separate from modelling the processes involved. In reality, there 
are a variety of methods currently in use in both primary and secondary care systems. 
In the UK, it is typical to communicate with the use of letter correspondence between 
primary and secondary care. The primary focus is to consider the risks within the 
complex process. However, when the stakeholder team convene to model a real 
instance, different perceptions of security risks might be identified based on the team 
members’ roles and expertise.  
 
In this ICP scenario, the focus will be on evaluating the MSR-BPM approach when 
compared to an ordinary risk register table alone. Risk register is commonly used 
within UK hospitals, as discussed section 4.7.1. 
7.4 Apply MSR-BPM Approach in Integrated Care Pathway  
 
The MSR-BPM approach was applied by establishing the context, identifying risk, 
generating risk register, evaluating risk, defining security goals, determining 
countermeasure and updating risk register to ensure traceability. 
7.4.1 Establishing the Context 
 
The context used is the integrated care pathway for breast cancer. The BPM diagram 
was modelled to visualise the whole treatment pathway for the patient in four 
locations; GP surgery, Hospital 1 for further examination, Hospital 2 for MDT 
meeting, and Hospital 3 for performing the surgery. The full set of diagrams are 
available in Appendix E.1.  The evaluator will have these sets as an output. As an 
example, the processes followed by the doctor (Doctor Process) within GP surgery is 
presented in Figure 7-1.  
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Figure 7-1 Sample of Doctor Process in GP Surgery 
 
 
7.4.2 Identify Security Risks 
 
Security risks were added to all the process models. As an example of identifying 
security risks in the GP Referral process, Figure 7-2 illustrates some of the risks in 
each activity within the Doctor Process.  
 
 
Figure 7-2 Identify Security Risks in Doctor Process 
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7.4.3 Generate Risk Register 
 
A risk register was generated for four locations to determine the risk’s name and 
description. Appendix E.3 represents the full risk register. A sample of Doctor Process 
risk register is presented in Table 7-1 below.  
No 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/ Description 
4 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 Safeguarding patient confidential information and compliance. 
Description: Risk of doctor disclosure of patient confidential 
information to someone else from the diagnosing process. 
6 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 Health records accessible. 
Description: The risk of doctor retrieving the results of another 
patient from health records.  
7 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 Identity Access Management  
Description: The risk of another doctor using identity and access 
privilege of another doctor to view the patient’s results.  
8 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Data protection  
Description: The risk of the doctor sharing suspicions of 
malignancy based on results with another person without the 
patient’s approval. 
9 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 Intercepting data in transit 
Description: The risk of disclosure from a doctor or nurse when 
processing the referral form between different places, computers 
or sites.  
Table 7-1 Sample of Doctor Process Risk Register 
 
7.4.4 Evaluate Risk  
 
To evaluate the risk level, a risk register was used as an input. In addition, the ENISA 
(2012) was used to identify the impact, likelihood and level of the risk. The risk 
register table was then updated by adding three columns that resemble each of them 
(impact, likelihood and level of risk). This information is important to assess the 
treatment of risk, whether it is cost-effective to be mitigated or whether it can be 
minimised. Figure 7-3 represents the risk evaluation for part of the GP Referral stage 
in the process.  
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Figure 7-3 Risk Evaluation 
 
A sample of the updated risk register with risk evaluation is presented in Table 7-2. 
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No 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/ 
Description  
Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
4 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding the 
patient’s confidential 
information and 
compliance. 
Description: Risk of 
doctor disclosure of the 
patient’s confidential 
information to someone 
else from the diagnosing 
process. 
Very 
High       
Medium High  
6 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Health records 
accessible. 
Description: The risk of 
doctor retrieving the 
results of another patient 
from medical records. 
Very 
High 
Medium High 
7 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Identity Access 
Management.  
Description: The risk of 
another doctor using 
identity and access 
privilege of another 
doctor to view the 
patient’s results.  
High Low Medium 
8 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Data protection.  
Description: The risk of 
doctor sharing 
suspicions of 
malignancy based on 
results with another 
person without the 
patient’s approval. 
High 
 
High 
 
High  
 
9 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Intercepting data in 
transit. 
Description: The risk of 
disclosure from a doctor 
or nurse when 
processing the referral 
form between different 
places, computers or 
sites.  
High 
 
Medium 
 
Medium 
 
Table 7-2 Sample of Doctor Process Risk Register-Evaluation 
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7.4.5 Define Security Goal 
 
RMIAS (Cherdantseva, 2014) was adopted at this stage to specify the security goals 
to maintain in each activity. Figure 7-4 represents the updated BPM diagram part of 
the GP Referral in the Doctor Process. The risk register table was then updated by 
adding a security goal column.  
 
Figure 7-4 Evaluate Security Risks in Doctor Process 
 
The updated risk register Table 7-3 will present the security goal for each risk. 
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No 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/ 
Description  
Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Security Goals 
4 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding the 
patient’s confidential 
information and 
compliance. 
Description: 
Risk of doctor 
disclosure of the 
patient’s confidential 
information to someone 
else from the diagnosing 
process. 
Very 
High       
Medium High  Accountability 
 
Confidentiality   
6 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Health records 
accessible. 
Description: 
The risk of doctor 
retrieving the results of 
another patient from 
medical records. 
Very 
High 
Medium High Confidentiality 
7 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Identity Access 
Management.  
Description: 
The risk of another 
doctor using identity and 
access privilege of 
another doctor to view 
the patient’s results.  
High Low Medium Confidentiality 
 
Privacy  
 
Availability  
8 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Data protection.  
Description: 
The risk of doctor 
sharing suspicions of 
malignancy based on 
results with another 
person without the 
patient’s approval. 
High 
 
High 
 
High  
 
Privacy  
 
Confidentiality 
 
 
9 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Intercepting data in 
transit. 
Description: 
The risk of disclosure  
from a doctor or nurse 
when processing the 
referral form between 
different places, 
computers or sites.  
High 
 
Medium 
 
Medium 
 
Availability  
 
Confidentiality 
 
Table 7-3 Updated Risk Register with Security Goals 
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7.4.6 Identify Countermeasure  
 
After evaluating the risk level and security goals, the countermeasure symbols 
identified in Secure*BPMN (Cherdantseva, 2014) were adopted to indicate the 
appropriate countermeasure for each risk in the process model. Information Security 
Management Systems (ISO 27000) and Information Security Management in Health 
(ISO 27799:2008 and 2016) were used to specify the details of the countermeasure in 
the risk register. For instance, for the activity, the Dr. diagnoses a patient, the risk of 
safeguarding the patient’s information requires a technical countermeasure as the 
doctor must have the right authentication and authorisation based on his role in storing 
medical health records and safeguarding the with the main security regulations. Figure 
7-5 presents a BPM diagram for part of the GP Referral in Doctor Process with all 
countermeasure symbols for all risks. Appendix E.2 shows the full diagram and 
Appendix E.3 presents a full table for the GP Referral process. 
 
Figure 7-5 Countermeasure Security Risks Identified in Doctor Process 
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7.4.7 Updated Risk Register Table with Traceability 
 
The Risk Register table was used as an input at this stage to add a traceability column 
(Table 7-4) which is not usually listed in the ordinary risk register table. It is important 
to trace the risk by showing its location and activity process which occur within it. 
Appendix E.3 presents a Risk Register Table for GP Referral, Appendix E.5 Risk 
Register for Hospital 1, Appendix E.7 Risk Register for Hospital 2 and Appendix E.9 
Risk Register for Hospital 3. 
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No Risk 
Type  
Risk Name Impact Likelihood Risk 
Level 
Security Goals Risk 
Countermeasure  
Traceability  
5 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding the 
patient’s 
confidential 
information and 
compliance. 
 
 
Description: 
Risk of doctor 
disclosure of the 
patient’s 
confidential 
information to 
someone else from 
the diagnosing 
process. 
 
Very 
High       
Medium High  Confidentiality  
Accountability 
 
Technical: 
Doctor must have 
the right 
authentication and 
authorisation 
based on his role 
in storing medical 
health records and 
safeguarding 
these with key 
security 
regulations. 
 
Process: 
GP Referral  
 
Location: 
GP Surgery 
 
Activity:  
Doctor 
diagnoses the 
patient  
6 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Health records 
accessible. 
 
Description: 
The risk of doctor 
retrieving the 
results of another 
patient from 
medical records. 
 
Very 
High 
Medium High Confidentiality 
Privacy 
Availability 
Technical: 
Doctor needs the 
authorisation to 
access and 
retrieve the results 
of a patient within 
his team of care as 
well as supporting 
privacy 
guidelines.  
Process: 
GP Referral  
 
Location:  
GP Surgery 
 
Activity: 
Doctor 
retrieves 
patient 
results 
Table 7-4 Sample GP Referral- Doctor Process Risk Register Table
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7.5 Evaluation Methodology  
 
To evaluate the MSR-BPM, the MSR-BPM approach was presented to Dr 
Cherdantseva. She provided positive feedback and stressed that this method would 
help in structuring and organising risk-related information. Also, she approved the 
expansion of the RMIAS and Secure*BPMN (Cherdantseva, 2014) by adding risk 
management to it. In fact, expanding the RMIAS to capture risk assessment was stated 
as an area for future work.  
This research approach focused on using the BPM to model risk and enhance it with 
a risk register document by following Information Security Risk Management (ISO 
27005) key processes, as shown in Figure 7-6. Therefore, the main activities in Risk 
Management Process were focused on evaluating the MSR-BPM approach. Focusing 
on the risk management policy, five leading questions were identified : 
• Who: is required to report, communicate, and take action?  
• What: is required to be reported by staff, managers, executives, governance 
and committees?  
• When: are risks to be reported and when is information to be disseminated to 
the clinicians, staff, executive and management committees/governing body?  
• Where: is information stored, and communicated? 
• How: are tools and processes to be used – e.g. risk assessments, risk registers, 
BPM? 
• When: may a risk be removed from the current risk register? 
 
These questions were employed in the comparison table between Risk Register and 
Business Process Modelling (BPM) in Table 5-12 in Chapter 5, based on the key 
processes of the ISO 27005 to enhance the importance of combining both elements in 
managing security risks.  
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Figure 7-6 ISO27005 Information Security Risk Management Process 
 
Information Security Risk Management (ISO 27005) processes were used to structure 
the evaluation which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
7.6  Evaluation Methodology for MSR-BPM  
 
Based on the comparison table between risk register and business process modelling 
in Chapter 5, the literature was reviewed in terms of quality criteria that are essential 
to fulfil in a system requirement. The SQuaRE Standard (ISO 25010) is widely used 
as a software product quality criteria which helps in identifying a broader range of 
quality aspects. The evaluation was influenced by the SQuaRE criteria to evaluate the 
work. In addition, the review of the literature explored evaluation methods for other 
approaches, such as the Method Evaluation Model (MEM) (Moody, 2003) to evaluate 
Secure*BPMN. Figure 7-7 elucidates the BPM for the evaluation methodology for the 
MSR-BPM approach.  
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ISO 27005  process 
Determine criteria to 
evaluate the approach
Design the survey
Record video of the 
experiments and 
prepare URL 
Contact experts in risk 
management, BPM and 
healthcare 
End
Analysis of survey 
feedback
Pilot study and 
modification
Consider the 
criteria that are 
relevant to MSR-
BPM
Arrange Qs based on 
stages and provide 
screen shots
Record the entire 
experiment in details 
for the experts
Use LinkedIn to find 
experts in RM, BPM and 
Healthcare and contact 
them via e-mail
 
    Figure 7-7 BPM of Evaluation Methodology 
 
7.6.1 ISO 27005 Risk Management Processes 
 
Questions were designed for all stages to enhance using the risk register to document 
risk assessment and countermeasures with business process modelling. Both methods 
complement each other by visualising the complex process and providing detailed 
analysis of the countermeasure needed for each risk.  
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7.6.2 Design of the Survey Questions  
 
The survey started with a brief introduction about the researcher. The main purpose of 
performing the experiment which was assessing an approach for security risks in the 
healthcare domain that combines Business Process Modelling with Risk Register was 
also stated. The targeted practitioner/researcher was in Risk Management, Business 
Process Modelling and/or healthcare. Also, the survey explained that the evaluation 
process would be through watching a video (approximately 11 minutes) then 
answering questions to evaluate the proposed approach. The video outlined the 
healthcare scenario and demonstrated how the approach could be applied to manage 
security risks associated with the scenario. The video covered a subset of the 
scenario’s processes and activities so a full set of process models with their associated 
Risk Register were provided for reference (Appendix E.1). A sample of the letter sent 
out is available in Appendix F.1. In Questions 1 to Question 13, the participants were 
asked about their role in an organisation, as shown in Appendix F.2. They were asked 
about risk management methods, and the nature of their experience, whether from 
research, practice or both. Also, they were asked about their Business Process 
Modelling experience over a number of years, the nature of their experience as well 
as the BPM methods they were familiar with. In addition, they were asked about their 
experience in healthcare.  
 
The survey was anonymous, and no personal details were collected from the 
participants. They were questioned about their level of expertise in risk management, 
BPM and healthcare. Each response was based on a 4-point Likert scale: 
 
Expert  Competent   Some knowledge   No knowledge. 
 
According to Joshi et al. (2015), the Likert scale is commonly used for measuring 
attitude in social sciences, medical and educational research. A Likert scale provides 
a range of answers or statements of agreement/disagreement from which a respondent 
may choose when answering a question. 
 
Also, based on SQuaRE quality criteria, survey questions were designed and compiled 
to validate MSR-BPM for all stages. The main aim of the evaluation was to ensure 
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that the MSR-BPM approach complied with the formal requirements of a well-
established framework that is widely used for the assessment of the quality of 
modelling languages. Appendix F.2 presents the full set of survey questions. Figure 
7-8 presents an example of the survey questions layout.  
 Stage 3: Risk Analysis and Evaluation 
 
 
 
 
Q18: Using both the process model and risk register approach helps staff to clearly 
identify the appropriate security goals and risk level with each risk. 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
 
Q19:  The Risk Register-BPM approach used is more likely to be effective in the 
analyses and evaluation of risk than using a risk register only. 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
Figure 7-8 Sample of the Survey Questions Design 
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Questions 14 to 25 were based on the ISO27005 and main processes. The answer to 
each question was measured using a 7-point Likert scale:  
 
Strongly Agree | Agree |Neither Agree/Disagree | Disagree| Strongly Disagree | I do 
not know. 
 
During the literature review of quality evaluation (Moody, 2003), a number of quality 
standards (e.g SQuaRE ISO 25010) were reviewed to determine a set criterion to 
evaluate the MSR-BPM approach. It was necessary to ensure the right quality criteria 
was involved in the evaluation of the approach to determine the effectiveness of the 
proposed MSR-BPM approach in enhancing the communication of information 
security risk in healthcare processes. 
 
The SQuaRE Standard (ISO 25010) is widely used in identifying a broad range of 
quality aspects. An appropriate criterion such as effectively applied, effective 
communication, useful and clear understanding was adopted based on the MSR-BPM 
context. The term ‘effectiveness’ is defined as “accuracy and completeness with which 
users achieve specified goals” (ISO 25010, 2011). The questions statement in Q14, 
Q19, Q20 and Q24 are used to measure effectiveness.  
 
The term ‘usefulness’ is defined as the “degree to which a user is satisfied with their 
perceived achievement of pragmatic goals, including the results of use and the 
consequences of use” (ISO 25010,2011). The questions statement in Q15 is used to 
measure usefulness.  
 
Also, the term ‘usability’ is used and defined as the “degree to which a product or 
system can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, 
efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use” (ISO 25010,2011). The 
questions statement in Q16, Q17, Q18, Q21, Q22, Q23 and Q25 are used to measure 
usability.  
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Using ISO 27005 processes; 
• At stage 1, participants were asked whether using the BPM effectively applied 
within the healthcare domain and if it was useful in establishing the context for 
stage one.  
• At stage two, they were asked if the BPM could identify security risks and the 
likelihood of security risks associated with the roles.  
• At stage three for risk analysis and evaluation, participants were asked about 
how effective the processes were to identify the security goals and risk 
evaluation. 
• At stage four for risk treatment, they were asked if the MSR-BPM effectively 
helped in identifying the appropriate countermeasure.   
• At stage five for monitoring and reviewing, the main concern was knowing if 
the MSR-BPM could identify change with risk position and whether it was in 
process, activity or inflow.  
• At six stage of communication and consultation, it was necessary to ascertain 
whether the MSR-BPM approach was clearly understandable and appropriate 
to manage risk, effective communication and provide a shared understanding 
of risks as well as managing risks in compliance with the ISO 27005 processes. 
 
Table 7-5 presents a justification for questions 14 to Q25 to evaluate MSR-BPM 
approach.  
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ISO 
27005 
Stages 
Question 
No. 
Question Justification 
Stage 
1 
Q14 The BPM approach used can 
be effectively applied to 
capture processes in 
healthcare. 
To know if using BPM is 
effectively applied within the 
healthcare domain. 
Q15 The BPM approach used is useful 
for designing process models as it 
helps to clearly identify activities, 
flows, locations and roles in 
healthcare processes. 
To know whether MSR-
BPM is useful. 
Stage 
2 
Q16 The BPM approach used can 
clearly identify security risks with 
different activity levels in 
healthcare processes. 
Clear identification of 
security risks. 
Q17 The BPM approach used is more 
likely to help staff identify the 
appropriate security risks 
associated with the roles 
compared to relying on a Risk 
Register only. 
To identify the likelihood of 
occurring and security risks 
associated with the roles. 
Stage 
3 
Q18 Using both the process model 
and risk register approach 
helps staff to clearly identify 
the appropriate security goals 
and risk level with each risk. 
Identify security goals and 
risk level.  
Q19 The Risk Register-BPM 
approach used is more likely to 
be effective in the analyses and 
evaluation of risk than using a 
Risk Register only. 
Effective analysis and 
evaluation of risk. 
Stage 
4 
Q20 The Risk Management-BPM 
approach used is more likely to 
be effective in identifying 
suitable countermeasures in the 
healthcare domain than using 
risk register only. 
Effective in identifying 
countermeasure. 
Q21 Using Risk Register and BPM 
together is more likely to help 
in identifying the appropriate 
countermeasure. 
To identify the appropriate 
countermeasure.  
Stage 
5 
Q22 Using Risk Register and BPM 
together is more likely to help 
in identifying any changes with 
the risk than using risk register 
only. 
Identify change with risk. 
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Stage 
6 
Q23 The Risk Register–BPM 
approach used is clearly 
understandable and appropriate 
to use to manage security risk 
in healthcare processes. 
To know if the MSR-BPM is 
clearly understandable and 
appropriate to manage risk. 
Q24 Risk Register-BPM approach 
used is more likely to 
effectively communicate risks 
to achieve a shared 
understanding of all roles 
involved in the process 
compared to using Risk 
Register only. 
Effective communication and 
providing shared 
understanding of risk.   
Q25 Developing BPM and risk 
register for key health 
processes is more likely to help 
healthcare organisations 
manage security risks in 
compliance with Information 
security risk management 
practices (ISO27005) 
compared to developing a Risk 
Register only. 
To know if MSR-BPM 
manages risk in compliance 
to ISO27005 
Table 7-5 Justification of Survey Questions to Evaluate MSR-BPM Approach 
 
7.6.3 Pilot Study of the Experiment  
 
A pilot test of the experiment was performed with two academics. The approach to the 
experiment was initially refined in response to the feedback received from the thesis’s 
supervisor, Dr. Wendy Ivins. Also, it was sent to Dr. Yulia Cherdantseva in order to 
test the logical flow of it; the BPM diagram was clear and the explanation for each 
stage was obvious and explicit.  The video and survey were refined according to the 
feedback received in the pilot test; the clarity of the experiment material was 
improved, as a result. Then, the evaluation material was sent via e-mail to all the 
participants who agreed to participate in the evaluation experiment. The material of 
the evaluation includes a URL of the video, Survey Questions and a Full set of BPM 
and Risk Register for the healthcare scenario. See Appendix E.  
 
The evaluation was not performed in Oman as it was not possible to find sufficient 
experts in risk management, business process modelling or healthcare.  
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7.6.4 Record Video of the Experiments and Prepare URL 
 
The complete set of the evaluation scenario of the Integrated Care pathway for Breast 
Cancer treatment was recorded by providing the actual scenario, BPM for all stages, 
BPM for identified risks, BPM for risk evaluation, security goals and risk 
countermeasures. In addition, the video shows the output of how the risk register will 
look and provides an electronic document of all the deliverables (Appendix E).  
 
7.6.5 Contact the Experts  
 
Networks established by the School of Computer Science and Informatics were used 
to contact the experts in risk management, business process and health care to evaluate 
the MSR-BPM approach. A sample of the letter sent out is available in Appendix F.1.  
The evaluation experiment process consists of three main parts:   
1. Watching a video that is approximately 11 minutes long through the URL: 
https://youtu.be/R0idfl9McJE. The video outlines the healthcare scenario and 
demonstrates how our approach can be applied to manage security risks 
associated with the scenario. The video covers a subset of the scenario's 
processes and activities, so a full set of process models with their associated 
Risk Registers in Appendix E was provided for reference.  
 
2. Answering questions to evaluate the MSR-BPM approach proposed for 
Security Risk Analysis and Business Process Model according to the ISO 
27005 activities.   
 
3. Post-task survey, the participants were asked to provide their opinion regarding 
usefulness of the MSR-BPM.  
The video is still available for anyone who would like an insight into the MSR-BPM 
approach.  
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7.6.6 Analysis of Survey Feedback 
 
7.6.6.1 Participant Profile from UK 
 
Twelve individuals participated in the empirical evaluation of the MSR-BPM from 
different areas of expertise in healthcare and security. They are experts in risk 
management (7) and business process modelling (6). Several of them are familiar with 
the healthcare industry (6). As Appendix F3 and F4 showed, the experience of the 
participants varies from 1 to more than 12 years. According to Chung and Nixon 
(1995), the qualitative IS research is evaluated analytically by its developers and then 
additional evidence is provided by case studies and interviews with domain experts. 
The important roles of case studies and interviews in IS research and, particularly, in 
qualitative IS research are discussed in Benbasat & Goldstein (1987) and Mayers & 
Newman (2007) respectively. The participants in this evaluation were asked to answer 
a survey questions based on a case study. Therefore, this research used qualitative 
methods to evaluate the MSR-BPM approach. All twelve participants came from the 
UK. A summary of the participants’ profiles is provided in Table 7-6. The full details 
are presented in Appendix F.3 and F.4 Table 1 and Table 2. 
 
Risk Management Business Process Modelling  
Healthcare 
domain 
 
Expert Competent Some 
knowledge 
Expert Competent Some 
knowledge 
YES NO 
P2,P12 P1, 
P3,P7,P8,P1
1 
P4,P5,P6,P9,
P10 
P3 P1,P2,P7 
P11,P12 
P4,P5,P6, 
P8, P9,P10 
P2,P3,P
7,P8, 
P10,P12 
P1,P5,
P6,P9,
P11 
Table 7-6 Summary of Evaluator Background. 
 
7.6.6.2 Participant Feedback on Questions 14 to 25 
The analysis was performed using Excel based on the survey stages to explore the 
participant perceptions and acceptance of using the MSR-PBM within the healthcare 
domain. Figure 7-9 illustrates the findings for stage one. It can be seen that all 
Chapter 7 Framework Evaluation 
266 | P a g e  
 
participants are in strong agreement in stage 1, which indicates strong acceptance for 
establishing the context and enhancing traceability. In particular, Q15 shows strong 
agreement regarding its effectiveness. Participants supported this by saying:  
Participant 2: “The value lies in improving traceability between the technology and 
the clinical setting.” 
Participant 4: “Certainly more readable, understandable and referable than a 
potentially large and unwieldy risk register.” 
 
  
Figure 7-9 Summary of Stage 1 Analysis 
 
On the other hand, in stage 2 (Figure 7-10), Identify Security Risks, Q17 indicates that 
the participants show some uncertainty that the MSR-BPM approach will help in 
identifying appropriate security risks.  
  
42
8
58
92
0
0
Q15: The BPM approach used is useful for 
designing process models as it helps to 
clearly identify activities, flows, locations 
and roles in healthcare processes.
Q14: The BPM approach used can be 
effectively applied to capture processes in 
healthcare.
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stage 1 Establishing the Context  
Strongly Agree % Agree % Neither Agree/Disagree %
Disagree % Strongly Disagree % I do not know %
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Figure 7-10 Summary of Stage 2 Analysis 
 
Meanwhile, in stage 3 (Figure 7-11), Risk Analysis and Evaluation, Q18 and Q19 
indicate the participants’ acceptance of using the BPM and risk register for risk 
assessment and evaluation. Participant 11 supported this by commenting, “I always 
find modelling to be very useful and I like the way that BPM is linked to the register”. 
 
 
Figure 7-11 Summary of Stage 3 Analysis 
 
Figure 7-12 presents stage 4; Q20 and Q21 demonstrate that the participants are not 
sure that this approach will be effective or helpful in identifying suitable and 
appropriate countermeasures. Participant 1 explains this as follows: “Regarding Q20 
and Q21, I do not see how this method could actually help with identifying appropriated 
33
25
50
58
0
17
8
0
0 8
Q17: The BPM approach used is more likely to 
help staff identify the appropriate security risks 
associated with the roles compared to relying on 
a risk register only.
Q16: The BPM approach used can clearly identify 
security risks with different activities level in the 
healthcare processes.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%100%
Stage 2: Identify Security Risks 
Strongly Agree % Agree % Neither Agree/Disagree %
Disagree % Strongly Disagree % I do not know %
50
50
10
33
8
17
0
0
Q19: The Risk Register -BPM approach used is 
more likely to be effective in the analyses and 
evaluation of risk than using a risk register only.
Q18: Using both the process model and risk 
register approach helps staff to clearly identify 
the appropriate security goals and risk level …
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%100%
Stage 3: Risk Analysis and Evaluation
Strongly Agree % Agree % Neither Agree/Disagree %
Disagree % Strongly Disagree % I do not know %
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countermeasures. They could be equally well identified based on the description of the 
problem provided in a risk register. It only depends on how detailed is the register and how 
detailed is a model. Although, I can clearly see the benefits of the method for structuring and 
organising risk related information, I am not sure that it assists with identifying 
countermeasures.” 
  
Figure 7-12 Summary of Stage 4 Analysis 
 
In addition, in Q20, Participant 11 differentiated between the problem and solution 
and highlighted that the MSR-BPM can improve the understanding of risk but it does 
not offer a solution to the problem. Also, in Q21, Participant 11 emphasised that the 
statement was logical but it does not ensure that appropriate countermeasures will be 
implemented.  
Participant 11: “I think the solutions and problems are two different things. I think this 
approach is more likely to identify problem areas. What is done about them is (in my 
experience) far more likely to be affected by the security practitioners knowledge 
and other external factors such as available budget. The people implementing the 
countermeasures won’t be the people operating the BPM system in my experience. 
This approach will certainly provide better information about what the risks are but 
won’t guarantee that they will be treated”. 
25
42
25
25
33
25
17
8
0
0
Q21: Using Risk register and BPM together is 
more likely to help in identifying the 
appropriate countermeasure.
Q20: The Risk management-BPM approach 
used is more likely to be effective in 
identifying suitable countermeasure in 
healthcare domain than using risk register 
only.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%100%
Stage 4: Risk Treatment 
Strongly Agree % Agree % Neither Agree/Disagree %
Disagree % Strongly Disagree % I do not know %
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Participant 11: “But it will provide comprehensive information about the risk. The 
statement is logical but this doesn’t always guarantee that the most appropriate 
countermeasure will be deployed.” 
Stage 5 (Figure 7-13) represents a strong agreement that the MSR-BPM would help in 
identifying any changes within the risk rather than using risk register only. Participant 4 
supported this as follows: “Certainly more readable, understandable and referable than 
a potentially large and unwieldy risk register”. 
  
Figure 7-13 Summary of Stage 5 Analysis 
Although stage 6 (Figure 7-14) shows strong acceptance for using the MSR-BPM as a tool 
to enhance communication and manage risks, it illustrates that some participants are not sure 
that it is clearly understandable.  
Participant 3: “It’s better than just a risk register but I haven’t seen it compared to 
CESGs approach to infosec risk management which as a public sector body they 
should adhere to”. 
 
58 25 17 0
Q22: Using Risk register and 
BPM together is more likely 
to help in identifying any 
changes with the risk than 
using risk register only.
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stage 5:  Monitoring & Review
Strongly Agree %
Agree %
Neither Agree/Disagree %
Disagree %
Strongly Disagree %
I do not know %
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Figure 7-14 Summary of Stage 6 Analysis 
 
7.6.6.3 Participant Feedback about MSR-BPM Q26 to Q29 
 
In this section, open-questions were designed to allow for more feedback from the 
participants regarding the MSR-BPM approach.  
 
 
 
 
Question 26 was created to understand whether there are any difficulties following the 
Risk Register-BPM approach. Most of the participants indicated that the method was 
easy to follow and no difficulties were mentioned, but they raised an important point 
that the user of the approach needed to be familiar with the area because a clinician or 
a nurse might not be aware of its modelling aspect. Also, the final output of the 
diagram looked overcrowded with all the annotations of access permissions from 
Secure*BPMN, risks, security goals and countermeasures. Hence, this aspect will be 
addressed in future research.  
 
Participant 1: “I followed the method easily. My main concern is that the final 
annotated diagram is overcrowded with symbols which make reading and 
understanding harder. I would suggest that in future work you should consider how 
18
64
25
64
27
50
9
9
17
0
0
8 0
9
Q25: Developing BPM and risk register for 
key health processes is more likely to help 
healthcare organisations manage security …
Q24: Risk Register-BPM approach used is 
more likely to effectively communicate risks 
to achieve a shared understanding of all …
Q23: The Risk Register – BPM approach 
used is clearly understandable and 
appropriate to use to manage security risk …
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Stage 6: Communication  & Consultation 
Strongly Agree % Agree % Neither Agree/Disagree %
Disagree % Strongly Disagree % I do not know %
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following the Risk 
Register-BPM approach presented in the video. 
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to improve the effectiveness of the visual representation of annotated BPMN 
models.” 
 
Participant 2: “Who is the user of your approach? A security engineer or a clinician? 
I would say an engineer might be familiar with this sort of modelling. I doubt a 
clinician will have the skill or time to develop these models”. 
 
The MSR-BPM approach is very rich; what it represents in the BPM and what level 
of detail depends on the stakeholder’s team. The stakeholders’ discussions will allow 
team members to discuss each risk’s impact, likelihood and level rather than copying 
from previous risk register documents.  
 
Participant 8: “…People have a tendency to just copy by default what has gone 
before in the examples, as they stick with the defaults. Taking this into account for 
your examples would be quite helpful”. 
Participant 2: “As a framework it’s fine. The problem is in having data/evidence to 
decide on things like likelihood and impact parameters”. 
 
 
 
In Question 27, the primary intention was to ascertain if there was any aspect missing 
or not relevant to managing security risks domain. Participant 1 placed emphasis on 
"Privacy" as an important element, especially in the healthcare field; this needs to be 
clearly considered and any issues pertaining to data anonymization needs to be 
addressed. In addition, 5 participants were considered to model other types of risks, 
such as physical access and data at rest. These types of technical risks are addressed 
in Reference Generic Table in Appendix C. 
 
Participant 1: “Privacy is critical in healthcare, but at the same time data are 
collected for important medical analysis. So you may want, in future work, to 
consider representation or privacy and address issues of data anonymization”. 
 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are missing or 
not relevant to the Managing security risks domain? If yes, please name them. 
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To enhance the usefulness of the approach, it is important to capture customers’ 
‘Feared Events’ which would assist people in addressing the risks without thinking of 
the infrastructure, people, process and technology. Therefore, the approach will focus 
on the source of the risk and find a practical mitigation solution for it. Also, it is 
necessary to identify the requirement of the organisation or the customer to help in 
understanding various concerns or potential risks within their domain.  
Participant 11: “One of the things that we have found to be very useful is to take into 
consideration the customer ‘Feared Events’. These tend to be high level and help 
people to think about the risks without the constraints of current infrastructure / 
people / process / technology. It also helps in stopping people ‘solutionising’ (sorry 
– horrible word) too early in the process. This type of approach also helps people 
consider the risks introduced by process and people, as opposed to being purely 
technology focussed, which is a real problem in my experience. It is important for 
the security system design team to understand where the risks are derived from so 
that they can be effectively mitigated in the solution. Another useful question is to 
identify the organisations ‘crown jewels’ so that you know what is of most value to 
the customer. It is always useful to gain as many perspectives from as many different 
sources as practical. ” 
 
 
 
In question 28, the participants were asked if the Risk Register-BPM approach could 
be used as a tool to complement the risk register to manage security risks. They 
highlighted that the method could bring multiple benefits as it helps in visualising the 
entire process of security risks in the complex business process.  
 
Participant 1: “If used appropriately, the method could bring multiple benefits as it 
helps to visualise security risks in complex business processes, and make them 
explicit and easy to see for experts with different backgrounds.” 
Participant 7: “To a great extent.” 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a 
valuable tool to complement using a risk register to manage security risks? 
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Participant 8:“I think it is useful to have the visualisation for people so they can see 
the connections across an organisation and the flow. This is often what is missing a 
lot of the time”. 
Also, they considered it as more readable and understandable than the standard risk 
register document. They also believed that it might enhance traceability.   
 
Participant 4: “Certainly more readable, understandable and referable than a 
potentially large and unwieldy risk register.” 
Participant 3: “It’s better than just a risk register but I haven’t seen it compared to 
CESGs approach to infosec risk management – which as a public sector body they 
should adhere to – hence harsh mark on Q23 – sorry –”. 
Participant 5: “As I mentioned earlier, I quite liked the model and is a great starting 
point to evaluate risk particularly when establishing processes.” 
Participant 10: “This model of three different hospitals may not be a universal model 
but it will be applicable in few scenarios. There would be some patient who will go 
from GP to Hospital 1 (usually holds the first and subsequent MDTs) for further 
assessment and then Hospital 2 for treatment (Hospital 2 will hold MDTs as well).    
But the scenario is a very practical one and associated risks are better identified 
using the BPM and risk register approach. Well done”. 
In addition, the MSR-BPM is more like a living document than the commonly used 
risk register, which tends to be ignored after the initial project is implemented.   
Participant 11: “I think it would be an improvement on what currently exists. We are 
often presented with a risk register during consult / system design phases which tend 
to be a cut and paste of the last one with no real thought into the actual risk. It 
would be more likely to be a living document than a risk register which tend to 
ignored after the initial project implementation.” 
Providing a training session for using the MSR-BPM is important as some of the 
participants raised concerns regarding the use of the MSR-BPM by non-technical 
stakeholders. 
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Participant 6: “Have the right methodology and tooling is essential for managing 
security risk. Having a methodology that is sound is good, and I think this can be 
used, but you would need to spend the time not just creating the method but also 
building the training and implementation capability, as people performing this work 
are incredibly busy and don’t always have time to learn new methods if the methods 
they are using are ‘good enough’ Being a better method is not always a good enough 
reason to stop doing what has been working, so you’ll need to construct a 
compelling reason not just why this is good, but also why the current method is not 
good.” 
The MSR-BPM has a substantial importance in terms of understanding the risk 
holistically compared to a traditional risk register. Therefore, the MSR-BPM is a 
helpful tool in identifying risks through a logical process flow.   
Participant 9: “I feel it is of significant value in comparison to a traditional risk 
register. If this was applied in detail to a very specific hospital / health care facility, 
it could be used as starting point to understand risk, referencing out to more detailed 
documents to form a holistic risk analysis. If this where updated as departmental 
processes evolve, it could be used to inform the ‘plan’ aspect of a health care 
providers ISMS.” 
Participant 10: “It is useful in explaining the underlying process and in my opinion 
stakeholders will find it helpful to view the exact points/processes which have 
underlying risks.” 
Participant 12: “It will be a helpful tool in identifying some risks through a logical 
process flow, however it shouldn’t be used in isolation. Equally, risk registers are 
used for simplicity and the ability of a wide audience to be able to consume their 
outputs and contribute. It’s possible that whilst this is good for a technical audience, 
you may have security risks that threaten brand or more nebulous economic value. 
It’s likely stakeholders you’d want to engage in this process won’t be from a 
technical background and may struggle conceptually with it, so alternative 
techniques may be required.” 
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In Question 29, the participants were asked if they anticipated any problems with 
adopting the risk register-BPM approach. Some participants argued that the MSR-
BPM is not a standard and therefore it would require extensive testing and several 
rounds of evaluation for improvement before being implemented in practice. Others 
consider the user acceptance as a critical issue, especially if the user does not have a 
technical background. Therefore, having stakeholder teams from multidisciplinary 
fields would help in this aspect.  
  
Participant 1: “As this is not a standardised or widely used method, I anticipate a lot 
of difficulties with adopting a method in large and heavily regulated organisations. 
The method would have to go through a lot of empirical testing, and several rounds 
of evaluation and improvement before it may be adopted in practice”. 
Participant 2: “User acceptance might be an issue, especially if the intended user is 
not an engineer, e.g. doctor or nurse.” 
Participant 3: “would be fine but as part of a wider RMADS / approach to 
implementing GPMS – basically needs lots of scoping documents and quite a lot of 
other stuff – after recent events this is likely to be pretty important. ” 
Participant 4: “It would depend on how process varies across hospital 
‘constituencies’ in the UK – is the process totally standardised across all hospitals? 
(I don’t know the answer to that)”. 
On the other hand, some participants argue that most organisations already have a risk 
template that they follow. Therefore, they will not likely be receptive to a different 
method. Having a Multidisplinary stakeholder team could encourage them to embrace 
the approach as it will enhance people’s understanding of risk impacts, regardless of 
diversity of experience.  
Participant 5: “The only problem I can think of is that most organisations already 
have a risk template that they follow with different level schema, which could involve 
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register-BPM approach? 
If yes, please outline them in in detail here. 
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a lot of levels (A1,A3, B3, etc.) and it might be difficult to map their existing schema 
with the three levels (Red, Amber and Green)”. 
Participant 6: “What I mentioned above. It’s hard in busy spaces, especially in health 
care, to learn and use new things. This would have to be used by multiple 
practitioners in different hospitals for it to be effective, with the underlying DB 
constructed in a way to collect the right information, so to make this effective it’s not 
just convincing one manager or one hospital, but a group of them working together. 
Is there a need for this in the marketplace? Do hospitals see a problem with what 
they are using to demand something better? ” 
In addition, some participants had concerns about people’s capacity and time needed 
to carry out the MSR-BPM method as people are busy and do not have time to learn 
and adopt new methods. This research carefully considered the need for training and 
awareness sessions as a necessary activity for all staff to enhance the importance of 
identifying risk within the whole process.  
Participant 8: “As mentioned above I would question the time and capacity people 
have to do this. They are often stretched for time, why would they adopt this over just 
keeping with the risk register? As much as it’s known risk registers aren’t the best 
and have many issues, how will you bring people with you, to make them understand 
what could be done with this work?” 
Participant 11: “The supporting functions such as training and system management 
of implementing such a system at scale should not be under estimated. Systemic 
change is always difficult. Typically, the change management function within the 
organisation would look after the living document so system change in that area 
would be required.” 
 
 
One participant did not answer the questions as they found it difficult. 
Participant 2: “It was hard to answer your questions since you do not provide a 
reference/benchmark against which to compare your approach. For example, is it 
nothing vs your approach? Or using flowchart vs BPMN? This makes a big 
difference”. 
Q30: Any other comments or feedback? 
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As a suggestion for effectiveness improvement, Participant 11 recommends linking 
the MSR-BPM with the security systems. This can be earmarked for future research 
as it will help in measuring the countermeasure effectiveness to mitigate the identified 
risks or not.  
Participant 11: “… To be effective it would also need to be linked to the security 
system design documentation to measure how well the identified risks are mitigated 
(or not) as the systems capability (in terms of people, process and technology) 
change over time.” 
 
7.6.6.4 Evaluating MSR-BPM with Stakeholder from Oman 
 
The researcher liaised with practitioners from Oman to evaluate the MSR-BPM 
approach. Verbal communication was conducted with practitioners from the 
healthcare and Information Technology Authority. A confirmation assured their 
willingness to participate. The evaluation material, which included a formal request 
letter to explain the research aims and objectives, the experiment’s URL, deliverable 
output and survey questions, were sent via e-mail on 23rd May 2018. A kind reminder 
was sent on a weekly basis. Unfortunately, there was a lack of response to emails. 
Only one respondent replied via email out of twenty.   
 
From the feedback received, it was revealed that the practitioner faced difficulty in 
following up the experiment video as she was not familiar with the terminology of risk 
register and BPM. She commented, “I'm terribly sorry my dear for not being able to 
help you with the survey. The difficulty was in that I found the video too long but of 
course I understand that you needed the time to explain the topic. The second difficulty 
was the technical terminology which I had a problem to cope with, I'm not sure if 
anything needs to be changed because maybe someone else will be in a better position 
than me to understand the concept and fill the survey”. 
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In addition, she indicated that the risk register was not in use in their workplace. 
However, an electronic incident reporting system where they enter their medication 
errors and any incidents which may be technical or environmental was in use. She 
maintained that the system also incorporated error types and causes which are entered 
through drop down lists and free text format. The system then produces reports when 
needed. 
 
The researcher tried to request further responses and other evidence of using risk 
register within the healthcare in Oman. However, it was not possible to find any 
evidence that risk register is adopted in the healthcare in Oman. This may explain the 
lack of responses from practitioners in Oman as they are unfamiliar with the technique 
used in this methodology. 
 
The lack of adoption of Risk Registers in the healthcare in Oman would be a barrier 
to migrating the MSR-BPM approach in the Omani context. However, the MSR-BPM 
is suitable for any organisation that is familiar with the ISO 27000 standards and could 
also be adopted by organisations that are familiar with the ISO 31000 standards. 
 
The Omani healthcare system has not yet adopted the concept of patient pathways. 
According to World Health Organization (WHO, 2017) Oman has extensive plans to 
strategically implement initiatives to make health care systems “patient-centred”, i.e. 
a system that provides care that is “respectful of and responsive to individual patient 
preferences, needs and values, and ensuring that patient values guide all clinical 
decisions” (WHO, 2017). If Oman moves to patient-centred system, MSR-BPM 
approach will help in providing shared understanding of anticipated risks within 
patient pathways.  
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7.6.7  Evaluate MSR-BPM in ISO 27005 Process 
 
7.6.7.1 Advantages of MSR-BPM 
 
It was decided to reflect on the MSR-BPM approach based on the ISO 27005 process 
(Figure 7-6) to show its effectiveness and the extent to which it satisfied all process 
requirements. The anticipated benefits of combining risk register with BPM (in section 
5.4, Table 5-12) form the roadmap for the reflection. The MSR-BPM helped in 
establishing the context by identifying the scope and boundaries of the context that 
needed to be reported by creating the BPM. The MSR-BPM diagram shows who is 
required to report and communicate risks within an organisation. Also, the MSR-BPM 
approach is highly effective in helping staff understand what the risks associated 
within their roles are. Participants are in strong agreement regarding the MSR-BPM, 
as shown in the analysis section 7.6.6.2 for stages 1, 2 and 3. In addition, Participants 
8 and 10 provide positive comments in terms of visualising the risks within a process.  
Participant 8:“I think it is useful to have the visualisation for people so they can see 
the connections across an organisation and the flow. This is often what is missing a 
lot of the time”. 
Participant 10: “It is useful in explaining the underlying process and in my opinion 
stakeholders will find it helpful to view the exact points/processes which have 
underlying risks. The scenario is a very practical one and associated risks are better 
identified using the BPM and risk register approach. Well done”. 
The MSR-BPM is vital in terms of understanding the risk holistically compared to the 
traditional risk register. It is a helpful tool in identifying risks through a logical process 
flow. Another advantage can be seen in the way it allows structuring and organising 
risk-related information. The MSR-BPM is useful in risk assessment (risk 
identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation) as it determines the risk name and type 
with a brief description in the risk register. It also provides information on the impact, 
likelihood and risk level.  
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Participant 4: “Certainly more readable, understandable and referable than a 
potentially large and unwieldy risk register”. 
Participant 5: “…I quite liked the model and is a great starting point to evaluate risk 
particularly when establishing processes.” 
Participant 9: “I feel it is of significant value in comparison to a traditional risk 
register. If this was applied in detail to a very specific hospital / health care facility, 
it could be used as starting point to understand risk, referencing out to more detailed 
documents to form a holistic risk analysis. If this where updated as departmental 
processes evolve, it could be used to inform the ‘plan’ aspect of a health care 
providers ISMS. ” 
Participant 12: “It will be a helpful tool in identifying some risks through a logical 
process flow.” 
The MSR-BPM approach improves the communication mechanism between different 
rows and locations by providing all parties with a shared understanding of the risks as 
they are tested through the application, as explored in Chapter 5 in section 5.3 for the 
hypothetical case study. In addition, it enhances traceability of risk changes. 
Therefore, the MSR-BPM approach helps in the Monitoring and Review process by 
identifying any changes within a risk rather than using the risk register only. The BPM 
diagram will update the process to clearly visualise the risk changes, whether at the 
process or activity level.  
 
Participant 11 supported this by commenting, “I always find modelling to be very 
useful and I like the way that the BPM is linked to the register. I think it would be an 
improvement on what currently exists. We are often presented with a risk register 
during consult / system design phases which tend to be a cut and paste of the last one 
with no real thought into the actual risk. It would be more likely to be a living 
document than a risk register which tend to ignored after the initial project 
implementation.” 
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Although the findings from the interviews and questionnaire in Chapter 3 address 
other types of risks, such as Management, Technical, Legal and other Risks not 
specific to cloud computing (listed in Appendix C), the time constraints of the research 
made it difficult to addressed all risks in detail. Therefore, the primary focus of this 
research was centred on security risks. Besides, there were risks that had dependencies 
on other risk categories, that may affect or increase the current risks or create 
additional risks. For example, lowering the labour number can reduce cost but can also 
create a stressful environment for other labour, which may lead to a reduced quality 
of work. 
 
This research emphasises the importance of combining Risk Register with BPM 
because the major limitation of BPM is that it does not provide in-depth details about 
countermeasures. Hence, having the risk register table helps to document 
countermeasures in more depth. 
 
7.6.7.2 Limitations  
 
Applying Information Security Management Systems (ISO 27000) in the healthcare 
domain is a challenge because it involves high level guidelines. In addition, the time 
available to study the ISO 31000, ISO 27001, ISO 27002, ISO27799:2008, ISO 
27799:2016 and ISO 19510 was limited. The researcher had limited experience with 
both systems design and the healthcare domain; therefore, one of the MSR-BPM 
limitations was that it took time to draw the BPM diagram. Also, it was a challenge to 
know the level of details required to be included in the BPM diagram. Some might 
argue that the countermeasures can be removed from the BPM, but there is a need to 
structure thinking and visualise the risks for stakeholders. Others may suggest 
removing the level of access abstraction from the BPM to make the final annotated 
diagram less crowded with symbols and as a result reading and understanding becomes 
more user-friendly. The stakeholder team decides the level of detail required in the 
diagram according to the situation they are dealing with. Therefore, it helps to have an 
experienced business analysts as part of the team. 
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A reflective practitioner commented that it is a challenge to draw complex scenarios 
and therefore a Multidisplinary team is required to work on the MSR-BPM approach 
to discuss the right level of abstraction and to determine the risk level. Also, deciding 
the countermeasure for each risk is not an easy task as some risks are applicable to 
more than one countermeasure.  
 
The MSR-BPM is not a standard or commonly used method; therefore, user 
acceptance might be another obstacle as people might not accept new methods easily. 
Thus, several rounds of evaluation and improvements would be necessary before 
adopting the approach in practice. 
 
The experts/practitioners were right in that the limitation of MSR-BPM is that it is not 
effective in risk treatment because it does not help to determine the appropriate 
countermeasure to mitigate the risk. It does help document the countermeasure once 
it is identified by the stakeholder, however. Hence, there is a need for a Multidisplinary 
team to assist in suggesting the risk mitigation countermeasure based on their 
knowledge and expertise.  
 
7.6.7.3 Evaluation of the Approach to Determine Risks 
 
The literature review helped to identify various types of risks in using cloud computing 
in healthcare services. A range of risks were identified covering management, 
technical, legal and security risks.  However, many of the risks were either high-level 
or too specific to a particular context. 18 risks from the literature review were 
developed into a risk register in Chapter 2 (Table-2-3).  The risk register was enhanced 
with an analysis of importance and relevance to the healthcare context in Oman. It also 
incorporates some of the operational risks associated with central cloud infrastructure 
managed by the ODP and ITA-Cloud. However, developing a risk register through a 
survey of the literature alone gave an insufficient coverage of the risks and the sources 
did not always provide appropriate countermeasures for mitigating the risks. Further 
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an analysis was needed to understand the stakeholders’ perceptions of using cloud 
computing services within healthcare in Oman. 
 
The high-level risks in Table-2-3 were useful to build up the questionnaires in Chapter 
3 as it focussed on Management, Technical, Legal and Security Risks. Each area was 
expanded further according to surveys adopted from literature (Lian et al., (2014); 
Wijaya et al., (2014); Singh et al., (2014) and Chang et al., (2007)). The main finding 
of the questionnaires centred on identifying security and technical risks as main 
concerns. This was also confirmed in an interview with H.Dr. Ali Talib Al Hinai, 
Undersecretary for Planning Affairs in Ministry of Health who highlighted the need 
for an effective security risk assessment methodology to overcome the identified 
security concerns. Thus, the scope of the risk analysis was narrowed to the technical 
and security aspects of cloud computing. 
 
A framework was used to help identify and manage risks. The RMIAS (Cherdantseva, 
2014) was chosen because it provides the most comprehensive set of security aspects. 
It provides an analysis and classification of security aspects proposed by reference 
models on information assurance and security. Also, it is based on Information 
Security and Information Assurance standards and the ISO/IEC 27000 family of 
standards. However, RMIAS did not cover risk management in detail but the model 
was adapted, so that the Security Development Life Cycle Dimension (the top left 
quadrant) was replaced with the Information Security Management System (ISMS) 
process from the IS0 27005 so that Risk Management became the primary focus. This 
was used to develop a generic risk register table to document the risk name and risk 
description. The structure of the risk register was used to determine the taxonomy of 
risk information, such as risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. An 
ordinary risk register table does not have a security goal, but it is important to identify 
suitable countermeasure needed.  
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The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) was 
used as a guideline to identify the impact, likelihood and risk level for each risk 
because it holds security risks, technical risks and other types of cloud computing 
risks. A mapping process between the survey statement which identified the technical 
and security aspects and ENISA guidelines list of risks was performed. The mapping 
process resulted in creating a generic reference risk register table which holds 46 risks 
(Appendix C) rather than 18 risks which were identified in the literature (Chapter 2 
Table-2-3).  
 
The 46 risks were a mixture of areas related to different risks management 
perspectives. They include: Change project risks associated with introducing cloud 
computing into the hospitals, Operational risk associated with central cloud 
infrastructure managed by ODP and ITA-Cloud and Operational risks within each 
hospital.  
 
Despite risk register benefits (section4.9), there are limitations in using the Risk 
Register alone as it lacks risk visibility within a process. Thus, the methodology was 
enhanced to explicitly represent risk within a process. Secure*BPMN (Cherdantseva, 
2014) was expanded by adding risk representation to it. The main processes in 
Information Security Risk Management (ISO 27005) were used as a basis to combine 
the Risk Register and Business Process Modelling as an approach to manage security 
risks. Managing Security Risk – Business Process Modelling (MSR-BPM) can 
manage risks by addressing visibility and shared awareness of risk. Also, it helps to 
identify different risks due to the context of the process.  
 
The nature of the risks changes because modelling the process brings a stronger 
emphasis on the context of the risk. For instance, Chapter 5 provided a generic 
reference risk register table which holds most of the management perspectives areas. 
It holds change project risks, operational risks associated with central cloud 
infrastructure and operational risks associated with the hospital business processes. 
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However, the countermeasures provided are in general format. They need to be 
customised according to the context.  
 
Chapter 6 discussed key aspects for using a use case scenario to model the current 
situation and a potential future situation using cloud computing. It represents how the 
nature of risks and the countermeasures required to mitigate these risks changed 
significantly as the context changed to cloud computing. For instance, it addressed 
physical data protection risks in the current situation, whereas in cloud computing it 
addressed governance issues such as GDPR compliance for protecting data in 
Germany, which is not used in Oman. In addition, migrating to HL7 to address 
interoperability issues was not identified in the generic reference risk register table in 
Chapter 5.  
 
MSR-BPM approach is valuable to identify the risks in associated with using cloud 
computing to support healthcare processes. Considering risk management 
perspectives helped to identify the responsibility of different stakeholders for 
managing the risks, both inside and outside the scope of the hospital. MSR-BPM 
indicates the importance of using the process model and risk register to provide a clear 
understanding where the risks occur and how these need to be managed. For instance, 
at the operational level the hospital needs to manage risks such as Malicious insider, 
Identity access management and insecure deletion of data. Some of these risks and 
countermeasures change significantly when the context moves to cloud computing. 
For instance, for Data protection the patient needs to secure his PKI in Oman to 
prevent unauthorised access, whereas in Germany hospital, there is a need for GDPR 
compliance as patient needs to give consent for accessing his records. Applying MSR-
BPM approach helped in understanding cloud computing context especially in 
providing the relevance of each risk to the healthcare context in Oman. 
 
It can be challenging when modelling the process to decide the right level of 
abstraction, whilst ensuring that the diagram does not get too complex. The separation 
of concerns is recommended to model the infrastructure architecture (which is 
primarily the concern of ODP and ITA-Cloud) separately from the business 
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architecture (which is primarily the concern of the hospitals). It will create several 
benefits such as (a) the dimensions of risk will be reduced considerably (b) the 
diagrams are likely to be less 'busy'; (c) the extended risk register becomes simpler. 
This helps to focus on the risks that are pertinent to the architectural view. However, 
it is important to understand and manage the impact of any future changes on each of 
the architectural views. 
 
Chapter 7 was used to evaluate the MSR-BPM approach with practitioners. There was 
a need for a realistic scenario to critically evaluate the MSR-BPM integrated approach 
at the operational level within a business process which deals with day-to-day 
operations. Integrated Care Pathway (ICP) for breast cancer was chosen as it shows 
the processes, roles, activities and different locations. It will not be evaluated in cloud 
as it is inappropriate to the context. However, the cloud context had been analysed in 
Chapter 5 and 6. The feedback from practitioners provided advantages and limitations 
of the MSR-BPM approach. They supported using the risk register with the business 
process model to understand risks, enhance effective communication, identify any 
change in risks as it proved helpful in structuring and organising risk-related 
information. It is also useful when there is a complicated process that handles multiple 
locations and stakeholders. However, there are limitations for using the MSR-BPM. 
First, it does not help to identify the most the appropriate countermeasure to mitigate 
the addressed risks. Second, it takes time to draw the BPM diagram. Third, it is 
challenging in terms of how much detail needs to be included in the BPM diagram. 
Furthermore, the user acceptance of the approach and the need to be familiar with 
BPM area is another concern because a clinician or a nurse might not be familiar with 
the modelling aspect nor have a detailed knowledge of the security issues and 
countermeasures. 
 
The feedback from the evaluator of MSR-BPM confirms that the approach helps in 
visualising the operational risks with the hospital and assists in providing a risk register 
as a living document throughout a project, but it does not provide countermeasures. 
The stakeholder team needs to decide the suitable countermeasures needed according 
to the risk analysis.  
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7.6.7.4 Future Work 
 
There is scope for further research regarding the MSR-BPM approach and that is to 
extend the method to address various types of risks (management, technical and legal) 
which were explored in Chapter 3. In addition, the research can be further developed 
through software to provide an automated detection and mitigating recommendations 
for similar risks rather than creating the tables manually. Therefore, it will not only 
detect such risks, but also provide comprehensive solutions as well.   
 
Addressing Provenance will enhance the MSR-BPM approach to trace events in 
complex distributed processes. In addition, it will show dependencies between such 
events, and associated decisions by human actors.  
 
There is also the need to provide a training session for using the MSR-BPM as some 
of the participants raised concerns regarding the use of the MSR-BPM by non-
technical stakeholders. The training session would increase user awareness of the 
MSR-BPM approach and highlight how it differs from a traditional risk register by 
providing a living document of risks which can identify any changes within risks. In 
addition, enhancing employee awareness of security risks through regular and up-to-
date workshops could reduce the security risks. This will therefore reduce the expense 
of mitigating critical risks. 
Participant 6: “Have the right methodology and tooling is essential for managing 
security risk. Having a methodology that is sound is good, and I think this can be 
used, but you would need to spend the time not just creating the method but also 
building the training and implementation capability, as people performing this work 
are incredibly busy and don’t always have time to learn new methods if the methods 
they are using are ‘good enough’ Being a better method is not always a good enough 
reason to stop doing what has been working, so you’ll need to construct a 
compelling reason not just why this is good, but also why the current method is not 
good.” 
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The MSR-BPM can be linked with security systems to improve its effectiveness by 
assessing the countermeasure in mitigating the risks. If the countermeasure is not 
suitable, it will be modified accordingly.  
Participant 11: “… To be effective it would also need to be linked to the security 
system design documentation to measure how well the identified risks are mitigated 
(or not) as the systems capability (in terms of people, process and technology) 
change over time.” 
 
Also, Participant 12 is quite right in pointing out the need for a broader application to 
address various types of risks. Therefore, the MSR-BPM can be used in a broader 
context to address not only security risks but also management, technical and legal 
risks. It depends on the process that it is used for and how much detail the stakeholders’ 
team is required to gather during their discussion meeting.  
Participant 12: “Typically this approach will enable the identification of risks 
through a particular lens - in this case a process. However, security is somewhat all 
encompassing. Depending on the ultimate consumer of the activity, sticking to this 
approach will likely miss more binary risks driven by regulatory compliance; 
technical risk driven by more extensible systems and architectures (e.g. cloud 
infrastructure not managed by you) as well as contractual risk. I don’t know the 
overall objective so it’s hard to contextualise the question, so it may be appropriate, 
alternatively a broader approach may be required whereby this assessment can be 
used as part of a number of techniques to derive the overall risk posture.” 
This would be enabled using an enterprise architecture approach, as discussed in 
Section 6.5. However further work is needed to determine how an enterprise 
architecture approach such as TOGAF could be enhanced to manage risks across the 
different architectural concerns.  
 
Multidisciplinary stakeholder teams can use the MSR-BPM to identify different types 
of risks, for instance, in terms of business continuity and management which include 
technical, management and security risks. The MSR-BPM can also potentially be 
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applied within other domains, such as the banking sector, telecommunications, airlines 
or education, to provide effective communication on information security risks. 
 
In addition, the MSR-BPM approach is used in this research at an operational level 
within a business context.  In future, the approach can be used in a broader context 
within a strategic level within models and ISO 31000.  Further work can consider 
using the Risk Register with BPM in conjunction with the ISO 31000 to effectively 
manage organisational policy and strategy level. Thus, risks can be managed across 
the organisation. It can identify technical risks and security risks as well as other risks 
identified from the perception such as managerial, legal and clinical risks. 
 
Oman is currently not applying the risk management approach in healthcare, which 
provides a barrier to the adoption of the MSR-BPM approach. However, organisations 
that are familiar with the ISO 27000 standards in Oman, such as Information 
Technology Authority (ITA), can potentially adopt the MSR-BPM approach because 
they are already using the ISO 27000 in their workplace. The MSR-BPM approach 
can be used in the UK as participants view the Risk Register as a living document in 
the evaluation experiment. The Risk Register is widely adopted in the healthcare 
domain in the UK.  
 
7.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter presented an evaluation of the MSR-BPM within a complicated 
healthcare scenario through the Integrated Care pathway for breast cancer. The 
scenario was chosen because it had been used by several researchers within the 
Computer Science and Informatics Department at Cardiff University. It presents a 
complex treatment pathway which includes multiple locations and multiple 
stakeholders.  
 
Although other researchers addressed important concerns, such as information-sharing 
between GPs and members of the cancer team (Allam, 2006), automated workflow 
between the users of CISs and the legacy systems (Alsalamah,H. 2012), controlling 
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access permission between different locations (Burnap et al., 2012) and security 
requirements of the patient-centric approach (Alsalamah, S.2014), their research did 
not address information security risk in the healthcare processes. 
 
The literature on quality evaluations and quality standards was reviewed to determine 
a set of criteria to evaluate the MSR-BPM approach. It was important to ensure that 
the right quality criteria were involved in the evaluation of the approach to determine 
the effectiveness of the proposed MSR-BPM approach in enhancing the 
communication of information security risk in the healthcare process through survey 
questions.  
 
The feedback from the participants of the survey revealed both advantages and 
limitations of using in MSR-BPM approach: 
• The evaluators are in strong agreement regarding using MSR-BPM approach 
in establishing the context as they found it useful and effective in 
understanding the risks. 
• They support combining the risk register with business process modelling 
because it clearly identifies risks and enhances the traceability of risk in a 
complex process with multiple locations and stakeholders. 
• MSR-BPM can help in identifying any changes within risks rather than using 
a risk register only. 
• MSR-BPM approach proved that it could provide effective communication of 
information security risks in healthcare processes by combining risk register 
and business process modelling to visualise risks in healthcare processes and 
providing a shared understanding of these risks for stakeholders. 
 
In terms of limitations, the evaluators indicated uncertainty regarding whether the 
MSR-BPM approach would be useful in determining the countermeasures to mitigate 
the risks. This relies on the expertise of the stakeholder carrying out the analysis. 
However, the MSR-BPM can be useful in the planning phase to document the 
countermeasure once they are determined. 
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In addition, the MSR-BPM approach was reflected upon according to the ISO 27005 
processes to consider its effectiveness, advantages, limitations and suggestions for 
future work that could be carried out based on areas identified by this research that 
will be worth further investigation.  
  
The next chapter will highlight the key aspects of the research, before drawing 
conclusions 
 
.
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8.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter summarizes the key aspects of the research. It discusses the achievements 
of the research against its aims and objectives, draws conclusions from this research 
and confirms the research hypothesis. This chapter concludes with a summary of the 
originality and significance of the research contribution to learning. 
 
8.2 Achievements of the Research Objectives 
 
Section 1.2 identified the objectives that needed to be satisfied in order to achieve the 
research aim to develop a methodology to manage risks in order to improve the 
communication of Information Security Risk in the healthcare processes. These are 
reviewed in this section. 
 
8.2.1  Research Objective One  
 
Survey the literature to understand the benefits, challenges and risks 
associated with utilising cloud computing in healthcare and its relevance to 
the healthcare context in Oman 
Chapter 2 provided a background of cloud computing. It also addressed the benefits 
of using cloud computing in healthcare, providing different examples. Having cloud 
computing as a potential solution to address healthcare limitations requires a deep 
understanding of cloud computing benefits, challenges and risks associated with it. 
Therefore, a strategic analysis was performed of using cloud computing in the 
healthcare by observing the benefits and performing a SWOT analysis to understand 
the internal and external factors affecting cloud computing’s adoption. It was found 
that there are significant risks that need to be managed. Cloud computing risks in 
significant areas, such as management, technical, legal and security areas, were 
examined to gain a holistic view of risks that need to be considered before the adoption 
process. 
 
Table-2-3 presented risk register to summarise the main risks found in the literature. 
The risk register was expanded to highlight the importance and relevance to the 
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healthcare context in Oman. Also, it identified some of the operational risks associated 
with central cloud infrastructure managed by the ODP and ITA-Cloud. 
 
In Chapter 5 the generated reference risk register table came from combining standards 
such as ISO 27005 and ENISA with the Omani context. It indicated different ranges 
of risk types and countermeasures, which are needed to reduce the risk level. It 
identified 46 risks with appropriate countermeasures, security goals and risk levels. 
The use of cloud computing as a potential solution was explored in the hypothetical 
scenario in Chapter 6 to ease the exchange of sensitive data between two different 
countries. In addition, MSR-BPM was used to model the process of the scenario and 
generate a risk register with Strategic, Change and Operational risks specific to the 
context. The risk registers generated in chapters 2, 5 and 6 will assist stakeholders in 
mitigating the identified risks in a change project to expand cloud computing to enable 
the sharing of patient records, and in managing risks associated with using cloud-
computing in the hospitals' operational processes. 
 
It can therefore be concluded that the first objective was achieved and an 
understanding was gained in terms of the benefits, challenges and risks associated with 
utilising cloud computing in the healthcare and how this relates to the Omani context 
(Table-2-3).  
.  
8.2.2 Research Objective Two  
 
To understand stakeholders’ perceptions of risks in utilising cloud 
computing in the delivery of healthcare services 
 
Based on the comprehensive knowledge gained from Chapter 2 regarding cloud 
computing, preliminary interviews with seven stakeholders were designed. In 
addition, two sets of questionnaires (400 for the public and 150 for healthcare 
professionals) were provided to understand the perceptions of stakeholders.  
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The questions of the public and healthcare professionals’ questionnaires were adopted 
from Lian et al. (2014), Wijaya et al. (2014), Singh et al. (2014) and Chang et al. 
(2007).The questionnaires asked a very broad range of questions (75 questions) about 
the perceptions of risks in different areas, such as human, privacy, technology, 
organisational and environmental areas. The reliability and validity of the questions 
were checked through factor loading and Cronbach’s Alpha. Through the process, 
some of the questions were dropped. 46 questions were used for the analysis. The 
SPSS analysis and Radar Charts provided a detailed analysis of the various types of 
risks concerning human, privacy, technology, organisational and environmental areas. 
It was found that the major concerns were Data Security, Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability. Therefore, the findings emphasize the need for an effective methodology 
to manage such risks. The findings were validated with the Undersecretary for 
Planning Affairs in Ministry of Health who confirmed the need to have an effective 
methodology to manage risks within cloud computing.  
 
The key deliverables of Chapter 3 represent comprehensive statistical information 
about the stakeholder perception of different types of risks (Security, Management, 
Technical, Legal and other types of risks) that affect adopting cloud computing as a 
service. In addition, this research contributes to the literature by highlighting the risk 
factors preventing the government from adopting cloud computing as a service in the 
healthcare industry in the Omani context. Therefore, the second objective was 
achieved and a deeper understanding of stakeholders’ perceptions of risks in utilising 
cloud computing in the delivery of healthcare services was obtained. 
 
8.2.3 Research Objective Three  
 
Understand the framework and techniques used to manage risks and business 
process modelling to visualise risk. 
Chapter 4 provided a literature review on managing information security risk in 
general. The ISO/IEC 38500 for Corporate Governance of Information Technology 
was addressed. Risk Management (ISO 31000) was studied to understand the 
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techniques and guidelines of managing risks. Information Security Management 
Systems (ISO 27000) and Information Security Risk Management (ISO 27005) were 
discussed. A critical analysis of the ISO 38500, ISO 31000 and ISO 27000 methods 
were conducted and a comparison between the methods was carried out to be aware 
of how each method works, how it is used, which ISO it has compliance with, 
advantages, limitations and the technique it uses to manage risks. A summary table of 
the comparisons was created. Similarly, a comparison of the different tools that are 
commonly used within the healthcare industry to manage risks was considered. Risk 
Register (RR), Operational Critical Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) 
and Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) are the commonly used methods.  
 
A comparison table between OCTAVE, Risk Register and FMEA based on the ISO 
27005 processes was created. OCTAVE is an evaluation activity where a team 
identifies risks, analyses them to determine priorities and plan for improvement by 
developing a protection strategy for organizational improvement and risk mitigation 
plans to reduce the risk to the organization’s critical assets. It is not a continuous 
process as it has a defined beginning and end. FMEA is an assessment tool, but it does 
not eliminate risks. Although FMEA was useful as a risk analysis tool, it has many 
limitations, such as being biased toward severity ratings, having an ever-increasing 
list of possible failure modes, and being only as effective as the how the members of 
the FMEA team are using it. 
 
A risk register documents the assessment of risk with appropriate countermeasures; it 
is fully covered by Information Security Risk Management’s (ISO 27005) main 
processes. Therefore, the key significant deliverables are based on choosing risk 
register as the most appropriate tool for addressing risks. However, there are 
limitations related to using the risk register as it lacks visibility of the process and 
lacks a shared understanding of risks associated with each role. Thus, there is a need 
to enhance the risk register document through visualising the whole process, especially 
when there is a complicated process, which includes roles, processes, activities and 
multiple locations when different organisations are involved.  
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In addition, information security literature was examined to understand the concept of 
information security. The role of process modelling prospected in risk management 
framework was considered. Business Process Modelling (BPM) is a commonly used 
method in modelling techniques. The graphical style of the BPM furthers 
communication and interaction between stakeholders involved in a risk assessment. It 
was found that there was a better understanding of the risks through enhancing the 
communication of the risks in process modelling. However, the BPM does not provide 
the details of the countermeasure needed to manage the risks. Thus, there is a need to 
link it with another tool which can address this limitation.  
 
Therefore, the third objective of understanding the framework and techniques used to 
manage risks and business process modelling to visualise risk was achieved. 
 
8.2.4 Research Objective Four  
 
Develop an approach to address the stages of ISO 27005 and determine how to 
combine risk register and business process model to communicate information 
security risks 
Chapter 5 presented three contributions of this research. The first contribution relates 
to creating a comprehensive - and enhanced beyond previous work - generic reference 
risk register (Appendix C) which includes a mixture of risk management perspectives 
risks. It includes: Change project risks associated with introducing cloud computing 
into the hospital, Operational risk associated with central cloud infrastructure managed 
by the ODP and ITA-Cloud and Operational risks with the hospital. RMIAS 
(Cherdantseva, 2014) was used as a basis to create the risk register table and added 
traceability to show the risk location within a complex process. Many of the risks are 
out of scope of the hospital and are managed in the Change Project to transition to 
cloud or are managed by the ODP/ITA.  
 
The second contribution centres on providing an extension for Secure*BPMN to 
explicitly represent risk in the BPM. Secure*BPMN (Cherdantseva, 2014) was used 
as a strong candidate for modelling security concerns because it is accessible by all 
members of a multidisciplinary team, irrespective of their area of expertise. The syntax 
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of Secure*BPMN was designed specifically for human understanding and 
communication improvement purposes (Cherdantseva, 2014). Due to the researcher’s 
lack of familiarity with business process modelling, challenges were faced when using 
the modelling technique. In addition, choosing the risk symbol was difficult, as it had 
to be clear to the public who come from different backgrounds. Therefore, a triangle 
shape that was designed based on the road hazard symbols was used because it is 
deemed to be the most familiar to people who come from different backgrounds. 
 
The third is the main contribution of this research. It focuses on developing an 
approach, Managing Security Risk–Business Process Modelling (MSR-BPM), to 
visualise risks in a healthcare process and promote a shared understanding of the risks 
for stakeholders by combining risk register and business process modelling. A risk 
register documents the assessment of risk with appropriate countermeasures. The 
BPM visualises the risk activities, security goals and countermeasures in the process 
models to promote a shared understanding of risks to decision makers and 
stakeholders. 
 
It was decided to enhance the usefulness of the risk register by combining it with a 
business process modelling based on the ISO 27005 processes to show the anticipated 
benefits, as outlined in section 5.4.Table 5-12 showed that the risk register and 
business process modelling complement each other effectively. They provide a shared 
understanding of risks and improve the communication of information security risks 
in the healthcare process in complex processes with multiple locations and 
stakeholders. Also, the MSR-BPM is enriched with stakeholder perceptions of risks. 
The key deliverables of Chapter 5 featured presenting a methodology MSR-BPM 
approach to manage risks within a process.  
 
The MSR-BPM approach is different from other approaches. Other researchers used 
risk modelling in an algorithmic or quantitative approaches to risk, whereas the MSR-
BPM uses a qualitative approach and focuses on representing risk within the Business 
Process Modelling, ensuring that it is linked with the risk register to document the risk 
assessment. 
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Therefore, by developing the MSR-BPM approach to follow the stages of the 
ISO27005 Information Security Risk Management Process and determining how to 
combine both the risk register and business process model to communicate the 
information security risks, the fourth objective was achieved. 
 
8.2.5 Research Objective Five  
 
Identify a healthcare scenario to explain the need for migrating healthcare 
services to cloud computing and apply the approach to the scenario 
 
Chapter 6 addressed the application of the MSR-BPM approach through a hypothetical 
case study scenario that had been used in the preliminary interview to demonstrate the 
need for an improved communication mechanism in healthcare. It showed the benefit 
of having patients’ records available online to avoid multiple tests as well as having 
collaboration and communication between healthcare institutions in different 
locations. Having cloud computing may be considered as a solution but there are risks 
associated with it. The focus of this research was the security risks. 
 
This research followed the MSR-BPM stages as shown in Figure 5-3 in Chapter 5 to 
present the application in two ways: from a research approach to discuss how the 
scenario was modelled and from an anticipated stakeholder perception. The 
ISO 27005 Information Security Risk Management Process was followed at each 
stage in detail, which helped to structure the thinking about the security risks and to 
ensure that each activity in the process had been addressed. The ISO 27005 was chosen 
as it is an international information security standard which is widely used to manage 
risks. The MSR-BPM approach highlights the importance of enhancing the use of 
a risk register with business process modelling to provide a more effective way 
of communicating risks. In addition, it shows the importance of combining the risk 
register with business process modelling as a way to communicate risks. It presents 
the importance of visualising risks for decision makers and stakeholders. Also, it 
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highlights the importance of enriching the situation by involving stakeholders and 
multi-disciplinary team perceptions. Hence, the risks are made obvious to all 
stakeholders who have different perceptions of risks that need to be discussed openly 
when applying the MSR-BPM approach.   
 
It is challenging to include every step that a patient goes through; it will cause 
inconsistency over time as multidisciplinary teams will have different ideas regarding 
how the process should be carried out. As a consequence, there could be different 
processes with different activities and there will be different risks encountered too. It 
makes more sense to have a subprocess with risks which identifies the locations. The 
use of a subprocess for common processes can help in situations where both models 
become over complicated. In addition, the subprocess can facilitate obtaining more 
consistency when these activities are carried out in different locations. Therefore, the 
common processes need to model separately. 
 
The process model can become very complicated, particularly when looking at 
technology solutions. If it is likely that the same technology solution will be used for 
different pathways and different approaches, then it makes sense to manage the IT 
Infrastructure Risks separately from The strategic risks which covers governance 
aspects, project risks which handle the migration to cloud computing  and operational 
risks which covers day-to-day activities in hospital level. ODP and ITA-Cloud would 
manage many of IT infrastructure cloud computing risks centrally.  
 
Chapter 6 discussed key aspects for using a use case scenario to model the current 
situation and a potential future situation using cloud computing. It represents how the 
nature of risks and the countermeasures required to mitigate these risks changed 
significantly as the context changed to cloud computing. For instance, it addressed 
physical data protection risks in the current situation, whereas in cloud computing it 
addressed governance issues such as GDPR compliance for protecting data in 
Germany, which is not used in Oman. In addition, migrating to HL7 to address 
interoperability issues was not identified in the generic reference risk register table in 
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Chapter 5. MSR-BPM approach is valuable to identify the risks in associated with 
using cloud computing to support healthcare processes. Considering risk management 
perspectives helped to identify the responsibility of different stakeholders for 
managing the risks, both inside and outside the scope of the hospital. MSR-BPM 
indicates the importance of using the process model and risk register to provide a clear 
understanding where the risks occur and how these need to be managed 
 
Section 6.4 considered the use of cloud computing as a potential solution to facilitate 
communication between different locations and enhance the collaboration between 
different stakeholders. It was found that the choice of technology that was used to 
share information across different locations has a significant impact on the risks that 
will be faced. Also, it was suggested that cloud computing was a potential technology 
solution which may facilitate communication among different locations as well as 
address other types of risks. However, stakeholders need to discuss all the potential 
risks openly to determine which technology solution they should implement within 
their organisation.  
 
The key deliverables of Chapter 6 were related to identifying the practical use of the 
MSR-BPM approach through a hypothetical scenario. Therefore, the fifth objective 
was achieved in using an approach to document and visualise security risks and 
countermeasures in a healthcare scenario that benefits from cloud computing.  
 
8.2.6  Research Objective Six  
 
Evaluate the proposed approach with experts across the field of Risk management, 
Business process management and Healthcare through the Integrated Care 
Pathway scenario.  
 
Chapter 7 aimed to evaluate the MSR-BPM approach through a more complex 
scenario for breast cancer in the UK. The scenario was chosen because it had been 
used in various research papers within Computer Science and Informatics at Cardiff 
University. It presented how complex the treatment pathway is in reality in that it 
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includes multiple locations and multiple stakeholders. An evaluation methodology 
was created based on the ISO 27005 activities in the Information Security Risk 
Management Process to create survey questions for experts in Risk Management, 
Business Process and Healthcare. The survey was divided into three sections, 
participant profile, evaluating the MSR-BPM approach usefulness and qualitative 
feedback, to provide a greater insight into the effectiveness of the approach. Twelve 
individuals from the UK participated in the empirical evaluation of the MSR-BPM. 
They had high-level expertise in risk management (7) and business process modelling 
(6). Several were familiar with the healthcare industry (6).  
 
This research aimed to establish the extent to which the MSR-BPM approach was 
useful and effective in understanding the risks. The feedback from the evaluators 
supported using the risk register with the business process model as a way to 
understand risks and to enhance communication among stakeholders. Also, they were 
in strong agreement that the MSR-BPM approach can identify any change in risks 
rather than using the risk register only. In addition, they pointed out that the MSR-
BPM is helpful in structuring and organising risk-related information. The MSR-BPM 
approach is useful when there is a complicated process that handles multiple locations 
and stakeholders because it can identify the risks in each process as well as allow team 
members to discuss each risk impact, likelihood and level rather than copying 
information from the previous risk register document. Thus, the risk register document 
will be a living document.  
 
The MSR-BPM approach has a substantial importance in providing a shared 
understanding of risks holistically among stakeholders and enhancing communication 
between different locations, as the scenarios used for applying the approach (Chapter 
6) and evaluating the approach (Chapter 7) span multiple locations. In addition, it 
enhances traceability of risk changes. Therefore, the MSR-BPM approach helps in the 
Monitoring and Review process by identifying which activities, roles and locations 
may be affected by any changes within risks rather than using the risk register only. 
The BPM diagram will update the process to clearly visualise the risk, whether at the 
process level or activity level.  
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Therefore, the results of the evaluation have proved the research hypothesis that the 
communication of information security risk in healthcare processes can be improved 
by combining the risk register and business process modelling to achieve a shared 
understanding of risks and visualize the risks for decision makers and stakeholders. 
However, experts observed that MSR-BPM has several limitations. Firstly, although 
it can document the chosen countermeasure in the risk register, it does not help to 
identify the most appropriate countermeasure to mitigate the addressed risks. Another 
limitation is that it takes time to draw the BPM diagram. It is challenging in terms of 
how much detail needs to be included in the BPM diagram. Furthermore, the user 
acceptance of the approach and the need to be familiar with the BPM area is another 
concern because a clinician or a nurse might not be familiar with the modelling aspect 
nor have a detailed knowledge of the security issues and countermeasures. It is 
recommended that the MSR-BPM is applied with a multi-disciplinary team with 
relevant stakeholders, including a business analyst and security expert. This may be 
difficult to achieve in practice and it will represent an obstacle in using the approach.  
 
In addition, Chapter 7 aimed to evaluate the MSR-BPM approach among stakeholders 
in Oman and the UK.  In the UK, the proposed approached was evaluated through an 
Integrated Care Pathway (ICP) scenario which holds multiple locations and 
stakeholders. The practitioners agreed that MSR-BPM approach can provide effective 
communication of information security risks. 75 percent identified that the approach 
is clearly understandable and appropriate to use to manage security risk in healthcare 
processes. In addition, 91 percent agreed that the MSR-BPM is more likely to 
effectively communicate risks to achieve a shared understanding of all roles involved 
in the process compared to using a risk register only. Also, 82 percent pointed out that 
the MSR-BPM is more likely to help healthcare organisations manage security risks 
in compliance with Information security risk management practices (ISO27005) 
compared to developing a Risk register only. 
 
Unfortunately, there was a lack of responses among stakeholders in Oman. The lack 
of adoption of Risk Registers in the healthcare in Oman would be a barrier 
to migrating MSR-BPM approach in the Omani context. In addition, this lack of risk 
management awareness caused an obstacle to evaluate the MSR-BPM approach within 
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Omani context. However, the MSR-BPM is suitable for any organisation familiar with 
the ISO 27000 standards and could be adapted with further research for organisations 
that are familiar with the ISO 31000 standards.  
 
The Omani healthcare system has not yet adopted the concept of patient pathways. 
Oman has extensive plans to strategically implement initiatives to make health care 
systems “patient-centred” (WHO, 2017). If Oman moves to patient-centred system, 
MSR-BPM approach will help in providing shared understanding of anticipated risks 
during patient pathways.  
 
The sixth objective has been achieved in the UK context through the evaluation of the 
MSR-BPM approach. However, it is not been possible to evaluate this approach in the 
Omani context as risk registers are not used in the health care sector.  
 
Therefore, the research hypothesis was fulfilled and the communication of 
Information Security Risk in Healthcare processes can be improved by combining the 
risk register and business process modelling to visualise risks in a complex and 
significant healthcare process, such as the Integrated Care Pathway for Breast Cancer,  
 and achieve a shared understanding of these risks for stakeholders 
 
8.3 Originality and Significance of Research Contribution   
 
1. Provides comprehensive and significant statistics about the perception of different 
types of risks (Security, Management, Technical, Legal, Privacy and other types 
of risks) in adopting cloud computing as a service in the delivery of healthcare 
services within the Omani context. The results have enhanced the understanding 
of the perceptions of risks in the current system and cloud computing in the 
healthcare industry in Oman.  
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2.  Created a comprehensive - and enhanced beyond previous work - generic 
reference risk register for migrating cloud computing in healthcare.  This research 
has added to the available literature concerning various types of risks in the 
current system and cloud computing in healthcare. The generic reference risk 
register table lists the risk name, risk description, risk impact, risk likelihood, risk 
level, security goal and countermeasure. Therefore, it enriches understanding, 
within the context of Oman, of security, management, technical and cloud 
computing risks in the healthcare.   
 
3. Provides an extension to Secure*BPMN (Cherdantseva, 2014) by adding a risk 
representation to it. The decision makers and stakeholders team need to visualize 
the risks in the BPM diagram to gain a holistic view of the associated risks. The 
approach in this research is different as it focuses on representing risk explicitly 
within the BPM. Other researchers discuss integrating security requirements to 
the BPM (Rodríguez et al., 2007), extending the BPMN with a set of security 
concepts for Service-Oriented Architecture (SoA) applications (Saleem et al., 
2012), SecureBPMN (2012) extending the BPMN with access control and 
information flow constraints (Salnitri et al., 2017) and Secure*BPMN for 
communicating Information Assurance and Security (IAS) concepts to business 
experts and other non-technical audiences. Secure*BPMN added additional 
security classes such as Secure Swimlane, Secure Swimlane location, Access 
Permission, Information Taxonomy, Security Goals and Countermeasures, but 
did not represent or model risk. Conforti (2014) developed an operational 
approach for the management of risks related to executable business processes in 
near real-time. Jakoubi et al. (2010) presented a methodology enabling the risk-
aware modelling and simulation of business processes in an algorithmic way 
while Koster (2009) proposed an evaluation method for Business Process 
Management products. Therefore, these researchers focused on quantitative 
methods to evaluate risks rather than on qualitative methods to represent risks and 
this is how the proposed approach in this research is different.  
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4. The main contribution of this thesis is the creation of the MSR-BPM approach as 
an integrated approach to manage security risks. There are existing techniques 
which can be used for managing information security risks that are centred around 
the ISO 27000.  The ISO 27000 helps in managing security risks in the UK which 
uses risk register, but it does not include people and processes within it. There are 
other techniques for modelling security concerns such as Secure*BPMN. 
Secure*BPMN helps to identify security concerns within processes as it links 
people and processes to information security countermeasures and information 
security goals. However, it does not include risk register or explicitly represents 
risks. Hence, the integration of the ISO 27000 and Secure*BPMN helps to create 
an integrated approach: the MSR-BPM. The novelty of the MSR-BPM is 
combining a risk register, Secure *BPMN and visualisation of risks on a graphic 
of Business Process. It supports all aspects of operational services in day-to-day 
activities which include people, processes and information security. The MSR-
BPM is very important to visualise risks in a healthcare processes and promote a 
shared understanding of the risks to stakeholders. This view was supported by the 
evaluation of healthcare practitioners who are in broad agreement that MSR-BPM 
is more likely to effectively communicate risks to achieve a shared understanding 
of all roles involved in the process compared to using a risk register only.  Also, 
most of them agreed that the MSR-BPM is more likely to help healthcare 
organisations manage security risks in compliance with Information security risk 
management practices (ISO27005) compared to developing a Risk register only. 
 
In terms of the contribution of this research in relation to the literature, many 
methods based on the ISO 27000 were discussed in Chapter 4 section 4.6. 
Organisations can use the ISO 27000 methods, but the MSR-BPM provides a 
better modelling process as it identifies the risk location in each process and 
provides a shared understanding of risks for stakeholders. According to the ISO 
27000 methods, such as NIST, EBIOS, MEHARI, MAGERIT and CORAS, each 
method manages risks through risk identification, risk analysis, risk assessment, 
risk treatment and risk evaluation. NIST provides the information and 
communication flows necessary to make the process work effectively. The 
proposed approach in this research, the MSR-BPM, is not a replacement for those 
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methods, but rather it is a technique which can be used in conjunction with these 
methods to provide a better output by providing a risk register and risk 
representation in the BPM. The MSR-BPM is compliant with the ISO 27005 
processes. Other risk management tools do not have the same presentation that 
the MSR-BPM provides. For instance, OCTAVE and FEMA do not provide 
monitoring and review or communication and consultation for the whole process. 
OCTAVE is more likely helpful in the plan phase and FEMA is more likely to be 
used as an analysis tool. The MSR-BPM is compliant with the ISO 27000 as it 
focuses on risk assessment. Also, it has compliance with the ISO 27005 stages. 
The MSR-BPM approach followed the ISO 27005 processes for establishing the 
context from risk register and business process models. It is based on the best 
practices in information security risk management in healthcare process as it is 
grounded in the ISO 27005 processes. The evaluation in Chapter 7 shows the 
effectiveness of the MSR-BPM in improving the communication of information 
security risks in healthcare processes. Therefore, the MSR-BPM approach helps 
to improve the communication of information security risk management in 
healthcare processes by following the ISO 27005 processes: 
 
• Establishing context to show the current situation. It is necessary to collect all 
information about information security risk management and which 
requirements need to be addressed by understanding the staff roles and 
locations. Staff can gain a shared understating of risks in the process. 
Therefore, it facilitates the reporting and communication of risks within an 
organisation.  
 
• Risk assessment through risk identification, risk level, likelihood and impact. 
The BPM diagram will visualize the risks in different stages, such as process, 
activities and flow dependency.  
 
• Risk treatment through documenting the appropriate countermeasure type in 
the BPM and detailing discussion within risk register table.  
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• Monitoring and reviewing by adding the traceability column to the risk register 
document to clearly show the position of risk, whether it is in a process, activity 
or flow. It is suggested that the domain provenance can be addressed in future 
research. Provenance information can be a resource for “reflection-in-action” 
during analysis, supporting collaboration between analysts, and helping to 
trace data quality and uncertainty through the analysis process. It can also act 
as a resource after the event, supporting the interpretation of claims, audit, 
accountability, and training.  
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• Communication and consultation by providing an agreement on how to 
manage risks by exchanging and sharing information about risk among 
decision makers and stakeholders.   
 
 
 
 
References 
 
312 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
9 References 
  
References 
 
313 | P a g e  
References: 
 
• Aagedal, J.O., Den Braber, F., Dimitrakos, T., Gran, B.A., Raptis, D. and Stolen, K., 
2002. Model-based risk assessment to improve enterprise security. In Enterprise 
Distributed Object Computing Conference, 2002. EDOC'02. Proceedings. Sixth 
International (pp. 51-62). IEEE. 
 
• AbuKhousa, E., Mohamed, N. and Al-Jaroodi, J., 2012. e-Health cloud: opportunities 
and challenges. Future Internet, 4(3), pp.621-645. 
 
• Aguilar-Saven, R.S., 2004. Business process modelling: Review and 
framework. International Journal of production economics, 90(2), pp.129-149. 
 
• Aguilar-Saven, R.S., 2004. Business process modelling: Review and 
framework. International Journal of production economics, 90(2), pp.129-149. 
 
• Ahuja, S. P., Mani, S., & Zambrano, J. (2012). A survey of the state of cloud 
computing in healthcare. Network and Communication Technologies, 1(2), p12. 
 
• Akhtar, M.F., Ali, K. and Sadaqat, S., 2011. Liquidity risk management: a comparative 
study between conventional and Islamic banks of Pakistan. Interdisciplinary Journal 
of Research in Business, 1(1), pp.35-44. 
 
• Al-Ahmad, W. and Mohammad, B., 2012. Can a single security framework address 
information security risks adequately?. International Journal of Digital Information 
and Wireless Communications (IJDIWC), 2(3), pp.222-230. 
 
• Alam, M.G.R., Cho, E.J., Huh, E.N. and Hong, C.S., 2014, January. Cloud based 
mental state monitoring system for suicide risk reconnaissance using wearable bio-
sensors. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Ubiquitous 
Information Management and Communication (p. 56). ACM.  
 
• Alberts, C., Dorofee, A., Stevens, J. and Woody, C., 2003. Introduction to the 
OCTAVE Approach. Pittsburgh, PA, Carnegie Mellon University. 
 
• Alberts, C.J., Behrens, S.G., Pethia, R.D. and Wilson, W.R., 1999. Operationally 
critical threat, asset, and vulnerability evaluation (OCTAVE) framework, Version 1.0. 
 
• Alkhater, N, Walters, R. and Wills, G., 2017. An empirical study of factors influencing 
cloud adoption among private sector organisations. Telematics and Informatics. 
• Allam, O. (2006). A Holistic Analysis Approach to Facilitating Communication 
between General Practitioners and Cancer Care Teams. PhD. Cardiff University. 
 
• Alruwaili, F.F. and Gulliver, T.A., 2015. Secsdlc: A practical life cycle approach for 
cloud-based information security. IJRCCT, 4(2), pp.095-107. 
References 
 
314 | P a g e  
• Alsalamah, H. (2012). Supporting Integrated Care Pathways with Workflow 
Technology. PhD. Cardiff University. 
 
• Alsalamh, S. (2014). Achieving a Secure Collaborative Environment in Patient-
Centred Healthcare with Legacy Information Systems. PhD. Cardiff University. 
 
• Alshaikh, M., Ahmad, A., Maynard, S.B. and Chang, S., 2014. Towards a taxonomy of 
information security management practices in organisations. ACIS. 
 
• American Society for Healthcare Risk Management, 2011. Risk Management 
Handbook for Health Care Organizations, 3 Volume Set. John Wiley & Sons. 
 
• Amini, A. and Jamil, N., 2018, May. A Comprehensive Review of Existing Risk 
Assessment Models in Cloud Computing. In Journal of Physics: Conference 
Series (Vol. 1018, No. 1, p. 012004). IOP Publishing. 
 
• Anderson, J. 2003."Why we need a new definition of information security," 
Computers & Security, 22(4) pp. 308-313. 
 
• Armbrust, M., Fox, O., Griffith, R., Joseph, A. D., Katz, Y., Konwinski, A. & 
Zaharia, M. (2009). M.: Above the clouds: a Berkeley view of cloud computing.  
 
• Assunção, M.D., Calheiros, R.N., Bianchi, S., Netto, M.A. and Buyya, R., 2015. Big 
Data computing and clouds: Trends and future directions. Journal of Parallel and 
Distributed Computing, 79, pp.3-15. 
 
• Astuti, H.M., Muqtadiroh, F.A., Darmaningrat, E.W.T. and Putri, C.U., 2017. Risks 
Assessment of Information Technology Processes Based on COBIT 5 Framework: A 
Case Study of ITS Service Desk. Procedia Computer Science, 124, pp.569-576. 
 
• Awan, M.S.K., Burnap, P. and Rana, O., 2016. Identifying cyber risk hotspots: A 
framework for measuring temporal variance in computer network risk. computers & 
security, 57, pp.31-46. 
 
• Bamiah, M., Brohi, S. and Chuprat, S., 2012, December. A study on significance of 
adopting cloud computing paradigm in healthcare sector. In Cloud Computing 
Technologies, Applications and Management (ICCCTAM), 2012 International 
Conference on (pp. 65-68). IEEE. 
 
• Barry LJ.  (1995) Assessing risk systematically. Risk Management 42:12–17.  
 
• Barua, M., Liang, X., Lu, R. and Shen, X., 2011. ESPAC: Enabling Security and 
Patient-centric Access Control for eHealth in cloud computing.  International Journal 
of Security and Networks, 6(2-3), pp.67-76. 
 
References 
 
315 | P a g e  
• Blank, R.M. and Gallagher, P.D., 2012. Nist special publication 800-30 revision 1 
guide for conducting risk assessments. National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Tech. Rep. 
 
• BS EN ISO 9001:2015 Quality Management Systems Requirements. 
 
• BS ISO/IEC 25010:2011 Systems and software engineering - Systems and Software 
Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) - System and software quality 
models. 
 
• BSA, 2019.The Software Alliance. GLOBAL computing Scorecard- Germany 2019  
https://cloudscorecard.bsa.org/2018/pdf/country_reports/2018_Country_Report_Germ
any.pdf [Accessed on June, 2019]  
• Budgen, D., Rigby, M., Brereton, P. and Turner, M., 2007. A data integration broker 
for healthcare systems. Computer, 40(4). 
 
• Burnap, P.R., Spasic, I., Gray, W.A., Hilton, J.C., Rana, O.F. and Elwyn, G., 2012, 
May. Protecting patient privacy in distributed collaborative healthcare environments by 
retaining access control of shared information. In 14th International Conference on 
Collaboration Technologies and Systems (CTS), 2012, (Denver), pp. 490–497, IEEE. 
• Butt A, Hameed S (2011) Success of Spiral Model along with its Development 
Techniques. Models and methods applied in sciences.  
 
• Buyya, R., Beloglazov, A., & Abawajy, J. (2010). Energy-efficient management of 
data center resources for cloud computing: a vision, architectural elements, and open 
challenges. arXiv preprint arXiv:1006.0308. 
 
• Cardiff and Vale University Hospital (2017) accessed on 18.05.2017 URL: 
http://www.cardiffandvaleuhb.wales.nhs.uk/home 
 
• Carneal, G., J.D , Daviss,S. and Harbin, H., 2017. New Technologies for Improving 
Behavioral Health. 
 
• Carter R, Hancock T, Morin JM, Robins N. (1995) Introducing RIKSKMAN 
Methodology. 1st ed.UK:NNC Blackwell Ltd.  
 
• Catteddu, D. & Hogben, G. (2009), Cloud Computing: Benefits, Risks and 
recommendations for information security, Technical Report, European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA). 
 
• Chahino, M. and Marchant, J. (2010) CIS conference presentation, Washington DC.  
 
• Chang, I. C., Hwang, H. G., Hung, M. C., Lin, M. H., & Yen, D. C. (2007). Factors 
affecting the adoption of electronic signature: Executives’ perspective of hospital 
information department. Decision Support Systems, 44(1), 350–359. 
References 
 
316 | P a g e  
 
• Chapman, C. and Ward, S., 2003. Project risk management: processes, techniques, 
and insights. Wiley. 
 
• Cherdantseva, Y. and Hilton, J., 2013, September. A reference model of information 
assurance & security. In Availability, reliability and security (ares), 2013 eighth 
international conference on (pp. 546-555). IEEE. 
 
• Cherdantseva, Y., 2014. Secure* BPMN-a graphical extension for BPMN 2.0 based 
on a reference model of information assurance & security. PhD Thesis, Cardiff 
University. 
 
• Cherdantseva, Y., Burnap, P., Blyth, A., Eden, P., Jones, K., Soulsby, H. and 
Stoddart, K., (2016). A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA 
systems. computers & security, 56, pp.1-27. 
 
• Chiarini, A., 2012. Risk management and cost reduction of cancer drugs using Lean 
Six Sigma tools. Leadership in Health Services, 25(4), pp.318-330. 
 
• Chin, W. W. (2010) ‘How to Write up and Report PLS Analyses’ Handbook of Partial 
Least Squares: In: Esposito Vinzi, V.; Chin, W.W.; Henseler, J.; Wang, H. (Eds.). 
Handbook of Partial Least Squares: Concepts, Methods and Applications (Springer 
Handbooks of Computational Statistics Series, vol. II). pp. 713-735 Heidelberg, 
Dordrecht, London, New York: Springer. 
 
• Choo, K.K.R., Heravi, A., Mani, D. and Mubarak, S., 2015. Employees’ Intended 
Information Security Behaviour in Real Estate Organisations: a Protection Motivation 
Perspective.  
 
• Chow-White, P.A., MacAulay, M., Charters, A. and Chow, P., 2015. From the bench 
to the bedside in the big data age: ethics and practices of consent and privacy for 
clinical genomics and personalized medicine. Ethics and Information 
Technology, 17(3), pp.189-200. 
 
• Coleman, J., 2004, June. Assessing information security risk in healthcare 
organizations of different scale. In international congress series (Vol. 1268, pp. 125-
130). Elsevier. 
 
• Conforti, R., 2014. Managing risk in process-aware information systems (Doctoral 
dissertation, Queensland University of Technology). 
 
• Davies, J.M., 1996. 7 Risk assessment and risk management in anaesthesia. Bailliere's 
Clinical Anaesthesiology, 10(2), pp.357-372. 
 
• Davis, F.D., 1989. Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and user acceptance of 
information technology. MIS quarterly, pp.319-340. 
References 
 
317 | P a g e  
 
• DeRosier, J., Stalhandske, E., Bagian, J.P. and Nudell, T., 2002. Using health care 
failure mode and effect analysis™: the VA National Center for Patient Safety’s 
prospective risk analysis system. The Joint Commission journal on quality 
improvement, 28(5), pp.248-267. 
 
• Desai, S.S., Dua, A., Kuy, S. and Upchurch, G.R., 2014. PS132. Mitigating Mortality 
in Abdominal Aortic Aneurysmal Disease Through the Use of a Risk Register: 
Indications for EVAR vs Open Repair. Journal of Vascular Surgery, 59(6), pp.65S-
66S. 
 
• Devadass, L., Sekaran, S.S. and Thinakaran, R., 2017. CLOUD COMPUTING IN 
HEALTHCARE. International Journal of Students' Research in Technology & 
Management, 5(1), pp.25-31. 
 
• Dibbern, J., Goles, T., Hirschheim, R., & Jayatilaka, B. (2004). Information systems 
outsourcing: a survey and analysis of the literature. ACM SIGMIS Database, 35(4), 6-
102. 
 
• España, S., Condori-Fernandez, N., González, A. and Pastor, Ó., 2010. An empirical 
comparative evaluation of requirements engineering methods. Journal of the 
Brazilian Computer Society, 16(1), pp.3-19. 
 
• European Coordination Committee of the Radiological, Electromedical and Healthcare 
IT Industry, (2012) COCIR eHEALTH TOOLKIT: Advancing healthcare delivery with 
cloud computing  [Accessed on 25-05-2015] 
http://www.cocir.org/fileadmin/4.4__eHealth/eHealth_Toolkit_INT_2012_chap2.pdf . 
 
• European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) 2018 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/threat-risk-management/risk-
management/current-risk/risk-management-inventory/rm-ra-
methods/m_ebios.html[Accessed on 1-06-2016] 
 
• Fabian, B., Gürses, S., Heisel, M., Santen, T. and Schmidt, H., 2010. A comparison of 
security requirements engineering methods. Requirements engineering, 15(1), pp.7-40. 
 
• Finne, T., 2000. Information systems risk management: key concepts and business 
processes. Computers & Security, 19(3), pp.234-242. 
 
• Gillies, A., 2011. Improving the quality of information security management systems 
with ISO27000. The TQM Journal, 23(4), pp.367-376. 
 
• Gjerdrum, D. and Peter, M., 2011. The new international standard on the practice of 
risk management–A comparison of ISO 31000: 2009 and the COSO ERM 
framework. Risk management, 31(2), pp.8-13. 
 
References 
 
318 | P a g e  
• Goluch, G., Ekelhart, A., Fenz, S., Jakoubi, S., Tjoa, S. and Muck, T., 2008, January. 
Integration of an ontological information security concept in risk aware business 
process management. In Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 
Proceedings of the 41st Annual (pp. 377-377). IEEE. 
 
• Gordon, L.A., Loeb, M.P. and Tseng, C.Y., 2009. Enterprise risk management and firm 
performance: A contingency perspective. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 28(4), pp.301-327. 
 
• Gritzalis, D., Iseppi, G., Mylonas, A. and Stavrou, V., 2018. Exiting the Risk 
Assessment Maze: A Meta-Survey. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 51(1), p.11. 
 
• Gritzalis, D., Stavrou, V., Kandias, M. and Stergiopoulos, G., 2014, March. Insider 
threat: enhancing BPM through social media. In New Technologies, Mobility and 
Security (NTMS), 2014 6th International Conference on (pp. 1-6). IEEE. 
 
•  Hair, J., F., Black, W., C., Babin, B., J. Anderson, R., E. and Tatham, R. L. (2010). 
Multivariate Data Analysis : A Global Perspective. (7th Edition). New Jersey: 
Pearson Prentice Hall Publication. 
 
• Hair, J.F. and Jnr, B., 2009. BJ, & Anderson, RE (2010). Multivariate data analysis: A 
global perspective. 
 
• Hong, K.S., Chi, Y.P., Chao, L.R. and Tang, J.H., 2003. An integrated system theory 
of information security management. Information Management & Computer 
Security, 11(5), pp.243-248. 
 
• Hosseini, A., Greenwood, D., Smith, J.W. and Sommerville, I., 2012. The cloud 
adoption toolkit: supporting cloud adoption decisions in the enterprise. Software: 
Practice and Experience, 42(4), pp.447-465. 
 
• Humphreys Edward, Plate Angelika. (2008) ISMS risk management. BSI 
Publications.  
 
• Humphreys Edward. (2007) Implementing the ISO/IEC 27001 information security 
management system standard. Artech Press. 
 
• Humphreys, E., (2008) Information security management standards: Compliance, 
governance and risk management. Information security technical report, 13(4), 
pp.247-255. 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
319 | P a g e  
• Information Security Forum (ISF) (1997). Simplified practical risk analysis 
methodology (SPRINT) user guide. p. 43–57. URL 
http://www.citicus.com/report_esf_sprint.asp Information security risk management. 
• International, H. (2019). Health Level Seven International - Homepage | HL7 
International. [online] Hl7.org. Available at: http://www.hl7.org/ [Accessed 11 Jul. 
2019]. 
• Internet world stats, 2017 Accessed on 7 April 2017 URL 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm 
• ISO. BS ISO 31000:2009.  2009 Risk management. Principles and guidelines. 
• ISO. BS ISO/IEC 27005:2011. 2011 Information technology. Security techniques. 
 
• Jensen, M.B., Philipsen, M.P., Møgelmose, A., Moeslund, T.B. and Trivedi, M.M., 
2016. Vision for looking at traffic lights: Issues, survey, and perspectives. IEEE 
Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 17(7), pp.1800-1815. 
 
• Jin, Z. and Chen, Y., 2015. Telemedicine in the cloud era: Prospects and 
challenges. IEEE Pervasive Computing, 14(1), pp.54-61. 
 
• Joseph, R. and Brown, P., 2017. The Cloud Gets Personal: Perspectives on Cloud 
Computing for Personalized Medicine. International Journal of E-Health and Medical 
Communications (IJEHMC), 8(2), pp.1-17. 
 
• Joshi, A., Kale, S., Chandel, S. and Pal, D.K., 2015. Likert scale: Explored and 
explained. British Journal of Applied Science & Technology, 7(4), p.396. 
 
• Karabacak, B. and Sogukpinar, I., 2005. ISRAM: information security risk analysis 
method. Computers & Security, 24(2), pp.147-159. 
 
• Kazemi, M., Khajouei, H.  and Nasrabadi, H. (2012).Evaluation of Information 
Security Management System Success Factors: A Case Study of Municipal 
Organisation. African Journal of Business Management Vol. 6(14), pp. 4982-4989. 
 
• Khajeh-Hosseini, A., Sommerville, I., & Sriram, I. (2010). Research challenges for 
enterprise cloud computing. arXiv preprint arXiv:1001.3257. 
 
• Khajeh-Hosseini. (2013). Supporting system deployment decisions in public cloud, A 
thesis submitted for the degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews.  
 
• Kifor, T., Varga, L. Z., Vazquez-Salseda, S., Alvarez, S., Willmott, S., Miles, S., & 
Moreau, L. (2006). Provenance in Agent-mediated Healthcare Systems. Intelligent 
Systems, IEEE , 21(6), 38-46. DOI: 10.1109/MIS.2006.119. 
References 
 
320 | P a g e  
 
• Kingston Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. 2017. URL 
https://www.kingstonhospital.nhs.uk/media/202487/enc-m-corporate-risk-register-at-18-01-
16.pdf 
 
• Labunets, K., Massacci, F. and Paci, F., 2013, October. An experimental comparison 
of two risk-based security methods. In Empirical Software Engineering and 
Measurement, 2013 ACM/IEEE International Symposium on (pp. 163-172). IEEE. 
 
• Labunets, K., Paci, F., Massacci, F. and Ruprai, R., 2014, August. An experiment on 
comparing textual vs. visual industrial methods for security risk assessment. 
In Empirical Requirements Engineering (EmpiRE), 2014 IEEE Fourth International 
Workshop on (pp. 28-35). IEEE. 
 
• Lalonde, C. and Boiral, O., 2012. Managing risks through ISO 31000: A critical 
analysis. Risk management, 14(4), pp.272-300. 
 
• Lam, H.Y., Choy, K.L., Ho, G.T.S., Cheng, S.W. and Lee, C.K.M., 2015. A 
knowledge-based logistics operations planning system for mitigating risk in 
warehouse order fulfilment. International Journal of Production Economics, 170, 
pp.763-779. 
 
• Latif, R., Abbas, H., Assar, S., & Ali, Q. (2014). Cloud computing risk assessment: a 
systematic literature review. In Future Information Technology (pp. 285-295). 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
 
• Li, G., Xu, B., He, R.X. and Zhang, S.X., 2017. Using Healthcare Failure Mode and 
Effect Analysis to Reduce Intravenous Chemotherapy Errors in Chinese Hospitalised 
Patients. Cancer nursing, 40(2), pp.88-93. 
 
• Li, M., Yu, S., Ren, K. and Lou, W., 2010, September. Securing personal health records 
in cloud computing: Patient-centric and fine-grained data access control in multi-owner 
settings. In International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication 
Systems (pp. 89-106). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
 
• Lian, J. W., Yen, D. C., & Wang, Y. T. (2014). An exploratory study to understand 
the critical factors affecting the decision to adopt cloud computing in Taiwan 
hospital. International Journal of Information Management, 34(1), 28-36. 
 
• Liang, Y., Qi, G., Wei, K. and Chen, J., 2017. Exploring the determinant and 
influence mechanism of e-Government cloud adoption in government agencies in 
China. Government Information Quarterly. 
 
• Lisiak-Felicka, D. and Szmit, M., 2014. Information security management systems in 
Marshal Offices in Poland. Information Systems In Management, 3(2), pp.134-144. 
 
References 
 
321 | P a g e  
• Liu, W., & Park, E. K. (2013). e-Health care Cloud-Enabling Characteristics, 
Challenges and Adaptation Solutions. Journal of Communications, 8(10), 612-619. 
 
• Lubamba, C. and Bagula, A., 2017, July. Cyber-healthcare cloud computing 
interoperability using the HL7-CDA standard. In Computers and Communications 
(ISCC), 2017 IEEE Symposium on (pp. 105-110). IEEE. 
 
• Lupse, Oana-Sorina & Mihaela, Marcella & Vida, Lăcrămioara & Stoicu-Tivadar, 
Vasile. (2018). Cloud Computing and Interoperability in Healthcare Information 
Systems. 
 
• M. Dlamini, J. Elo_, M. Elo_,(2009) "Information security: The moving target," 
Computers and Security, vol. 28, iss. 3-4, pp. 189-198. 
 
• Mahy, Y., Ouzzif, M. and Bouragba, K., 2016. Toward a shared view of IT 
governance. International Journal of Innovation, Management and Technology, 7(4), 
p.125. 
 
• Mansfield, J.G., Caplan, R.A., Campos, J.S., Dreis, D.F. and Furman, C., 2015. Using 
a quantitative risk register to promote learning from a patient safety reporting 
system. The Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety, 41(2), pp.76-
AP1. 
 
• Mao, M. and Humphrey, M., 2014. Resource Provisioning in the Cloud: An 
Exploration of Challenges and Research Trends. In Handbook of Research on 
Architectural Trends in Service-Driven Computing (pp. 589-612). IGI Global. 
 
• Martin-Flatin, J.P., 2014. Challenges in cloud management. IEEE Cloud 
Computing, 1(1), pp.66-70. 
 
• Masrom, M. and Rahimli A,A. (2014) Review of Cloud Computing Technology 
Solution for Healthcare System . Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering 
and Technology 8(20). 
• Masrom, M. and Rahimli, A., 2015. Cloud Computing Adoption in the Healthcare 
Sector: A SWOT Analysis. Asian Social Science, 11(10), p.12. 
 
• Mayer, N., Barafort, B., Picard, M. and Cortina, S., 2015, September. An ISO 
compliant and integrated model for IT GRC (Governance, Risk Management and 
Compliance). In European Conference on Software Process Improvement (pp. 87-99). 
Springer, Cham. 
 
• Ministry of Health in Oman (2017) URL: 
https://www.moh.gov.om/en/web/directorate-general-of-information-
technology/future-projects. [Accessed on 11-04-2017] . 
References 
 
322 | P a g e  
 
• Moody, D.L., 2003. The method evaluation model: a theoretical model for validating 
information systems design methods. ECIS 2003 proceedings, p.79. 
 
• Mxoli, A., Gerber, M., & Mostert-Phipps, N. (2014, November). Information security 
risk measures for Cloud-based personal health records. In Information Society (i-
Society), 2014 International Conference on (pp. 187-193). IEEE. 
 
• Năstase, P., Năstase, F. and Ionescu, C., 2009. Challenges generated by the 
implementation of the IT standards CobiT 4.1, ITIL v3 and ISO/IEC 27002 in 
enterprises. Economic computation & economic cybernetics studies & 
research, 43(1), p.16. 
 
• National Centre for Statistics & Information (2017) Population Clock,  Accessed on 
10th April, 2017 Source: https://www.ncsi.gov.om/Pages/NCSI.aspx . [Accessed on 25-5-
2015]. 
 
• Neuman, D., Neuman, M. and Kandaswamy, B., Isonetic Inc, 2018. Dark virtual 
private networks and secure services. U.S. Patent Application 15/789,909. 
 
• New Horizon. Computer learning centre (2018) COBIT vs ITIL Available at 
https://blog.nhlearningsolutions.com/blog/tabid/145/artmid/16483/articleid/1514/cob
it-vs-itil [Accessed on 2 July, 2018]. 
 
• Oman Data Park (ODP), 2019 website https://www.omandatapark.com/ [Accessed 
June 2019 ]. 
 
• Olsson, R., 2007. In search of opportunity management: Is the risk management 
process enough?. International journal of project management, 25(8), pp.745-752. 
 
• Oxley, Catriona. 2015. Risk Assessment Procedure and Risk Register Guidance. NHS 
SHETLAND DOCUMENT. 
 
• Patterson, F.D. and Neailey, K., 2002. A risk register database system to aid the 
management of project risk. International Journal of Project Management, 20(5), 
pp.365-374. 
 
• Pipkin, D.L., 2000. Information security: protecting the global enterprise. Prentice 
Hall PTR. 
 
• Quality One. 2017. "FMEA | Failure Mode and Effects Analysis | Quality-
One". quality-one.com. [Accessed 28-7-2017]. 
 
References 
 
323 | P a g e  
• Quality-One International Discover the value  (2015) http://quality-one.com/fmea/ 
[Accessed 10 August 2017]. 
 
• Rahman, N. H. A., & Choo, K. K. R. (2015). Factors Influencing the Adoption of Cloud 
Incident Handling Strategy: A Preliminary Study in Malaysia.  In Proceedings of 21st 
Americas Conference on Information Systems, AMCIS 2015, arXiv preprint 
arXiv:1505.02908. http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2015/ISSecurity/GeneralPresentations/17/ . 
 
• Rasid, A., Zaleha, S., Golshan, N., Mokhber, M., Tan, G.G. and Mohd-Zamil, N.A., 
2017. Enterprise Risk Management, Performance Measurement Systems and 
Organizational Performance in Malaysian Public Listed Firms. International Journal 
of Business & Society, 18(2). 
 
• Recker, J.C. and Rosemann, M., 2010. A measurement instrument for process modeling 
research: development, test and procedural model. Scandinavian Journal of 
Information Systems, 22(2), pp.3-30. 
 
• Reid, R.C. and Floyd, S.A (2001), “Extending the risk analysis model to include 
market insurance”, Computers & Security, Vol.20 No 4, pp331-9.  
 
• Ren, L., Zhang, L., Wang, L., Tao, F. and Chai, X., 2017. Cloud manufacturing: key 
characteristics and applications. International Journal of Computer Integrated 
Manufacturing, 30(6), pp.501-515. 
 
• Riskworld.net. (2017). COBRA - Security Risk Assessment, Security Risk Analysis 
and ISO 17799 / BS7799. [online] Available at: http://www.riskworld.net/ [Accessed 1 
May 2017]. 
 
• Rodríguez, A., Fernández-Medina, E. and Piattini, M., 2007. A BPMN extension for 
the modeling of security requirements in business processes. IEICE transactions on 
information and systems, 90(4), pp.745-752. 
 
• Rosemann, M. and vom Brocke, J., 2015. The six core elements of business process 
management. In Handbook on business process management 1 (pp. 105-122). 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
 
• Rösler, P., Mainka, C. and Schwenk, J., 2018. More is Less: On the End-to-End 
Security of Group Chats in Signal, WhatsApp, and Threema. 
 
• Rottermanner, C., Kieseberg, P., Huber, M., Schmiedecker, M. and Schrittwieser, S., 
2015, December. Privacy and data protection in smartphone messengers. 
In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Information Integration and 
Web-based Applications & Services (p. 83). ACM. 
 
References 
 
324 | P a g e  
• Rukh, L. and Malik, A.A., 2017, April. Swiss army knife of software processes 
generic framework of ISO 27001 and its mapping on resource management. 
In Communication Technologies (ComTech), 2017 International Conference on (pp. 
12-15). IEEE. 
 
• Salnitri, M., Dalpiaz, F. and Giorgini, P., 2014. Modeling and verifying security 
policies in business processes. In Enterprise, Business-Process and Information 
Systems Modeling (pp. 200-214). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
 
• Sahi, M.A., Abbas, H., Saleem, K., Yang, X., Derhab, A., Orgun, M.A., Iqbal, W., 
Rashid, I. and Yaseen, A., 2018. Privacy Preservation in e-Healthcare Environments: 
State of the Art and Future Directions. Ieee Access, 6, pp.464-478. 
 
• Salnitri, M., Dalpiaz, F. and Giorgini, P., 2017. Designing secure business processes 
with SecBPMN. Software & Systems Modeling, 16(3), pp.737-757.  
 
• Sekgweleo, T., 2018. Understanding Traditional Systems Development 
Methodologies. IJAME.  
 
• Shaojie, W.A.N.G., Liang, H.O.U., Lee, J. and Xiangjian, B.U., 2017. Evaluating 
wheel loader operating conditions based on radar chart. Automation in 
Construction, 84, pp.42-49. 
 
• Sharma, S.K., Al-Badi, A.H., Govindaluri, S.M. and Al-Kharusi, M.H., 2016. 
Predicting motivators of cloud computing adoption: A developing country 
perspective. Computers in Human Behavior, 62, pp.61-69. 
 
• Sherwood, J., Clark,A., Lynas, D., 2005 Enterprise Security Architecture: A 
Business-Driven Approach. CMP Books. 
 
• Shini.S.G, Dr.Tony Thomas, Chithraranjan.K (2012) Cloud Based Medical Image 
Exchange-Security Challenges, Procedia Engineering 38, SciVerse ScienceDirect 
3454-3461. 
 
• Shoemaker, D., Bawol, J., Drommi, A., 2004. A Delivery Model for an Information 
Security Curriculum. In Proceedings of the Third Security Conference, (Las Vegas, 
Nevada, USA), Information Institute, 2004. 
• Shostack (2012) "The evolution of information security" in The Next Wave: 
Developing a blueprint for a science of cybersecurity, vol. 19(2). 
 
• Shostack, A., 2014. Threat modeling: Designing for security. John Wiley & Sons. 
 
References 
 
325 | P a g e  
• Singh, Narain A., Gupta, M.P. and Ojha, A., 2014. Identifying factors of 
“organizational information security management”. Journal of Enterprise Information 
Management, 27(5), pp.644-667. 
 
• Skilton, A. (2011) Supporting the Information Systems Requirements of Distributed 
Healthcare Teams. PhD Thesis. Cardiff University. 
 
• Spikin, I.C., 2013. Risk Management theory: the integrated perspective and its 
application in the public sector. Estado, Gobierno y Gestión Pública, (21), pp.pp-89. 
 
• Spink, J., Moyer, D.C. and Speier-Pero, C., 2016. Introducing the food fraud initial 
screening model (FFIS). Food Control, 69, pp.306-314. 
 
• Stavrou, V., Kandias, M., Karoulas, G. and Gritzalis, D., 2014, September. Business 
Process Modeling for Insider threat monitoring and handling. In International 
Conference on Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business (pp. 119-131). 
Springer International Publishing.  
 
• Stolen, K., den Braber, F., Dimitrakos, T., Fredriksen, R., Gran, B.A., Houmb, S.H., 
Lund, M.S., Stamatiou, Y. and Aagedal, J.O., 2002. Model-based risk assessment–the 
CORAS approach. In NIK (2002) informatics conference, Kongsberg.  
 
• Subramaniam, N., Collier, P., Phang, M. and Burke, G., 2011. The effects of perceived 
business uncertainty, external consultants and risk management on organisational 
outcomes. Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, 7(2), pp.132-157.  
 
• Sultan, N., 2014. Making use of cloud computing for healthcare provision: 
Opportunities and challenges. International Journal of Information 
Management, 34(2), pp.177-184. 
 
• Sultan, N., 2015. Reflective thoughts on the potential and challenges of wearable 
technology for healthcare provision and medical education. International Journal of 
Information Management, 35(5), pp.521-526.  
 
• Susanto, H., Almunawar, M.N. and Tuan, Y.C., 2011. Information security 
management system standards: A comparative study of the big five. International 
Journal of Electrical Computer Sciences IJECSIJENS, 11(5), pp.23-29. 
 
• Syalim, A., Hori, Y. and Sakurai, K., 2009, March. Comparison of risk analysis 
methods: Mehari, magerit, NIST800-30 and microsoft's security management guide. 
In Availability, Reliability and Security, 2009. ARES'09. International Conference 
on (pp. 726-731). IEEE. 
 
• Shirazi, F., Seddighi, A. and Iqbal, A., 2017, July. Cloud Computing Security and 
Privacy: An Empirical Study. In International Conference on Human-Computer 
Interaction (pp. 534-549). Springer, Cham. 
References 
 
326 | P a g e  
 
• Tabachnick, G. B. and Fidell, L. S. (2001) Using Multivariate Statistics. (4th Edition) 
U.S.A: Allyn and Bacon. 
 
• Taylor, Joanne 2013. Concepts of Strategic Risk and management Strategic 
Risk. Presentation to the Strategic Planning Task Force. 
 
• Teclaw, R., Price, M.C. and Osatuke, K., 2012. Demographic question placement: 
Effect on item response rates and means of a veterans health administration 
survey. Journal of Business and Psychology, 27(3), pp.281-290. 
 
• The Broadband Commission for Digital Development , (2016) The State of Broad 
Band in 2015, Accessed on 8th February 
http://www.broadbandcommission.org/documents/reports/bb-annualreport2015.pdf . 
 
• The knowledge Academy (2018). 
https://www.theknowledgeacademy.com/blog/prince2-vs-agile/  [Accessed on July 
2018]. 
 
• Tomanek, M. and Juricek, J., 2015. Project risk management model based on 
PRINCE2 and SCRUM frameworks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1502.03595. 
 
• Tran, T.H.D., 2017. Risk Assessment Based on CORAS and Fuzzy logic (Master's 
thesis). 
 
• Tudor, J.K. (2001) Information Security Architecture, CRC Press Boca Raton, FL. 
Not in ch 2 
 
• Uta, L., Chiliya, N., & Chuchu, T. (2014). Determining the Feasibility of Adopting 
Technological Innovation to Enhance Service Delivery in Selected Johannesburg 
Health Institutions. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(25), 148.  
 
• Van Haren Publishing. (2018) ISO/IEC 38500 for IT Governance  URL: 
https://www.vanharen.net/blog/it-management/isoiec-38500-for-it-governance-in-3-
minutes/ [Accessed on 09.07.2018]. 
 
• Venter, H.S. and Eloff, J.H., 2003. A taxonomy for information security 
technologies. Computers & Security, 22(4), pp.299-307. 
 
• Vincent, D.W. and Honeck, W., 2004. Risk Management analysis techniques for 
validation programs. Journal of validation technology, 10, pp.235-251. 
 
References 
 
327 | P a g e  
• Vorster, A. and Labuschagne, L.E.S., 2005, July. A framework for comparing different 
information security risk analysis methodologies. In Proceedings of the 2005 annual 
research conference of the South African institute of computer scientists and 
information technologists on IT research in developing countries (pp. 95-103). South 
African Institute for Computer Scientists and Information Technologists. 
 
• Vilarinho, S. and da Silva, M.M., 2011, October. Risk management model in ITIL. 
In International conference on ENTERprise information systems (pp. 306-314). 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
 
• Ward S. (1999) Assessing and managing important risks. International Journal of 
Project Management;17:331–6. 
 
• Wendy L. Currie, Jonathan J. M. Seddon. A Cross-Country Study of Cloud 
Computing Policy and regulation in Healthcare. In Proceedings of 22st European 
Conference on Information Systems, ECIS 2014.  
 
• Whitman, M. and Mattord, H. (2012) Principles of Information Security, 4th edition, 
Course Technology, Cengage Learning. 
 
• Wijaya, A.A., Purnama, J., Soetomo, M.A.A. and Eng, K.I., 2014, September. 
Indonesian awareness of health record stored in cloud computing. In ICT For Smart 
Society (ICISS), 2014 International Conference on (pp. 77-81). IEEE 
 
• Williams TM. (1993) Risk-management infrastructures. International Journal of 
Project Management ;11:5–10. 
 
• Woody, C., Coleman, J., Fancher, M., Myers, C. and Young, L., 2006. Applying octave: 
Practitioners report (No. CMU/SEI-2006-TN-010). CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV 
PITTSBURGH PA SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INST. 
 
• World Health Organization, 2017. Strengthening national capacity for patient and 
community engagement and empowerment in health care in Oman:(No. 
WHO/HIS/SDS/2017.2). World Health Organization. Regional Office for the Eastern 
Mediterranean. 
 
• Wright, M. (1999), “Third generation risk management practices”, computers & 
Security, Vol. 1999 No.2, pp. 9-12.  
 
• Xu, B., Xu, L., Cai, H., Jiang, L., Luo, Y. and Gu, Y., 2017. The design of an m-Health 
monitoring system based on a cloud computing platform. Enterprise Information 
Systems, 11(1), pp.17-36. 
 
References 
 
328 | P a g e  
• Xu, K., Attfield, S., Jankun-Kelly, T.J., Wheat, A., Nguyen, P.H. and Selvaraj, N., 
2015. Analytic provenance for sensemaking: A research agenda. IEEE Computer 
Graphics and Applications, 35(3), pp.56-64. 
 
• Yazar, Z., 2002. A qualitative risk analysis and management tool–CRAMM. SANS 
InfoSec Reading Room White Paper. 
 
• Yeandle, J., Gordon, C., Challis, E. and Fawkes, L., 2013. Risk assessment and 
management of people with personality disorders: Jane Yeandle and colleagues 
outline an approach staff can use to address harmful behaviour that focuses on the 
patient’s relationships. Mental Health Practice, 17(2), pp.21-23. 
 
• Youssef, A.E., 2014. A framework for secure healthcare systems based on big data 
analytics in mobile cloud computing environments. Int J Ambient Syst Appl, 2(2), 
pp.1-11. 
 
• Zhang, Y., Qiu, M., Tsai, C.W., Hassan, M.M. and Alamri, A., 2017. Health-CPS: 
Healthcare cyber-physical system assisted by cloud and big data. IEEE Systems 
Journal, 11(1), pp.88-95. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
329 | P a g e  
 
 
Appendixes  
330 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10  Appendixes 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendixes  
331 | P a g e  
 
 
Appendix A  
332 | P a g e  
11 Appendix A:  Interview Questions  
 
A.1: Interview Questions to Managers to Migrate Healthcare 
Services to Cloud  
 
Meeting main 
To understand manager’s and healthcare providers attitude towards migrating 
healthcare services to cloud computing. It considers migrating process from 
management, technical, legal and security prospective. In addition, it focusses on 
cloud security checklist any healthcare provider would like to consider before 
migrating their healthcare services to cloud.   
Meeting Questions 
Category Question list 
Role in the 
organization  
1. What are the roles you play in the healthcare organization(s)? 
Give more details about each role. 
Management 
perspective  
2.What do you think about migrating healthcare service to cloud? 
 
3. Would system administrators be happy to give up some of their 
control over systems and rely on cloud service providers for the 
support of end users? 
 
4.How would departments react to the migration of applications 
and data to cloud service providers? They might not have the same 
level of access to a cloud as they currently do to their internal 
systems, so how would they have to change their 
working practices? 
 
Security  
(Data storage, 
process and 
transfer) 
 
5.What do you think the role of security is/ should be in 
healthcare? 
 
6.What is the backup plan for data stored in the cloud? 
 
7. Will the data be encrypted in the cloud? How will it processed 
or transferred? 
 
8.Will the data be isolated? 
 
9.Can the data be portable to different cloud provider? 
How long it will take to migrate to another cloud? 
Is there a special tool for exporting data? 
 
10.Does your cloud service provide data integrity and availability? 
 
11.How the original data be deleted? Is it actually erased when 
contract terminated.  
 
12. Is it monitored? From provider to ensure acceptable use and 
customer  
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Can the data be Non-repudiation? 
Security  
(Access control) 
 
13.Does your cloud provider provide management access control 
within healthcare? 
 
14.does your cloud provider have “backdoor” for maintenance, 
support and services 
 
User/patient access control in the healthcare 
Security 
(procedure) 
 
15.Does your cloud provider provide “Auditing” 
 
Certification (customer to check is it relevant to their work or not) 
and does it follow Personal Identifiable Information(PII) 
ISO/IEC 27018:2014  
 
16.Countermeasures- how does your cloud provider react about 
security breach? 
 
17.Testing ( cloud provider  what kind of security tests) 
 
18.If there is breach of security will the provider provide a 
notification to customers or not? 
Detection 
Key management 
Security level 
Incident 
management 
 
18.How security incident are dealt with?   
Does cloud provider provide: Response? 
Logging? 
Reporting? 
Forensics? 
 
19.Is there a certain mechanism to notify customers about data 
breaches or information security incident?  
Privacy 
 
20.Non-disclosure? Can provider use or access the data? 
 
Data minimization 
Hybird clouds 
 
21. Does your cloud provide rely on outsourcing some of the 
services? (may rely on the services from multiple provider) 
 
Technical 
 
22. Does your cloud provider face or likely to some of the 
following technical issues? if yes, how it deals with? 
Resource exhaustion (under or over provisioning) 
Isolation failure 
Cloud provider malicious insider- abuse of high privilege roles 
Management interface compromise (manipulation, availability of 
infrastructure) 
Intercepting data in transit 
Insecure or ineffective deletion of data 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
Economic denial of service (EDOS) 
Loss of Cryptographic Keys 
Compromise service engine 
Conflicts between customer hardening procedures and cloud 
environment 
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Legal 
 
23.Does your cloud provider clarify the status of the legal issues 
for instance: 
Risk from changes of jurisdiction 
Data protection risks 
Licensing risks 
 
24.Does your cloud provider follow Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)? 
 
25.Does your cloud provider follow Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)? 
Risks not specific 
to the cloud 
 
26. Does your cloud provider face or likely to some of the 
following issues? 
Network breaks 
Network management (network congestion/mis-connection/non-
optimal use) 
Modifying network traffic 
Privilege escalation 
Social engineering attacks (impersonation) 
Loss or compromise of operational logs 
Loss or compromise of security logs (manipulation of forensic 
investigation) 
Backups lost, stolen 
Non Cloud-Specific Network-Related Technical Failures or Attacks 
Natural disasters 
Further 
recommendation 
27.Do you recommend anyone who we can speak to about the 
areas we mentioned above? (For example, those dealing with 
Information Governance, Information systems, or cloud provider) 
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A.2 Glossary Terms for Interview Questions 
 
Cloud computing from e-Healthcare: an application- oriented and services-based 
infrastructure where Health-IT resources are pooled, allowing services to be widely 
deployed or rapidly shared in response to changing healthcare business and regulatory 
requirements. (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services). 
Security  
Data Encrypted: Convert (information or data) into a code, especially to prevent 
unauthorized access. 
Data Isolated: Data not accessible to others  
Data Portable: data can be moved from one cloud to another 
Data integrity: refers to the accuracy and consistency of data stored in a database. 
Cloud monitoring: It is the process of reviewing, monitoring and managing the operational 
workflow and processes within a cloud-based IT asset or infrastructure to ensure that a cloud 
infrastructure or platform performs optimally. 
Non-repudiation: is a method of guaranteeing data transmission between parties via digital 
signature and/or encryption. It is one of the five pillars of information assurance (IA). The 
other four are availability, integrity, confidentiality and authentication. It is mainly used for 
digital contracts, signatures and email messages.  
Auditing: accredited auditors may perform independent audit of cloud providers and their 
datacenters. 
Countermeasures: It is an action, process or device or system can prevent or mitigate the 
effects of threats to server or networks.  
Forensics: Cloud forensics is the application of digital forensics in cloud computing as a 
subset of network forensics. It is a cross-discipline between cloud computing and digital 
forensics 
Non-disclosure: it is a signed formal agreement between two parties where the first party 
agree to give the second party confidential information about product. The second party 
agree not to share this information with anyone else for a certain period.  
Outsourcing some of the services: obtain more than one cloud provider for various services 
Technical  
Resource exhaustion As Cloud services are on-demand services, there is the possibility that 
the CP will not be able to 1) meet an increased demand in a certain shared resource, or 2) to 
maintain a given service level. 
 
Isolation failure: In shared environments, errors or attacks can lead to situations where one 
tenant has access to another tenant’s resources or data. In the case of attacks, an attacker gets 
access to the resources or data of a specific customer, or even of all customers of the Cloud 
service. Thus, it covers the failure of mechanisms separating storage, memory, routing and 
reputation between different tenants. 
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Cloud provider malicious insider: Abuse of high privilege roles (i.e examples include CP 
system administrators and managed security service providers). 
 
Management interface compromise (manipulation, availability of infrastructure) the 
customer management interfaces of public cloud providers are Internet accessible and 
mediate access to larger sets of resources (than traditional hosting providers) and therefore 
pose an increased risk especially when combined with remote access and web browser 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Intercepting data in transit  
Whenever data is transferred between different computers or sites, there is the possibility 
that the transfer can be intercepted, this is especially relevant in shared environments and 
when data is transferred between sites (e.g. between CC and CP). 
 
Insecure or ineffective deletion of data:  
Deleting data from Cloud storage does not in fact mean that the data is removed from the 
storage or eventual backup media. If disk storage is not encrypted, the data could be 
accessed at later time by another customer of a Cloud provider. 
 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS): Distributed Denial of Service attacks aim at 
overloading a resource (network or service interface) by flooding it with requests from many 
sources distributed across a wide geographical or topological area, so that the legitimate 
users are unable to use the resource as intended..  
 
Economic denial of service (EDOS): As a consequence of attacks, poor budget planning, or 
misconfigurations, the cost of a Cloud service can strain the financial resources of a CC to 
an extent that the service is no longer affordable. 
 
Loss of Cryptographic Keys: 
The loss or compromise of cryptographic keys used for encryption, authentication or digital 
signatures can lead to data loss, denial of services, or financial damages 
 
Compromise service engine: A compromise of the service engine will give an attacker 
access to the data of all customers, resulting in a potential complete loss of data or denial of 
service. 
 
Conflicts between customer hardening procedures and cloud environment 
Certain security measures of a Cloud Customer may conflict with a Cloud Providers 
environment, making their implementation by the Cloud Customer impossible. 
Legal  
Risk from changes of jurisdiction 
When data is stored or processed in a data centre located in a country other than the CC’s, 
there are numerous ways in which the change in jurisdiction could affect the security of the 
information. Examples include: 1) Data might be seized or the operations of a service 
disrupted due to reasons that don’t exist in the CC’s country. 2) In some cases, national 
security interests of the hosting country might be cited as a reason for seizing data. 3) 
Additionally, a CP might be subject to law enforcement or national security actions from the 
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country its business headquarters is based in, not just those from the countries where its data 
centers are located. 
 
Data protection risks 
Processing data in another country may incur difficulties regarding data protection 
legislation, or might even be considered unlawful by the responsible Data Protection 
authority. 
 
Licensing risks 
Violating a software supplier’s licensing agreements can result in significant 
financial penalties or disruptions of service. 
Risks not specific to the cloud  
Privilege escalation: it is the act of abusing a bug or design flaw or configuration oversight 
in an operating system or software application to gain elevated access to resources that are 
normally protected from an application or user. 
 
Social engineering attacks: Social engineering is understood to mean the art of 
manipulating people into performing actions or divulging confidential information. While it 
is similar to a confidence trick or simple fraud, it is typically trickery or deception for the 
purpose of information gathering, fraud, or computer system access; in most cases the 
attacker never comes face-to-face with the victims. 
 
Backups lost, stolen: The backups a CP makes of it’s customers’ data can get lost, 
damaged, or the physical media on which the backup is stored can get stolen. 
 
Non Cloud-Specific Network-Related Technical Failures or Attacks: 
Cloud services can be affected by a number of network-related technical failures that can 
also occur on classic IT settings. Examples include the loss of Internet connectivity due to 
failures at the CC’s site or the CC’s Internet service provider, temporarily reduced network 
bandwidth on the path between CC and CP, disruptions in the global Internet routing 
infrastructure leading to the loss of the network path between CC and CP, and failures of the 
CP’s Internet connectivity. 
 
Natural disasters: Natural disasters like flooding and earthquakes can affect the 
infrastructure of a Cloud Provider. This way, a Cloud Customer might be affected by 
natural disasters occurring far away from its own location. 
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A.3 Interview Transcript with CC01 
 
Interview transcript No 1  
Date:  18th Sep, 2015 
Voice file name: Meeting with CC01 
Duration: 0.17mins 
Typist comments regarding dictation:   Mostly clear 
VOICE FILE NAME:  Meeting with Prof.Allal Ouhtit  (16 June, 2015) 
Key:  
  
I  = Interviewer Woman 
R  = Respondent 
Aah  = sounds like  
 
I Good morning Prof. Allal can you please introduce your name and your 
role in the organisation? 
R Aah.. my name CC01 and I’m professor in the department of genetics..aah 
I’m an academician but also involved in healthcare as person in charge as 
diagnostics for genetics disease. 
I Aah.. basically my research is about migrating healthcare services to 
cloud computing what do think about this idea? 
R Ah.. its fantastic idea and something that we will be moving to it in any way. 
We can’t avoid it technology is improving at high speed and we are already 
moving to it in other fields and areas. And healthcare is also already moving 
to it. There is so  many problems we can resolve using IT. 
I Do you think that system administration will be happy giving their role 
and control to cloud provider rather than have it indoor? 
R Definitely, if they understand that this is all confidential and this is all user 
name and password based. They will definitely welcome the idea. Especially 
that the system that they are using now. In terms of Health care and family 
history and things like that. It all also same way that it computerized and highly 
sophisticated.  And something that resolves problems related to security and 
confidentiality that we have at the moment.  Moving to cloud may resolve 
these issues. 
I What about the department? Will the staff be looking forward to this 
movement or it will be or reluctant? 
R Aah based on my short experience. So your questions is based on our 
environment here not in Oman in general in Sultan Qaboos University 
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Hospital. Based on my experience.. There is always be people who will be 
against the idea especially when it comes to security and confidentiality, 
facilities things like that. Obviously, the idea is new and it has to be brain 
stormed  ..ahh… by inclusion of all concerned people; administration, 
scholars, scientist, physicians and people from the public the community. So 
all these people have to brain stormed the idea before it can be applied you 
know .. so that everybody is happy and gives the green light..  but I can tell 
you that everyone will welcome the idea. But the application of it .. there will 
be some problems.. that’s why all these people and the parties that were 
concerned have to be involved in brain storming and discussing the idea.  
I Alright.. in terms of security what  do you think of having a backup of 
the systems of the cloud. 
R Aah okay so there are two securities here. The first one is obviously when you 
have data.. you are worried you  gona lose it  because of disaster or natural 
disaster and things like that  aaah so you must have a backup.it is like your 
phone you must have backup. That back up will have also security and 
confidentiality who will have access to that backup? Because you are 
duplicating here.. as soon as duplication  of original .. its like you are holding 
confidential dossier that dossier as  soon as you duplicate it you are increasing 
the level of security and you  are increasing the error . human error. So 
obviously yes there should be backup and you must secure the backup.  
I Sometimes they encrypt the data before putting it in the cloud. What do 
you think of that ? 
R They do what? 
I Encryption? Means they verify the data into codes then they store it in 
the cloud.  
R Ahha .. they code the data aah will that have  some .. hum let say  there are 
error problems and you lose the coding  something like that how  would you 
bring back your data ? 
I This is one of the risks from IT prospective  
R So I think highly  knowledge people  in the field should be consulted. 
I Do you think the data can be portable to different cloud provider in case 
one cloud provider will have some issues in it ? and then is it necessary 
in the agreement itself to know that data is portable to another cloud 
provider or not? 
R What do you mean about cloud provider from one country to another or do 
mean it just different companies.   
I Yes different companies 
R I think it should be possible through agreement..  Signed consents and 
agreements so if there is any breach ..aah…. the company will be responsible. 
I Sometimes the company would  like to monitor the data in the cloud. Is 
that acceptable from  healthcare perspective?  
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R If it is coded yes. If there is no name of the patient that’s fine. For example do 
not mention my name but as in A B C D . yes you can but again there is 
another risk. I will give you an example. You know as an Academic who does 
mainly a research. Sometimes for us when we have a project. We want for 
example study a disease   what we do we have access to the system. We can 
access the system and collect all the clinical data of the patient. There are 
companies now that sell the data. A real data.  Even if I put A on the patient.  
At least I know it has this age this clinical data. What I am concerned about is 
the disease and clinical features. I’m not concerned about the name of the 
patient my mainly concern is the disease we are studying. There are 
companies who sell a real data to investigators. They will sell it to me without 
you know.so if you allow the company to the data they may sell without uou 
know selling it worldwide. So there should be some agreement as well.  
I What about management access control? Do you think that patient 
should have access to his own data? 
R Yes I think so . 
I So basically patient owns the data not like let say Sultan Qaboos 
University? 
R Yes based on patient user name and password should be the only one who 
has access as I said before and his own physician.. but even the physician 
should sign the consent form.  
I I’m asking because some hospitals consider the health information 
belongs to the hospital not the patient.  
R No it is the patient life not them.. any body in the hospital they finish their shift 
they go home  right but the patient who would like to know what’s going on. 
Not only that the hospital is responsible for any change to the data. As soon 
as the patient undergoes a surgery or treatment. He has to know what has 
been going through what are the consequences what is treatment has been 
giving. As you can see now in the west when go to a physician to do surgery  
you have the right to ask all questions they will explain to you in details what’s 
going to happen and then what are the consequences. Then you have to sign 
on consent on those consequences. They will tell you look you have 20% to 
live and 80% probability to die and you get consent for that. So hospital does 
not own anything. The only thing the hospital can do is interfering and give the 
consultation to the patient.  
I As I know in UK for example the health data belongs to the hospital or 
GP not  to the patient . It was kind of strange.  
R The physician has gone through a training for 7 or 8 years. During those years 
there is a course of bioethics. How to break a bad news to a patient. Obviously 
yes.  If I’m a doctor for me to tell you .. that you have cancer . obviously I’m 
the first to have access to this information right but it is not my information 
right it is your information it concerns you first. so first of all I have to  break 
the news to you and the family. Second I  do not own that information. As soon 
as I break the news. You own the information and I have no right to tell any 
body without your consent. So all in all you are the owner.  
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I What about you know ..the cloud provider ..aah.. basically these are 
technical terms  I won’t go through it as it not really related your area.. 
ah..but let say   in case of networks breaks.. you do not have access to 
the internet ..and the patient information is stored in the cloud.. how 
would you think and react about it.  As physician ? 
R  Aah .. see that’s why there should always be a backup. Now why are we 
moving to cloud? To avoid the paper work right. The hassle of paper work and 
store data and things like that right. It would be nice once the network is off I 
have an access somehow. And the only way I can either on file. I can pull the 
patient file from hospital but we do not want that. We want hospital that do not 
have storage no files. Everything is computerized. Now that’s why IT people 
has to think of having a backup somewhere. Like electricity when there is 
break out of electricity what do we have we have emergency plugs. For 
example during a storm, we know electricity will cut off. In our genetics 
department we store sample data in fridge.  Those fridges has red plugs that 
turn on automatically for few hours to save the sample. Especially if we have 
sample blood from a patient who passed away. Then there is no way to have 
the sample blood again.   
I Yeah .. right.. finally Do you recommend anyone who we can speak to 
about the areas we mentioned above? 
R Yes you should meet someone from CIS department in SQU and someone 
from hospital administration to get a clear picture.  
I Thank you so much. 
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A.4 Interview Transcript with CC02 
 
Interview transcript no 2 
Date:  19th Sep, 2015 
Voice file name: Meeting with CC02 
Duration: 0.17mins 
Typist comments regarding dictation:   Mostly clear 
VOICE FILE NAME:  Meeting with Dr. Marwan Al Sharbati (21 June, 2015) 
Key:  
 I  = Interviewer Woman 
R  = Respondent 
aah  = sounds like  
 
I  Good morning Dr. Marwan my name is Aseela Al Harthi. I’m doing a 
research about migrating healthcare services to cloud computing. Can you please 
introduce yourself and your role in the organisation?  
R  yeah, I’m CC02. Associate professor in  the department of Behavioral Medicine in 
Sultan Qaboos University. Specialist in child and adult Psychiatric.  
I  Dr. my research will be mainly about migrating healthcare services of patients 
and medical service to cloud computing. Which means it will available at any 
time any where.through the internet. Do you support this idea? 
R yeah, I support it provided that the security for the patient’s secrets and states should 
kept confidential. But it is good idea to communicate with other colleagues in other hospitals 
and other countries.  To exchange idea  and opinion about certain conditions and cases.  
I  some will argue that medical information belongs to the hospital not the patient 
what do you think about it? 
R well really it is okay it is related to HIS or IT system but the secrets of the patients is 
as well should be considered in secret way and appropriate way. Because the confidentiality 
is crucial issue to consider. Patient care is different from other cases. Some people do not 
like for others to know their condition or their diagnosis of certain disease because of social 
stigma or something like that as it can affect their work and social states in the community. 
So this should be  considered crucial  actually.  
I let us assume the confidentiality of the patient information is there and the 
security is the data is guaranteed somehow. What about the attitude of the medical 
staff? Will they support migrating their role to the cloud rather than physical work in 
the hospital. For example register as new patient or book an appointment.  
R I think they will support it because it is for the future is a necessity. Because science 
and communication is advancing very fast.  And we do need to transmit our information of 
certain cases with other colleagues. So to have such assistance it will facilitate the 
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communication  process with others and reduce the time and effort now taking by putting or 
writing special medical reports. And to be transferred to our colleagues in another hospital 
for follow up or diagnosis or treatment of some cases. So this will actually have a great 
advantages for both sides doctors and patients. 
I okay, what in terms of emergency let say there are networks breaks. What 
alternative way to deal with the patients data? 
R There should be a plan from IT department or from HIS that can deal with such 
disasters and crises when they happen actually in order to prevent any problem or any delay 
in the delivery of the service or treatment of the patient and to avoid any complication that 
might happen in this concern. Actually this is a technical problem that should be dealt 
properly  with specialised people in the IT and information technology systems.  
I  alright let say from the medical side, you as a doctor  do you prefer to see all 
your patient data available online at any time? Let say you are travelling abroad and 
there some case that need your opinion. In that case. Will support having this data 
online so you can access via username and password? In order to give your diagnose or 
input what to do next? 
R Yes I supported it provided again the confidently will be available and secure in all 
steps. But if the confidently will be lost then the confidence of the patients on us and the 
system will be disturbed very much.  
I In normal cases is there like a recovery plan for patient data as it is right now? 
Is it stored in the hospital? 
R Up to my knowledge yeah it is stored in the hospital in HIS systems. All the 
information are there actually.  
I according to the recent events in Oman. There were many natural disaster like 
Guno in 2007 then Feet in 2008 and recently Ashwaya in 2015. So does it affect the 
information stored in the hospital in any way? 
R Yeah Of Course, if we do not be prepared to deal with such crises and problems 
encounter in such events. Then all information will be lost and this will be a real tragedy. 
The technical people should think about these problems and should keep the data in save 
place in addition to kept it available in the system itself. In a separate place away from the 
hospital. For instance in ministry of health or somewhere else in order to use the extra data 
when the original data be lost or destroyed by floods or by some other disasters.  
I  Finally I would like to ask for your opinion. Do you recommend a certain 
Doctor or a person to meet regarding the same topic. Information systems or medical 
side? 
R Well. You can select any doctor work in the hospital they are very cooperative if 
they have time as you know time is very important. Maybe Dr. Samir Al Adawi might be 
available. You can check his timing with his coordinator Ms. Ruqayah.  
I  What is his title? 
R Prof. Samir Al Adawi is professor and head of behavioural medicine department.  
I Alright. Thank you so much for your time I really appreciate it.  
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A.5 Interview Transcript with CC03 
 
Interview transcript no 3 
Date:  19th Sep, 2015 
Voice file name: Meeting with CC03 , Manager for Cloud Initiatives, Information 
Technology Authority 
Duration: 0.36mins 
Typist comments regarding dictation:   Mostly clear 
VOICE FILE NAME:  Meeting with Mr. Khalid Al Rahbi (29 June, 2015) 
 
Key:  
 I  = Interviewer Woman 
R  = Respondent 
aah  = sounds like  
 
I  Good morning Mr. Khalid as we communicate via an e-mail. I’m doing a research 
about migrating healthcare services to cloud computing. Can you please introduce yourself 
and your role in the organisation?  
R  Well. My name is CC03. Senior solution architect. I’m also the government cloud 
manager in government cloud we actually more focusing in the basic  infrastructure and 
building basic blocks of the cloud in IaaS, PaaS and SaaS. We might extended to Business 
PaaS.  
I can you please clarify G-Cloud in more details? 
R G-Cloud is a platform based on open source technologies that enables the Omani 
Government and other state authorities to locate their information systems to a central state-
managed private cloud and to refrain from maintaining their own IT-infrastructures. The 
objective for implementing G-Cloud is to improve ministries’ business outcomes by 
consolidating their IT infrastructure, reducing the IT budget and increasing their agility as 
well as to provide government ICT services at lower costs. 
I Great, my research is basically about migrating healthcare services to cloud so that 
the patient will have his/her medical record available online with all medical history. Where 
is ministry of health standing from here. I heard they are deploying partly cloud in some of 
its services.  
R  aah .. not sure exactly what ministry of health is doing. But I do agree about that this 
will be defiantly a big jump in terms of quality in healthcare in Oman. aah another thing 
from what you’ve just said I have seen you have stepped one step ahead then what’s cloud 
can offer. When we talk about cloud. cloud can be two things. From consumer point of view 
or citizens or residents point of view. It can be I’m user setting at home getting my 
information from the internet my status my information list. This is not just cloud player 
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over here. This is a complete integrated solution and application that can bring you the 
information. Which at this point can come from ministry of health. For example or  maybe 
any private healthcare Bader Alsama or Star care whatever we have in the country. The 
cloud concept normally would help the organisation to speed up the process that means they 
can acquire infrastructure as a service (IaaS). They can provision platform as a service 
(PaaS) and go for software as a service (SaaS). Now how do they play and what kind of 
application they really want to put on it depends on their organisation strategy. What’s 
ministry of health strategy. One of the application I can see which could have big potentials 
is the healthcare. You know unifying kind of information of course, security is important at 
this range but definitely, it will make simple to do it. But not sure if ministry of health 
publish anything that way in cloud yet. But I heard that they are working in such project that 
citizen and resident can now book their appointment for special hospitals and public 
hospitals in Oman. Please check with ministry of health, as I am not their representative so 
this question is directly for them.  
I  Of course I will double check from ministry of health in all cases I’m planning to 
see staff who work in IT department in ministry of health. So if we would like to talk about 
the security of the information as far as you are concern. Will the data or information in the 
cloud be encrypted (coded) 
R Yeah definitely there are many ways of securing your information.  Security itself is 
a huge chapter when of them starts from Infrastructure level where you need to secure your 
physical location where you put your VMs and hardware and data centers itself. And that’s 
completely different method of doing it. Then you have the middleware where you need to 
check about VMs and some sort of application security related.  Then you have the 
application layer where you have data transformation, data transactions happens between 
place A to place B and that’s different way of securing. Now in cloud we actually following 
security standard like NIST security standard. Also we have government security standard, 
which is held by the one the division in ITA ensuring producing the national related security 
standard for Oman. hum.. This is also part of our main security divisions, which called, is 
the ISD. They actually responsible ensuring to security all of the data information that can 
come. There is a huge exercise to secure any information.  Now  going back to your project. 
Your project mainly comes to medical report and medical information. From my point of 
view as an ITA representative aah the information that we can secure is the information that 
related to entity that’s very true.  But the entity also need to come with their own security to 
consulate. Coz when we talk about information of X person in Oman who has so and so 
secret no one should know. Security comes true an application layer where the vender or 
implementer must have really taken a place and also it has to come to the middle wear and 
infrastructure layer. Now for us if they become part of the government cloud we secure all 
layer depending on what package they took . Let say if they took infrastructure as package 
we will be secure their infrastructure as well along with secure the rest but not as much when 
they took software as service when we provide the service the software then they just use it.  
I okay so what you are saying you have different packages? 
R  Yes  
I  ok.. now the customer has the right to choose which package to use. Right. As far as 
I know ITA provide cloud service to various ministries free of charge? 
R  aah that statement not completely right. We provide cloud-computing services at this 
point to selective customers. When I say selective that means customers that fall under 
criteria and prerequisites. One of the main prerequisites they must have some sort of service 
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that service citizens and residents and integrated services with other ministries. to speed up 
the electronic Oman (eOman). That kind of project we currently looking for we do not have 
a target at this point for hosting a website.at this point is not our main focal. Maybe 
sometime in future but not now. That’s why I said that statement is not completely true. 
When you said free I’m not sure also its free. Because there will some sort of cost. Because 
these infrastructure we are providing doesn’t come free but we are not profitable 
organisation so we probably be much more cheaper than the rest.  And from security point of 
view when they come to the cloud we are responsible to secure them. So also this another 
goal added and point to the project.   
I So let assume that ITA provide cloud service to A ministry, they will be concern 
about their backup data, is monitored by ITA, will they have  like incident report if anything 
goes wrong. Will it be listed in their agreement? 
R Yes we have a SLA that we will signed with any customer who become part of our 
cloud customer and we will provide them definitely a complete monitoring systems. When 
we say monitoring system along with the operation we say they can raise a ticket any time 
they wants. They have the ability to see how they performing. What exactly went wrong in 
any certain time period. Coz we have back team in ITA responsible to see if anything goes 
wrong with their application so yeah that insurance we defiantly provide with SLA as well. 
So there will be customer agreement signed off and SLA agreed between us and there will 
be OLA as well (Operational Level Agreement). 
I let say the customer is not comfortable about the service will it be available all the 
time let say network breaks during any natural disaster happen will they be able to access the 
service at that time.  
R See if they took a package with DR as a services coz we have this service then DR 
will defiantly suits that kind of requirement. Which they can switch at any time to DR sites 
and the primary sites maintained.  
I So what you are saying they can switch from one package to another one easily? 
R They have to come with the first request what they want. If you are ministry X then 
you would know you need a backup. You would know any cluster environment. And you 
probably looking for DR service. So you put that as requirement as it does not come as 
default so you’ve got them all. Because when you start either migrating your application to 
the cloud or installing fresh insulation to the cloud. You must have basic structure design. 
How things should move when things went wrong right.  According to the plan we studied 
with you, we will give suggestion if we can. From there if you have disaster from human 
side somehow you can always switch if you have package of the DR. if you actually backup 
coz the backup will come according what kind of backup you would like to have then that 
backup definitely be stored with us.  
I Well I have two points to clarify. Will the data itself be coded when it stored in the 
cloud or according to the customer request.  
R  No it will not be encoded. Actually we have a department for coding and encoding. 
But now the encoding and decoding also depends on what the package you have. With 
infrastructure as a service we can’t do much coz we are providing with the infrastructure. 
When we go to Software as service yes we encode and decode. When you go as platform as 
service we do encode and decode. But for security also reason if you are asking how secure 
is this  we are running private cloud in ITA which means we have separate network. It is not 
public network like Amazon its not. It is separate network, which is secure by devices. 
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These devices one responsibility encoding and decoding data transformation defiantly that 
will be the case. And also from implementer point of view they normally make sure that the 
data is encoded and decoded as well.  
I Ok let say the customer would request to delete his/her data in the cloud will it 
actually be erased?  
R Yes. see about the delete and removed it depends  exactly on what they are look if 
they wanna delete  this question deal with how security is this right? .. I think if you have 
delete your VMs or your application and probably its at development stage right. you delete 
an application. And you haven’t make a backup for this . then that defiantly it will be 
deleted. Let say If you go to production and say I want to delete a VM. Then deleting this is 
not that easy because you need to come up with approval to delete a production of data.  The 
scenario here can go wide depending on what application you do. If you are talking about 
medical record data then defiantly for ITA we do not own it. Let say ministry of health host 
their applications or medical report within the GCloud  then yes. Within GCloud they are as 
tenant but still not owning the data. For me setting in the operation room I cannot see what’s 
in. I do not have the right to see what’s in but you as ministry of health representative you 
can. So you can anything with your data as long as it’s your business. And if you feel you 
want to correct data then still it’s your business. I cannot come and say no you are not 
allowed. For me I provide you a service to facilitate you but not responsible on changing 
anything in your data.  
I Alright.. let’s assume that health ministry request the service and they have it. 
Regarding the access to the data. Will the patient has an access to his data in the cloud. Or it 
will be for hospital only.  
R It depends on the design of the application of ministry of health. If they designed in 
a way the patient can access from the internet. Then yes, they will. But if they just come up 
with an application that can be designed internally with some sort of Ministry of Health 
centers then that’s the way you can approach it. Each and every design for us we accept 
both. Now this is the thing the cloud I think the only confusion between your questions is the 
cloud and actually the accessibility of data. These two different things. The cloud is actually 
simplify for me as a ministry or government cloud to get infrastructure as service  and it 
simplify to get platform as service. It simplify my life if I want to go for software as a 
service. Now it  depends what kind of software let say you   ministry of health and you took 
Infrastructure as service as a package where I install and I bring my application. That 
application probably with citizens and residents through internet to check their report. Then 
cloud will defiantly help it because they provide a system that capable to provide that service 
to resident and citizens. The cloud itself is there you can use it and do anything with it.  I’m 
not sure if I did help you with my answer but I’m trying to tell you that actually your 
question has two different path. One path is application related question where I think an 
application architect within ministry of health should tell you what’s going on right now 
about their projects that services citizens and residents. Another question I’m answering here 
is what cloud would help this application in order to make this story true and invisible for 
citizen and residents.  
I Well I’m trying to get some people from ministry of health in order to question 
where are the standing from migration healthcare services to cloud computing will they be 
interested or not.  Lets go back to security if there is an incident report.. will you notify  the 
customers  that so and so had happen in such date ? and those reaction where taken and dealt 
with? 
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R  Yeah ..notification again task number one you are asking for is notification in the 
application  it should be yes happening but that related to the ministry from our point of 
view will notify them according to what package they have. Let say they have a problem 
with their VMs we tell them. But if there is an application the one they design has stuck or 
loop within the application that we cannot tell. But we can tell them if they have 
performance problem. Application related its not owned by us its not we are not providing 
then it will be ministry of health especially when it go to medical related  application then 
they take a complete security aspect for it. But from government cloud point of view we do 
give them a complete notification that related to their package.  
I In terms of your services that you are providing to the ministries. Is there like audit 
and run by who.  
R Yes, we are running an internal audit within ITA and as you can cloud itself. It is 
very flexible in terms of demand. If you ask one VM server, you can get it within 5 minutes. 
Sometimes you have projects that run seasonally for example Majles Alshura someone 
wanna just see a vote of something in probably one month. So they are asking for so and so 
service. That only required for one month. The flexibility of the cloud you can get all of 
these VMs at once. And when the job is done you can say close I do not need them anymore 
maybe next year again. So you get the  flexibility of resources. That will defiantly will help 
to provide ministries their own demands .we call it on-demand-services. About the audit 
actually we do have an audit about how many customers do we have and also about our 
infrastructure we are running internally. So yes we defiantly do. How we run it you mean? 
Actually there are many many ways.  
I Ok great .. I wonder if you do outsourcing for some the services in cloud as you said 
you are capable provide different packages according to the customer need.  
R  I would say we will be able to run PaaS at this point we are providing infrastructure 
as a service (IaaS) in a month and half time we would be probably running PaaS and early 
next year we will provide SaaS. 
I Excellent .. aah we talked about technical issues whether  isolation failure might 
occur 
R Yes the isolation failure depends exactly on what categorise but defiantly we are 
taking care of all the operations requirement. When we talk about operation requirement we 
can sum it from infrastructure point of view operation monitoring and also support.  
I  What about the legal agreement who provide SLA ? 
R We are provide SLAs. And agreement must be signed by the tenant or ministries.  
I Are you expecting any kind or risks not precisely related to the cloud? Aah as we 
said natural disasters attacks.  
R Yeah defiantly I mean that was why we are putting DR service in different locations 
in case this cloud has problem then the other cloud will run straight away.  
I  aah .. thank you so much .. 
R You wanna ask about outsourcing something  
I Oh yeah thanks .. I meant for outsourcing some of the cloud services do you rely on 
other providers to do the service? 
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R No strategically this point as government we really want to run the service for the 
tenant in secure environment we are not outsourcing any other cloud from different vendors 
like amazon .we build the cloud within our data centre. But in future if we found some sort 
of venders that could bring potential and secured. Yes we are also ready because we have 
cloud connector that can connect to any other cloud later . 
I So what you said regarding the location not necessary to be here in Oman? 
R No at this point we do not have outside all in Oman because of security promising it 
should be in Oman. as I said at the beginning we have to follow the government security rule 
that information security rules released in 2013. But it been released by our security advisor 
division in ITA.  And we follow that.  
I Is there any documentation or statistics who used the cloud service from ITA so far.  
R Well to be honest we just started with three customers yet.  So the statistics not clear 
yet even for us. We are trying to get complete statistics. But I think at the end of this year we 
will be able to announce a complete statistics and how we are performing and defiantly it 
will be publicly shared.  
I So at the end of year I will contact you again to it that statistics hopefully.  
R Alright..at this time we have two major projects one of them is eOman itself  in 
cloud and the other one is  ministry of health and there is few 8 to 12 ministries potentially 
coming as well to cloud in various packages.  
I aah .. whom do you recommend to meet next regarding the same area.   
R I think most of your questions will defiantly be answered by ministry of health 
because your project is about providing a shred service for resident and citizens in Oman 
that they can access their medical report. Now this medical report can set on the cloud or in 
their premises it does not matter.  Because your goal is how to make those recorders 
available to public which is fall into shared services area. Aaah defiantly ministry of health 
can give you where they are and maybe they can tell you if they have sort of challenges at 
this moment. I’m not aware about it. Aah but I know they would answer most of the 
questions. Because most of my answers how we can help X ministries to give what you are 
asking for.  But now even with the cloud if X ministries or entities are not ready to 
accommodate those services to citizens and residents. You are citizen wont feel the reason 
behind why we are doing a cloud.  
I Well to convince a manager or undersecretary about the facilities within the cloud 
obviously we need to clarify the cost of it. Do you have an idea how much each package 
cost? How cloud can save a lot of expenses to them .  
R The pricing not yet  released as I said we are not profitable organisation. The only 
reason we are running the cloud to speed up the shared services in Oman. Whoever tenant 
come in us is basically to speed up the process of giving those services to citizen and 
residents. We are not profitable so our price will be the lowest among others. The numbers I 
do not have them yet no one has them yet. As you we just started we’ve gone life two 
months back. We have two customers so far  
I May I know who those customers are ? 
R Yeah eOman project and Ministry of Health.  
I Whom shall I contact in Ministry of Health  
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R  aaah .. not about the same project .. its different than what you are asking for it 
called “Shefa Project”. I probably I can share the contact person but I need to ask first.  
I Yes please do. I can leave you with my number and e-mail.  
R What I think you should do is go to Ministry of health to IT department and ask 
about shared services to citizens and residents and where we are at this point. They will tell 
you probably what they have. You will be surprized of what we have but no one is using it.  
I  no one is using it !! 
R Yeah there are two thing; we have but no one knows about it. And we have but it 
useless because no one can use it  and we  can not have because challenges. We defiantly see 
those when you set with them. So the point is not go to project related to us as much as IT 
central IT with ministry of health asking for that questions. Probably you will get better 
answers for your questions.  
I I think they should market their service so the public will know about and go ahead 
and use it.   
R Marking is actually one of the reason that the citizens and residents use the service.  
But it depends on what do they have and how  much they can.. there are much complexity 
when it come to shared service. I think  by the end of this research you will probably know 
most of them and you go and  understand why it was not possible at so and so time and why 
it possible now. And you will see that challenges.  Myself I do not even know how much do 
they achieve because we do not go in details in cloud. but I’m sure there is a division in ITA 
do have a good idea what they are doing. Like e-services team who have statistics because 
they are responsible on government services. They doing a survey about readiness. That 
report will come from e-services team.  You might  be able to see the e-health readiness if 
can ask for that report. Then they can tell where they are at this point because they run that 
exercises. It is a different division than government cloud. 
I Most of the public when you ask them to use e-services they comment on the 
internet speed as not efficient to perform such tasks.  
R Infrastructure speed can be also a bottleneck but it depends on what you want to 
share. Infrastructure might have … not just in Oman anywhere in the world by the way 
because you would always want to improve the speed of the performance. But the 
architecture design that you can come up with can serve citizen and residence according to 
what do you have of the infrastructure limitation. Does not mean I have to wait 10 years or 
so until I see the infrastructure grow up to certain level then I can act. We started by iminium 
computers and we able to come up to where are right now. Technology moves along. The 
good architect, good design, good thought of what kind or services I can provide to publicly 
for citizens and residents leads to an answer but that’s again depends on what’s your 
objectives about the project.  
I well so my next aim is to target people on shares services in ministry of health. 
R Right .. or one of the team of e-health readiness. So first, you get one of them here 
then you see the people from health ministry.  
I  Thank you so much for your time. I really appreciate it.  
R You welcome my pleasure to help.  
  
Appendix A  
352 | P a g e  
 
 
  
Appendix A  
353 | P a g e  
A.6 Interview Transcript with CC04 
 
Interview transcript no 4 
Date:  20th Sep, 2015 
Voice file name: Meeting with CC04, Director of eHealth in ministry of health in 
department of IT  
Duration: 0.20 mins 
Typist comments regarding dictation:   Mostly clear 
VOICE FILE NAME:  Meeting with Ms. Layan Al Alawi (16 August, 2015) 
Key:  
 I  = Interviewer Woman 
R  = Respondent 
aah  = sounds like  
I  Good morning my name is Aseela Al Harthi and I’m doing a research about  
migrating healthcare services to cloud computing. Can you please introduce yourself 
and your role in the organisation?  
R  Ok. My name is CC04 . Director of eHealth in Ministry of Health in Department of 
Information Technology. I’m  responsible for eHealth portal.  
I Did you really start migrating healthcare service to cloud or not yet? 
R “We are not providing eHealth services in terms of health services. We are 
providing e-services in terms of just communicating what health establishment. to request 
an appointment or can cancel an appointment or reschedule an appointment. We do not 
store the medical records of a patient online. Doctor can view patient chart as long as the 
patient is under his care. In case you are admitted in the hospital and his away not in duty 
and he needs to be consulted for something then he can view it from outside.  
I Can the patient view his/her chart outside Oman or only within Oman.  
R  He can view it outside Oman as long as he has internet connection and log in with 
his Id card.  
I This Id card will it has patient medical history from various hospitals in Oman. 
as you know the patient database in Khaula Hospital is different than the one in 
Alsultani Hospital. So a patient will have a record in both hospitals. 
R The Id card does not store the medical history. It is read from Archive of health 
information system through the portal. And it read chart by chart it doesn’t read a 
combination of both records so far. Because still did not unified the patient record. We will 
be doing in stages later.  
I So let say cloud service will be a solution to unified the patient records? 
R Actually no we are not utilizing the cloud solution to unify the records. we are doing 
it in data base level. 
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I When you do it in database level moving to electronics records. will it minimize 
some of the departments role? 
R  Like what? 
I Like some departments like patient registry or storage data. 
R Still not clear sorry  
I  Ok let say patient A has a medical record in Khula Hospital and would like to 
take a second opinion from one of the private establishment (Bader Alsama) his 
electronic medical records or chart will it be viewable to the doctor? 
R Right .. at this stage no we do not give access to the patient chart through the portal 
except for the patient or for the doctor who treat that patient in that hospital. So private 
establishment not included. But the patient himself can view the chart even from his  mobile 
phone and then show it to the doctor but not on doctor PC.  
I  Do you think this system is secure? 
R aah.. we have moved to GCloud as we are seeking more security. Because we do not 
have here the infrastructure and people to managed it. That’s why we choose to use the 
GCloud for the portal I mean not for patient chart. Patient chart still client server. So it is 
locally in each hospital  
I Let say there is an incident or security breach will you notify your patient that 
there is a breach in the system? 
R aah ..i can not speak for that. If its for the portal then it will be handled as soon as 
possible.  
I Alright .. what about the patient chart in the system if you request certain data 
to be deleted is actually removed or erased from the system.  
R We do not store anything in the portal. We send web service request and get 
whatever data stored in it. 
I  I would like to know more how you will use GCloud in health portal  
R Basically we are hosting the application or the system of eHealth portal in the cloud. 
We are utilizing their environment as the infrastructure already there. we are  using the ITA 
government cloud to host the ministry portal (website) 
I So you will use the cloud infrastructure to make eHealth portal accessible and 
useable.  
R Yeah for hospital and administrative staff.  
I Do you something called Alshefa project? What it is about? 
R Alshefa is  electronic health record.  It is client server based. It is basically the 
patient chart. It covers everything from patient registration to examination, radiology, tests, 
x-rays.  Each hospital has its own local database on site 
I Great and those data will it be stored in Alshefa? 
R The data will be stored locally in each hospital. It build in oracle system. So the 
portal is web service only it request for patient data only.  
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I What about the storage capacity? Will it have enough storage for each patient 
data? 
R  Do you mean Alshefa ? yeah I think they have enough. I can not speak for them as it 
is different department. 
I Right .. how can I get more details about Alshefa project and eHealth portal? 
R For al Alshefa you need to speak to different department called health applications 
but for eHealth I can provide you with the information. As for the eHealth portal basically it 
is our website but its been updated.  
I Right .. I will add your name for eHealth portal.. I will need to know the main 
objective of it  and at what stage you are in right now. I will give my contact details.  
R Ok I can send all the details to you via an e-mail .  
I Great .. thank you so much for your time .  
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A.7 Interview Transcript with CC05 
 
Via e-mail  
Category Question list 
Role in the 
organization  
1. What are the roles you play in the healthcare 
organization(s)? Give more details about each role. 
Dr. CC05, Assistant professor, Science College at Sultan 
Qaboos University 
Management 
perspective  
2.What do you think about migrating healthcare service to cloud? 
 
Migrating services to clouds becomes more and more  attractive IT 
option to cut costs, support on-demand provisioning, diversify 
infrastructures, and obtain higher levels of flexibility and security 
 
3. Would system administrators be happy to give up some of their 
control over systems and rely on cloud service providers for the 
support of end users? 
 
It varies from one to one. Although I think migrating partially to 
Could  computing  will give them a chance to inspect  the reality of 
what cloud can and can’t do. 
 
4.How would departments react to the migration of applications 
and data to cloud service providers?  
Several concerns have held healthcare organizations back from 
moving ahead toward full-scale cloud migrations. Examples of such 
concerns are privacy and security. 
 
They might not have the same level of access to a cloud as they 
currently do to their internal systems, so how would they have to 
change their working practices? 
They still can manage the cloud.  
 
Security  
(Data storage, 
process and 
transfer) 
 
5.What do you think the role of security is/ should be in 
healthcare? 
The responsibility goes both ways, however: the provider must 
ensure that their infrastructure is secure and that their clients’ data 
and applications are protected while the user must take measures to 
fortify their application and use strong passwords and 
authentication measures 
 
6.What is the backup plan for data stored in the cloud? 
7. Will the data be encrypted in the cloud? How will it processed 
or transferred? 
 
8.Will the data be isolated? 
 
9.Can the data be portable to different cloud provider? 
How long it will take to migrate to another cloud? 
Is there a special tool for exporting data? 
 
10.Does your cloud service provide data integrity and availability? 
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11.How the original data be deleted? Is it actually erased when 
contract terminated.  
 
12. Is it monitored? From provider to ensure acceptable use and 
customer  
Can the data be Non-repudiation? 
 
From my side I think cloud provider should provide backup, 
encrypt data, make it portable and  provide data integrity 
 
Security  
(Access control) 
 
13.Does your cloud provider provide management access control 
within healthcare? 
N/A 
14.does your cloud provider have “backdoor” for maintenance, 
support and services 
N/A 
 
User/patient access control in the healthcare 
Security 
(procedure) 
 
15.Does your cloud provider provide “Auditing” 
N/A 
 
Certification (customer to check is it relevant to their work or not) 
and does it follow Personal Identifiable Information(PII) 
ISO/IEC 27018:2014  
 
16.Countermeasures- how does your cloud provider react about 
security breach? 
N/A 
 
17.Testing ( cloud provider  what kind of security tests) 
N/A 
 
18.If there is breach of security will the provider provide a 
notification to customers or not? 
Detection 
Key management 
Security level 
Incident 
management 
 
18.How security incident are dealt with?   
Does cloud provider provide: Response? 
Logging? 
Reporting? 
Forensics? 
 
19.Is there a certain mechanism to notify customers about data 
breaches or information security incident?  
Privacy 
 
20.Non-disclosure? Can provider use or access the data? 
N/A 
 
Data minimization 
Hybird clouds 
 
21. Does your cloud provide rely on outsourcing some of the 
services? (may rely on the services from multiple provider) 
N/A 
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Technical 
 
22. Does your cloud provider face or likely to some of the 
following technical issues? if yes, how it deals with? 
Resource exhaustion (under or over provisioning) 
Isolation failure 
Cloud provider malicious insider- abuse of high privilege roles 
Management interface compromise (manipulation, availability of 
infrastructure) 
Intercepting data in transit 
Insecure or ineffective deletion of data 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
Economic denial of service (EDOS) 
Loss of Cryptographic Keys 
Compromise service engine 
Conflicts between customer hardening procedures and cloud 
environment 
N/A 
 
Legal 
 
23.Does your cloud provider clarify the status of the legal issues 
for instance: 
Risk from changes of jurisdiction 
Data protection risks 
Licensing risks 
N/A 
 
24.Does your cloud provider follow Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)? 
N/A 
 
25.Does your cloud provider follow Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)? 
Risks not specific 
to the cloud 
 
26. Does your cloud provider face or likely to some of the 
following issues? 
Network breaks 
Network management (network congestion/mis-connection/non-
optimal use) 
Modifying network traffic 
Privilege escalation 
Social engineering attacks (impersonation) 
Loss or compromise of operational logs 
Loss or compromise of security logs (manipulation of forensic 
investigation) 
Backups lost, stolen 
Non Cloud-Specific Network-Related Technical Failures or Attacks 
Natural disasters 
N/A 
 
Further 
recommendation 
27.Do you recommend anyone who we can speak to about the 
areas we mentioned above? (For example, those dealing with 
Information Governance,  Health Information systems, or cloud 
provider) ITA g-cloud team 
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A.8 Interview Transcript with CC06 
 
Via e-mail  
Category Question list 
Role in the 
organization 
1. What are the roles you play in the healthcare organization(s)? 
Give more details about each role. 
 
Dr. CC06, Assistant Professor and healthcare consultant and 
manager.As a health care manager I command the operation of 
different types of medical facilities. They typically work closely 
with medical staff as well as industry suppliers and others involved 
in the delivery of health care. Some important roles are; 
 
Strategic Planning: The manager is in charge of making 
business decisions and leading strategic planning to create a 
vision and direction for the practice or facility going forward. 
He normally works with medical boards and the medical staff 
to make sure the clinic's goals align with that of the budget, 
community needs and practitioner goals. 
 
Spokesperson : When media seeks information from a medical 
facility, the manager normally serves as the organization's 
spokesperson. Some large hospitals have full-time 
spokespeople or public relations representatives, though. In 
this capacity, the manager holds press conferences or delegates 
delivery of press releases to announce important news or 
events.  
 
Collaboration :The health care manager typically collaborates 
with medical staff leaders to coordinate ongoing and daily 
responsibilities. He coordinates departmental budgets with 
each department head, discusses medical equipment and 
supply needs with physicians, and delegates and follows up on 
any tasks related to the overall operation of the practice. 
Maintaining good rapport with physicians and nurses is a key 
duty of health care managers to keep morale high. 
 
Staff Management :The health care manager also has oversight 
over staff and helps run daily operations of the facility. This 
includes office staff, billing departments, doctors and nurses 
and custodial staff. This is one of the more challenging roles of 
the manager, as he must make critical decisions on what the 
facility's budget allows for help, what standards are in play for 
performance, and how to evaluate the performance of each 
type of worker. 
 
Management 
perspective  
2. What do you think about migrating healthcare service to 
cloud? 
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Answer: The rate of adoption of cloud computing technologies is 
rising rapidly and there doesn’t seem to be any signs of it slowing 
down. Cloud Computing quickly brings in natural economies of 
scale with most cloud services provider charging on a pay as you go 
basis thereby eliminating wastage on unused resources. Many 
healthcare organizations embark on cloud migrations to achieve 
scalability, cost-efficiency and higher application performance 
healthcare services. But migrating apps to the cloud is a complex 
process that requires careful planning and deliberation. 
It's essential that healthcare organizations consider all possibilities -- 
both good and bad. Cloud migration issues, such as unexpected 
costs, interoperability, security gaps and unanticipated application 
rework, can create significant obstacles. To help smooth a frequently 
bumpy path, healthcare organizations need to craft a well-thought-
out migration strategy. 
Whether your organization is migrating to the cloud from an in-
house environment, it's important to understand the process and 
temper any exorbitant expectations. And, since not every application 
will benefit from the cloud, make sure a migration is right for your 
organization before diving in. 
 
3. Would system administrators be happy to give up some of 
their control over systems and rely on cloud service providers 
for the support of end users? 
 
Answer: The systems administrator role is perhaps one of the 
earliest in technology, at least as far as the implementation of a 
system goes. In the earliest days of computing, electronic technical 
professionals built prototype computers, and newly minted 
"programmers" wrote logical instructions for these systems. In time, 
the systems administration role owned the installation, 
configuration, operation and tuning of these systems once they went 
into production and use on a larger scale. 
 
The systems administrator has the same concerns and impacts of 
"the cloud" as the DBA and the Systems Architect. They need to 
educate themselves on the options within this new option 
(Knowledge), try a few test solutions out (Experience) and of course 
work with others on various parts of the implementation 
(Coordination). 
 
4. How would departments react to the migration of applications 
and data to cloud service providers? They might not have the 
same level of access to a cloud as they currently do to their 
internal systems, so how would they have to change their 
working practices? 
 
Answer: When departments are migrating towards cloud service 
they usually face many challenges which are; incompatibility issues, 
security and privacy issues, reliability issues, availability issues and 
network connectivity issues etc. So, by underlining these issue it 
seems difficult to migrate from internal systems to cloud but once 
the department staff is trained then they will understand the full 
value of cloud system. For the purpose of staff training department 
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must offer them different certifications, workshop and educate them 
to understand work flow of cloud system. Once the staff is become, 
user friendly with cloud system working practices then they might 
be on the level to take benefits of cloud facilities.  
 
Security  
(Data storage, 
process and 
transfer) 
 
5. What do you think the role of security is/ should be in 
healthcare? 
 
Answer:  Role of security is important to protect patient privacy, 
comply with health care laws, and ensure that only authorized health 
care professionals access the correct data. Some health organizations 
are hesitant to adopt cloud computing because of the complexity of 
structuring cloud computing to comply with the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which regulates how 
health organizations protect private healthcare information. Others 
are resistant to adopting cloud computing due to concerns over 
unauthorized access to data. Patients are not always viewing their 
medical records online due to network security concerns. 
A successful cloud healthcare network must use data security 
measures that comply with HIPAA, prevent unauthorized access, 
and protect authentic patient data. There must be no doubt of the 
authenticity of patient data, which can make the difference in 
effective medical treatment. Both healthcare professionals and 
patients must trust the cloud network security to protect personal 
data for it to work. Effective cloud security will gain this vital trust. 
Challenges of Cloud Security: Effective cloud security must 
address key challenges in the following areas: 
Preventing unauthorized access: It is critical that only authorized 
users’ access data in a healthcare setup. This can be tricky in a 
virtual environment with so many remote users and multiple Wi-Fi 
devices. 
Accessing data safely from mobile devices: Health professionals and 
patients should be able to access data securely from mobile devices 
like cell phones, tablets, or laptops. If network security isn't optimal, 
vulnerable data could be lost or stolen when accessed through an 
unsecured mobile device. 
Protecting databases from malware and attacks: A cloud must have 
a secure database that effectively protects against cyber attacks and 
malware. Some popular security components like open-source 
software, which played a role in the Heart bleed bug breach at 
Community Health Systems, are not the safest options. It is also 
important to have an incident repair and response system in place to 
respond quickly to block any attacks or breaches. 
Preventing data loss: A cloud has to have a good system to prevent 
data loss and a way to retrieve lost data when possible. A cyber-
attack, an encryption error, or a natural disaster are some of the ways 
data could be lost. 
 
6. What is the backup plan for data stored in the cloud? 
 
Answer: Cloud backup, also known as online backup, is a strategy 
for backing up data that involves sending a copy of the data over a 
proprietary or public network to an off-site server. The server is 
usually hosted by a third-party service provider, who charges the 
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backup customer a fee based on capacity, bandwidth or number of 
users.  
 
Online backup systems are typically built around a client software 
application that runs on a schedule determined by the level of 
service the customer has purchased. If the customer has contracted 
for daily backups, for instance, then the application 
collects, compresses, encrypts and transfers data to the service 
provider's servers every 24 hours. To reduce the amount of 
bandwidth consumed and the time it takes to transfer files, the 
service provider might only provide incremental backups after the 
initial full backup. 
Third-party cloud backup has gained popularity with small offices 
and home users because of its convenience. Capital expenditures for 
additional hardware are not required and backups can be run dark, 
which means they can be run automatically without manual 
intervention. 
 
7. Will the data be encrypted in the cloud? How will it processed 
or transferred? 
 
Answer: Yes data will be encrypted in cloud because encryption 
changes data into a secure format that only an authorized user with 
the correct encryption key can access. Data should be encrypted 
when it is in use, in transit, and at rest to make sure that the data is 
unreadable if it is lost or stolen. Split-key encryption provides even 
greater network security because it is protected by two encryption 
keys, which are held by the healthcare organization and the cloud 
service provider. Both keys must be used in order to access data. 
 
8. Will the data be isolated? 
 
Answer: Yes, data Isolation can be seen as a special sort of privacy, 
where the a service should not get in contact with other services, and 
the provider of the Cloud should not know what data are used in the 
service and for what purpose the service is used by the customer. 
 
 
9. Can the data be portable to different cloud provider? 
How long it will take to migrate to another cloud? 
Is there a special tool for exporting data? 
  
Answer: Yes, Data can be portable or migrate to different cloud 
provider, Moreover the migrating time depend the size of the data, 
hardware capacity and network bandwidth. There are also some 
special tools for exporting data from cloud to cloud one of these tool 
is Nava Certus 1.4 (http://www.linkgard.com/blog/cloud-storage-
migration-is-becoming-a-serious-business.html ). Some of cloud to 
cloud migration tactics are listed below; 
 
1. Direct cloud-to-cloud migration: Some providers have direct, 
high-speed connections to other providers. For example, Google and 
TwinStrata have worked together to develop a way to migrate data 
from one cloud to the next using Google’s own high-speed 
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connections, and without any impact on the customer’s network. 
Once the data is moved, it’s a fairly simple exercise to maintain 
access to the data using TwinStrata Cloud Array - without having to 
modify any of your application settings. And in fact, that’s exactly 
what we did for customers such as IAC in the last few weeks. 
2. Cloud compute migration: One of the fundamental advantages 
of using cloud-integrated storage is the ability to spin up the 
software in the cloud. By spinning up your cloud gateway in a cloud 
compute environment, you can do the migration from one cloud to 
the other using without taxing your own network. 
3. Re-point the cache: For some organizations, an on-premise 
transfer is unnecessary. Some of our customers (particularly those 
using cloud for backup or application data) keep a full copy of 
everything they have in the cloud in their local cache. If you’re 
accessing the cloud through a cloud gateway, you should be able to 
just re-point the cache to the new provider, thereby limiting the 
impact on your network to just outgoing traffic. 
4. On-premise transfer: If the amount of data you have in the cloud 
is small, and your corporate network is large, you can bring the data 
back on premise and then send it to the new cloud of your choice. If 
you’re using a cloud enabler such as TwinStrata’s cloud-integrated 
storage software CloudArray, this exercise becomes significantly 
simpler because you can simply migrate the volume to another 
provider, but it can take a toll on your network. 
5. Start fresh: The final option is limited to those customers who 
use cloud storage to back up their on-premise data. A small number 
of organizations with which we’ve worked have elected to start fresh 
with a new cloud provider by copying their on-premise backups to 
the new cloud, Once it is safely migrated, they can then delete the 
data from their existing cloud (or in the case of Nirvanix, just throw 
away the encryption keys so it can’t be accessed). This option is 
viable only if you’re using the cloud for backups and have enough 
onsite copies of your backup to meet your retention policy. 
 
10. Does your cloud service provide data integrity and 
availability? 
 
Answer:  
Cloud Service Data Integrity: Yes, cloud service data Integrity 
should be computed for every document and kept in the database. 
The encryption mechanism used to ensure confidentiality during the 
TCP/IP transmission includes an integrity check that prevents the 
risk of data corruption. A typical integrity check is the use of hashes. 
Hashes can be included in a signature to ensure authenticity. In such 
a case, the signature contains the document hash encrypted with the 
sender private key and the public key to allow decryption. It also 
points to the certification authority. The key used to encrypt the data 
should be stored (encrypted) with the data itself. If data has been 
modified intentionally, or accidentally, data decryption would then 
fail. This protection also prevents the sending of corrupted data to 
clinicians and other users. 
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Cloud Service Availability: In cloud service availability any 
service or application should start with a secure and reliable storage 
mechanism: 
 
 • The cloud service provider should maintain at least two copies of 
ingested data, thus reducing the risk o+9f data loss. One of the two 
copies is made on removable media so it can be stored at another 
location—in case a disaster impacts the data center. The system 
should ensure that the two copies are permanently synchronized.  
• Database is stored on RAID-10 (1+0) disk system. RAID-10 
provides high availability and performance when there is a need to 
reconstruct data in the case of disk failure.  
• Data is stored on RAID-6. While this type of RAID is slower to 
reconstruct in case of disk failure, it offers excellent reliability with 
a higher ratio of usable storage/physical storage.  
 
One of the often overlooked areas of data security is authentication 
procedures. It is not enough to maintain two copies of patient data—
the cloud service provider must also have a validation process that 
ensures that each copy of the data maintains its integrity. Damaged 
files must be able to be detected and reconstructed. Responsibility 
for maintaining data integrity should be clearly defined as part of 
any contract with a service provider. 
 
11. How the original data be deleted? Is it actually erased when 
contract terminated. 
 
Answer: Data deletion is also of prime importance when 
terminating the contract with the provider. An essential point is that 
data that has to be deleted by the user because he or she no longer 
needs it or may no longer process it for another reason is also 
deleted by the provider and no more copies of data are available. 
This can lead to problems, in particular in connection with backups 
that are created by the provider if these contain data belonging to a 
number of his customers and targeted deletion of individual data 
items proves financially unreasonable or technically inappropriate in 
terms of feasibility.  
 
As far as the Data Retention policy of the cloud service provider is 
concerned, the law against which the state’s jurisdiction falls into is 
also of prime importance. For example, The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 mandates the retention of 
data for 6 year. Once, the data exceeds the specified period of 
retention, it’s critical to ensure its safe disposal. The Federal Trade 
Commission’s FACTA Disposal Rule mandates that the data be 
cleaned up should it be deemed of no use. Another example would 
be The General Data Protection Regulation proposed by the 
European Commission which provisions for a “Right to Erasure”.   
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12. Is it monitored? From provider to ensure acceptable use and 
customer  
Can the data be Non-repudiation? 
 
Answer: Non repudiation of data over the cloud can be ensured in 
several ways. The easiest of which would be to determine the proof 
of data integrity. This may be accomplished via the checking of data 
hash. Alternatively, the method of using Digital Certificates may 
also be used to ensure the origin of a particular data stream and its 
authenticity. 
 
Security  
(Access control) 
 
13. Does your cloud provider provide management access control 
within healthcare? 
 
14.does your cloud provider have “backdoor” for maintenance, 
support and services 
 
 
User/patient access control in the healthcare 
Security 
(procedure) 
 
15.Does your cloud provider provide “Auditing” 
 
Answer: Yes, because by agreeing on information and audit rights, 
the user establishes the opportunity to verify that the obligations 
entered into by the provider are being fulfilled. Depending on the 
sector to which the user belongs, such rights also have to be 
provided for auditing companies and regulatory authorities to whose 
control the user is subject. 
 
Certification (customer to check is it relevant to their work or not) 
and does it follow Personal Identifiable Information(PII) 
ISO/IEC 27018:2014  
 
16. Countermeasures- how does your cloud provider react about 
security breach? 
Answer: In general, they follow these steps to reduce the risk 
of suffering security breaches: 
1. Authenticate all people accessing the cloud. 
2. Frame all access permissions so users have access only to 
the applications and data that they’ve been granted specific 
permission to access. 
3. Authenticate all software running on any computer — and 
all changes to such software. 
4. Formalize the process of requesting permission to access 
data or applications. 
5. Monitor all network activity and log all unusual activity. 
6. Log all user activity and program activity and analyze it for 
unexpected behavior. 
7. Encrypt, up to the point of use, all valuable data that needs 
extra protection. 
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8. Regularly check the network for vulnerabilities in all 
software exposed to the Internet or any external users. 
 
17. Testing ( cloud provider  what kind of security tests)? 
 
Answer: Cloud Testing uses cloud infrastructure for software 
testing. Organizations pursuing testing in general and load, 
performance testing and production service monitoring in particular 
are challenged by several problems like limited test budget, meeting 
deadlines, high costs per test, large number of test cases, and little or 
no reuse of tests and geographical distribution of users add to the 
challenges. Moreover ensuring high quality service delivery and 
avoiding outages requires testing in one's datacenter, outside the 
data-center, or both. Cloud Testing is the solution to all these 
problems. Effective unlimited storage, quick availability of the 
infrastructure with scalability, flexibility and availability of 
distributed testing environment reduce the execution time of testing 
of large applications and lead to cost-effective solutions. 
 
Types of Cloud Testing 
Stress 
Stress Test is used to determine ability of application to maintain a 
certain level of effectiveness beyond breaking point. It is essential 
for any application to work even under excessive stress and maintain 
stability. Stress testing assures this by creating peak loads using 
simulators. But the cost of creating such scenarios is enormous. 
Instead of investing capital in building on-premise testing 
environments, cloud testing offers an affordable and scalable 
alternative. 
Load 
Load testing of an application involves creation of heavy user traffic, 
and measuring its response. There is also a need to tune the 
performance of any application to meet certain standards. However a 
number of tools are available for that purpose. 
Performance 
Finding out thresholds, bottlenecks & limitations is a part 
of performance testing. For this, testing performance under a 
particular workload is necessary. By using cloud testing, it is easy to 
create such environment and vary the nature of traffic on-demand. 
This effectively reduces cost and time by simulating thousands of 
geographically targeted users. 
Functional 
Functional testing of both internet and non-internet applications can 
be performed using cloud testing. The process of verification against 
specifications or system requirements is carried out in the cloud 
instead of on-site software testing. 
Compatibility 
Using cloud environment, instances of different Operating Systems 
can be created on demand, making compatibility testing effortless. 
Browser performance 
To verify application's support for various browser types and 
performance in each type can be accomplished with ease. Various 
tools enable automated website testing from the cloud. 
Latency 
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Cloud testing is utilized to measure the latency between the action 
and the corresponding response for any application after deploying it 
on cloud. 
 
18.If there is breach of security will the provider provide a 
notification to customers or not? 
Detection 
Key management 
Security level 
Incident 
management 
 
18.How security incident are dealt with?   
Does cloud provider provide: Response? 
Logging? 
Reporting? 
Forensics? 
 
19.Is there a certain mechanism to notify customers about data 
breaches or information security incident?  
 
 
Privacy 
 
20.Non-disclosure? Can provider use or access the data? 
 
Answer: A non-disclosure agreement (NDA) is a signed formal 
agreement in which one party agrees to give a second party 
confidential information about its business or products and the 
second party agrees not to share this information with anyone else 
for a specified period of time. Non-disclosure agreements are 
common in technology companies where products are sometimes 
jointly developed. (In this case, the non-disclosure agreement is 
often mutual or two-way.) An NDA is also sometimes used when a 
company seeks venture capital from potential financial backers as a 
way to make sure that proprietary secrets or ideas are not stolen or 
leaked to someone else by the prospective investors.  
 
Hybird clouds 
 
21.Does your cloud provider rely on outsourcing some of the 
services? (may rely on the services from multiple provider) 
 
 
Technical 
 
22. Does your cloud provider face or likely to some of the 
following technical issues?if yes, how it deals with? 
Resource exhaustion (under or over provisioning) 
Isolation failure 
Cloud provider malicious insider- abuse of high privilege roles 
Management interface compromise (manipulation, availability of 
infrastructure) 
Intercepting data in transit 
Insecure or ineffective deletion of data 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
Economic denial of service (EDOS) 
Loss of Cryptographic Keys 
Compromise service engine 
Conflicts between customer hardening procedures and cloud 
environment 
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Legal 
 
23.Does your cloud provider clarify the status of the legal issues 
for instance: 
Risk from changes of jurisdiction 
Data protection risks 
Licensing risks 
 
24. Does your cloud provider follow Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act(HIPAA)? 
 
Answer:  Yes, because HIPAA is a U.S. Federal law that was 
designed to protect patient privacy, and does so by mandating and 
enforcing strict privacy and security rules over how medical 
information is collected, handled, used, disclosed and protected. 
While the HIPAA Privacy rule pertains to patients’ privacy and 
rights for their personal health information, the HIPAA Security 
rule, focuses on assuring the availability, confidentiality, and 
integrity, of electronic protected health information through a series 
of administrative, physical and technical safeguards. 
  
25. Does your cloud provider follow Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)? 
Risks not 
specific to the 
cloud 
 
26. Does your cloud provider face or likely to some of the 
following issues? 
Network breaks 
Network management (network congestion/mis-connection/non-
optimal use) 
Modifying network traffic 
Privilege escalation 
Social engineering attacks (impersonation) 
Loss or compromise of operational logs 
Loss or compromise of security logs (manipulation of forensic 
investigation) 
Backups lost, stolen 
Non Cloud-Specific Network-Related Technical Failures or Attacks 
Natural disasters 
 
Further 
recommendation 
27.Do you recommend anyone who we can speak to about the 
areas we mentioned above? (For example, those dealing with 
Information Governance,  Health Information systems, or cloud 
provider) 
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A.9 Interview Transcript with CC07 
 
Feedback from Gartner representative via e-mail   
The short answer to many of these questions is that if it is a private internal cloud you 
will have control over policies, procedures and design, thus it would be the design 
decisions as to whether or not you chose to create and store audit logs, what to do in 
the event of a security incident, an attack or a breach will necessarily have different 
responses. 
 
If using public cloud then you are more restricted to what the provider either offers or 
is willing to negotiate on.  For example some will allow government officials to inspect 
and audit the data centre, some will not. 
Specific answers below in Red. 
Category Question list 
Management 
perspective  
1. What do you think about migrating some services to cloud? (for 
example ROP or healthcare services) 
This is becoming the defacto operating model across many parts of 
the world.  Many governments are now enacting “cloud first” 
policies, that is to say that government agencies are expected to use 
cloud computing in the first instance, and only not use it if there is a 
strong business case against.  Simply saying security issues exist is 
no longer sufficient, as many would argue that public cloud from 
the big providers is MORE secure than many government agency 
data centers. 
 
2. Would system administrators be happy to give up some of their 
control over systems and rely on cloud service providers for the 
support of end users? 
Asking someone to give up part of their job is always difficult and 
human nature shows that a defensive position is often taken as 
people do not like change.  That said many System Administrators 
are finding their roles developing, as they become cloud brokers.  
Responsible for sourcing and integrating the different cloud 
solutions being used. 
 
3. How would departments react to the migration of applications 
and data to cloud service providers? They might not have the same 
level of access to a cloud as they currently do to their internal 
systems, so how would they have to change their 
working practices? 
They do have the same level of access to systems and data to USE 
the application.  Many departments welcome use of cloud based 
applications as they frequently offer more modern capabilities, 
frequent upgrades keeping the functionality current and they are not 
waiting on IT to deliver this.  You need to be careful that these 
upgrades come at a pace that the organization can cope with in 
terms of training staff in the new functionality. 
Security  4. What do you think the role of security is/ should be in  ROP? 
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(Data storage, 
process and 
transfer) 
 
I can’t answer what it is, I am not familiar, but what it should be I 
could suggest the following. 
• Setting policies and standards 
• Evaluating solutions and vendors 
• Auditing security and investigating data breaches and 
attacks if warranted. 
• Contributing to the classification of data and ensuring 
APPROPRIATE safeguards are in place for each level.  
This does not mean treat all data at the highest level which 
is what tends to happen as people seek to protect 
themselves from blame. 
• Openly discuss risk management NOT risk elimination. 
 
5. What is the backup plan for data stored in the cloud? 
If it is your cloud it depends on what you decide, if it is in the 
public cloud it depends on the vendor’s policy and what you are 
willing to pay/negotiate for.  Do not assume because it is in the 
cloud it offers DR capabilities, but many do use the cloud for 
exactly this purpose. 
 
6. Will the data be encrypted in the cloud? How will it processed 
or transferred? 
If it is a private cloud it is your choice.  If a public cloud that 
depends on the vendor and what service you are buying. 
 
7. Will the data be isolated? 
Your cloud your choice as to the degree of separation.  The public 
cloud offers choices, multi-tenant where the separation is carried 
out at the software level and bars one user from seeing anothers.  
You can have single tenant where the hardware is dedicated to one 
organization offering physical separation. Finally you may choose 
to use a community of government cloud type model where 
different agencies or departments many share the same 
infrastructure and share data more easily but still in line with access 
rights, privileges’and agreements. 
 
8. Can the data be portable to different cloud provider? 
How long it will take to migrate to another cloud? 
Is there a special tool for exporting data? 
Yes data can be migrated but this can prove difficult if the software 
is proprietary and or the vendor/ supplier does not cooperate.  As 
too how long, this depends on many factors such as the means used 
to transfer the data, bandwidth etc. as well as the amount to data to 
be transferred. 
Tools depend on which systems and methodology is being used. 
 
9. Does your cloud service provide data integrity and availability? 
Generally yes although this should be checked, often the public 
cloud has higher reliability and availability than internal cloud or 
data center operations, as this impacts their global business. 
 
10. How the original data be deleted? Is it actually erased when 
contract terminated.  
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Some providers offer different levels of guarantee but it is a 
difficult one to be absolutely sure about, especially if you want 
multiple sites and back-ups to be used.  You can in the end only 
ensure that as far as you can.  It cannot always be guaranteed 
internally… 
 
11. Is it monitored? From provider to ensure acceptable use and 
customer  
This depends on the service and the application, if yours it is your 
choice to what level, if from a vendor check with them what they do 
but they are likely only to do from their perspective.  Is the 
customer operating in line with any contractual agreements. 
 
Can the data be Non-repudiation? 
This depends on the service and application again and what you are 
prepared to pay.  This is critical to maintain the value of digital data 
in archives for long-term archive storage and for criminal justice 
solutions. 
 
Security  
(Access control) 
 
12. Does the cloud provider provide management access control 
within sensitive data such as personal or health details? 
Access control is usually the domain of the customer organization 
and the VAST majority of security breaches are on the part of the 
organization and not the (public) cloud provider. If this is a private 
cloud then what is provided is down to the design of that service. 
 
Personal data and health data are normally protected and will have 
the most rigorous access controls applied. 
 
13. Does your cloud provider have “backdoor” for maintenance, 
support and services  
Again differentiate between public and private.  Private cloud – that 
is a decision for you.  Public- the provider does normally have 
requirements to access systems rather than data, increasingly data is 
encrypted with the customer holding the key, and so “backdoor” 
access does not imply access to data. 
Patient access to health records is becoming increasingly the norm 
and this is controlled by strong authentication processes.  
User/patient access control in the healthcare. 
 
Security 
(procedure) 
 
14. Does cloud provider provide “Auditing” 
Public cloud providers vary their terms and conditions as to what 
they do and don’t allow, if this is important then it would be part of 
your criteria when selecting a supplier. 
 
Certification (customer to check is it relevant to their work or not) 
and does it follow Personal Identifiable Information(PII) 
ISO/IEC 27018:2014  
Not sure what this is asking? 
 
15. Counter measures- how does your cloud provider react about 
security breach? 
All vendors have their laid down procedures, and this would be for 
negotiation when procuring a service.  But this control is one of 
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things that differentiates on-premise from public cloud.  The 
security challenges differ, and one of the key differences is how 
processes change.  Incident response is a good example.  If your on-
premise email server gets hacked, you can go to the datacenter and 
unplug it.  If your O365 account gets hacked, you have to contact 
MSFT, pass their authentication test (prove that you have the 
authority to take a drastic action like shutting down email), and wait 
for them to process the change.  All that takes a lot longer.  Other 
processes are different too – like change management.  So security 
is different in the two environments. 
 
16.Testing ( cloud provider  what kind of security tests) 
The large scale providers test their services in ways that most 
governments cannot begin too.  A recent study returned figures 
from cloud users saying that 61% of them believed that cloud was 
now at least as or MORE secure than on premise. 
 
But this would be for you to discuss with your chosen vendors 
which they may not reveal, as doing so in itself could create a 
security risk? 
 
17. If there is breach of security will the provider provide a 
notification to customers or not? 
Most if not all vendors will inform the clients of any potential or 
actual security breach. 
 
Detection 
Key management 
Security level 
Incident 
management 
 
18. How security incident are dealt with?   
Does cloud provider provide: Response? 
Logging? 
Reporting? 
Forensics? 
Security in the big providers is taken very seriously indeed, they 
will certainly investigate as a matter of course security threats.  
Note that companies such as Microsoft play an active role in 
working with police forces to identify and remove threats where 
possible.  Security incidents will be logged and reported, the extent 
of any forensic examination will be based upon the seriousness of 
the incident and the potential threat.   The issue remains that the 
biggest threat is from poor controls within the client organization 
themselves, weak access controls not enforcing policies etc. sharing 
of passwords etc.  If you keep systems in house then these problems 
remain. 
 
For example Apple took a barrage of complaints for the celebrity 
photo scandal last year.  “Cloud” was at fault, it was not, the fault 
lay with individuals who had set up weak passwords and these were 
compromised.  Nothing to do with the underlying cloud 
infrastructure. 
 
19. Is there a certain mechanism to notify customers about data 
breaches or information security incident?  
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Vendors vary in their approach and this would be one area where 
you may be able negotiate a better response than normal depending 
on your requirement. 
 
Privacy 
 
20. Non-disclosure? Can provider use or access the data? 
In most cases no they can neither access nor use, but examine in 
detail the terms and conditions issued by the vendor. 
 
Data minimization –Not sure to what this refers? 
 
Hybrid clouds 
 
21. Does your cloud provide rely on outsourcing some of the 
services? (may rely on the services from multiple provider) 
Hybrid cloud refers to the mix of internal private and public cloud, 
not generally the sub-contracting of some services.  However some 
SaaS providers allow the customer to choose where the service may 
be hosted, such as on Azure or AWS or indeed a hybrid situation 
between the cloud and on-premise. 
 
Again check with your chosen provider the architecture they 
propose to use for any given solution or offering. 
 
Technical 
 
22. Does your cloud provider face or likely to some of the 
following technical issues? if yes, how it deals with? 
Resource exhaustion (under or over provisioning) 
Isolation failure 
Cloud provider malicious insider- abuse of high privilege roles 
Management interface compromise (manipulation, availability of 
infrastructure) 
Intercepting data in transit 
Insecure or ineffective deletion of data 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
Economic denial of service (EDOS) 
Loss of Cryptographic Keys 
Compromise service engine 
Conflicts between customer hardening procedures and cloud 
environment 
I am unable to provide detailed answers to this list of questions and 
in any event the answers may vary between Vendors.  But cloud is 
scalable and under provision is not the concern of the client, nor is 
over provision as you only pay for what you use. 
 
Data in transit is a shared responsibility with the client and 
encryption needs to be agreed. 
 
Legal 
 
23.Does your cloud provider clarify the status of the legal issues 
for instance: 
Risk from changes of jurisdiction 
Data protection risks 
Licensing risks 
They will clarify who is responsible for what and will depend on 
what service is being taken,, For example IaaS licensing will be 
included up to the point of the operating system, where the client 
becomes responsible. 
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24. Does cloud provider follow Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA)? 
Microsoft Azure in the USA is accredited to HIPAA standards 
 
25. Does your cloud provider follow Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)? 
You must satisfy yourself of this when choosing a provider. 
 
Risks not specific 
to the cloud 
 
26. Does your cloud provider face or likely to some of the 
following issues? 
Network breaks 
Network management (network congestion/mis-connection/non-
optimal use) 
Modifying network traffic 
Privilege escalation 
Social engineering attacks (impersonation) 
Loss or compromise of operational logs 
Loss or compromise of security logs (manipulation of forensic 
investigation) 
Backups lost, stolen 
Non Cloud-Specific Network-Related Technical Failures or Attacks 
Natural disasters 
Yes of course they are subject to the same risks as everyone else, 
however they go to great lengths to ensure the data centers being 
used are not in flood plains or earthquake fault lines. But they take a 
great deal of effort to minimise them and are subject to the same 
political interference that many government agencies can be about 
the placing of facilities or privilege escalation etc. 
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A.10 Interview Transcript with Undersecretary for Planning 
Affairs 
 
For the purpose of this research, cloud computing is defined as “a technology model 
which allow patient to view his/her health records online  with all resources 
application, software, processing power, data storage, backup facilities, development 
tools . Literally everything is delivered as a set of services via the Internet” (Aljabre, 
2012).   
Meeting main 
To understand manager’s and healthcare providers attitude towards migrating 
healthcare services to cloud computing. It considers migrating process from 
management, technical, legal and security prospective. In addition, it focus on cloud 
security checklist any healthcare provider would like to consider before migrate their 
healthcare services to cloud.   
Meeting Questions 
Category Question list 
Role in the 
organization  
1. What are the roles you play in the healthcare 
organization(s)? Give more details about each role. 
H.Dr. Ali Talib Al Hinai Undersecretary for Planning Affairs in 
Ministry of Health  
Management 
perspective  
2.What do you think about migrating healthcare service to 
cloud? 
Ministry of health started to use cloud computing as infrastructure 
as a service by hosting the ministry website in cloud. The online 
system provides various services to patient but in different phases. 
For in example apply for tender or discharged summary. Also, 
allow patient to book and cancel appoint. But a patient cannot view 
his medical record online for security concerns. There is a need for 
organized mechanism and low for organizing viewing patient 
record online. In UK it is not allowed for patient to view their 
medical records online. In U.S it is not allowed too but in Canada 
patient can have access to his medical records online. Each country 
differ than other country according to rules and regulations. With us 
here in Oman, it is not allowed to view patient medical records 
except for authorized people. Clinical pharmacy cannot view all 
patient records, and administrator staff cannot view patient records. 
Each staff according to their roles and responsibilities. The only 
person can view patient medical record is the consultant if the 
patient under his name of treatment people. He can view the 
treatment plan for the patient, any surgical conducted and 
medication. However, the consultant cannot view the administrative 
work such as budget for the hospital or any financial issues.  
 
Given healthcare scenario about a lady from Germany went to US 
to attend a conference but her taxi was hit by another car and she 
was not unconscious in the emergency unit. The doctors prescribe a 
medicine she has allergic too. Luckily the doctors swap her 
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smartphone which indicate her medical history hence, the doctors 
changed the medicine which cloud have her killed.  
 
Dr. Ali, there is a different to put medical records online or to put it 
in cloud. The risk is too high in cloud. Using ALSHIFA system 
there is an internal server in ministry of health. The risk will be 
internal but when you put it in cloud there will be external risks 
from hackers from anywhere. It is fine to provide services online to 
book or cancel appointment even if it hacked by someone it is not 
major concerns. But having patient file is top secret. If you put 
patient file in cloud there is high risk of it being hacked. The cloud 
provide good services except for patient file.  
 
ALSHIFA provide different services for citizens and residents 
except of patient medical records. Currently the citizens and 
residents can use there ID card to give hospital or health center 
authority to view his medical record when he need treatment. At 
later stage there will be central database which unify patient file in 
one place.  
 
There are two servers one in ministry of health and the other one in 
ITA as a back up. This represents disaster recovery plan. Currently 
we are working on enhancing the security rules among all hospitals 
but all sectors have to apply ALSHIFA systems within their sector.  
 
Will the codes in al Shifa a system is knowing internationally in 
different country.  
 
Yes of course the codes used within AlSHIFA is globally used.  
 
Technology 
importance order  
How would you order the following points in the technology factor 
according to importance?  
 
• CIA-----5 
• Complex and Cost----4 
• Internet based services ---3 
• Privacy----1 
• Data Security ----2 
• Provider Control ----6 
• Business application -----7 
• Social networking-----8 
 
Challenges in 4 
factors 
 
What do you think of Human challenges  
Medical team tend to resist change and new information technology 
 
Technology Challenges  
CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability), Complex and cost, 
internet based services, privacy, provider control and business 
applications. 
 
Organizational Challenges 
Will top management support cloud computing migration? 
Is there adequate resources to migrate healthcare services to cloud 
computing? 
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Will the perceived benefits of utilizing cloud computing cut down 
operating costs in healthcare? 
 
Environmental Challenges  
Government policy 
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12 Appendix B: Questionnaires 
 
B.1 Questionnaire Justification  
 
Question Statement Justification 
Part # 1 Personal Information 
1.Nationality:   
2.Gender: 
3.Age:  
4.Education Degree:   
5. Designation at work: 
The first part seeks information 
about demographic data about 
the participant 
 
Question Statement Justification Sources 
Part # 2  
1. Do you have IT Experience? 
2. Have you ever heard of cloud 
computing?      
3. Do you know the meaning of 
cloud computing? 
4. Do you use cloud computing 
services today? 
5. Do you think cloud 
computing is safe? 
 
Those questions seeks 
information about 
participant awareness of 
IT experience in general 
and cloud computing as 
service in particular and 
if they think it is safe to 
use or not.  
Wijaya et al. 
(2014) 
 
Question Statement Justification Sources 
Part # 3: Internet based Services 
I1.Social Networking Sites e.g. 
Facebook, MySpace and 
Friendster.  
I2.Professional Social 
Networking sites e.g. LinkedIn 
and Xing. 
I3.Online media storage e.g. 
Flickr and YouTube. 
I4.Internet-based email e.g. 
Gmail and Hotmail. 
I5.Online Office Suites e.g. 
GoogleDocs and Prezi.  
I6.Business Applications e.g. 
Salesforce.com, Spendvision and 
Insight.  
Those questions to 
investigate participant 
knowledge and use of 
internet based services 
within their daily life 
and work environment 
on Likert scale from Use 
Frequently to Never 
heard of.  
The researcher added 
extra column for I do 
not know as an option 
for participant if they are 
not aware of the topic 
Wijaya et al. 
(2014) 
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I7.Platform services e.g. Google 
Apps Engine and Microsoft 
Azure.  
I8.Infrastructure services e.g. 
Amazon EC2 and Amazon S3. 
 
Question Statement Justification Sources 
Part # 4: Privacy 
P1.You believe it is fine to share 
your personal details (e.g name, 
gender, material status, date of 
birth, contact number, home 
address, e-mail) online. 
P2.You believe it is fine to share 
your business details (job 
information, business address, 
phone number, e-mail) online. 
P3.You believe it is fine to share 
your education details online 
P4.You believe it is fine to share 
your medical information online  
P5.You believe it is fine to share 
your credit card details online 
P6.You believe it is fine to share 
your (e.g. photo, video’s) online. 
 
Those questions seeks 
information concerning 
participant’s perceptions  
of privacy in their 
personal details, business 
details, education details, 
medical information and 
credit card details online.  
It intend to know 
participant’s perceptions 
of cloud security and 
privacy threats on Likert 
scale for Strongly 
Disagree to Strongly 
Agree  as well as adding 
I do not know option. 
Wijaya et al. (2014) 
 
Question Statement Justification Sources 
Part # 5: Human 
H1: Among your peers, you are 
among the first who try out new 
information technologies. 
H2: You like to experiment with 
new information technologies. 
H3: Employees (and patients) 
are enthusiastic about the cloud 
computing technology adoption 
in healthcare services.  
H4: Employees (and patients) 
are ready to accept the changes 
caused by the cloud computing 
technology adoption in 
healthcare services. 
Those questions 
concerning participant’s 
perceptions whether they 
are willing and ready to 
adopt new technology or 
not. Human play an 
important role in the 
successful 
implementation of new 
information technology in 
the delivery of healthcare 
services if they have a 
positive attitude.  
Lian et al., (2014) 
 
 
Appendix B  
 
380 
 
Question Statement Justification Sources 
Part # 6 Technological  
T1: Cloud computing in 
Healthcare services should 
enforce security controls (such 
as the cryptographic system) to 
protect patient sensitive 
information. 
T2: In the current healthcare 
systems, unauthorized 
employees are prohibited from 
accessing patient’s/ medical 
information resources. 
T3: Employees follow 
healthcare policy and regulations 
when releasing or transmitting 
medical information. 
T4: In the current healthcare 
systems, healthcare service has 
well implemented security 
practices to protect important 
medical information from being 
stolen by malicious intrusions 
(such as break-in, Trojans, and 
spy-wares).  
T5: In the current healthcare 
systems, information security 
measures are implemented in 
healthcare services to prevent 
sensitive information from 
unauthorized disclosure. 
T6: In the current healthcare 
systems, healthcare provider 
constantly updates information 
resources and regularly creates 
information backups. 
T7: In the current healthcare 
systems, healthcare provider 
regularly conducts risk 
assessment and updates security 
plans to reduce the probability of 
loss of information. 
T8: When acquiring important 
information from the 
information sources or business 
partners, employees will store it 
into the hospital’s database. 
T9: Healthcare provider has 
security controls (such as change 
Technological entails the 
internal and external 
influences of adopting 
specific information 
technology. Those 
questions seeks 
information concerning 
participant’s perceptions  
in adopting cloud 
computing as services 
and what are the critical 
key factors in 
information security such 
as; confidentially, 
integrity, availability, 
data security, complex, 
cost and compatibility 
which might influence 
the decision to adopt 
cloud computing or not. 
Lian et al., (2014) 
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management procedures) in 
place to prevent unauthorized 
information changes (creation, 
alternation, and deletion). 
T10: The database is 
periodically reconciled and 
regularly maintained in hospitals 
to increase the accuracy and 
reliability of information. 
T11: Healthcare provider pays 
attentions to lower down the 
probability of information 
system breakdown and 
information service disruption. 
T12: There are well established 
information access control 
procedures in hospitals, to make 
sure that for any particular 
information resource only 
authenticated users with right 
privileges can access such 
resource. 
T13: In the current healthcare 
systems, a legitimate user with 
business needs can access 
hospital information at any time 
and at any place. 
T14: Cloud computing 
technology provides a secure 
channel for transferring medical 
data across different sites.  
T15: When using cloud-
computing technology may 
cause your medical data to be 
stolen. 
T16: You do not think it is safe 
to use cloud-computing 
technology in healthcare because 
of security concerns. 
T17: You believe by using cloud 
computing in healthcare there is 
a significant risk of data loss. 
T18: You believe by using cloud 
computing in healthcare there is 
risk of data being misused by 
cloud computing provider 
T19: You believe by using cloud 
computing in healthcare there is 
risk of unauthorized data access 
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T20:You believe by using cloud 
computing in healthcare there is 
risk of unauthorised data 
manipulation i.e. data fraud 
T21: You believe by using cloud 
computing in healthcare there is 
risk of data exposure to other 
users of the cloud service 
T22: You believe by using cloud 
computing in healthcare there is 
risk of losing control over data 
location. 
T23: You believe by using cloud 
computing in healthcare there is 
risk of data theft via external 
attacks such as hacking 
T24: You believe by using cloud 
computing in healthcare there is 
risk of data being accessed by 
government departments outside 
of healthcare. 
T25: The skills required to use 
cloud in healthcare are too 
complex for the most of people. 
T26: Learning to use cloud 
applications in healthcare is too 
time consuming. 
T27: It is difficult to transfer 
current healthcare systems to 
cloud computing platform. 
T28: It is complex to develop 
Cloud Computing applications 
in healthcare. 
T29: It is complex to maintain 
Cloud Computing platform in 
healthcare. 
T30: Adopting cloud technology 
in healthcare is compatible with 
current healthcare services 
practices. 
T31: Adopting cloud technology 
is compatible with hospital’s 
core values and goals. 
T32: Adopting cloud technology 
is compatible with current 
information infrastructure in the 
hospitals. 
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T33: The cost of establishing 
Cloud technology in healthcare 
services is far greater than the 
expected benefits. 
T34: The cost of maintaining 
Cloud technology in healthcare 
services is likely to be higher 
than maintaining the current 
system. 
T35: The cost of Cloud 
technology user training in 
healthcare services is likely to be 
high. 
 
Question Statement Justification Sources 
Part # 7 : Organisational  
O1: Adopting cloud computing 
technology in healthcare services 
can improve the collaboration 
and communication between 
professionals involved in the 
patient treatment plan. 
O2: Adopting cloud computing 
technology in healthcare services 
can reduce the operating costs 
O3: Cloud computing technology 
can provide more timely access 
to patient information. 
O4: Top managers are likely to 
support the adoption of cloud 
computing technology in 
healthcare services. 
O5: Top managers are likely to 
provide sufficient resources to 
adopt cloud technology in 
healthcare services. 
O6: Top managers are likely to 
understand the benefits of cloud 
technology in healthcare 
services. 
O7:  Top managers are likely to 
encourage the development of 
healthcare services using Cloud 
Computing.  
O8: Hospital have sufficient IT 
infrastructure to support the 
development of cloud computing 
This part for healthcare 
professional only as the 
questions seeks 
information concerning 
their perceptions in 
terms of what factors 
might affect hospital 
intention to adopt new 
information systems 
technology.  Some 
variables might be 
relative advantage if 
adopting cloud 
computing can reduce 
the operating costs and 
increase the relative 
operational benefits for a 
given hospital, benefits 
for adopting cloud 
computing in healthcare 
services. 
In addition, Adequate 
resources; 
the adoption of cloud 
computing technology is 
usually a large project 
and a huge undertaking 
for hospitals. If a given 
hospital has a sufficient 
budget, adequate human 
resource support, ample 
time, and good top 
manager’s involvement, 
Chang et al., 
(2007) 
Lian et al., (2014) 
Singh et al., (2014)   
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technology in healthcare 
services.  
O9: Hospital have enough 
human resources to develop 
cloud computing technology in 
healthcare services. 
O10: Hospital have enough time 
to develop cloud-computing 
technology in healthcare 
services. 
O11: Hospital have enough 
budget to develop cloud-
computing technology in 
healthcare services.  
O12: Adopting cloud computing 
technology can improve hospital 
image and expertise. 
O13: Adopting cloud computing 
technology can improve internal 
efficiency. 
O14: Adopting cloud computing 
technology can improve 
healthcare service quality. 
O15: Adopting cloud computing 
technology can improve the 
relationship between hospital and 
patient. 
O16: Adopting cloud computing 
technology can provide 24x7 
worldwide accessibility to 
medical records. 
O17: Adopting cloud computing 
technology will reduce duplicate 
patient tests. 
O18: Adopting cloud computing 
technology can reduce time 
needed for doctors to access the 
patient treatment plan. 
O19: Adopting cloud computing 
technology can increase health 
research and collaboration 
between various healthcare 
providers.  
O20: Adopting cloud computing 
technology can improve the 
reliability of IT resources to 
avoid server break down or data 
loss. 
then the adopting of 
cloud computing 
technology will be met 
in a positive manner 
 
The Top management 
support which refers to 
whether or not the 
executives understand 
the nature and functions 
of cloud computing 
technology and therefore 
fully support the 
development of it. 
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Question Statement Justification Sources 
Part # 8 Environmental 
 
E1: Healthcare cloud computing 
development is a key priority for the 
government. 
E2: The government should develop 
Electronic Medical Records using cloud 
computing. 
E3: Training courses on how to use cloud 
computing technology in healthcare should 
be provided by the government. 
E4: High quality of training programs will 
be provided by the Cloud provider. 
E5: High quality of training programs will 
be provided by the Hospitals. 
E6: High quality of ongoing technical 
support will be provided by the Cloud 
provider. 
This part for 
healthcare 
professional only 
as the questions 
seeks  as the 
questions seeks 
information 
concerning 
healthcare 
professional 
perceptions in 
terms of 
government 
policies have a 
positive impact on 
hospitals trying to 
adopt new 
information 
systems 
technology or not.  
Chang et al., 
(2007) 
Lian et al., 
(2014) 
Singh et al., 
(2014 
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B.2 Public Questionnaire  
 
Questionnaire: Perception of Security using Cloud Computing in the Delivery 
 of Healthcare Services (Public) 
This questionnaire has been developed for a research purpose only and used to 
evaluate the Perception of Security using Cloud Computing in the delivery of 
Healthcare Services. The researcher is a PhD student at Cardiff University, United 
Kingdom. All information provided will remain strictly confidential.  
Thank you for your participation and Co-operation 
For the purpose of this research, cloud computing is defined as “a technology 
model which allow patient to view his/her health records online  with all resources 
application, software, processing power, data storage, backup facilities, development 
tools . Literally everything is delivered as a set of services via the Internet” (Aljabre, 
2012).  I will be grateful if you could spend 20 to 30 minutes on answering the 
following questionnaire.  
 
 ،يتديس /يديس ةزيزعلا يتايحت 
ملاب فيراك هعماج يف هاروتكد هبلاط انالا ةكلمو ةدحتم نملاا موهفم" لوح نايبتسا ءارجإ دوأ
حلا مادختساب اهنأب ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا فيرعت متي ثحبلا اذه ضرغل .ةيحصلا تامدخلا ميدقت يف ةيباحسلا ةبسو
 دراوملا تاقيبطت عيمج عم تنرتنلاا ىلع ةيبطلا تلاجسلا ضرعب ضيرملل حمست يتلا ايجولونكتلا جذومن
لا هوقو جماربلاو ةجلاعم نيزختو ءيش لك ميلست متي رخا ىنعمب .ةيمنتلا تاودأو ةيطايتحلاا خسنلاو ،تانايبلا
 هحاتلأ اريثك هنتمم نوكأس .تنرتنلاا ربع تامدخلا نم هعومجم لكش ىلع20-30  ىلع ةباجلإل هقيقد
يلاتلا نايبتسلاا 
Aim: 
The aim of this questionnaire is to identify stakeholders’ perceptions of information 
security in the national cloud-based health record infrastructure provided by the 
Omani Ministry of Health. Also to understand how to attain the right balance 
between Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) of medical data in a cloud-
based health record.  
Part 1: Personal Information 
Nationality:  [  ] Omani  [  ] Saudi  [ ] Emirati [ ] 
Bahraini 
  [  ] Qatari  [  ] Kuwait    [ ] Other Specify 
……………..  
Gender:  
[  ] Male   [  ] Female 
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Age:   
[  ] 18-22   [  ] 23-30 years [  ] 31-40 years 
[  ] 41-49years  [  ] 50-59 years [  ] 60 years or more  
 
Education Degree:   
[  ] High School [  ] Diploma         [  ] Bachelor’s Degree  
[  ] Master’s Degree  [  ] PhD Degree       [ ] Other Specify …………….. 
 
Designation at work: 
   [ ] Employed, working full-time [ ] Not employed, Not looking for work 
  [ ] Employed, working part-time [ ] Retired 
  [ ] Not employed, looking for work [ ] Disabled, not able to work 
   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Part 2:  
1. Do you have IT Experience?             [  ] Yes [  ] No 
له كيدل هفرعم ةينقتب تامولعملا  
2. Have you ever heard of cloud computing?       [  ] Yes [  ] No 
له قبس كل نأ تعمس نع ةبسوحلا حسلاةيبا ؟  
3. Do you know the meaning of cloud computing?  [  ] Yes [  ] No 
له فرعت ىنعم ةبسوحلا ةيباحسلا  
4. Do you use cloud computing services today?  [  ] Yes [  ] No 
له مدختست تامدخ ةبسوحلا ةيباحسلا ؟مويلا  
5. Do you think cloud computing is safe?   [  ] Yes [  ] No 
له دقتعت نأ ةبسوحلا ةيباحسلا ؟ةنمآ  
 
Part 3: The following set of statements relates to how often you use the following 
Internet-based services. For each statement, please choose the answer that best 
represents your opinion “Never Heard of these” to  “Use Very Frequently” and “N/A” 
if the statement is not applicable.   
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   مل" نم كبساني ام رتخا هرابع لكل .تنرتنلاا ىلع ةدنتسملا تامدخلل كمادختسا ىدم نع ربعت ةيلاتلا تارابعلا
و "ًادج رركتم لكشب اهمدختست " و "اقلطم اهب عمسا" N/A " طنت لاكيلع قب  
Statement 
N
ev
er
 h
ea
rd
 o
f 
 
th
es
e
 
 N
ev
er
 U
se
d
  
 N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
ab
le
 
U
se
 R
ar
el
y 
 
 U
se
 F
re
q
u
en
tl
y 
 
 U
se
 V
er
y 
Fr
e
q
u
en
tl
y 
 
 
I1.Social Networking Sites e.g. Facebook, 
MySpace and Friendster  
عقاوم  تاكبشلا ةيعامتجلاا لثم ،كوبسيفلا يام سيبس 
 رتسدنيرفو 
      
I2.Professional Social Networking sites e.g. 
LinkedIn and Xing 
عقاوم  تاكبشلا ةيعامتجلاا ةينهملا    
      
I3.Online media storage e.g. Flickr and 
YouTube 
  طئاسو نيزختلا ربع تنرتنلإا  ىلع ليبس  لاثملا  ركيلف 
 بويتويو 
      
I4.Internet-based email e.g. Gmail and 
Hotmail 
 ىلع  ةكبش لإارتنتن  لثم ديربلا ينورتكللإا ديرب  لجوج 
ليمتوهو 
      
I5.Online Office Suites e.g. GoogleDocs and 
Prezi  
نوأ نيلا  سيفوا ستوس  ىلع  ليبس لاثملا   
GoogleDocs and Prezi 
      
I6.Business Applications e.g. 
Salesforce.com, Spendvision and Insight  
تاقيبطت لامعلأا  ىلع  ليبس لاثملا  Salesforce.com, 
Spendvision 
      
I7.Platform services e.g. Google Apps 
Engine and Microsoft Azure  
ةصنم  تامدخ لثم  تاقيبطت لجوج كرحمو 
تفوسوركيام  روزأ  
      
I8.Infrastructure services e.g. Amazon EC2 
and Amazon S3 
تامدخ ةينبلا ةيتحتلا  لثم نوزامأ  EC2 نوزامأو S3 
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Part 4: How do you value the Privacy of your information?  
For each statement, please choose the answer that best represents your opinion 1 
“Strongly Disagree” to 5 “Strongly Agree”, “Neutral” if the statement is not 
applicable. 
فيك ردقت ةيصوصخ تامولعملا ةصاخلا ؟كب لكل هرابع رتخا ام كبساني  "لا قفاوأ ةدشب "  "قفاوأ ةدشب "، 
 "دياحم "اذإ تناك ةرابعلا لا قبطني .N/A 
 
Statement 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e 
 D
is
a
g
re
e
  
N
eu
tr
al
 
A
g
re
e 
 S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e 
 
P1.You believe it is  fine to share your 
personal details (e.g name, gender, material 
status, date of birth, contact number, home 
address, e-mail) online 
تنا دقتعت هنأ  نم ديجلا لدابت ليصافتلا  ةيصخشلا 
ةصاخلا كب (لثم مسلاا سنجلاو عضولاو ،يداملا خيراتو 
،دلايملا مقر  ،لاصتلاا ناونع ،لزنملا ديربلاو 
تكللإاينور )ربع تنرتنلإا  
     
P2.You believe it is fine to share your 
business details (job information, business 
address, phone number, e-mail) online 
تنا دقتعت هنأ  نم ديجلا لدابت ليصافتلا  ةيصخشلا 
ةصاخلا كب (لثم مسلاا سنجلاو عضولاو ،يداملا خيراتو 
،دلايملا مقر  ،لاصتلاا ناونع ،لزنملا ديربلاو 
ينورتكللإا )ربع تنرتنلإا  
     
P3.You believe it is fine to share your 
education details online 
تنا دقتعت هنأ نم ديجلا لدابت ليصافت ميلعتلا هصاخلا كب 
ىلع تنرتنلاا  
     
P4.You believe it is fine to share your 
medical information online  
تنا دقتعت هنأ نم ديجلا لدابت تامولعملا ةيبطلا ةصاخلا 
كب ىلع تنرتنلاا  
     
P5.You believe it is fine to share your credit 
card details online 
تنا دقتعت هنأ نم ديجلا لدابت ليصافت ةقاطب ئلاانامت 
ةصاخلا كب  ىلع تنرتنلاا  
     
P6.You believe it is fine to share your (e.g. 
photo, video’s) online. 
تنا دقتعت هنا رما ديج  نا كراشت (لثم روصلا عطاقمو 
ويديفلا )ىلع تنرتنلاا . 
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Part 5: The following set of statements relates to Human Domain. For each statement, 
please choose the answer that best represents your opinion “Strongly Disagree” to  
“Strongly Agree”, “Neutral” if the statement is not applicable. “ N/A” if you do not 
know.  
اميف  قفاوأ"  "ةدشب قفاوأ لا"  كبساني ام رتخا هرابع لكل .ناسنلإا لاجمب قلعتت تارابعلا نم ةعومجم يلي
ا تناك اذإ "دياحم" ،"ةدشبقبطني لا ةرابعل . "N / A" فرعت لا تنك اذإ. 
Statement 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e 
 D
is
a
g
re
e 
 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e 
 S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e 
 N
/A
 
H1: Among your peers, you are among the 
first who try out new information 
technologies. 
 نم ديدجلا برجي نم لوأ تنا ،كئلامز نيب نم
تايجولونكت تامولعملا . 
      
H2: You like to experiment with new 
information technologies. 
 تايجولونكت نم ديدجلا برجت نا بحت تناتامولعملا . 
      
H3: Employees (and patients) are 
enthusiastic about the cloud computing 
technology adoption in healthcare services.  
 لاوم ايجولونكت دامتعلأ نوسمحتم )ىضرملاو( نيفظ
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا. 
      
H4: Employees (and patients) are ready to 
accept the changes caused by the cloud 
computing technology adoption in healthcare 
services. 
ادعتسا ىلع )ىضرملاو( نيفظوملا تارييغتلا لوبقل د
 نع ةمجانلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا. 
      
 
Part 6: The following set of statements relates to Technology Domain. For each 
statement, please choose the answer that best represents your opinion “Strongly 
Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” and “Neutral” if the statement is not applicable, “N/A” 
if you do not know.  
 "ةدشب قفاوأ"  "ةدشب قفاوأ لا" كبساني ام رتخا هرابع لكل .ينقتلا لاجملاب قلعتت تارابعلا نم ةيلاتلا ةعومجملا
 ،قبطنت لا ةرابعلا تناك اذإ "دياحم" و"N / A" فرعت لا تنك اذإ. 
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Statement 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
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a
g
re
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n
g
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A
g
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e 
 N
/A
 
T1: Cloud computing in Healthcare services 
should enforce security controls (such as the 
cryptographic system) to protect patient 
sensitive information. 
لا ةبسوحلا يف ةيباحس قبطت نأ بجي ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ
 تامولعملا ةيامحل )ريفشتلا ماظن لثم( ةينملأا طباوضلا
لاىضرملل ةساسح .       
T2: In the current healthcare systems, 
unauthorized employees are prohibited from 
accessing patient’s/ medical information 
resources. 
  يف أ نيفظوملا ىلع رظحي ،ةيلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا ةمظن
 دراوم ىلإ لوصولا نم نيلوخملا ريغ / ةيبطلا تامولعملا
ضيرملا.       
T3: Employees follow healthcare policy and 
regulations when releasing or transmitting 
medical information. 
حئاوللاو تاسايسلا نوعبتي نيفظوملا  وأ حاصفلإا دنع ةيحصلا
ولعملا لقنةيبطلا تام .       
T4: In the current healthcare systems, 
healthcare service has well implemented 
security practices to protect important medical 
information from being stolen by malicious 
intrusions (such as break-in, Trojans, and spy-
wares).  
 يلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا همضنأ يف هينما تاسرامم دجوي ة
 ةنصحأ لثم ةثيبخلا تاقارتخلاا نم ةيبطلا تامولعملا ةيامحل
سسجتلاو ةداورط       
T5: In the current healthcare systems, 
information security measures are implemented 
in healthcare services to prevent sensitive 
information from unauthorized disclosure. 
 نمأ ريبادت ذيفنت متي ،ةيلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا ةمظنأ يف
ا عنمل ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ يف تامولعملا تامولعمل
مهل حرصملا ريغل فشكلا نم ةساسحلا       
T6: In the current healthcare systems, 
healthcare provider constantly updates 
information resources and regularly creates 
information backups. 
 ةياعرلا دوزم موقي ،ةيلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا ةمظنأ يف
سن ئشنيو رارمتساب تامولعملا دراوم ثيدحتب ةيحصلا خ
رارمتساب تامولعملا نم ةيطايتحا       
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T7: In the current healthcare systems, 
healthcare provider regularly conducts risk 
assessment and updates security plans to reduce 
the probability of loss of information. 
  ةيحصلا ةياعرلا دوزم ،ةيلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا ةمظنأ يف
 دحلل نملاا ططخ ثدحيو رطاخملا مييقت مظتنم لكشب يرجي
نم تامولعملا نادقف لامتحا        
T8: When acquiring important information 
from the information sources or business 
partners, employees will store it into the 
hospital’s database. 
 وأ تامولعملا رداصم نم ةمهم تامولعم ىلع لوصحلا دنع
وملا موقي  ،نييراجتلا ءاكرشلا ةدعاق يف اهنيزختب نيفظ
يبلاىفشتسملاب تانا        
T9: Healthcare provider has security controls 
(such as change management procedures) in 
place to prevent unauthorized information 
changes (creation, alternation, and deletion). 
طباوض هيدل ةيحصلا ةياعرلا دوزم  تاءارجإ لثم( ةينمأ ةرادإ
 اهب حرصملا ريغ تارييغتلا عنمل ناكملا يف )رييغتلا
)فذحو ،بوانتلا ،ءاشنإ( تامولعملا.       
T10: The database is periodically reconciled 
and regularly maintained in hospitals to 
increase the accuracy and reliability of 
information. 
 نيب قيفوتلا متي ماظتناب اهتنايصو يرود لكشب تانايبلا ةدعاق
اهتيقوثومو تامولعملا  ةقد ةدايزل تايفشتسملا يف       
T11: Healthcare provider pays attentions to 
lower down the probability of information 
system breakdown and information service 
disruption. 
   زمدو  لامتحا ضفخل ديدش هابتنا يلوي ةيحصلا ةياعرلا
تامولعملا ةمدخ عاطقناو تامولعملا ماظن رايهنا.       
T12: There are well established information 
access control procedures in hospitals, to make 
sure that for any particular information 
resource only authenticated users with right 
privileges can access such resource. 
 يف تامولعملا ىلإ لوصولا ةبقارم تاءارجإ  دجوت
 نكمي لا صاخ تامولعم ردصم يأ نأ نم دكأتلل ،تايفشتسملا
يلع قداصملا نيمدختسملا لاإ لوصولا قح تازايتما عم مه
دراوملا هذه ىلإ.       
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T13: In the current healthcare systems, a 
legitimate user with business needs can access 
hospital information at any time and at any 
place. 
 يعرشلا مدختسملل نكمي ،ةيلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا ةمظنأ يف
 لمعلا تاجايتحا عم )لوخملا وا( جولولا ىفشتسملا تامولعمل
ناكم يأ يفو تقو يأ يف.       
T14: Cloud computing technology provides a 
secure channel for transferring medical data 
across different sites.  
   ةيبطلا تانايبلا لقنل ةنمآ ةانق ةبسوحلا تاينقت ةباحس رفوت
ةفلتخم عقاوم ربع.       
T15: When using cloud-computing technology 
may cause your medical data to be stolen. 
 ةقرس ىلا يدؤي دق ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ةينقت مادختسا دنع
كب ةصاخلا ةيبطلا تانايبلا       
T16: You do not think it is safe to use cloud-
computing technology in healthcare because of 
security concerns. 
 نأ دقتعت لا تناا ايجولونكت مادختسا يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحل لاجم
ةينمأ فواخم ببسب نما ةيحصلا ةياعرلا       
T17: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is a significant risk of data 
loss. 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب دقتعت تنا
 رطخ كانه ةيحصلاتانايبلا نادقف نم ريبك .       
T18: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data being misused 
by cloud computing provider 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب دقتعت تنا
بق نم اهمادختسا ءاسي يتلا تانايبلا نم رطخ كانه ةيحصلا ل
ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا دوزم       
T19: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of unauthorized data 
access 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب نمؤت تنأ
 ريغ لبق نم تانايبلا ىلإ لوصولا نم رطخ كانه ةيحصلا
مهل حرصملا       
T20:You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of unauthorised data 
manipulation i.e. data fraud 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب نمؤت تنأ
 ريغ نم  تانايبلا ريوزتو بعلاتلا رطخ كانه ةيحصلا
مهل حرصملا       
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T21: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data exposure to 
other users of the cloud service 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب نمؤت تنأ
 نيرخلآا نيمدختسملل تانايبلا فشك رطخ كانه ةيحصلا
ةيباحسلا ةمدخلل       
T22: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of losing control over 
data location. 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب دقتعت تنا
تانايبلا عقوم ىلع ةرطيسلا نادقف رطخ كانه ةيحصلا.       
T23: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data theft via external 
attacks such as hacking 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب نمؤت تنأ
 تامجهلا قيرط نع تانايبلا ةقرس رطخ كانه ةيحصلا
 ةنصرقلا لثم ةيجراخلا       
T24: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data being accessed 
by government departments outside of 
healthcare. 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب دقتعت تنا
 جراخ ةيموكح رئاودل تانايبلا لوصو رطخ كانه ةيحصلا
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا.       
T25: The skills required to use cloud in 
healthcare are too complex for the most of 
people. 
  تاراهملالا ةمزلالا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا  مادختس
صاخشلاا مظعمل ةبسنلاب ةياغلل ةدقعم ةيحصلا ةياعرلا       
T26: Learning to use cloud applications in 
healthcare is too time consuming.  
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا تاقيبطتلا مادختسا ةيفيك ملعت
نم لوطأ اتقو ذخأت ةيحصلا مزلالا .       
T27: It is difficult to transfer current healthcare 
systems to cloud computing platform. 
 ةصنم  ىلإ ةيلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا ةمظنأ لقن بعصلا نم
ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا.       
T28: It is complex to develop Cloud 
Computing applications in healthcare. 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا تاقيبطت ريوطت دقعملا نم
ةيحصلا.       
T29: It is complex to maintain Cloud 
Computing platform in healthcare. 
 لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ةصنم ىلع ءاقبلإا دقعملا نم
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا.       
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T30: Adopting cloud technology in healthcare 
is compatible with current healthcare services 
practices. 
 دامتعا قفاوتم ةيحصلا ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ايجولونكتلا
ةيلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ تاسرامم عم.       
T31: Adopting cloud technology is compatible 
with hospital’s core values and goals. 
اع فادهلأ  ةيساسلأا ميقلا عم قفاوتم ةيباحسلا ايجولونكتلا دامت
ىفشتسملا       
T32: Adopting cloud technology is compatible 
with current information infrastructure in the 
hospitals. 
 ةيتحتلا ةينبلا عم قفاوتم ةيباحسلا ايجولونكتلا دامتعا
ملا يف ةيلاحلا تامولعمللتايفشتس .       
T33: The cost of establishing Cloud 
technology in healthcare services is far greater 
than the expected benefits 
 ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ايجولونكتلا ءاشنإ ةفلكت نإ
ةعقوتملا دئاوفلا نم ريثكب ربكأ يه ةيحصلا       
T34: The cost of maintaining Cloud technology 
in healthcare services is likely to be higher than 
maintaining the current system. 
 ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ايجولونكتلا ىلع ظافحلا ةفلكت
 ماظنلا ىلع ظافحلا نم ىلعأ نوكت نأ حجرملا نم ةيحصلا
يلاحلا.       
T35: The cost of Cloud technology user 
training in healthcare services is likely to be 
high. 
 يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكتل نيمدختسملا بيردت ةفلكت
ةعفترم نوكت نأ حجرملا نم ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ       
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B.3 Healthcare Professionals Questionnaire  
 
Questionnaire: Perception of Security using Cloud Computing in the Delivery 
 of Healthcare Services (Healthcare Professional) 
This questionnaire has been developed for a research purpose only and used to 
evaluate the Perception of Security using Cloud Computing in the delivery of 
Healthcare Services . The researcher is a PhD student at Cardiff University, United 
Kingdom. All information provided will remain strictly confidential.  
Thank you for your participation and Co-operation 
For the purpose of this research, cloud computing is defined as “a technology 
model which allow patient to view his/her health records online  with all resources 
application, software, processing power, data storage, backup facilities, development 
tools . Literally everything is delivered as a set of services via the Internet” (Aljabre, 
2012).  I will be grateful if you could spend 20 to 30 minutes on answering the 
following questionnaire.  
 
 ،يتديس /يديس ةزيزعلا يتايحت 
 ةبسوحلا مادختساب نملاا موهفم" لوح نايبتسا ءارجإ دوأو ةدحتملا ةكلمملاب فيراك هعماج يف هاروتكد هبلاط انا
 ميدقت يف ةيباحسلا ايجولونكتلا جذومن اهنأب ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا فيرعت متي ثحبلا اذه ضرغل .ةيحصلا تامدخلا
لا ضرعب ضيرملل حمست يتلا ةجلاعملا هوقو جماربلاو دراوملا تاقيبطت عيمج عم تنرتنلاا ىلع ةيبطلا تلاجس
يطايتحلاا خسنلاو ،تانايبلا نيزختوءيش لك ميلست متي رخا ىنعمب .ةيمنتلا تاودأو ة  نم هعومجم لكش ىلع
 هحاتلأ اريثك هنتمم نوكأس .تنرتنلاا ربع تامدخلا20-30 يلاتلا نايبتسلاا ىلع ةباجلإل هقيقد . 
Aim: 
The aim of this questionnaire is to identify stakeholders’ perceptions of information 
security in the national cloud-based health record infrastructure. Also to understand 
how to attain the right balance between Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
(CIA) of medical data in a cloud-based health record.  
يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب تامولعملا نما روصتل ماعلا يارلا هفرعم وه نايبتسلاا نم فدهلا  ميدقت
رفاوتو تامولعملا هيرس نيب نزاوتلا قيقحت اضيأو ةيحصلا تامدخلا  ةبسوحلا ربع اهتيقادصمو ةيبطلا تانايبلا
ةيباحسلا 
Part 1: Personal Information 
 
Nationality:  [  ] Omani  [  ] Saudi [ ] Emirati [ ] Bahraini 
  [  ] Qatari  [  ] Kuwait   [ ] Other Specify …………….. 
 
Gender:  
[  ] Male   [  ] Female 
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Age:   
[  ] 18-22   [  ] 23-30 years [  ] 31-40 years 
[  ] 41-49years  [  ] 50-59 years [  ] 60 years or more 
  
Education Degree:   
[  ] High School [  ] Diploma  [  ] Bachelor’s Degree  
[  ] Master’s Degree [  ] PhD Degree [ ] Other Specify……… 
Designation at work: 
    [  ] Medical Doctor      [  ] Administrator   [  ] Assistant Director 
    [  ] Healthcare Manager [   ] Nurse    [  ] Student  
[  ] Pharmacist    [  ] Retired  [  ] Healthcare IT Support 
  [ ] Assistant Pharmacist [ ] Other Please Specify: …………… 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Part 2:  
1. Do you have IT Experience?              [  ] Yes [  ] No 
تامولعملا ةينقتب هفرعم كيدل له 
2. Have you ever heard of cloud computing?        [  ] Yes [  ] No 
 ؟ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا نع تعمس نأ كل قبس له 
3. Do you know the meaning of cloud computing?  [  ] Yes [  ] No 
ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ىنعم فرعت له 
4. Do you use cloud computing services today?  [  ] Yes [  ] No 
؟مويلا ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا تامدخ مدختست له 
5. Do you think cloud computing is safe?   [  ] Yes [  ] No 
؟ةنمآ ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا نأ دقتعت له 
Part 3: The following set of statements relates to how often you use the following 
Internet-based services. For each statement, please choose the answer that best 
represents your opinion  “Never Heard of these” to  “Use Very Frequently” and “N/A” 
if the statement is not applicable.   
  سملا تامدخلل كمادختسا ىدم نع ربعت ةيلاتلا تارابعلاخا هرابع لكل .تنرتنلاا ىلع ةدنت مل" نم كبساني ام رت
و "ًادج رركتم لكشب اهمدختست " و "اقلطم اهب عمسا" N/A " كيلع قبطنت لا 
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I1.Social Networking Sites e.g. 
Facebook, MySpace and Friendster  
 يام ،كوبسيفلا لثم ةيعامتجلاا تاكبشلا عقاوم
رتسدنيرفو سيبس 
      
I2.Professional Social Networking sites 
e.g. LinkedIn and Xing 
ةينهملا ةيعامتجلاا تاكبشلا عقاوم   
      
I3.Online media storage e.g. Flickr and 
YouTube 
  لاثملا ليبس ىلع تنرتنلإا ربع نيزختلا طئاسو
بويتويو ركيلف 
      
I4.Internet-based email e.g. Gmail and 
Hotmail 
  ديرب ينورتكللإا ديربلا لثم تنرتنلإا ةكبش ىلع
ليمتوهو لجوج 
      
I5.Online Office Suites e.g. 
GoogleDocs and Prezi  
  ستوس سيفوا نيلا نوألاثملا ليبس ىلع   
GoogleDocs and Prezi 
      
I6.Business Applications e.g. 
Salesforce.com, Spendvision and 
Insight  
لاثملا ليبس ىلع لامعلأا تاقيبطت 
Salesforce.com, Spendvision 
      
I7.Platform services e.g. Google Apps 
Engine and Microsoft Azure  
دخ ةصنملثم تام  كرحمو لجوج تاقيبطت
روزأ تفوسوركيام 
      
I8.Infrastructure services e.g. Amazon 
EC2 and Amazon S3 
نوزامأ لثم ةيتحتلا ةينبلا تامدخ EC2 نوزامأو 
S3 
      
 
 
Part 4: How do you value the Privacy of your information? 
For each statement, please choose the answer that best represents your opinion 
“Strongly Disagree” to  “Strongly Agree”, “Neutral” if the statement is not applicable.  
ب قفاوأ"  "ةدشب قفاوأ لا"  كبساني ام رتخا هرابع لكل ؟كب ةصاخلا تامولعملا ةيصوصخ ردقت فيك ،"ةدش
ي لا ةرابعلا تناك اذإ "دياحم"قبطن .N/A 
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P1.You believe it is  fine to share your personal 
details (e.g name, gender, material status, date of 
birth, contact number, home address, e-mail) 
online 
يجلا نم  هنأ دقتعت تناصخشلا ليصافتلا لدابت د لثم( كب ةصاخلا ةي
 ،لاصتلاا مقر ،دلايملا خيراتو ،يداملا عضولاو سنجلاو مسلاا
تنرتنلإا ربع )ينورتكللإا ديربلاو ،لزنملا ناونع 
     
P2.You believe it is fine to share your business 
details (job information, business address, phone 
number, e-mail) online 
 لثم( كب ةصاخلا ةيصخشلا ليصافتلا لدابت ديجلا نم  هنأ دقتعت تنا
 ،لاصتلاا مقر ،دلايملا خيراتو ،يداملا عضولاو سنجلاو مسلاا
نرتنلإا ربع )ينورتكللإا ديربلاو ،لزنملا ناونعت  
     
P3.You believe it is fine to share your education 
details online 
تنا عت ىلع كب ةصاخلا ميلعتلا ليصافت لدابت ديجلا نم هنأ دقت
تنرتنلاا 
     
P4.You believe it is fine to share your medical 
information online 
 ىلع كب ةصاخلا ةيبطلا تامولعملا لدابت ديجلا نم هنأ دقتعت تنا
تنرتنلاا 
     
P5.You believe it is fine to share your credit card 
details online 
 كب ةصاخلا نامتئلاا ةقاطب ليصافت لدابت ديجلا نم هنأ دقتعت تنا
تنرتنلاا ىلع 
     
P6.You believe it is fine to share your (e.g. photo, 
video’s) online. 
 ديج رما هنا دقتعت تنا )ويديفلا عطاقمو روصلا لثم( كراشت نا
تنرتنلاا ىلع. 
     
 
Part 5 :The following set of statements relates to Human Domain. For each statement, 
please choose the answer that best represents your opinion “Strongly Disagree” to  
“Strongly Agree”, “Neutral” if the statement is not applicable. “ N/A” if you do not 
know.  
يف قفاوأ"  "ةدشب قفاوأ لا"  كبساني ام رتخا هرابع لكل .ناسنلإا لاجمب قلعتت تارابعلا نم ةعومجم يلي ام
قبطني لا ةرابعلا تناك اذإ "دياحم" ،"ةدشب. "N / A" فرعت لا تنك اذإ. 
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H1: Among your peers, you are among the 
first who try out new information 
technologies. 
 نم ديدجلا برجي نم لوأ تنا ،كئلامز نيب نم
تامولعملا تايجولونكت. 
      
H2: You like to experiment with new 
information technologies. 
 تايجولونكت نم ديدجلا برجت نا بحت تناتامولعملا . 
      
H3: Employees (and patients) are 
enthusiastic about the cloud computing 
technology adoption in healthcare services.  
  ايجولونكت دامتعلأ نوسمحتم )ىضرملاو( نيفظوملا
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا. 
      
H4: Employees (and patients) are ready to 
accept the changes caused by the cloud 
computing technology adoption in healthcare 
services. 
 تارييغتلا لوبقل دادعتسا ىلع )ىضرملاو( نيفظوملا
 تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا نع ةمجانلا
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا. 
      
 
Part 6: The following set of statements relates to Technology Domain. For each 
statement, please choose the answer that best represents your opinion “Strongly 
Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” and “Neutral” if the statement is not applicable, “N/A” 
if you do not know.  
بعلا نم ةيلاتلا ةعومجملا "ةدشب قفاوأ"  "ةدشب قفاوأ لا" كبساني ام رتخا هرابع لكل .ينقتلا لاجملاب قلعتت تارا
 ،قبطنت لا ةرابعلا تناك اذإ "دياحم" و"N / A" فرعت لا تنك اذإ. 
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T1: Cloud computing in Healthcare services 
should enforce security controls (such as the 
cryptographic system) to protect patient 
sensitive information. 
 قبطت نأ بجي ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا
 تامولعملا ةيامحل )ريفشتلا ماظن لثم( ةينملأا طباوضلا
لاىضرملل ةساسح .       
T2: In the current healthcare systems, 
unauthorized employees are prohibited from 
accessing patient’s/ medical information 
resources. 
   نيفظوملا ىلع رظحي ،ةيلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا ةمظنأ يف
 دراوم ىلإ لوصولا نم نيلوخملا ريغ / ةيبطلا تامولعملا
ضيرملا.       
T3: Employees follow healthcare policy and 
regulations when releasing or transmitting 
medical information. 
 وأ حاصفلإا دنع ةيحصلا حئاوللاو تاسايسلا نوعبتي نيفظوملا
ةيبطلا تامولعملا لقن.       
T4: In the current healthcare systems, 
healthcare service has well implemented 
security practices to protect important medical 
information from being stolen by malicious 
intrusions (such as break-in, Trojans, and spy-
wares).  
 يلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا همضنأ يف هينما تاسرامم دجوي ة
صحأ لثم ةثيبخلا تاقارتخلاا نم ةيبطلا تامولعملا هيامحل ةن
سسجتلاو ةداورط       
T5: In the current healthcare systems, 
information security measures are implemented 
in healthcare services to prevent sensitive 
information from unauthorized disclosure. 
 نمأ ريبادت ذيفنت متي ،ةيلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا ةمظنأ يف
ولعملا تامولعملا عنمل ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ يف تام
 فشكلا نم ةساسحلامهل حرصملا ريغل        
T6: In the current healthcare systems, 
healthcare provider constantly updates 
information resources and regularly creates 
information backups. 
 يلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا ةمظنأ يف ةياعرلا دوزم موقي  ،ة
ب ةيحصلا خسن  ئشنيو رارمتساب تامولعملا دراوم ثيدحت
رارمتساب تامولعملا نم  ةيطايتحا       
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T7: In the current healthcare systems, 
healthcare provider regularly conducts risk 
assessment and updates security plans to reduce 
the probability of loss of information. 
  ةيحصلا ةياعرلا دوزم ،ةيلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا ةمظنأ يف
 نملاا ططخ ثدحي و رطاخملا مييقت مظتنم لكشب يرجي دحلل
تامولعملا نادقف لامتحا  نم       
T8: When acquiring important information 
from the information sources or business 
partners, employees will store it into the 
hospital’s database. 
 وأ تامولعملا رداصم نم ةمهم تامولعم ىلع لوصحلا دنع
 ةدعاق يف اهنيزختب نيفظوملا موقي  ،نييراجتلا ءاكرشلا
لاىفشتسملاب تانايب        
T9: Healthcare provider has security controls 
(such as change management procedures) in 
place to prevent unauthorized information 
changes (creation, alternation, and deletion). 
 لثم( ةينمأ طباوض هيدل ةيحصلا ةياعرلا دوزم ةرادإ تاءارجإ
 اهب حرصملا ريغ تارييغتلا عنمل ناكملا يف )رييغتلا
)فذحو ،بوانتلا ،ءاشنإ( تامولعملا.       
T10: The database is periodically reconciled 
and regularly maintained in hospitals to 
increase the accuracy and reliability of 
information. 
 متي ماظتناب اهتنايصو يرود لكشب تانايبلا ةدعاق نيب قيفوتلا
اهتيقوثومو تامولعملا  ةقد ةدايزل تايفشتسملا يف       
T11: Healthcare provider pays attentions to 
lower down the probability of information 
system breakdown and information service 
disruption. 
    لامتحا ضفخل ديدش هابتنا يلوي ةيحصلا ةياعرلا دوزم
تامولعملا ةمدخ عاطقناو تامولعملا ماظن رايهنا.       
T12: There are well established information 
access control procedures in hospitals, to make 
sure that for any particular information 
resource only authenticated users with right 
privileges can access such resource. 
 يف تامولعملا ىلإ لوصولا ةبقارم تاءارجإ  دجوت
كأتلل ،تايفشتسملا نكمي لا صاخ تامولعم ردصم يأ نأ نم د
 لوصولا قح تازايتما عم مهيلع قداصملا نيمدختسملا لاإ
اوملا هذه ىلإدر .       
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T13: In the current healthcare systems, a 
legitimate user with business needs can access 
hospital information at any time and at any 
place. 
نأ يفا ةمظ يعرشلا مدختسملل نكمي ،ةيلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرل
 جولولا لمعلا تاجايتحا عم )لوخملا وا( ىفشتسملا تامولعمل
ناكم يأ يفو تقو يأ يف.       
T14: Cloud computing technology provides a 
secure channel for transferring medical data 
across different sites.  
  حس رفوتنقت ةبا ةيبطلا تانايبلا لقنل ةنمآ ةانق ةبسوحلا تاي
ةفلتخم عقاوم ربع.       
T15: When using cloud-computing technology 
may cause your medical data to be stolen. 
 ةقرس ىلا يدؤي دق ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ةينقت مادختسا دنع
كب ةصاخلا ةيبطلا تانايبلا       
T16: You do not think it is safe to use cloud-
computing technology in healthcare because of 
security concerns. 
 نأ دقتعت لا تنا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت مادختسا
ةينمأ فواخم ببسب نما ةيحصلا ةياعرلا       
T17: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is a significant risk of data 
loss. 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب دقتعت تنا
 رطخ كانه ةيحصلاتانايبلا نادقف نم ريبك .       
T18: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data being misused 
by cloud computing provider 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب دقتعت تنا
بق نم اهمادختسا ءاسي يتلا تانايبلا نم رطخ كانه ةيحصلا ل
ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا دوزم       
T19: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of unauthorized data 
access 
دختساب نمؤت تنأحسلا ةبسوحلا ما ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيبا
 ريغ لبق نم تانايبلا ىلإ لوصولا نم رطخ كانه ةيحصلا
مهل حرصملا       
T20:You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of unauthorised data 
manipulation i.e. data fraud 
يباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب نمؤت تنأ ةياعرلا لاجم يف ة
رطخ كانه ةيحصلا  ريغ نم  تانايبلا ريوزتو بعلاتلا
مهل حرصملا       
Appendix B  
 
404 
 
T21: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data exposure to 
other users of the cloud service 
ياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب نمؤت تنأ ة
نيرخلآا نيمدختسملل تانايبلا فشك رطخ كانه ةيحصلا 
ةيباحسلا ةمدخلل       
T22: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of losing control over 
data location. 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب دقتعت تنا
ا نادقف رطخ كانه ةيحصلاتانايبلا عقوم ىلع ةرطيسل .       
T23: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data theft via external 
attacks such as hacking 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب نمؤت تنأ
 تامجهلا قيرط نع تانايبلا ةقرس رطخ كانه ةيحصلا
راخلا ةنصرقلا لثم ةيج        
T24: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data being accessed 
by government departments outside of 
healthcare. 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا مادختساب دقتعت تنا
كح رئاودل تانايبلا لوصو رطخ كانه ةيحصلا جراخ ةيمو
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا.       
T25: The skills required to use cloud in 
healthcare are too complex for the most of 
people. 
  لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا  مادختسلا ةمزلالا تاراهملا
صاخشلاا مظعمل ةبسنلاب ةياغلل ةدقعم ةيحصلا ةياعرلا       
T26: Learning to use cloud applications in 
healthcare is too time consuming.  
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا تاقيبطتلا مادختسا ةيفيك ملعت
مزلالا نم لوطأ اتقو ذخأت ةيحصلا.       
T27: It is difficult to transfer current healthcare 
systems to cloud computing platform. 
ظنأ لقن بعصلا نميحصلا ةياعرلا ةم ةصنم  ىلإ ةيلاحلا ة
ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا.       
T28: It is complex to develop Cloud 
Computing applications in healthcare. 
 ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا تاقيبطت ريوطت دقعملا نم
ةيحصلا.       
T29: It is complex to maintain Cloud 
Computing platform in healthcare. 
 لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ةصنم ىلع ءاقبلإا دقعملا نم
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا.       
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T30: Adopting cloud technology in healthcare 
is compatible with current healthcare services 
practices. 
 دامتعافاوتم ةيحصلا ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا ايجولونكتلا ق
ةيلاحلا ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ تاسرامم عم.       
T31: Adopting cloud technology is compatible 
with hospital’s core values and goals. 
 فادهلأ  ةيساسلأا ميقلا عم قفاوتم ةيباحسلا ايجولونكتلا دامتعا
ىفشتسملا       
T32: Adopting cloud technology is compatible 
with current information infrastructure in the 
hospitals. 
 ةيتحتلا ةينبلا عم قفاوتم ةيباحسلا ايجولونكتلا دامتعا
تايفشتسملا يف ةيلاحلا تامولعملل.       
T33: The cost of establishing Cloud 
technology in healthcare services is far greater 
than the expected benefits 
 ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ايجولونكتلا ءاشنإ ةفلكت نإ
ةعقوتملا دئاوفلا نم ريثكب ربكأ يه ةيحصلا       
T34: The cost of maintaining Cloud technology 
in healthcare services is likely to be higher than 
maintaining the current system. 
لا ىلع ظافحلا ةفلكت ةيباحسلا ايجولونكت ةياعرلا تامدخ يف
 ماظنلا ىلع ظافحلا نم ىلعأ نوكت نأ حجرملا نم ةيحصلا
يلاحلا.       
T35: The cost of Cloud technology user 
training in healthcare services is likely to be 
high. 
 يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكتل نيمدختسملا بيردت  ةفلكت
 تامدخةعفترم نوكت نأ حجرملا نم ةيحصلا ةياعرلا        
 
Part 7: The following set of statements relates to Organization Domain. For each 
statement, please choose the answer that best represents your opinion  “Strongly 
Disagree” to  “Strongly Agree” and “Neutral” if the statement is not applicable 
 ا نم ةيلاتلا ةعومجملا قفاوأ لا"   كبساني ام رتخا هرابع لكل .ىفشتسملا وا ةسسؤملا لاجمب قلعتت تارابعل
قبطنت لا ةرابعلا تناك اذإ "دياحم" و "قفاوأ ةدشب“ "ةدشب. 
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O1: Adopting cloud computing technology in 
healthcare services can improve the collaboration 
and communication between professionals involved 
in the patient treatment plan. 
 دق  ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا
سحت ىلع دعاسياعلا نيينهملا نيب لصاوتلاو نواعتلا ني يف نيلم
ىضرملل جلاعلا ةطخ.      
O2: Adopting cloud computing technology in 
healthcare services can reduce the operating costs 
.   ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا
ليغشتلا فيلاكت نم للقت نأ نكمي.      
O3: Cloud computing technology can provide more 
timely access to patient information. 
   ىلإ لوصولا رفوت نأ نكمي ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت
  تامولعملايسايق نمزب ىضرملل ةيبطلا .      
O4: Top managers are likely to support the 
adoption of cloud computing technology in 
healthcare services. 
 يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا ءاردملا معدي نأ حجرملا نم
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ.      
O5: Top managers are likely to provide sufficient 
resources to adopt cloud technology in healthcare 
services. 
رفوي نأ حجرملا نم  دراوملا ءاردملا ايجولونكت ينبتل  ةيفاكلا
 ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا      
O6: Top managers are likely to understand the 
benefits of cloud technology in healthcare services. 
 يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دئاوف ءاردملا مهفتي نأ حجرملا نم
تامدخ ةيحصلا ةياعرلا .      
O7:  Top managers are likely to encourage the 
development of healthcare services using Cloud 
Computing.  
 ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ ريوطت ىلع ءاردملا عجشي نأ حجرملا نم
ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت مادختساب      
O8: Hospital have sufficient IT infrastructure to 
support the development of cloud computing 
technology in healthcare services.  
 ايجولونكت ريوطت معدل ةيفاكلا هينقتلا ةيتحتلا ةينبلا هيدل ىفشتسملا
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا.      
O9: Hospital have enough human resources to 
develop cloud computing technology in healthcare 
services. 
 ايجولونكت ريوطتل ةيرشبلا دراوملا نم يفكي ام هيدل ىفشتسملا
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا.      
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O10: Hospital have enough time to develop cloud-
computing technology in healthcare services. 
 ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت ريوطتل تقولا نم يفكي ام هيدل ىفشتسملا
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا .      
O11: Hospital have enough budget to develop 
cloud-computing technology in healthcare services.  
 بسوحلا ايجولونكت ريوطتل ةينازيملا نم يفكي ام هيدل ىفشتسملا ة
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا تامدخ يف ةيباحسلا.      
O12: Adopting cloud computing technology can 
improve hospital image and expertise. 
 ةروص نيسحت ىلع دعاسي دق  ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا
.هتاربخو ىفشتسملا .      
O13: Adopting cloud computing technology can 
improve internal efficiency. 
 ةءافكلا نيسحت ىلع دعاسي دق ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا
لخادلاةي .      
O14: Adopting cloud computing technology can 
improve healthcare service quality. 
 ةياعرلا تامدخ ةدوج نسحي دق  ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا
ةيحصلا.      
O15: Adopting cloud computing technology can 
improve the relationship between hospital and 
patient. 
 ةقلاعلا نيسحت ىلع دعاسي دق  ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا
ضيرملاو ىفشتسملا نيب.      
O16: Adopting cloud computing technology can 
provide 24x7 worldwide accessibility to medical 
records. 
 حيتت ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا تلاجسلا ىلإ لوصولا
 ةعاسلا رادم ىلع ملاعلا ءاحنأ عيمج يف ةيبطلا      
O17: Adopting cloud computing technology will 
reduce duplicate patient tests. 
سلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا راركت نم للقي فوس ةيباح
خلااىضرملل تارابت .      
O18: Adopting cloud computing technology can 
reduce time needed for doctors to access the patient 
treatment plan. 
 مزلالا تقولا نم للقت نأ نكمي ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا
يجلاعلا ةطخ ىلإ لوصولل ءابطلألىضرملل ة .      
O19: Adopting cloud computing technology can 
increase health research and collaboration between 
various healthcare providers.  
 ةيحصلا ثوحبلا ديزت نأ نكمي ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت دامتعا
ةيحصلا ةياعرلا يمدقم فلتخم نيب نواعتلاو.      
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O20: Adopting cloud computing technology can 
improve the reliability of IT resources to avoid 
server break down or data loss. 
  دراوم ةيقوثوم نم نسحي دق ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا ةينقت دامتعا
تانايبلا نادقف وأ همدخلا عاطقنا بنجتل تامولعملا ايجولونكت.      
 
Part 8: The following set of statements relates to Environment Domain. For each 
statement, please choose the answer that best represents your opinion  “Strongly 
Disagree” to  “Strongly Agree” and “Neutral” if the statement is not applicable. 
 ا نم ةيلاتلا ةعومجملاارابعللعتت ت و "قفاوأ ةدشب"  "ةدشب قفاوأ لا"  كبساني ام رتخا هرابع لكل .ةئيبلا لاجمب ق
قبطنت لا ةرابعلا تناك اذإ "دياحم". 
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E1: Healthcare cloud computing development is a 
key priority for the government. 
 ةيولوأ يه ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا قيرط نع ةيحصلا ةياعرلا ريوطت
ةموكحلل ةيسيئر.      
E2: The government should develop Electronic 
Medical Records using cloud computing. 
 مادختساب ةينورتكللإا ةيبطلا تلاجسلا عضت نأ ةموكحلا ىلع
ةيباحسلا ةبسوحلا.      
E3: Training courses on how to use cloud 
computing technology in healthcare should be 
provided by the government. 
 ةبسوحلا ايجولونكت مادختسا ةيفيك ىلع ةيبيردت تارود ريفوت يغبني
ةموكحلا لبق نم ةيحصلا ةياعرلا لاجم يف ةيباحسلا.      
E4: High quality of training programs will be 
provided by the Cloud provider. 
 ةبسوحلا دوزم لبق نم ةيبيردتلا جماربلا نم ةيلاع ةيعون ريفوت متيس
ةيباحسلا.      
E5: High quality of training programs will be 
provided by the Hospitals. 
 ةيعون ريفوت متيسسملا لبق نم ةيبيردتلا جماربلا نم ةيلاعتايفشت .      
E6: High quality of ongoing technical support will 
be provided by the Cloud provider. 
 دوزم لبق نم رمتسملا ينفلا معدلا نم ةيلاع ةدوج ريفوت متيس
باحسلا ةبسوحلاةي .      
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B.4 Authorisation Letter from SQU 
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B.5: Demographic Data of Respondent  
 
Frequency Table 
 
Response type 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Professional 151 27.6 27.6 27.6 
Public 397 72.4 72.4 100.0 
Total 548 100.0 100.0  
 
Nationality : 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Omani 406 74.1 74.4 74.4 
Saudi 41 7.5 7.5 81.9 
Emirati 10 1.8 1.8 83.7 
Bahraini 50 9.1 9.2 92.9 
Qatari 6 1.1 1.1 94.0 
Kuwait 7 1.3 1.3 95.2 
Other Please Specify 26 4.7 4.8 100.0 
Total 546 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 2 .4   
Total 548 100.0   
 
Gender: 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Female 365 66.6 67.0 67.0 
Male 180 32.8 33.0 100.0 
Total 545 99.5 100.0  
Missing System 3 .5   
Total 548 100.0   
 
Age: 
 Frequency Percent 
Missing System 548 100.0 
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Education Degree 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid High School 37 6.8 6.8 6.8 
Diploma 84 15.3 15.4 22.2 
Bachelor's Degree 238 43.4 43.6 65.8 
Master Degree 147 26.8 26.9 92.7 
PhD Degree 33 6.0 6.0 98.7 
Other Please Specify 7 1.3 1.3 100.0 
Total 546 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 2 .4   
Total 548 100.0   
 
Designation at work: 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Employed, working full-time 216 39.4 39.9 39.9 
Employed, working part-time 25 4.6 4.6 44.5 
Not employed, looking for job 29 5.3 5.4 49.8 
Not employed, Not looking for 
job 
22 4.0 4.1 53.9 
Retired 6 1.1 1.1 55.0 
Disabled not able to work 1 .2 .2 55.2 
Student 93 17.0 17.2 72.3 
Medical Doctor 27 4.9 5.0 77.3 
Healthcare Manager 11 2.0 2.0 79.3 
Pharmacist 29 5.3 5.4 84.7 
Assistant Pharmacist 5 .9 .9 85.6 
Administrator 17 3.1 3.1 88.7 
Nurse 33 6.0 6.1 94.8 
Assistant Director 5 .9 .9 95.8 
Staff 4 .7 .7 96.5 
Healthcare IT Support 19 3.5 3.5 100.0 
Total 542 98.9 100.0  
Missing System 6 1.1   
Total 548 100.0   
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B.6: Rotated Component Matrixa for Public and Healthcare 
Professional  
Rotated Component Matrixa 
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T14 .595                   
T15 .739               
T16 .730               
T17 .809               
T18 .841               
T19 .867               
T20 .862               
T21 .777               
T22 .796               
T23 .806               
T24 .644               
T3   .592              
T4   .670              
T5   .766              
T6   .750              
T7   .753              
T8   .838              
T9   .788              
T10   .797              
T11   .741              
T12   .630              
T25    .635            
T26    .636            
T27    .611            
T28    .638            
T29    .556            
T33    .652            
T34    .657            
T35    .654            
I4      .626   
 
       
I5      .598           
I7      .713           
P4      .658           
P1       .791         
P2       .813         
P3      
 
.564         
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P5       .652         
I6         .734   
 
    
I8         .735   
 
    
I1         
 
.687      
I2         
 
.609      
H2            0.725     
H3            0.650     
T30             .502   
T32             .653   
T1               0.610 
T2                   0.628 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 101 iterations. 
 
 
  
Appendix B  
 
414 
 
B.7: Rotated Component Matrix for Healthcare Professional  
 
 Rotated Component Matrix
a 
 
No   
Component 
Benefits 
Gov. 
Policy 
Adequate 
resource 
Top Managers 
Support 
Relative 
advantage 
1 O12 .783         
2 O13 .739         
3 O14 .825         
4 O15 .813         
5 O16 .742         
6 O17 .788         
7 O18 .832         
8 O19 .789         
9 O20 .701         
10 E1   .628      
11 E4   .710      
12 E5   .746      
13 E6   .773      
14 O8    .563     
15 O9    .636     
16 O10    .561     
17 O11     .507     
18 O4      .708   
19 O5      .766   
20 O6      .785   
21 O7      .765   
22 O1         .810 
23 O2         .811 
24 O3         .818 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
a. Rotation converged in 10 iterations. 
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B.8: Radar Charts Tables  
 
Public and Healthcare Professional  
Data Security Public % 
Agree 
Professional 
% Agree 
Public % 
Disagree 
Professional 
% Disagree 
T14: Cloud computing technology provides a 
secure channel for transferring medical data 
across different sites.   
56 69 14 12 
T15: When using cloud-computing technology 
may cause your medical data to be stolen. 
50 45 23 30 
T16: You do not think it is safe to use cloud-
computing technology in healthcare because of 
security concerns. 
43 44 29 26 
T17: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is a significant risk of data loss. 
45 44 32 27 
T18: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data being misused by 
cloud computing provider 
53 59 19 22 
T19: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of unauthorized data 
access 
65 62 18 21 
T20:You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of unauthorised data 
manipulation i.e. data fraud 
60 51 20 27 
T21: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data exposure to other 
users of the cloud service 
61 57 19 24 
T22: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of losing control over 
data location. 
55 53 21 29 
T23: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data theft via external 
attacks such as hacking 
68 61 11 16 
T24: You believe by using cloud computing in 
healthcare there is risk of data being accessed by 
government departments outside of healthcare. 
60 55 23 25 
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Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability 
Public % 
Agree 
 Professional 
% Agree 
Public % 
Disagree 
Professional % 
Disagree 
T3: Employees follow healthcare policy and 
regulations when releasing or transmitting 
medical information. 
72 70 9 15 
T4: In the current healthcare systems, 
healthcare service has well implemented 
security practices to protect important 
medical information from being stolen by 
malicious intrusions (such as break-in, 
Trojans, and spy-wares).  
63 69 14 15 
T5: In the current healthcare systems, 
information security measures are 
implemented in healthcare services to 
prevent sensitive information from 
unauthorized disclosure. 
65 64 13 20 
T6: In the current healthcare systems, 
healthcare provider constantly updates 
information resources and regularly creates 
information backups. 
65 63 8 13 
T7: In the current healthcare systems, 
healthcare provider regularly conducts risk 
assessment and updates security plans to 
reduce the probability of loss of information. 
63 60 12 21 
T8: When acquiring important information 
from the information sources or business 
partners, employees will store it into the 
hospital’s database. 
68 63 5 14 
T9: Healthcare provider has security controls 
(such as change management procedures) in 
place to prevent unauthorized information 
changes (creation, alternation, and deletion). 
66 70 8 11 
T10: The database is periodically reconciled 
and regularly maintained in hospitals to 
increase the accuracy and reliability of 
information. 
69 75 8 9 
T11: Healthcare provider pays attentions to 
lower down the probability of information 66 73 9 12 
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system breakdown and information service 
disruption.  
T12: There are well established information 
access control procedures in hospitals, to 
make sure that for any particular information 
resource only authenticated users with right 
privileges can access such resource. 
69 66 9 12 
 
Complex  and Cost Public 
% agree 
Professional 
% Agree 
Public % 
Disagree 
Professional 
% Disagree 
T25: Skills complex to use CC 
39 43 38 33 
T26: Learning CC time consuming 
27 29 52 40 
T27: Difficult to transfer Healthcare to CC. 
23 27 49 50 
T28: Complex to develop CC in healthcare. 
21 31 54 45 
T32: CC compatible with current  
infrastructure 47 55 14 19 
T33:Cost effectiveness greater than benefits 30 26 48 40 
T34: cost of maintaining CC in healthcare 41 52 34 21 
 
Privacy Public % 
Agree 
 
Professional 
% Agree 
Public % 
Disagree 
Professional 
% Disagree 
P1.You believe it is  fine to share your 
personal details (e.g name, gender, 
material status, date of birth, contact 
number, home address, e-mail) online 
13 11 67 73 
P2.You believe it is fine to share your 
business details (job information, business 
address, phone number, e-mail) online 
25 22 53 53 
P3.You believe it is fine to share your 
education details online 
50 46 22 29 
P4.You believe it is fine to share your 
medical information online 
20 29 58 55 
P5.You believe it is fine to share your 
credit card details online 
5 3 84 86 
P6.You believe it is fine to share your (e.g. 
photo, video’s) online. 
20 16 50 64 
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Human Public % 
Agree 
 Professional 
% Agree 
Public % 
Disagree 
Professional 
% Disagree 
H1: Among your peers, you are 
among the first who try out new 
information technologies. 
36 27 33 32 
H2: You like to experiment with 
new information technologies. 
66 58 11 9 
H3: Employees (and patients) are 
enthusiastic about the cloud 
computing technology adoption in 
healthcare services.  
50 44 13 19 
H4: Employees (and patients) are 
ready to accept the changes caused 
by the cloud computing technology 
adoption in healthcare services. 
45 43 17 19 
 
Compatible 
Public % 
agree 
 
Professional 
% Agree 
Public % 
Disagree 
Professional 
% Disagree 
T30: Adopting cloud technology in 
healthcare is compatible with current 
healthcare services practices. 
52 67 8 16 
T31: Adopting cloud technology is 
compatible with hospital’s core values 
and goals. 
60 63 4 13 
T32: Adopting cloud technology is 
compatible with current information 
infrastructure in the hospitals. 
47 55 14 19 
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B.9  : Healthcare Professional  
 
Organisational - Relative Advantage Professional 
% Agree 
Professional 
% Disagree 
O1: Adopting cloud computing technology in healthcare 
services can improve the collaboration and communication 
between professionals involved in the patient treatment plan. 
73 9 
O2: Adopting cloud computing technology in healthcare 
services can reduce the operating costs. 
59 10 
O3: Cloud computing technology can provide more timely 
access to patient information.  
73 7 
 
Organisational -Top Management Support 
Professional 
% Agree 
Professional 
% Disagree 
O4: Top managers are likely to support the adoption of cloud 
computing technology in healthcare services. 
51 12 
O5: Top managers are likely to provide sufficient resources 
in adopting cloud technology in healthcare services. 
47 9 
O6: Top manager are likely to understand the benefits of 
cloud technology in healthcare services. 
54 8 
O7: Top manager are likely to encourage the development of 
cloud computing technology healthcare services.  
54 10 
 
Organisational - Adequate resource Professional 
% Agree 
Professional 
% Disagree 
O8: Hospitals have sufficient IT infrastructure to support the 
development of cloud computing technology in healthcare 
services.  
39 18 
O9: Hospitals have enough human resources to develop 
cloud computing technology in healthcare services. 
38 25 
O10: Hospitals have enough time to develop cloud-
computing technology in healthcare services. 
37 20 
O11: Hospital have enough budget to develop cloud-
computing technology in healthcare services.   
34 25 
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Organisational -Benefit 
Professional 
% Agree 
Professional 
% Disagree 
O12: Adopting cloud computing technology can improve 
hospital image and expertise. 
68 6 
O13: Adopting cloud computing technology can improve 
internal efficiency. 
67 5 
O14: Adopting cloud computing technology can improve 
healthcare service quality. 
67 4 
O15: Adopting cloud computing technology can improve the 
relationship between hospital and patient. 
60 7 
O16: Adopting cloud computing technology can provide 24x7 
worldwide accessibility to medical records. 
67 4 
O17: Adopting cloud computing technology will reduce 
duplicate patient tests.  
70 6 
O18: Adopting cloud computing technology can reduce time 
needed for doctors to access the patient treatment plan. 
73 4 
O19: Adopting cloud computing technology can increase 
health research and collaboration between various healthcare 
providers.  
73 3 
O20: Adopting cloud computing technology can improve the 
reliability of IT resources to avoid server break down or data 
loss.  
67 4 
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Environmental 
Professional 
% Agree 
Professional 
% Disagree 
E1: Healthcare cloud computing development is a key 
priority for the government. 
46 14 
E2: The government should develop Electronic Medical 
Records using cloud computing. 
61 4 
E3: Training courses on how to use cloud computing 
technology in healthcare should be provided by the 
government. 
74 5 
E4: High quality of training programs will be provided by the 
Cloud provider. 
61 2 
E5: High quality of training programs will be provided by the 
Hospitals. 
57 5 
E6: High quality of ongoing technical support will be 
provided by the Cloud provider. 
57 5 
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13 Appendix C: Generic Reference Risk Register Table 
 
 
No 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/ Description 
Im
p
a
ct
 
L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
 
R
is
k
 L
ev
el
 
Risk 
Perception 
Security Goal 
Security countermeasure 
 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding patient 
confidential information 
and compliance  
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
  
  
  
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
H
ig
h
  
C
o
n
fi
d
en
ti
al
it
y
   Confidentiality  
Integrity 
Accountability 
Auditability 
Technical: 
 Dr. must have the right authentication and 
authorisation based on his role on storing medical 
health records and safeguarding it with key 
security regulations.  
Description Risk of 
Doctor disclosure of 
patient confidential 
information to someone 
else from the diagnose 
process.   
 
Sources:  Mapped from ENISA 2012 Management interface compromise (manipulation, 
availability of infrastructure)  
ISO27799:2008 
7.8.1.2 Access control policy  
The organization’s policy on access control should be established on the basis of predefined roles 
with associated authorities which are consistent with, but limited to, the needs of that role. 
The access control policy, as a component of the information security policy framework described 
in 7.2.1 Information security policy document shall reflect professional, ethical, legal and subject-
of-care-related requirements and should take account of the tasks performed by health professionals 
and the task’s workflow. 
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The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium- within Oman hospital medical staff tend to reveal medical information to family member 
or a friend without recognising that this action considers a breach of security. Thus, there is a need 
for awareness of disclosing patient information.   
2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Health records accessible 
 
Description: 
The risk of Doctor 
retrieves the results of 
another patient from 
health records.  
 
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
  
  
  
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
H
ig
h
  
Confidentiality Confidentiality 
Privacy 
Availability   
Technical: 
Dr needs authorization to access and retrieves 
the results of a patient within his team of care as 
well as supporting privacy guidelines  
Sources: Mapped from ENISA 2012 Management interface compromise (manipulation, availability 
of infrastructure)  
ISO27799:2008 
7.8.1.2 Access control policy  
The organization’s policy on access control should be established on the basis of predefined roles 
with associated authorities that are consistent with, but limited to, the needs of that role. 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- Doctors are expected to check that this is the right patient before retrieves the results to avoid 
retrieving someone else results.  
 
3 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Identity theft  
H
ig
h
  
L
o
w
  
M
ed
iu
m
  Confidentiality 
Data Security  
Confidentiality 
Authorization, 
Authentication 
and Auditing 
(AAA) 
Technical: 
Apply Authorization, Authentication and 
Auditing (AAA) enforcing strong passwords 
creation. Only authorised parties granted access, 
ensuring that users do not gain access to other 
users’ data. 
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Description The 
fraudulent practice of 
using another person's 
name and personal 
information in order to 
obtain credit loans or 
other confidential details. 
Mapped from EDoS ENISA 2012 
 4 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Distributed Denial of 
service (DDoS) attacks.  
Ref: ENISA,2012 
H
ig
h
  
 
  
M
ed
iu
m
    
M
ed
iu
m
  Availability 
Data security 
Availability  Technical: 
Penetration testing to check and patch 
vulnerabilities. 
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Description Preventing 
legitimate users from 
accessing their services in 
the cloud Leads to 
unavailability of resources 
and increases cloud usage 
bills 
 
 
Source:  
7.7.5 Health information backup: 
In addition to following the guidance given by ISO/IEC 27002, organizations processing personal 
health information shall back up all personal health information and store it in a physically secure 
environment to ensure its future availability. 
 
7.7.6.2 Security of network services 
In addition to following the guidance given by ISO/IEC 27002, organizations processing personal 
health information should carefully consider what impact the loss of network service availability 
will have upon clinical practice. 
 
7.10.1 Reporting information security events and weaknesses 
7.11 Information security aspects of business continuity management 
Disaster recovery, is increasingly recognised as a requirement for health organizations and the 
priority it is accorded continues to grow 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium- in Oman most of the traffic is controlled by Oman Gateway and OmanCert which is used 
in ITA-Cloud to filter all the attacks thus it can help to minimize the impact of DDoS 
 
5 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
 Economic Denial of 
Service (EDoS) 
Ref: ENISA,2012 
H
ig
h
  
L
o
w
  
M
ed
iu
m
  Availability 
Data security 
Availability  Technical : 
Penetration testing to check and patch 
vulnerabilities reactive/on-demand in-cloud 
eDDoS mitigation service (scrubber service) for 
mitigating the application-layer and network-
layer DDOS attacks with the help of an efficient 
client-puzzle approach. 
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Description: happen as a 
result of attacks, poor 
budget planning, or 
misconfigurations, the 
cost of a Cloud service 
can place pressure on the 
financial resources of a 
Cloud Customer to the 
point where the service is 
no longer affordable. 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low – This is managed by ODP and ITA-Cloud 
 
6 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
 Insecure or ineffective 
deletion of data  
Ref: ENISA,2012 
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
  
M
ed
iu
m
  
H
ig
h
   Integrity  Privacy  
Integrity 
(accuracy) 
Legal: 
Signing Service Level Agreement for critical 
data to destroy data as per user 
requirement. 
Description When a user 
request to delete his data 
from service provider in 
cloud, they cannot delete 
the entire disk as it shared 
by other users too. 
Sources: 
7.9.1 Security requirements of information systems 
Organizations processing personal health information should ensure that data from which personal 
identification can be derived is only retained where it is necessary to do so, and that deletion, 
anonymization and pseudonymization techniques are appropriately used to the full extent possible 
to minimize the risk of unintentional disclosures of personal information. 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium-  X ministry need to specify in the service level agreement with ODP and ITA-Cloud the 
policy for deletion of data and how long for such action can take. 
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7 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
 
Federated authentication 
H
ig
h
  
H
ig
h
  
H
ig
h
  Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality 
Authorization, 
Authentication 
and Auditing 
(AAA) 
Technical:  
Only authorised parties granted access, ensuring 
that users do not gain access to other users’ data. 
For example, single sign on, federated identity.  
 
Description It delegates 
authentication to the 
organisations that use 
SaaS. As a user, the 
healthcare organisations 
must ensure that their 
cloud provider enforces 
security measures. 
Mapped from ENISA for Data protection ENISA, 2012 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman  
 
High- in Oman authority is given according to the role and responsibility.  
An organisation must ensure that their cloud provider enforces security measures 
8 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
 
Loss of governance 
Ref: ENISA, 2012 
. 
V
er
y
 h
ig
h
  
V
er
y
 h
ig
h
  
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
   Data security  Accountability  Organisational: 
- Clarify in detail in the Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) roles and responsibilities 
before cloud adoption. To avoid any 
miscommunication in future.   
-Use Service Level agreement to address the 
exact type of control needed over their data in 
cloud. 
Description In using 
cloud infrastructures, the 
client necessarily give up 
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control to the Cloud 
Provider (CP) on a 
number of issues which 
may affect security. At 
the same time, SLAs may 
not offer a commitment to 
provide such services on 
the part of the cloud 
provider, thus leaving a 
gap in security defences 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman  
Low- according to Oman Data Park (ODP) and Information Technology Authority-Cloud (ITA-
Cloud) each Ministry has to sign off service level agreement which indicates the type of control 
required over their data centre locally and how to act in case of emergency.  
9 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
 Data Lock-in 
  
Ref: ENISA 2012  
 
M
ed
iu
m
  
H
ig
h
  
H
ig
h
   Availability  
 
Availability  
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Technical:  
Mitigate IaaS lock-in risk by using middleware 
that is compatible with multiple clouds. 
Organisation: 
Organizations processing personal health 
information shall back up all personal health 
information and store it in a physically secure 
environment to ensure its future availability. 
To protect its confidentiality, personal health 
information should be backed up in an encrypted 
format. 
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Description  
for SaaS/PaaS and system 
lock-in for IaaS in cloud 
computing it represents 
the situation where 
customers are dependent 
(i.e. locked-in) on a 
single cloud provider 
technology 
implementation and 
cannot easily move in the 
future to a 
different vendor without 
substantial costs, legal 
constraints, or technical 
incompatibilities 
Source :  
ISO27799:2008 
7.7.5 Health information backup 
In addition to following the guidance given by ISO/IEC 27002, organizations processing personal 
health information shall back up all personal health information and store it in a physically secure 
environment to ensure its future availability. 
To protect its confidentiality, personal health information should be backed up in an encrypted 
format. 
7.7.10 Monitoring 
7.10.1 Reporting information security events and weaknesses 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman  
Low- ODP and ITA- Cloud are responsible to manage those kind of risk as they are the only 
provider for cloud computing service in Oman  
10 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Intercepting data in transit 
Ref: ENISA,2012 H
ig
h
  
M
ed
iu
m
  
M
ed
iu
m
  Confidentiality 
Data Security  
Confidentiality 
Authentication 
 
Availability  
Technical:  Dr. and Nurse need to have the right 
authorisation and authentication when dealing 
with the referral form of the patient. 
Human Oriented:  Dr. and Nurse need to have 
security training awareness when processing the 
referral form. 
Description  
When the data move from 
one location to another 
Sources:  
ISO27799:2016  
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location through the 
internet or private 
network, there is risk data 
in transit or data at rest 
depends on security 
measures in place to 
secure the data.  
there is high possibility 
the transfer can be 
intercepted for instance 
between Cloud Customer 
and Cloud Provider 
13.2.2 Agreements on information transfer 
As noted in 13.2.1, specific guidance on health information exchange policies can be found in ISO 
22857. 
Though that International Standard explicitly references trans-border flow of personal health 
information (where borders in this context represent health jurisdictions, not necessarily national 
boundaries), much of its advice can be adapted, where necessary, to deal with exchange of data 
from one organization to another. 
ISO/IEC 27002:2013, 13.2.1 which is Formal transfer policies, procedures and controls should be in 
place to protect the transfer of information through the use of all types of communication facilities. 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman  
Medium –currently it clouds computing is not used however, Man In the Middle (MIM) can control 
the data between hospital and cloud. 
11 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Data protection risks 
Ref: ENISA,2012 
  
H
ig
h
  
H
ig
h
  
H
ig
h
   Data Security Confidentiality  
Privacy 
 Cryptography 
Human Oriented  
patient should keep his record in locked bag 
with need pin code to access to avoid 
unauthorised access. 
Technical:  
Doctor should protect 
Patient medical information from unauthorized 
access.  
Organisational: based on security procedure 
within the GP to consult another specialist to 
confirm patient results in top confidential 
process to confirm Dr. suspect 
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Description patient need 
to secure his hard copy 
report and CDs of 
performed results in 
secure place. 
Whereas in Germany 
hospital, there is a need 
for GDPR compliance as 
patient needs to give 
consent for accessing 
their records. 
Sources: 
ISO27799:2008 7.12.2.2 Data protection and privacy of personal information 
In addition to following the guidance given by ISO/IEC 27002, organizations processing personal 
health information should manage informational consent of subjects of care. 
Where possible, informational consent of subjects of care should be obtained before personal health 
information is e-mailed, faxed, or communicated by telephone conversation, or otherwise disclosed 
to parties external to the healthcare organization. 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- ODP and ITA-Cloud store the data centrally in Oman according to Royal Degree thus it 
reduces the complication of rules and regulation of saving sensitive data abroad.  
As for Germany cloud provider it has to follow GDPR rules and regulations 
12 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Malicious insider  
Ref: ENISA,2012 
 
V
er
y
 h
ig
h
  
M
ed
iu
m
  
H
ig
h
   Confidentiality 
Data Security 
Availability  
Confidentiality  
Privacy  
Accountability 
Authenticity & 
Trustworthines
s 
Technical: specify and implement the access 
control policy for each member in the 
organisation according to their roles and 
responsibilities. 
 Human Oriented: organisation must provide 
security training workshop for all members to 
enhance their awareness of possible threats.  
Organisational: Management in each 
organisation has to notify all members of 
security policy implemented 
Description Represents 
members who have 
authorized access to a 
Source: 
From ISO27799:2008 
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user’s data may misuse it 
to perform malicious 
attacks on the users’ PHR 
data. Mxoli et al. (2014) 
7.8.1.2 Access control policy  
7.5.1 Prior to employment  
7.5.2 during employment 
7.5.3 termination or change of employment   
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
High - this risk is applicable in every organisation as staff members may misuse their work rule in 
finding unauthorised information.  
13 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Identity and Access 
Management  
 
H
ig
h
 
L
o
w
  
M
ed
iu
m
  Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality 
Authorization, 
Authentication 
and Auditing 
(AAA) 
Technical: 
apply Authorization, Authentication and 
Auditing (AAA) enforcing strong passwords 
creation. Only authorised parties granted access, 
ensuring that users do not gain access to other 
users’ data. 
Description Identity and 
access management can 
be used to ensure that 
users with legitimate 
identity can access data.  
Sources: Mapped from Economic Denial of Service ENISA 2012, 
ISO27799:2008 (7.8.2.1) 
User registration procedures shall ensure that the level of authentication required of claimed user 
identity is consistent with the level(s) of access that will become available to the user. 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low – This is managed by ODP and ITA-Cloud 
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14 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Physical intrusion  
 
Mxoli et al. (2014) 
 
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
H
ig
h
  Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality 
Privacy  
  
Technical: 
Authorisation use; physical security and 
biometric locks in critical locations. 
Description Cloud storage 
facilities are at a risk of 
being accessed by 
intruders which may 
compromise PHR data 
stored there.  
Mxoli et al. (2014)  
Mapped from Cloud provider malicious insider - abuse of high privilege roles, ENISA 2012 
Source:  
Organisational to enforce physical entry controls to offices should be secured, room and facilities 
should be secured, protection against external and environmental threat 
ISO27799:2008 7.6.1.2 
 
  The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium- ODP and ITA- Cloud are responsible to manage the cloud storage 
15 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
  Third party access 
 
Mxoli et al. (2014) 
  
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
 
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
 
V
er
y
 H
ig
h
 Confidentiality  
Availability 
Confidentiality  
Audit  
Technical: measures that must be applied 
and/complied with for service levels to be 
achieved in reduced services, the arrangements 
for compliance auditing of the third-parties, and 
the penalties that will apply should any of these 
not be honoured. Information exchange 
agreements that specify the minimum set of 
controls to be implemented must also be used. 
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Collaboration is needed 
between two institution to 
exchange sensitive data. 
A Cloud provider can 
provide access to both 
institutions to view their 
sensitive data in a secure 
mode in the cloud 
however, a Cloud 
provider may decide to 
outsource the storage of 
some of their users’ data 
to external parties . This 
increases the fear of 
unauthorized access to the 
user’s PHR data 
 
Sources: Mapped from Loss of governance ENISA, 2012 p22 
ISO27799: 2008  
7.3.3.1 Identification of risks related to external parties 
Organisation should implement Risk assessment to weight the risk by third party access. Then 
security control to be implemented according to risk level and technology used. 
  
7.3.3.3 Addressing security in third-party agreements 
7.7.8.1 Health information exchange policies and procedures and exchange agreements. 
  The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- ODP and ITA-Cloud hosted the data standalone centrally in Oman. However, MoH will need 
to sign an agreement with Germany hospital to exchange medical data which will change the impact 
to Medium level.  
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16 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Multi-tenancy 
 
Mxoli et al. (2014) 
 
H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 Data Security  Confidentiality  
Integrity 
Availability  
Technical: development, test and operation 
facilities should be separated (physically or 
virtually).  
Compartmentalization should be enforced to 
ensure that consumers may not access other 
users' information due to multi-tenancy. Cloud 
service provider should use effective encryption 
methods to guarantee data isolation between 
client: also, data fragmentation can be used. 
Description Different 
users share memory, 
networking capabilities 
etc. in Cloud Computing. 
This puts users’ data at 
risks of being accessed by 
malicious attackers posing 
as PHR owners .  
Mxoli et al. (2014) 
Sources: Mapped from Isolation failure ENISA 2012 p29 
ISO27799:2008 
7.7.1.4 Separation of development, test and operational facilities  
To separate physical or virtual and make sure that consumers do not have access due to Multi-
tenancy. 
 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium – ODP and ITA-Cloud hosted the data standalone and no multi-tenancy carried out.  
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17 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Loss of encryption Keys 
Ref: ENISA,2012 H
ig
h
  
L
o
w
  
M
ed
iu
m
  Confidentiality  Availability  
Integrity  
Technical:  
There are various ways to restate keys. One 
alternative is through using PKI. This 
mechanism assures the activation of the key in a 
secured channel. Another alternative is via the 
usage of a mobile SIM card which enables a 
one-time password to be used in the activation 
process. 
The loss or compromise 
of cryptographic keys 
used for encryption, 
authentication or digital 
signatures can lead to data 
loss, denial of services, or 
financial damages 
Ref: ENISA,2012 
 
Sources: Mxoli et al. (2014); (Citrix, 2014). 
  
Use Wireshark network analysis to rebuild the traffic based on the gathered keys. These keys can be 
used to decrypt the concerned traffic 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low as ODP and ITA-Cloud follow high security standards as ISO 20000 and ISO 27000 which 
provide sense of assurance and security. However, the level will be high in case it happens within 
ODP and ITA-Cloud. 
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18 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Software intrusions 
 
Mxoli et al. (2014) 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
 Data Security  Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability  
Authenticity & 
Trustworthiness 
 
Technical: 
Organizations processing sensitive information 
shall implement appropriate prevention, 
detection and response controls to protect 
against malicious software and shall implement 
appropriate user awareness training. 
 
Description A user’s PHR 
may be attacked by 
malware which can 
compromise their 
sensitive information such 
as login details [23]. 
Mxoli et al. (2014) 
Mapped from Licensing Issues, ENISA 2012 p47 
Source: 
Organisational (procedure) and Human oriented (security awareness and training ) 
ISO27799:2008 7.7.4.1 
In addition to following the guidance given by ISO/IEC 27002, organizations processing personal 
health information shall implement appropriate prevention, detection and response controls to 
protect against malicious software and shall implement appropriate user awareness training. 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium- ODP and ITA- Cloud are responsible to manage the software as well as arrange for 
awareness and training workshop for data security for hospital staff.  
19 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Data Privacy and security  
 
 
H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 Data Security 
 
Privacy  
Availability  
Human oriented: 
Transactional process needs to be carried out by 
security experts to make sure that there is no 
illegal activity  
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Description  
it encompasses issues 
related to confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability 
of data should be ensured 
not only in enterprise 
storage and cloud storage, 
but also between different 
cloud storage services 
(Shirazi et al., 2017). 
 
Sources: Mapped from Data protection risk , ENISA 2012 p 45 
 
ISO27799:2008 7.12.2.2 Data protection and privacy of personal information 
In addition to following the guidance given by ISO/IEC 27002, organizations processing personal 
health information should manage informational consent of subjects of care. 
Where possible, informational consent of subjects of care should be obtained before personal health 
information is e-mailed, faxed, or communicated by telephone conversation, or otherwise disclosed 
to parties external to the healthcare organization. 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
High – it will be high in Oman because it is dealing with three objective of patient data which is 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  
 
20 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Social engineering attacks 
(impersonation) 
Ref: ENISA, 2012 
H
ig
h
   
M
ed
iu
m
   
M
ed
iu
m
  Data Security  
Internet based 
services 
(indirect) 
Privacy  
 
Privacy  
 
Human Oriented:  
Security awareness training needs to be 
performed to ensure information security. 
 
  
Using people to get 
confidential information. 
Ref: ENISA, 2012 
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  The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
High- in Oman there is lack of awareness of security programs. There is a need for mitigation 
strategy to deal with those kinds of risks within cloud environment. thus, ODP and ITA-cloud need 
to provide security training workshop for hospital staff.  
 
21 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Third-party storage 
servers are a target for 
hackers that may lead to a 
breach of the PHI (Li at 
al., 2013). 
 
H
ig
h
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
  Confidentiality  
 
Confidentiality  Technical: 
Encrypt all medical records before 
outsourcing to the cloud (Li et al., 2013). 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- not stored on third party as part of Service Level Agreement 
22 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 Security and privacy of 
medical data  
V
er
y
 h
ig
h
 
M
ed
iu
m
  
M
ed
iu
m
  Confidentiality Confidentiality Organisation:  
There is a need to decide high level of protection 
in the service level agreement to avoid any 
medical data leakage 
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Description 
Security and privacy of 
medical data from any 
threats or attacks are one 
of the main reasons for 
many enterprises that do 
not intend to employ 
cloud services (Seddona 
and Currie, 2013). 
 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- storing the data centrally minimize a lot of risks. 
 
23 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Reduced staff 
productivity  
 
H
ig
h
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
 Professional 
Environmental 
(Technical 
Competence 
Gap Human Oriented:  
Ensure that experts are not dismissed and 
involve them in the migration project so that 
they get a sense of ownership. Provide training 
in cloud technology and enable staff to learn 
new skills. 
During the migration as 
changes to staff work and 
job uncertainty lead to 
low staff self-esteem and 
nervousness spreading in 
the organisation. 
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The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium- the move to cloud will be huge change to hospital infrastructure. Thus, it needs careful 
consideration about the time and training needed to use new system infrastructure. This risk has 
critical effect on the work productivity as it can reduce the daily achievement by not keeping track 
on the daily work plan.  
 
24 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Managing a system 
deployed on several 
clouds  
V
er
y
 h
ig
h
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
 Professional 
organisational 
Top 
Management 
support  
 
 Organisational:  
Procedure to make management aware of the 
extra effort that might be required. Indicator: 
using several cloud providers for a system, as 
cloud providers have different types of support 
mechanisms. 
Description: Managing a 
system deployed on 
several clouds can make 
extra management effort 
compared to deploying 
systems in-house to 
ensure data availability. 
 
 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- because Ministry of Health (MoH) use central institutional data centre which is managed by 
ODP and ITA-Cloud 
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25 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Employee resist change  
 H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 Gap Gap Organisational:  
Government and senior management need to 
provide positive leadership and support for 
employees to accept cloud computing as a new 
service because it will encourage employees to 
embrace it as new way of increasing the quality 
of work 
Description: Employee 
resist change to use new 
information technology 
(Lian et al., 2014; 
Alkhater et al., 2017)..  
 
 
The importance of 
this risk to the 
healthcare context in 
Oman 
High – this risk has a significant rule in the success or failure of a project. Healthcare organisation 
need to arrange for awareness training workshop for employees to accept the change and gain 
benefits of the new service from information technology 
26 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Lack of IS IS staff skills 
 
 
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
  
M
ed
iu
m
 Gap Gap Human Oriented:  
Arrange for training courses to provide enough 
knowledge of skills needed to deal with cloud 
computing 
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Description : IS staff need 
to have sufficient 
knowledge, awareness 
and the required skills to 
adopt cloud computing 
(Lian et al., 2014). 
 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium-  Ministry of Health (MoH) in Oman has launched cloud infrastructure to host ministry 
website. MoH need to provide training course for IS staff to deal with cloud computing. The 
medical data is owned by hospital, used by doctor and custodian by other hospital. Thus the training 
courses are need for data owner, custodian and user. 
27 
M
an
ag
em
en
t  Maintain privacy for 
genomic data  
 M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
 Gap Gap Technology:  
Provide Single Sing On to registered users. 
Description Maintain 
privacy for genomic data 
especially with the 
blending of genomics 
with Internet technologies 
which shared among the 
network (Chow-White et 
al., 2015). 
 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- It is critical to assure the privacy of patient data among shared network however genomic data 
is not dealt with in Oman currently. 
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28 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
IS infrastructure  
H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 Gap Gap Organisational:  
Organisation need to operate the versatility 
across different environments; scaling to 
accommodate large data centres; automating to 
create self-managed environments; and 
integration of non-cloud products into the cloud 
architecture  
(Joseph and Brown, 2017) 
 
Description Ensure IS 
infrastructure deliver the 
right quality of service. 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low -  In Oman there is Oman Data Park (ODP) and Information Technology Authority (ITA) who 
provide IS infrastructure, and smoothing the transfer process. ODT and ITA act like data centre. 
According to the royal degree it is not allowed to hold cloud outside Oman. Thus, risks of storing 
data abroad are low.  In addition, ODT and ITA are compliance with the data centre standard and 
properly accredited with ISO 20000 for IT service Management, ISO 27001 for information 
Security Management System 
29 
M
an
ag
em
en
t Technology readiness 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
  
M
ed
iu
m
 Gap Gap Organisational:  
Organisation need to check their resources in 
terms of IT infrastructure and human whether 
they can be used to implement e-Gov cloud.   
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Description Technology 
readiness, existence of the 
IT infrastructure and 
human resources 
(Alkhater et al., 2017) 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium- this is risk relevant to Oman because we have the IT infrastructure However, human 
readiness is an issue as there is a lack of local expertise 
30 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Lack of ICT skills  
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
 Professional 
Environmental 
(Government 
policy) and 
Technical 
competence 
Human 
domain 
indirect 
 
 Human-oriented: set up motivational short 
courses to motivate and educate staff about the 
benefits of using the new technology as well as 
training sessions to familiarise themselves with 
the new ICT. 
Description Health 
professionals do not 
always have the necessary 
ICT skills to use eHealth 
solutions or leverage the 
benefits of cloud 
computing solutions. 
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The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
High – currently in Oman we are operating the available venders from abroad by acting like help 
desk. We have shortage in-house skills because we depend on third party to fix or maintain an 
equipment. Thus, there is a need to have in-house skills.   
31 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
High bandwidth and 
internet speed  H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 Gap Gap Organisational:  
Organisations need to have a robust 
technical infrastructure and the necessary 
technical skills to adopt new technical 
services. 
Description High 
bandwidth and internet 
speed play an important 
role in an organisation’s 
decision to employ cloud 
services. 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
High- this is relevant to Oman as hospitals in the capital already have fibre -optic installed whereas 
as hospitals in the village suffer from low connection speed. Thus, there is a need to enhance 
internet connection with suitable bandwidth to be able to accept the new technical service.   
32 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
IS complexity and 
compatibility will affect 
IT adoption (Lin et al., 
2012 and Liu, 2011).  
 
H
ig
h
  
H
ig
h
  
H
ig
h
  Gap Gap Organisational:  
Organisation need to check the alignments of IT 
application systems to the cloud to check system 
compatibility in cloud. Having cloud computing 
compatibility with existing systems or 
applications in the hospital will help make the 
adoption of cloud computing technology 
feasible (Lian et al., 2014),(Lin et al., 2012 and 
Liu, 2011). 
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Description : IS 
complexity and 
compatibility will affect 
IT adoption (Lin et al., 
2012 and Liu, 2011).  
For instance, migrate 
medical information 
system such as (PACS), 
(HIS) and (RIS) (Lian et 
al., 2014). 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
High – because Oman depend on some abroad venders there is risk of complexity between two 
venders. In addition, compatibility issue will raise as two different vendor’s system might not be 
compatibility to each other. In addition, Oman has shortage of in-house expertise who are needed to 
deal with medical information system such as PACS, HIS and RIS. 
33 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Losing control of a 
system’s infrastructure  
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
  
M
ed
iu
m
 Gap Gap Organisational:  
Before the adoption process, administrator can 
identify the system support in the service level 
agreement. 
Description   
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low-  it depends on the package X ministry will choose is it like a service or infrastructure as there 
are different plan suggested to each customer according to their need. Those services are provided 
in Oman through Oman data Park (ODP) and Information Technology Authority (ITA). thus it 
depends on the requirement and facilities that MoH need.   
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34 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Costs of the new IT 
investment play a 
significant role (Lian et 
al., 2014). 
  
Lo
w 
L
o
w 
L
o
w 
Gap Gap Organisational:  
Cloud Provider need to calculate the operation 
costs as adopting cloud computing requires 
different types of investment in such areas as 
hardware, software and system integration. The 
cost can be enormous due to the variable nature 
of the expenses (Lian et al., 2014). 
Description   
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Not relevant to MoH because its main concern will be on uploading and accessing the medical data 
whereas Cloud Provider (ODP and ITA) are responsible of calculating the costs. 
35 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Interoperability Issues  
 
H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 Gap Gap Technology:   
Use cloud middleware to ease interoperability 
issues. 
 Because of the limits of interoperability and 
security, no single vendor can provide a 
comprehensive, dominant solution serving both 
hospitals and smaller outpatient clinics (Jin and 
Chen, 2015).  
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Description Interoperation 
of healthcare systems such 
as maintaining HL7 in 
cloud-based environment 
(Jin and Chen, 2015; 
Lubamba and Bagula, 
2017; Medical White 
Paper, 2018).  
 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
High – Healthcare in Oman currently uses  
ICD system to record patient diagnoses and sends ICD message using the local cloud provider; on 
the other hand, global hospitals use HL7 to communicate with other healthcare provider. Thus there 
is risk of interoperability issues between Oman healthcare and international healthcare provider 
which can affect the availability of records 
 
36 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Risks of new technologies 
such as IoT and mobile 
combined with cloud 
(Lubamba and Bagula, 
2017).  
 
L
o
w
 
L
o
w
 
L
o
w
 Gap Gap Technical:  
Infrastructure to support the impeded system for 
IoT. 
Organisational: 
Those risks need to be added to risk register. 
Description   
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The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- not relevant currently because IoT not implement yet. However, there is a need for Oman to 
revise the risk  management approach once they adopt IoT 
37 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Temporary outages:  
 
Mxoli et al. (2014) 
H
ig
h
 
L
o
w
 
M
ed
iu
m
  Availability  
 
Availability  
 
Integrity  
Technical: 
multiple cloud providers monitor applications 
from outside the cloud. Replicating the system 
across multiple clouds has associated costs and 
technical challenges. 
Description Cloud 
services can and do 
experience temporary 
outages which last for 
hours .it can causes major 
service interruption 
resulting in extensive 
outages and unavailability 
of services or loss of data. 
Mapped from Resource exhaustion (under or over provisioning) ENISA, 2012 p27 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium- Ministry of Health (MoH) use Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) generators to ensure 
the service continuity.  
 
38 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Data Loss and Leakage 
 
 
H
ig
h
   
H
ig
h
   
H
ig
h
    Availability  
Integrity 
Data security 
Availability  
 
Integrity  
Technical:  
use Encryption key to encrypt the data before it 
is stored in the cloud  
Description  
Data Loss and Leakage 
could happen due to 
Mapped from Isolation failure From ENISA 2012 
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numerous reasons, such as 
an operational failure, 
unreliable data storage, 
and inconsistent usage of 
encryption keys. 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- for infrastructure this is the responsibility of ODP and ITA-cloud. 
As for clinicians within hospital there is a need for awareness and training about safe storage of 
sensitive data of patient.   
39 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Loss of backup   
Ref: ENISA,2012 
lo
w
  
L
o
w
   
M
ed
iu
m
  Availability  
Integrity 
Data security 
Availability  
 
Privacy 
Technical:  
use multiple cloud providers, monitor 
applications from outside the cloud. Replicating 
the system across multiple clouds has associated 
costs and technical challenges 
Description The backups 
a Cloud Provider makes 
of it’s customers’ data can 
get lost, damaged, or the 
physical media on which 
the backup is stored can 
get stolen.  
 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Not relevant to Oman because the data are stored remotely centrally in Oman through O DP and 
ITA-Cloud. 
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40 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Resource exhaustion  
(under or over 
provisioning) 
Ref: ENISA, 2012 
M
ed
iu
m
  
 M
ed
iu
m
  
 M
ed
iu
m
 
  
Organisational 
(Adequate 
resources) 
 
Availability  Organisational:  
policy agreement to set up Resource Limit for 
each user by Cloud Provider or consider another 
cloud provider. 
Description: Cloud 
provider might not be able 
to meet the increased 
demand  currently or in 
future in certain resource 
or to maintain given 
service level 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- this is the responsibility of ODP and ITA-cloud  
 
41 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
Network breaks 
Ref: ENISA,2012 
M
ed
iu
m
  
M
ed
iu
m
  
M
ed
iu
m
  Availability 
Data Security 
ISO 20,000 
Development 
of IT 
infrastructure  
can be one of 
the risks need 
to be address 
in future 
research 
 
Availability  Technical  
Use multiple cloud provider in a different 
location to ensure data protection and minimise 
the loss. This will require additional costs. 
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Description Network 
Breaks which indicates 
the loss of Internet 
connectivity due to 
failures at the Cloud 
Customer’s site or the 
Internet service provider, 
temporarily reduced 
network bandwidth on the 
path between Cloud 
Customer (CC) and Cloud 
Provider (CP), disruptions 
in the global Internet 
routing infrastructure 
leading to the loss of the 
network path between CC 
and CP, and failures of 
the CP’s Internet 
connectivity 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
This depends on the communication speed which is provided by the telecommunication companies 
as hospitals in capital might have fibre optic, however, rural hospital still using dial-up 56kps which 
does not work with cloud. Therefore, for those hospital who have fibre optic can use cloud 
computing service and state in the service level agreement the condition of network break.  
 
42 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 Modifying network traffic 
 H
ig
h
  
L
o
w
 
lo
w
 Availability 
 
Availability  Technical : 
Use multiple cloud provider. 
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Description  
If the network traffic is 
manipulated between 
user and cloud provider, 
this would result in loss of 
credibility. 
Comments: 
ISO 20,000 for the development of IT infrastructure could be one of the risks that needs to be 
addressed in future research. 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- as in Oman ODP and ITA-Cloud manage the network traffic. X Ministry can specify in the 
service level agreement the case of network traffic and what need to be done in case this incident 
happen. 
43 
L
eg
al
 
Risk from changes of 
jurisdiction 
Ref: ENISA,2012 
 
H
ig
h
   
H
ig
h
   
H
ig
h
   Out of scope Legal Legal: 
cloud customers need to be fully aware and 
understand the rules regarding where their data 
is held (Berry and Reisman, 2012). 
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Description When the 
data stored in different 
country than Cloud 
Customer’s security of the 
information will be 
affected by various 
security risks.  
Because the Legal and 
regulatory framework of 
where data is held tend to 
change according to rules 
and regulation within the 
custodians country 
(Berry & Reisman, 2012). 
 
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low- in Oman Cloud provider (ODP and ITA) hold all the data centrally according to Royal 
Degree. 
44 
L
eg
al
 
IT outsourcing  
H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 
H
ig
h
 Gap Gap Organisational:  
Provide high level of security with encryption to 
avoid any leakage during the transferring 
process 
Description: IT 
outsourcing is significant 
as transferring health data 
among various legal and 
regulatory jurisdictions is 
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absolutely critical and 
requires a deep 
understanding of cloud 
outsourcing contracts 
(Iyer & Henderson, 2012). 
regulation and compliance 
need to be considered 
(Seddona and Currie, 
2013). 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Low – in Oman is low because it stores data centrally. 
45 
L
eg
al
 
Address issues related to 
forensic and investigation 
shortcomings in cloud as 
well as lack of legal, 
judicial requirements and 
laws (Shirazi et al., 2017). 
 
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
M
ed
iu
m
 Gap Gap  Legal:   
Organisation needs to consider from a different 
angle when operating in cloud environments, 
especially in the healthcare domain. Rules and 
regulation need to be expanded to provide more 
comprehensive impact and expose data to higher 
level of risk in cloud environment (Shirazi et al., 
2017).. 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Not relevant in Oman currently. In case they moved to store data aboard then there is a gap the legal 
judicial laws which need to be updated according to the case adopted.  
46 
O
th
er
s Natural disasters  
Ref: ENISA,2012 H
ig
h
   
V
er
y
 l
o
w
  
M
ed
iu
m
   Availability Availability  Organisational  
Governance Strategy  
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Description: Natural 
disasters like flooding, 
earthquakes, tsunamis can 
affect the infrastructure of 
a CP. This way, a CC 
might be affected by 
natural disasters occurring 
far away from its own 
location.( ENISA,2012) 
Note: ISO 22301 Business Continuity management approach can be considered as future work.  
 
The importance of this 
risk to the healthcare 
context in Oman 
Medium- there is a need to maintain save backup abroad as Oman has several Cyclones from the 
Indian Ocean do occasionally make landfall in Oman in the summer months. For example: Cyclone 
Gonu (2007), Cyclone Phet (2010), Cyclonic Nilofar (2014), Cyclone Chapala (2015) and   Cyclone 
Mekunu (2018), Thus the government of Oman need to maintain a backup abroad with the right 
rules and regulations.  
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14 Appendix D: Hypothetical Scenario BPM and Risk 
Register Table 
Appendix D 1: Generic Health Centre Workflow  
 
Start
Patient registers at 
medical records 
require verification 
by ID card 
Triage room for vital signs(height-
weight-pressure-temperature) and 
record complaints of the patient
Doctor room to 
diagnoses patient 
(including request 
for lab or x-ray if 
needed)
Need 
Referral
 Patient case 
proceeds to collect 
medicine from 
pharmacy (if 
needed)
Patient needs to 
follow up with 
Doctor
Yes
No
Patient walk to 
healthcare 
centre the 
nurse at 
reception
Emergency 
case
No
 immediate 
treatment nurse
Yes
Patient case 
requires urgent 
referral to 
polyclinic or 
hospital
Request an 
ambulance to 
take patient to 
hospital 
No
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Appendix D .2 First Modelling Attempt  
H
e
al
th
ca
re
 in
 G
er
m
an
y
H
e
al
th
ca
re
 in
 O
m
an
G
er
m
an
y 
H
o
sp
it
al
O
m
an
 H
o
sp
it
al
New Patient 
RecordStart
Diagnose 
Patient A 
     Perform 
Further 
Examination 
End
No
Need Surgery Perform 
Surgery
Yes
Locally stored 
health records
Locally stored 
health records
Suspect Patient A 
malignant  
Need Surgery
End
Yes
Start
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Appendix D 2.1 Risk Register Table For First Modelling  
 
N
o 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/ Description Impact 
Likelih
ood 
Risk 
Level 
Security Goal 
Countermeasure 
 
Traceability 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding Patient 
information A Primary 
investigation health 
record in Oman hospital 
Description: Safegurding 
patient A health record in 
Oman hospital with key 
regulations  
 
Very 
High 
Medium  High Confidentiality  
Accountability  
Technical: 
implementing 
several layers of 
authentication such 
as user login, 
administration 
privilege based on 
their roles and need 
to access the data to 
secure health data 
records adequately 
Oman 
hospital 
Activity: 
Suspect 
malignant 
head 
tumour 
2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding Patient A 
Primary investigation 
health record in Germany 
hospital 
Description: Safegurding 
patient A health record in 
Germany hospital with 
key regulations  
 
Very 
High 
Medium  High Confidentiality  
Accountability  
Technical: 
implementing 
several layers of 
authentication such 
as user login, 
administration 
privilege based on 
their roles and need 
to access the data to 
secure health data 
records adequately 
Germany 
hospital 
Activity: 
Patient A 
diagnose  
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3 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Identity and Access 
Management  
Description: Oman 
hospital implement 
security practices to 
access patient health 
record as well as supporting 
privacy guidelines 
 
Very 
High 
Medium  High Privacy 
Availability  
Technical: apply 
Authorization, 
Authentication and 
Auditing (AAA) 
enforcing strong 
passwords creation. 
Only authorised parties 
granted access, 
ensuring that users do 
not gain access to 
other users data.  
Oman 
hospital  
Activity: 
Need 
surgery 
4 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Identity and Access 
management  
Description: Germany 
hospital implement 
security practices to 
access patient health 
record as well as supporting 
privacy guidelines 
 
Very 
High 
Medium  High Privacy 
Availability  
Technical: apply 
Authorization, 
Authentication and 
Auditing (AAA) 
enforcing strong 
passwords creation. 
Only authorised parties 
granted access, 
ensuring that users do 
not gain access to 
other users data.  
Germany 
hospital  
Activity: 
further 
examination 
required 
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5 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Malicious Insider:  
Description  
The risk of staff members 
in Oman hospital to misuse 
patient medical information 
 
Very 
High 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Confidentiality  
Accountability 
Authenticity & 
Trustworthines
s 
 Technical Specify the 
access control policy 
for each member in  
the hospital according 
to their roles and 
responsibilities 
 
 Human: hospital 
must provide security 
training workshop for 
all members to 
enhance their 
awareness of possible 
threats  
 
Organisation: hospital 
has to notify all 
members of security 
policy implemented in 
place.  
 
Oman 
hospital 
 
Process risk 
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6 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Malicious Insider:  
Description  
The risk of staff members 
in Germany hospital to 
misuse patient medical 
information 
 
Very 
High 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Confidentiality  
Accountability 
Authenticity & 
Trustworthines
s 
 Technical Specify the 
access control policy 
for each member in  
the hospital according 
to their roles and 
responsibilities 
 
 Human: hospital 
must provide security 
training workshop for 
all members to 
enhance their 
awareness of possible 
threats  
 
Organisation: hospital 
has to notify all 
members of security 
policy implemented in 
place.  
 
Germany 
hospital 
 
Process risk 
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Appendix D.3 BPM for Hospital Process  
 
H
ea
lt
h
c
ar
e
 i
n
 O
m
a
n
  
  
  
  
  
  
 H
o
sp
it
a
l
Referral Form 
Received
Local Health 
Database 
Referral form 
received 
Transfer to 
Senior 
Specialist clinic
Request more 
tests
Discuss the results 
with patient and 
suggest surgery 
Referral form
Surgery cannot be 
schedule in a 
reasonable 
timeframe
Patient decide to 
travel abroad to 
perform the surgery
Identity Access 
Management
Disclosure of 
patient results
Safeguarding 
patient  information 
Identity Theft
Insecure deletion 
of data 
Systems 
unavailability 
Ac
C
C
P
A
CP
I
A
Technical
Malicious insider
C
Ac
A
T
Technical
Organisational
Human Oriented
Technical
Technical
Technical
Human Oriented
Technical Human Oriented
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Appendix D 3.1 Oman Hospital Risk Register Table 
 
N
o 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/ Description Impact 
Likelih
ood 
Risk 
Level 
Security Goal 
Countermeasure 
 
Traceability 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Safeguarding Patient 
information  
 
Description: Safeguarding 
Nada’s health record in 
Oman Hospital with key 
regulations  
Very 
High 
Medium  High Confidentiality  
Accountability  
Technical: 
implementing 
several layers of 
authentication such 
as user login, 
administration 
privilege based on 
their roles and need 
to access the data to 
secure health data 
records adequately 
Oman 
hospital 
Process risk  
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2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Malicious Insider:  
Description  
The risk of staff members 
in Oman hospital to misuse 
patient medical information 
 
Very 
High 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Confidentiality  
Accountability 
Authenticity & 
Trustworthines
s 
 Technical Specify the 
access control policy 
for each member in the 
hospital according to 
their roles and 
responsibilities 
 
 Human: hospital 
must provide security 
training workshop for 
all members to 
enhance their 
awareness of possible 
threats  
 
Organisation: hospital 
has to notify all 
members of security 
policy implemented in 
place.  
Oman 
hospital 
 
Process risk 
3 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Identity Theft  
Description: The fraudulent 
practice of using another 
person's name and personal 
information in order to 
obtain confidential details. 
High 
 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
Confidentiality 
 
Technical 
Authentication based 
on smart card or 
certificate. physical 
identification. 
Activation required 
user finger print. 
the identity theft 
requires to obtain the 
card + the PIN number 
to access any system. 
End user must have the 
liability to ensure his 
PIN number is 
protected. 
Oman 
hospital 
Activity: 
Referral 
form 
received  
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4 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Identity and Access 
Management  
Description: Oman 
hospital implement 
security practices to 
access patient health 
record as well as supporting 
privacy guidelines 
 
Very 
High 
Medium  High Privacy 
Availability  
Technical: apply 
Authorization, 
Authentication and 
Auditing (AAA) 
enforcing strong 
passwords creation. 
Only authorised parties 
granted access, 
ensuring that users do 
not gain access to 
other users data.  
Oman 
hospital  
Activity: 
request 
more tests 
5 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Disclosure of patient 
results 
Description  
Doctor or nurse may 
disclosure patient results 
without the right permission 
or approval from the patient. 
Medium 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Confidentiality  
Privacy 
Human Oriented 
Training course are 
need to ensure patient 
confidential 
information and how 
important it is to 
maintain his privacy 
all the time 
 
Oman 
hospital 
Activity  
Discuss the 
results with 
patient and 
suggest 
surgery 
6 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Insecure Deletion of Data 
Description When a patient 
request to delete his data 
from hospital database, they 
cannot delete the entire disk 
as it shared by other users 
too. 
Very 
High 
 
Medium 
 
High  
 
Integrity  Legal Signing Service 
Level Agreement for 
critical data to 
Destroy data 
as per user 
requirement. 
Oman 
hospital  
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7 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
System unavailability  
Description: there is a 
possibility of systems 
unavailability and this can 
be a major issue in an 
emergency situation 
where a doctor or nurse 
needs to access or updated 
patient information in the 
database. 
High Low Medium  Availability  
 
Technical 
include redundant 
CPUs, hot-swappable 
RAID drives with 
multiple access paths, 
controlling software 
for the high 
availability cluster, 
multiple LANs and 
WANs with all the 
redundant hardware 
and lines this implies, 
end user devices with 
multiple network 
adapters 
Oman 
hospital  
 
Database  
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Appendix D 4: Patient BPM  
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Appendix D 4.1 Patient Process Risk Register Table 
 
N
o 
Risk 
Type 
Risk Name/ Description Impact Likelih
ood 
Risk 
Level 
Security Goal Countermeasure 
 
Traceability 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Third Party Access 
Description: there is a risk 
of third to access the hard 
copy of patient medical 
report without any 
permission.  
Very 
High 
Very 
High 
Very 
High 
Confidentiality  
Availability 
Human Oriented: 
patient must secure 
the hardcopy report 
in safe bag or in 
safety box which 
needs a code to open 
to avoid any 
unauthorised access 
Patient 
process  
2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Record could be Lost or 
Stolen 
Description: there is a 
risk of patient losing the 
hardcopy report  
 
 
Medium Medium Medium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability  Human Oriented: 
patient should keep a 
scanned copy of the 
hard copy report in 
his email or in secure 
flash memory with 
code. 
Patient 
process  
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3 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Data Protection: 
Description: patient need 
to secure his hard copy 
report and CDs of 
performed results in 
secure place. 
  
High 
 
High 
 
High  
 
 
 
 
 
Confidentiality Human Oriented 
patient should keep 
his record in locked 
bag with need pin 
code to access to 
avoid unauthorised 
access. 
Patient 
process  
4 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Getting the Full Set of 
Report 
Description: there is a 
risk Printer ran out of 
paper and the printout is 
not the full set of the 
report. 
 
Medium Medium Medium Availability  Human Oriented 
Patient need to 
double check the 
page numbers of his 
report  and ensure 
that he got the full 
set. 
Patient 
process 
5 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Imposter Another Patient 
Record 
Description: there is a 
risk of patient collecting 
another patient report by 
mistake. 
 
 
Medium Medium Medium Availability  Human Oriented 
Patient need to 
double check his 
personal details on 
the report before 
leaving the hospital 
to avoid any 
imposter with other 
patient details. 
Patient 
process 
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15 Appendix E: Integrated Care Pathway 
 
E.1 Full Set of BPM for Integrated Care Pathway  
New patient record
Controlled
G
P
 S
u
rg
e
ry
Controlled
R
e
ce
p
ti
o
n
is
t
Controlled
N
u
rs
e
Controlled
D
o
ct
o
r
Receptionist 
checks 
patient
Nurse to do 
Preliminary test for 
patient
Dr. Diagnose
 patient
Dr. Retrieves 
results
Dr. Suspect 
malignancy
Prepare  
Referral 
Form 
Referral Form
NO
Yes
Controlled
H
o
s
p
it
a
l 
1
 
Referral 
Form 
Received and 
Filed
Referral Form
Insert patient 
information
Patient 
contacts GP
Patient Discharged
A1: Transfer  
Referral Form to H1
Controlled
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
Database Health Record
A1: Referral 
Form Sent
 
GP Surgery 
Appendix E   
475 | P a g e  
 
Controlled
H
o
sp
it
a
l 1
Controlled
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
Controlled
O
n
co
lo
g
is
t 
Su
rg
e
o
n
Controlled
B
re
as
t 
C
an
ce
r 
N
u
rs
e 
Sp
ec
ia
lis
t
Controlled
H
e
m
at
o
lo
gi
st
Controlled
R
a
d
io
lo
gi
st
Controlled
P
at
h
o
lo
gi
st
Referral Form 
Received and 
Filed
Referral Form
Request more 
tests
Discuss results  
with patient 
Inform GP
Examination
Blood Test
Biopsy
Fine needle 
aspiration
Database Health 
Record
Database Health 
Record
Database Health 
Record
Database Health 
Record
Imagining 
Ultrasound
MRI
Database Health 
Record
Mammography
A1: Referral 
Form Received
A2: Transfer to MDT 
in H2
End
Further Examination
 
Figure  Hospital 1 for Further Examination 
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Controlled
H
os
pi
ta
l 2
Controlled
M
D
T
Request Patient 
information from 
Hospital 1 
Plan for surgery
Inform Hospital  1 
about surgery
Treatment 
Plan
Yes
Request Patient 
information from 
Hospital 1 and 3
Discuss new patient case in MDT 
Review and compare follow up 
patient previous MDT review 
A2: Patient 
Record 
received 
Is a new 
patient?  No 
(Follow up Patient)
Yes 
(New patient)
No
A3: Carry the surgery 
in H3
Does Patient need 
Surgery?
MDT Meeting
End
 
Figure: Hospital 2 for MDT Meeting 
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Controlled
H
o
sp
it
al
 3
Request information 
about patient from 
Hospital 1 
Perform 
surgery
Controlled
Su
rg
e
o
n
 
Update surgeon 
system
Send Surgery 
Summary to 
Hospital 1
Surgeon collect 
and record 
patient 
information to 
system
A3: Carry the surgery 
in H3
End
Controlled
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
Perform Surgery
 
Figure : Hospital 3 to Perform Surgery 
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E.2 Patient Pathway in GP with Countermeasures  
 
Controlled
G
P
 S
u
rg
e
ry
Controlled
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
Controlled
N
u
rs
e
Controlled
D
o
ct
o
r
Receptionist 
checks patient
Nurse to do 
Preliminary test for 
patient
Dr. Diagnose
 patient
Dr. Retrieves 
results
Dr. Suspect 
malignancy
Prepare  
Referral Form 
Referral Form
NO
Yes
Controlled
H
o
s
p
it
a
l 
1
 Referral Form 
Received and 
Filed
Referral Form
Insert patient 
information
Patient 
contacts GP
Patient Discharged
A1: Transfer  
Referral Form to H1
P
Social Engineering 
C Ac
Safeguarding Information 
Safeguarding Information 
Identity Access Management 
C
Health Records Accessible
CP
Data Protection 
Malicious 
Insider s
C
A
T
Controlled
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
GP  Referral Process
Ac
P
Database Health Record
Technical Human 
Technical
Technical
Technical
TechnicalOrganisational
Technical
Technical
Human
Organisational
CAc
New Patient Record
A1: Referral 
Form Sent
Intercepting Data 
C
TechnicalHuman
Data Protection
A C
Technical Human
P
Organisational
C P A
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E.3 Risk Register for Patient pathway in GP Referral   
 
No 
Risk 
Type  
Risk Name  Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Security 
Goals 
Risk 
Countermeasure  
Traceabilit
y 
Date 
Identified/ 
Modified 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
5
 
 
Malicious 
insider’s 
 
Description  
The risk of GP staff 
members to misuse 
patient medical 
information 
 
Very 
High 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Confidentia
lity  
Privacy  
Accountabi
lity 
Authenticit
y & 
Trustworthi
ness 
 Technical Specify 
the access control 
policy for each 
member in  the GP 
Surgery according to 
their roles and 
responsibilities 
 
 Human: GP must 
provide security 
training workshop 
for all members to 
enhance their 
awareness of 
possible threats  
 
Organisation: GP 
Surgery has to notify 
all members of 
security policy 
implemented in 
place.  
 
Process: 
GP Referral  
 
Location: 
GP Surgery  
22 Feb 2017 
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Specific Activity Risk in GP Referral  
 
No 
Risk 
Type  
Risk Name Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Security 
Goals 
Risk 
Countermeasure  
Traceability  
Date 
Identi
fied/ 
Modif
ied 
3 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-2
4
 
Social 
engineering 
attacks 
 
Description: 
Risk of patient 
impersonate other 
patient details. 
 
 
 
High  
 
Medium  
 
Medium 
 
Privacy  
 
Technical: 
Receptionist must 
check patient 
information by using 
fingerprint as 
validation process. 
 
Human: Security 
training for medical 
staff to ask security 
questions DoB, 1st 
line of patient 
address.  
  
Process : 
GP Referral  
 
Location  
GP Surgery 
 
Activity: 
Receptionist 
checks 
patient  
22 Feb 
2017 
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4 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
 
Safeguarding 
patient 
confidential 
information and 
compliance 
 
 
Description: 
Risk of Doctor 
disclosure of 
patient 
confidential 
information to 
someone else 
from the diagnose 
process.   
 
 
 
Very 
High       
Medium High  Confident
iality  
Accounta
bility 
 
Technical: Dr. must 
has the right 
authentication and 
authorisation based 
on his role on storing 
medical health 
records and 
safeguarding it with 
key security 
regulations.  
 
Process : 
GP Referral  
 
Location  
GP Surgery 
 
Activity:  
Doctor 
Diagnose 
patient  
22 Feb 
2017 
5 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
 
Safeguarding 
patient 
confidential 
information and 
compliance 
 
Description: 
The risk of Nurse 
disclosure patient 
results to 
someone else 
without the right 
approval during 
the  preliminary 
tests conducted 
Very 
High       
Medium High  Confident
iality  
Accounta
bility 
 
Technical: 
Nurse must has the 
right authentication 
and authorisation  on 
storing patient results 
in the medical health 
records and 
safeguarding it with 
key security 
regulations 
 
Process : 
GP Referral  
 
Location  
GP Surgery 
 
Activity: 
Nurse to do 
Preliminary 
test for 
patient 
22 Feb 
2017 
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6 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-2
 
Health records 
accessible 
 
Description: 
The risk of 
Doctor retrieves 
the results of 
another patient 
from health 
records.  
 
Very 
High 
Medium High Confident
iality 
Privacy 
Availabili
ty 
Technical: 
Dr needs 
authorization to 
access and retrieves 
the results of a 
patient within his 
team of care as well 
as supporting privacy 
guidelines  
Process : 
GP Referral  
 
Location  
GP Surgery 
 
Activity: 
Doctor 
Retrieves 
patient 
results 
22 Feb 
2017 
7 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
6
 
Identity Access 
Management  
 
Description: 
The risk of 
another Doctor 
using identity and 
access privilege 
of another Dr. to 
view patient 
results.  
 
 
 
High Low Medium Confident
iality 
 
Technical:  
Dr. should use 
registration 
procedure to ensure 
the right 
authorization to 
access and retrieves 
patient results is 
consistent with his 
role and identity.  
 
Organisational: 
 Dr. Should follow 
GP policy in 
retrieving patient 
results.  
Process : 
GP Referral  
 
Location  
GP Surgery 
 
Activity: 
Doctor 
Retrieves 
patient 
results  
22 Feb 
2017 
Appendix E   
483 | P a g e  
 
8 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
4
 
Data protection  
 
Description: 
The risk of 
Doctor sharing 
suspect of 
malignancy based 
on results with 
another person 
without patient 
approval. 
 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High  
 
Confident
iality  
Privacy 
  
Technical:  
Doctor should 
protect 
Patient medical 
information from 
unauthorized access.  
 
Organisational: 
based on security 
procedure within the 
GP to consult 
another specialist to 
confirm patient 
results in top 
confidential process 
to confirm Dr. 
suspect 
Process : 
GP Referral  
 
Location  
GP Surgery 
 
Activity: 
Doctor 
Suspect of 
malignancy 
22 Feb 
2017 
9 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
3
 
Intercepting 
data in transit 
 
Description: 
  
The risk of 
disclosure  from 
Dr. or nurse when 
processing the 
referral form 
between different 
places, computers 
or sites  
 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
Medium 
 
Confident
iality  
 
Availabili
ty 
Technical:  Dr. and 
Nurse need to have 
the right 
authorisation and 
authentication when 
dealing with the 
referral form of the 
patient. 
 
Human Oriented:  
Dr. and Nurse need 
to have security 
training awareness 
when processing the 
referral form. 
 
Process: 
GP  Referral  
  
Location  
GP Surgery 
 
Flow 
Dependencie
s: Referral 
Form 
transferred 
from GP 
Surgery to 
Hospital 1 
 
 
22 Feb 
2017 
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E.4 Patient Pathway in Hospital 1 with Countermeasures  
Controlled
H
o
sp
it
a
l 
1
Controlled
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
Controlled
O
n
co
lo
g
is
t 
Su
rg
e
o
n
Controlled
B
re
a
st
 C
a
n
ce
r 
N
u
rs
e
 S
p
e
c
ia
li
st
Controlled
H
e
m
a
to
lo
g
is
t
Controlled
R
a
d
io
lo
g
is
t
Controlled
P
a
th
o
lo
g
is
t
Referral Form 
Received and 
Filed
Request more 
tests
Discuss results  
with patient 
Inform GP
Examination
Blood Test
Biopsy
Fine needle 
aspiration
Database Health Record
Database Health Record
Database Health Record
Database Health Record
A1: Referral 
Form Received
A2: Transfer to 
MDT in H2
End
C P
Data Protection
PA
Data Privacy & Security 
Safeguarding Information 
 Health Records Accessible 
Data Protection
Data Protection
C
Further Examination
P
Imagining 
Ultrasound
MRI
Database Health Record
Mammography
P C
P
Data Protection
C
P
Data Protection
C
C
PA
Ac
C
Technical
Human
Organisational
Malicious 
Insider s
C
P
Ac
A
T
Technical Organisational
Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical
Referral Form
P
Intercepting Data 
C
TechnicalHuman
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E.5 Risk Register for Patient Pathway in Hospital 1  
 
No 
Ris
k 
typ
e  
Risk Name Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Security Goals 
Risk 
Countermeasure  
Traceability  
Date 
Identifi
ed/ 
Modifie
d 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
5
 
Malicious 
Insider’s  
 
Description: 
The risk of hospital 
1 staff members to 
misuse their role on 
the patient medical 
records. 
  
 
Very 
high 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Confidentiality  
Privacy  
Accountability 
Authenticity & 
Trustworthiness 
 Technical :specify 
the access control 
policy for each 
member in  Hospital 
1 according to their 
roles and 
responsibilities 
 
 Human: Hospital 1 
must provide security 
training workshop 
for all members to 
enhance their 
awareness of 
possible threats  
 
Organisation: 
Hospital 2 has to 
notify all members of 
security policy 
implemented in 
place.  
 
Process: 
Further 
Examination  
 
Location: 
Hospital 1 
 
 
22 Feb 
2017 
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Patient pathway in Further Examination (Hospital 1) -Flow Dependencies Risk  
No 
Risk 
type  
Risk Name Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Security 
Goals 
Risk 
Countermeasure  
Traceability 
Date 
Identified/ 
Modified 
2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
3
 
Intercepting 
Data in Transit 
 
Description: 
The risk of 
disclosure from 
Dr. or Nurse 
when processing 
the referral form 
between different 
places, computers 
or sites  
 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
Medium 
 
Confidentiality  
 
Availability 
Technical:  Dr. and 
Nurse need to have the 
right authorisation and 
authentication when 
dealing with the 
referral form of the 
patient. 
 
Human Oriented:  
Dr. and Nurse need to 
have security training 
awareness when 
processing the referral 
form. 
 
Process: 
Further 
Examination  
 
Location: 
Hospital 1 
 
Activity : 
Referral 
Form  
 
 
22 Feb 2017 
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Activity risks in Further Examination (Hospital 1)  
 
No 
Ris
k 
Ty
pe  
Risk Name Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Security 
Goals 
Risk Countermeasure  Traceability  
Date 
Identifi
ed/ 
Modifie
d 
3 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
4
 
Data Protection  
 
Description: 
The risk of 
Receptionist 
sharing Referral 
form details with 
another person 
without right 
approval. 
  
 
High 
 
High 
 
High  
 
Confidentiali
ty  
Privacy 
  
Technical:  
Receptionist should 
protect patient medical 
information from 
unauthorized access.  
 
Organisational: based 
on security procedure 
within the Hospital 1 to 
share or disclosure 
patient details with 
another person. 
 
Process: 
Further 
Examination  
 
Location : 
Hospital 1 
 
Activity : 
Referral 
Form 
Received and 
Filed 
 
22 Feb 
2017 
4 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-2
3
 
Data Privacy 
and security  
 
Description: 
The risk of 
sharing 
Oncologist 
Surgeon patient 
case with another 
person 
 
 
High High High Privacy  
Availability 
Technical:  
Oncologist Surgeon 
needs to deal with 
patient medical data as 
highly sensitive 
according to Data 
Privacy and security 
regulations. 
 
Process: 
Further 
Examination  
 
Location: 
Hospital 1 
 
Activity : 
Request 
more tests 
22 Feb 
2017 
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5 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
 
Safeguarding 
patient 
confidential 
information and 
compliance  
 
Description: The 
risk from 
Oncologist 
Surgeon not 
safeguarding 
patient medical 
results and 
disclosure it with 
another person 
without the right 
approval.   
 
Very 
High       
Medium High  Confidentiali
ty  
Accountabilit
y 
 
Technical: 
Oncologist Surgeon 
needs to safeguarding 
patient confidential 
information and 
compliance during the 
diagnose process.  He 
must has the right 
authentication and 
authorisation  on storing 
medical health records 
and 
safeguarding it with key 
security regulations. 
 
Process: 
Further 
Examination  
 
Location: 
Hospital 1 
 
Activity : 
Discuss 
results  with 
patient  
 
 
22 Feb 
2017 
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6 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-2
 
 Health Records 
Accessible  
 
Description: The 
risk from 
Oncologist 
Surgeon retrieves 
the results of 
patient from 
health records is 
leaving it 
accessible to other 
members who is 
outside the care 
team of the 
patient. 
  
 
Very 
High       
Medium High Confidentiali
ty 
Privacy 
Availability   
Technical: 
Oncologist Surgeon 
needs authorization to 
access and retrieves the 
results of a patient 
within his team of care 
as well as supporting 
privacy guidelines  
  
Process: 
Further 
Examination  
 
Location: 
Hospital 1 
 
Activity : 
Discuss 
results  with 
patient  
 
 
22 Feb 
2017 
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7 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
4
 
Data Protection  
 
Description: The 
risk of Breast 
Cancer Nurse 
Specialist, 
Hematologis, 
Radiologist and 
Pathologist 
sharing patient 
results with 
someone else 
without the right 
approval.  
 
  
 
High 
 
High 
 
High  
 
Confidentiali
ty  
Privacy 
  
Technical:  
Breast Cancer Nurse 
Specialist, Hematologis, 
Radiologist and 
Pathologist should 
protect patient medical 
information from 
unauthorized access and 
not disclosure it to 
anyone.  
  
Process: 
Further 
Examination  
 
Location: 
Hospital 1 
 
Activity : 
Breast 
Cancer 
Nurse 
Specialist, 
Hematologis, 
Radiologist 
and 
Pathologist 
 
 
22 Feb 
2017 
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E.6 Patient Pathway in Hospital 2 with Countermeasures 
Controlled
H
os
pi
ta
l 2
Controlled
M
D
T
Request Patient 
information from 
Hospital 1 
Plan for surgery
Inform Hospital  1 
about surgery
Treatment 
Plan
Yes
Request Patient 
information from 
Hospital 1 and 3
Discuss new patient case in MDT 
Review and compare follow up 
patient previous MDT review 
A2: Patient 
Record 
received 
Is a new 
patient?  No 
(Follow up Patient)
Yes 
(New patient)
No
A3: Carry the surgery 
in H3
Does Patient need 
Surgery?
Malicious 
Insider s
C
P
Ac
A
T Insecure
 Deletion 
Identity Access 
Management 
C
MDT Meeting
P
I
Technical
Organisational
Technical
Technical
Human
Organisational
End
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E.7 Risk Register for Patient Pathway in Hospital 2  
 
No 
Risk 
type 
Risk Name Impact Likelihood 
Risk 
Level 
Security 
Goals 
Risk 
Countermeasure 
Traceability 
Date 
Identifi
ed/ 
Modifie
d 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
5
 
Malicious 
Insider’s  
 
Description: 
The risk of 
Hospital 2 staff 
members to 
misuse their role 
on the patient 
medical records. 
  
 
Very 
high 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Confidentiali
ty  
Privacy  
Accountabilit
y 
Authenticity 
& 
Trustworthin
ess 
 Technical :specify 
the access control 
policy for each 
member in  the 
Hospital 2 according 
to their roles and 
responsibilities 
 
 Human: Hospital 2 
must provide security 
training workshop 
for all members to 
enhance their 
awareness of 
possible threats  
 
Organisation: 
Hospital 2 has to 
notify all members of 
security policy 
implemented in 
place.  
 
Process: 
MDT 
Review 
Meeting 
 
Location:  
Hospital 2 
 
 
22 Feb 
2017 
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2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-6
 
 Insecure or 
Ineffective 
Deletion  
 
Description: 
The risk of 
insecure or 
ineffective 
deletion of 
pervious patient 
medical team or 
authorization for 
Drs to access 
from outside the 
care team. 
 
 
Very 
High 
 
Medium 
 
High  
 
Privacy  
Integrity 
(accuracy) 
Technical : 
Check MDT team 
are within the care 
team and involved 
within the patient 
case to ensure the 
right authorisation 
and authentication 
based on their role.  
 
Process: 
MDT 
Review 
Meeting 
 
Location: 
Hospital 2 
 
Rows:  
Insecure or 
ineffective 
deletion  
 
22 Feb 
2017 
3 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
6
 
Identity and 
Access 
Management  
 
Description: The 
risk of involving a 
member outside 
the team care for 
patient case. 
 
 
 
High Low  Medium Confidentiali
ty 
 
Technical: 
Check MDT 
members are 
involved in patient 
case. Need to provide 
authorisation and 
authentication to 
ensure the right level 
of access is 
consistent with the 
level of  
access that will 
become available to 
the user.  
Process: 
MDT 
Review 
Meeting 
 
Location: 
Hospital 2 
 
Rows: 
Identity and 
access 
management 
 
 
22 Feb 
2017 
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E.8 Patient Pathway in Hospital 3 with Countermeasures 
 
Controlled
H
o
sp
it
al
 3
Request information 
about patient from 
Hospital 1 
Perform 
surgery
Controlled
Su
rg
e
o
n
 
Update surgeon 
system
Send Surgery 
Summary to 
Hospital 1
Surgeon collect 
and record 
patient 
information to 
system
A3: Carry the surgery 
in H3
Malicious 
Insider s
C
P
Ac
A
T
Safeguarding 
Information 
End
Controlled
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
Perform Surgery
P
A
Technical
Human
Organisational
Technical
Organisational
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E.9 Risk Register for Patient Pathway in Hospital 3  
 
No Risk 
type  
Risk Name Impact Likelihood Risk 
Level 
Security 
Goals 
Risk 
Countermeasure  
Traceability  Date 
Identified
/ 
Modified 
1 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
5
 
Malicious 
Insider’s  
 
Description: 
The risk of 
Hospital3 staff 
members to 
misuse their role 
on the patient 
medical records. 
  
 
Very 
High 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
Confidentia
lity  
Privacy  
Accountabi
lity 
Authenticit
y & 
Trustworthi
ness 
 Technical :specify 
the access control 
policy for each 
member in  the 
Hospital 3 according 
to their roles and 
responsibilities 
 
 Human: Hospital 3 
must provide security 
training workshop 
for all members to 
enhance their 
awareness of 
possible threats  
 
Organisation: 
Hospital 3 has to 
notify all members of 
security policy 
implemented in 
place.  
 
Process: 
Perform 
Surgery 
 
Location: 
Hospital 3 
 
 
22 Feb 
2017 
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2 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
-1
 
Safeguarding 
Patient 
Confidential 
information 
and compliance  
 
Description: 
The risk from 
Surgeon not 
safeguarding 
patient medical 
results and 
disclosure it 
with another 
person without 
the right 
approval.   
 
 
 
Very 
High       
Medium High  Confidentia
lity  
Accountabi
lity 
 
Technical: 
Surgeon needs to 
safeguarding patient 
confidential 
information and 
compliance when 
collecting and 
recording patient 
information in the 
system.  He must has 
the right 
authentication and 
authorisation  on 
storing medical 
health records and 
safeguarding it with 
key security 
regulations. 
 
Process: 
Perform 
Surgery 
 
Location: 
Hospital 3 
 
Rows: 
Surgeon 
22 Feb 
2017 
 
 
 
Appendix F 
 
497 | P a g e  
 
16 Appendix F: Evaluation Methodology  
 
F.1 Participation in a Research Evaluation  
My name is Aseela Al Harthi, a PhD student at Cardiff University. My PhD 
Supervisors are Dr. Wendy Ivins and Prof.Omer Rana. My research is about 
Managing Security Risks in Integrated Care Pathways. I came up with an approach 
to assess security risks in the healthcare domain that combines Business Process 
Modelling with a Risk Register.  
Thank you for agreeing to help with my research. Your responses and advice as a 
knowledgeable practitioner and/or researcher will help me evaluate our proposed 
approach. 
The evaluation uses a healthcare scenario that has previously been applied to four PhD 
theses in our department. The evaluation process will involve watching a video 
(approximately 11 minutes) then answering questions to evaluate our proposed 
Security Risk Analysis and Business Process Model.   
The video outlines the healthcare scenario and demonstrates how our approach can be 
applied to manage security risks associated with the scenario. The video covers a 
subset of the scenario’s processes and activities so a full set of process models with 
their associated Risk Register has been provided for reference.  
 Material for evaluation: 
1. URL to the Video https://youtu.be/R0idfl9McJE 
2.  Survey Questions  
3.  Full set of BPM and Risk Register for the healthcare scenario. 
Could you please send me your completed survey via email to: 
AlHarthiA@cardiff.ac.uk 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to ask me. 
Best regards, 
Assela 
 
Assela Nasser Al Harthi 
PhD Student at Cardiff University  
Computer Science & Informatics, 
Queen’s Building, 5th Parade, 
Cardiff, CF24 3AA 
E-mail: alharthi.aseela@gmail.com or AlHarthiA@cardiff.ac.uk 
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F.2 Survey Questions  
 
Survey Questions 
(All information will kept confidential and used for research purpose only. Kindly 
send your feedback to me on  alharthia@cardiff.ac.uk or alharthi.aseela@gmail.com 
or to Dr.Wendy Ivins ivinswk@cardiff.ac.uk) 
  
Part 1: Demographic Data  
 
Q1: Your Name and Title? 
 
Q2: Your Country? 
 
Q3: Your role in an organisation? 
 
Part 2: Risk Management 
Q4: Your level of expertise in Risk Management or related domains? 
Expert  Competent   Some knowledge   No knowledge  
 
If you have any experience in Risk Management or related domains, then please 
answer the following: 
Q5:  How many years of experience do you have?  
Q6: What methods of Risk Management have you used?  
Q7: Does your experience come from practice, research, or both? 
Part 3: Business Process Models  
Q8: Your level of expertise in Business Process Modeling, Business Analysis, or 
other related domain  
Expert  Competent Some knowledge   No knowledge  
 
If have any experience in Business Process Models or related domains, then please 
answer the following: 
Q9: How many years of experience do you have?  
Q 10: What methods of Business Process Modelling have you used? 
Q11: Does your experience come from practice, research, or both? 
 
Part 4: Healthcare  
Q12: Do you have experience in Healthcare or other related domain? 
Q13: What is your particular area of interest/responsibility? 
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Part 5: Evaluation of Managing Security Risk-BPM  
Stage 1: Establishing the Context : Capturing Business Process Modelling in 
Healthcare 
 
 
 
Q14: The BPM approach used can be effectively applied to capture processes in 
healthcare. 
 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
 
Q15: The BPM approach used is useful for designing process models as it helps to 
clearly identify activities, flows, locations and roles in healthcare processes. 
 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
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[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know. 
 
 
 
 
Stage 2: Identify Security Risks  
 
 
Q16: The BPM approach used can clearly identify security risks with different activities 
level in the healthcare processes 
 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
 
Q17: The BPM approach used is more likely to help staff identify the appropriate 
security risks associated with the roles compared to relying on a risk register 
only. 
 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
 
 Stage 3: Risk Analysis and Evaluation 
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Q18: Using both the process model and risk register approach helps staff to clearly 
identify the appropriate security goals and risk level with each risk. 
 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
 
 
Q19:  The Risk Register -BPM approach used is more likely to be effective in the 
analyses and evaluation of risk than using a risk register only. 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
 
 
 
Stage 4: Risk Treatment  
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Q20: The Risk management-BPM approach used is more likely to be effective in 
identifying suitable countermeasure in healthcare domain than using risk 
register only. 
 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
 
Q21: Using Risk register and BPM together is more likely to help in identifying 
the appropriate countermeasure. 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
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Stage 5:  Monitoring & Review 
 
Q22: Using Risk register and BPM together is more likely to help in identifying 
any changes with the risk than using risk register only. 
 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
 
Stage 6: Communication  & Consultation  
 
Q23: The Risk Register – BPM approach used is clearly understandable and 
appropriate to use to manage security risk in healthcare processes. 
 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F 
 
504 | P a g e  
 
 
Q24: Risk Register-BPM approach used is more likely to effectively communicate 
risks to achieve a shared understanding of all roles involved in the process 
compared to using risk register only. 
 
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
  
Q25: Developing BPM and risk register for key health processes is more likely to 
help healthcare organisations manage security risks in compliance to 
Information security risk management practices (ISO27005) compared to 
developing Risk register only.  
  
[  ] Strongly Agree 
[  ] Agree 
[  ] Neither agree/disagree 
[  ] Disagree 
[  ] Strongly Disagree 
[  ] I do not know 
 
 
 
Other Comments: 
 
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following Risk 
Register-BPM approach presented in the video. 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are 
missing or not relevant to the Manging security risks domain? If yes, please 
name them. 
 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a 
valuable of tool to complement using a risk register to manager security risks? 
 
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register- BPM approach 
.if yes please provide them in in details.  
  
Q30: Any other comments or feedback? 
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F.3 Participant Profile Part 1  
Table 1: Participant Profile Part 1 
No Country 
Role in 
Organisation  
Risk 
Management 
experience 
Exper. 
(years) 
Methods of risk 
Management 
Nature of Exper. 
P1  UK Lecturer Competent 6 
ISO 27005, some graphical 
methods 
 Research 
P2 UK 
 Lecturer in Safety-
Critical Systems Expert  12 
Safety Methods, e.g. FMEA, 
FFA, HAZOP and FTA 
Largely research 
but closely with 
practice (different 
industries) 
P3 UK Director/CTO Competent 8 CESG’s (RMADS etc.) Practice 
P4 UK Cyber Analyst 
Some 
knowledge 2 
Risk Registers defining Treat, 
Transfer, Tolerate, Terminate. 
DREAD methodology to 
quantify risk, Impact x 
likelihood methodology to 
quantify risk. Both 
P5 UK 
Threat Monitoring 
Specialist 
Some 
knowledge 
less 
than  
one 
year ISO27001 & ISO31000 
Postgraduate 
education  
P6 UK 
Lead Cyber 
Security 
Consultant 
Some 
knowledge 4 Reduction and avoidance Practice 
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P7 
UK- 
Wales 
Professor/Head of 
Workforce &OD Competent 
more 
than 10 
years Risk & Issues Practice 
P8 UK 
Senior 
Sociotechnical 
Researcher Competent 4 
I research risk methods mainly 
and the use of complexity theory 
and risk. But I have used 
ISO27001 and bits of IS1&2, 
Cynefin (sensemaking tool) 
Mainly research 
these days 
P9 
UK- 
England 
Cyber Security 
Customer Solutions 
Architect 
Some knowledge 2 
Specifically: ISO 27001 
implementation, PCI DSS 
implementation, Internal Risk 
Pro project management toolsets 
Alongside: Vulnerability 
analysis.  
ISMS implementation. 
Contractual risk analysis (for 
acceptable risks). 
Disaster recovery / continuity 
planning. 
Business process modelling / 
planning to adapt Audit criteria 
and processes to manage risk 
and comply with risk 
management requirements. 
Academic: • Cardiff MSc thesis 
on securing virtualized 
infrastructures / deployments 
within an IaaS environment. 
Focus was on technical, 
operational and life cycle 
security.  
Mainly practise, 
some theoretical 
knowledge from 
Academic studies 
(see above). 
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• Risk Management covered 
within SSCP & CISSP 
Certifications  
 
P10 
UK- 
Wales 
Clinical Fellow 
(Junior Dr); 
Previously Project 
Support Manager, 
NHS Wales 
Informatics Service 
Some knowledge 5 years PRINCE methodology Practice 
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P11 UK 
Cyber Sales 
Executive 
Competent 6 
Primarily Risk Registers when 
used during system design and 
specification. These are usually 
customer supplied and a typical 
requirement would be to state 
mitigation measures against the 
stated risks.  
Mainly practice but 
also related study 
also supervised by 
Wendy.  
P12 
UK-
England 
Cybersecurity 
Director - Lead 
cyber security and 
cyber insurance 
(including risk 
assessment) 
Expert  7 
Qualitative, Quantitative, 
ISO27000, various supply chain 
methodologies, government 
methodologies (IS1/IS2), 
bespoke methodologies, US 
Federal methodologies, 
regulatory/standards-based 
methodologies (ISA99, CFATS, 
safety cases etc) 
Practice 
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F.4 Participant Profile Part 2  
Participant Profile  Part 2 
No 
BPM 
Experience 
Exper. 
(years) 
Methods of BPM Nature of Exper. 
Healthcare 
Experience 
Area of interests 
/responsibility 
P1 
Competent 6 BPMN Research No N/A 
P2 Competent 3 
BPMN, activity 
diagrams and 
flowcharts  
Largely research 
but closely with 
practice (different 
industries) Yes 
Research and 
engineering in patient 
safety 
P3 Expert 10 
UML, BPMN, 
MODAF Practice Yes 
Was electronic health 
records in oncology and 
evidence-based 
medicine 
P4 
Some 
knowledge 
less 
than 1 BPMN Research N/A N/A 
P5 
Some 
knowledge 3 
Flowcharts, Swimlane, 
Data Flow Diagrams Both No 
Cyber Security Attacks 
and Investigations 
P6 
Some 
knowledge 4 
UML, Flowchart, 
GANTT Practice No No 
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P7 Competent 
more 
than 
10 
years 
Process 
mapping/business 
modelling Practice 
IT arm of 
the NHS 
Head of Workforce but 
lead the national team 
of service 
transformation  
P8 
Some 
knowledge 4 
Soft Systems 
Methodology, System 
Dynamics, SABSA,  Mainly research Yes 
I used to work in IT in 
the NHS and its comes 
up as an area of 
research now especially 
with the growth of IoT. 
P9 
Some 
knowledge 
9 
months 
Acting Service 
architect covering 
business process 
reengineering utilized: 
• Swim lanes 
• Data flow diagrams  
• UML Diagrams  
• Some role activity 
diagram 
·         Practise (with 
the exception of 
Dr Wendy Ivins 
MSc Classes) No 
Cyber: Networks, 
Virtualization, Cloud, 
PKI, SIEM. Recent 
experience with risk 
analysis and 
vulnerability analysis, 
some service design 
exposure and business 
process engineering in 
current role alongside 
being a PKI SME. 
P10 
Some 
knowledge 5 years 
Soft systems 
methodology Both Yes Health Informatics 
P11 Competent 6 
MODAF, EA, UML, 
SSM, SD. I appreciate 
that some of these are 
tools and some are 
methods.  
Mainly practice 
from the level of 
managing risk 
management 
practitioners as 
part of an 
Integrated Project 
Team.  
No. My 
experience 
is in 
Defence 
and 
Government 
Agency.  
I am the lead account 
manager for NATO 
CIRC and am also 
leading another project 
to deliver large scale 
cyber defence to a 
major EU Agency. I am 
involved in all aspects 
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of deploying cyber 
defence systems at scale 
which typically include 
consult, design, build 
and operate functions.  
P12 Competent 5 
UML, OO methods, flow 
charts, work flow, role 
interaction Research Yes 
UK healthcare (NHS), 
Insure multiple entities in 
the US for all healthcare 
related cyber risk (as 
covered under 
HIPAA/HITECH). 
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F.5 Participant Feedback for Q14 to Q25  
 
No Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 
P1 Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y 
Agree Agree 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Neither 
agree/di
sagree 
Neither 
agree/dis
agree 
Strongl
y Agree Agree 
Strongl
y Agree Agree 
P2 Agree Agree Agree 
I do not 
know 
Neither 
agree/d
isagree 
Neither 
agree/disa
gree 
Neither 
agree/di
sagree 
Neither 
agree/dis
agree 
Neither 
agree/d
isagree 
Neither 
agree/dis
agree 
Neither 
agree/di
sagree 
Neither 
agree/di
sagree 
P3 Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Neither 
agree/d
isagree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree 
Strongl
y Agree Disagree Agree Agree 
P4 Agree Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree Agree Disagree Agree Agree 
Strongl
y Agree Agree 
P5 Agree Agree Agree Agree 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y Agree Agree 
Neither 
agree/d
isagree Agree Agree Agree 
P6 Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y Agree Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y Agree Agree 
P7 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
P8 Agree Agree Agree Agree 
Neither 
agree/d
isagree Agree Agree 
Neither 
agree/dis
agree Agree Agree Agree Agree 
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P9 Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y Agree Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
P10 Agree Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
I do not 
know 
P11 Agree Agree Agree Agree 
Strongl
y 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Disagre
e * 
Disagree
* 
Strongl
y Agree Agree 
Strongl
y Agree Agree 
P12 Agree Agree 
Neither 
agree/d
isagree Disagree Agree Agree 
Neither 
agree/di
sagree* 
Neither 
agree/dis
agree* Agree 
Neither 
agree/dis
agree  blank blank 
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F.6 Participant Feedback for Q26- Q30 
 
Feedback from Participant 1 
 
Other Comments: 
 
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following Risk 
Register-BPM approach presented in the video. 
I followed the method easily. My main concern is that the final annotated diagram is 
overcrowded with symbols which make reading and understanding harder. I would 
suggest that in future work you should consider how to improve the effectiveness of the 
visual representation of annotated BPMN models. 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are missing 
or not relevant to the Manging security risks domain? If yes, please name them. 
 
Privacy is critical in healthcare, but at the same time data are collected for important 
medical analysis. So you may want, in future work, to consider representation or privacy 
and address issues of data anonymization.  
 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a 
valuable of tool to complement using a risk register to manager security risks? 
 
If used appropriately, the method could bring multiple benefits as it helps to visualise 
security risks in complex business processes, and make them explicit and easy to see for 
experts with different backgrounds.  
 
 
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register- BPM approach .if 
yes please provide them in in details.  
 
As this is not a standardised or widely used method, I anticipate a lot of difficulties with 
adopting a method in large and heavily regulated organisations. The method would have 
to go through a lot of empirical testing, and several rounds of evaluation and 
improvement before it may be adopted in practice. 
  
Q30: Any other comments or feedback? 
Regarding Q20 and Q21, I do not see how this method could actually help with identifying 
appropriated countermeasures. They could be equally well identified based on the description 
of the problem provided in a risk register. It only depends on how detailed is the register and 
how detailed is a model. Although, I can clearly see the benefits of the method for structuring 
and organising risk related information, I am not sure that it assists with identifying 
countermeasures. If in future work, you could extend the method do that it provides some 
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automated recommendations for similar risks, then it potentially may be helpful for this 
purpose as well. 
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Feedback from Participant 2 
 
Other Comments: 
 
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following Risk Register-
BPM approach presented in the video. 
Who is the user of your approach? A security engineer or a clinician? I would say an 
engineer might be familiar with this sort of modelling. I doubt a clinician will have 
the skill or time to develop these models. 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are missing or 
not relevant to the Manging security risks domain? If yes, please name them. 
As a framework it’s fine. The problem is in having data/evidence to decide on things 
like likelihood and impact parameters. 
 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a valuable 
of tool to complement using a risk register to manager security risks? 
The value lies in improving traceability between the technology and the clinical setting. 
 
 
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register- BPM approach .if yes 
please provide them in in details.  
User acceptance might be an issue, especially if the intended user is not an engineer, 
e.g. doctor or nurse.  
 
Q30: Any other comments or feedback? 
It was hard to answer your questions since you do not provide a reference/benchmark against 
which to compare your approach. For example, is it nothing vs your approach? Or using flowchart 
vs BPMN? This makes a big difference. 
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Feedback from Participant 3 
 
Other Comments: 
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following Risk Register-
BPM approach presented in the video. 
Followed fine 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are missing or 
not relevant to the Manging security risks domain? If yes, please name them. 
 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a valuable 
of tool to complement using a risk register to manager security risks? 
It’s better than just a risk register but I haven’t seen it compared to CESGs approach to 
infosec risk management – which as a public sector body they should adhere to – hence 
harsh mark on Q23 – sorry – search google on GPMS and RMADS (risk management 
and accreditation documents set) if you are unsure – this will start you down the right 
route 
  
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register- BPM approach .if yes 
please provide them in in details.  
See above – would be fine but as part of a wider RMADS / approach to implementing 
GPMS – basically needs lots of scoping documents and quite a lot of other stuff – after 
recent events this is likely to be pretty important 
  
Q30: Any other comments or feedback? 
Good luck 
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Feedback from Participant 4  
 
Other Comments: 
 
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following Risk Register-
BPM approach presented in the video. 
Does Hospital 1,2,3 infer that for each cancer diagnosis, three separate hospitals are 
used each time? 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are missing or 
not relevant to the Manging security risks domain? If yes, please name them. 
- 
 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a valuable 
of tool to complement using a risk register to manager security risks? 
 
Certainly more readable, understandable and referable than a potentially large and 
unwieldy risk register. 
 
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register- BPM approach .if yes 
please provide them in in details.  
It would depend on how process varies across hospital ‘constituencies’ in the UK – 
is the process totally standardised across all hospitals? (I don’t know the answer to 
that) 
  
Q30: Any other comments or feedback? 
I would assume that the same actors highlighted in the above BPM’s are also responsible for data 
at rest, would this be included in the above process?  
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Feedback from Participant 5 
  
Other Comments: 
 
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following Risk Register-
BPM approach presented in the video.  
 No difficulties to mention. 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are missing or 
not relevant to the Manging security risks domain? If yes, please name them. 
 
 Although I quite liked the model and is a great starting point to evaluate risk, I think it 
might be missing the following points: 
 
• Physical Access: The actors have been defined in the swim-lanes have neglected 
the outsider threat or any actor that is not part of the process. Such as can 
somebody walk-in and access the system? What physical access controls are 
available from stopping them? How about a break-in? 
 
• Data at rest: In your diagram, you did mention a database of health records, but I 
think a bit more detail is required here; Firstly, for the point I mentioned above 
(physical access). Secondly the technical aspects of protecting the data (type of 
encryption used, etc.) and lastly, to address availability and continuity; Is this a 
single point of failure?  Is there a hot/warm site available in case of disaster?  
 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a valuable 
of tool to complement using a risk register to manager security risks? 
 
 As I mentioned earlier, I quite liked the model and is a great starting point to evaluate 
risk particularly when establishing processes. 
  
 
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register- BPM approach .if yes 
please provide them in in details.  
 
 The only problem I can think of is that most organisations already have a risk template 
that they follow with different level schema, which could involve a lot of levels (A1,A3, 
B3, etc.) and it might be difficult to map their existing schema with the three levels (Red, 
Amber and Green) 
  
Q30: Any other comments or feedback? 
 Nope.  
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Feedback from participant 6 
 
Other Comments: 
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following Risk Register-
BPM approach presented in the video. None, you explain it clearly. 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are missing or 
not relevant to the Manging security risks domain? If yes, please name them. Not that I 
noticed, but this isn’t my domain of expertise. 
 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a valuable 
of tool to complement using a risk register to manager security risks? Have the right 
methodology and tooling is essential for managing security risk. Having a 
methodology that is sound is good, and I think this can be used, but you would need 
to spend the time not just creating the method but also building the training and 
implemention capability, as people performing this work are incredibly busy and 
don’t always have time to learn new methods if the methods they are using are 
‘good enough’ Being a better method is not always a good enough reason to stop 
doing what has been working, so you’ll need to construct a compelling reason not 
just why this is good, but also why the current method is not good. 
 
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register- BPM approach .if yes 
please provide them in in details.  What I mentioned above. It’s hard in busy spaces, 
especially in heath care, to learn and use new things. This would have to be used by 
multiple practitioners in different hospitals for it to be effective, with the underlying 
DB constructed in a way to collect the right information, so to make this effective 
it’s not just convincing one manager or one hospital, but a group of them working 
together. Is there a need for this in the marketplace? Do hospitals see a problem 
with what they are using to demand something better? 
  
Q30: Any other comments or feedback?  
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Feedback from Participant 7 
 
Other Comments: 
 
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following Risk Register-
BPM approach presented in the video. 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are missing or 
not relevant to the Manging security risks domain? If yes, please name them. 
 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a valuable 
of tool to complement using a risk register to manager security risks? To a great extent 
 
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register- BPM approach .if yes 
please provide them in in details. No 
  
Q30: Any other comments or feedback? 
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Feedback from Participant 8 
 
Other Comments: 
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following Risk Register-
BPM approach presented in the video. 
I would be cautious with your examples and their ratings, people have a tendency to 
just copy by default what has gone before in the examples, as they stick with the 
defaults. Taking this into account for your examples would be quite helpful as I would 
question the levels of impact associated with certain parts of this, is a malicious insider 
across the NHS process really a medium likelihood? 
Also what does malicious insider mean in a hospital sense? It might be worth looking at 
this piece of work https://www.crestresearch.ac.uk/csrflipbook/issue-2/?page=10 
What does High, Medium and low mean? 
 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are missing or 
not relevant to the Manging security risks domain? If yes, please name them. 
There is a move with risk to the use of complexity theory, especially in the areas like 
sensemaking. It might be worth taking a look at these things. This is an interesting 
paper  
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2841119 
 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a valuable 
of tool to complement using a risk register to manager security risks? 
I think it is useful to have the visualisation for people so they can see the 
connections across an organisation and the flow. This is often what is missing a lot 
of the time. 
 
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register- BPM approach .if yes 
please provide them in in details.  
As mentioned above I would question the time and capacity people have to do this. 
They are often stretched for time, why would they adopt this over just keeping with 
the risk register? As much as its known risk registers aren’t the best and have many 
issues, how will you bring people with you, to make them understand what could be 
done with this work? 
  
Q30: Any other comments or feedback? 
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Feedback from participant 9 
 
Other Comments: 
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following Risk Register-
BPM approach presented in the video. 
None 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are missing or 
not relevant to the Manging security risks domain? If yes, please name them.  
 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a valuable 
of tool to complement using a risk register to manager security risks? 
I feel it is of significant value in comparison to a traditional risk register. If this was applied 
in detail to a very specific hospital / health care facility, it could be used as starting point to 
understand risk, referencing out to more detailed documents to form a holistic risk analysis. If 
this where updated as departmental processes evolve, it could be used to inform the ‘plan’ 
aspect of a health care providers ISMS. 
 
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register- BPM approach .if yes 
please provide them in in details.  
No 
  
Q30: Any other comments or feedback? 
None, keep up the good work :) 
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Feedback from Participant 10  
 
Other Comments: 
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following Risk Register-
BPM approach presented in the video. 
None 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are missing or 
not relevant to the Manging security risks domain? If yes, please name them. 
None 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a valuable 
of tool to complement using a risk register to manager security risks? 
It is useful in explaining the underlying process and in my opinion stakeholders will find 
it helpful to view the exact points/processes which have underlying risks. 
 
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register- BPM approach .if yes 
please provide them in in details.  
 None 
Q30: Any other comments or feedback? 
This model of three different hospitals may not be a universal model but it will be applicable in few 
scenarios. There would be some patient who will go from GP to Hospital 1 (usually holds the first and 
subsequent MDTs) for further assessment and then Hospital 2 for treatment (Hospital 2 will hold 
MDTs as well). 
But the scenario is a very practical one and associated risks are better identified using the BPM and 
risk register approach. Well done. 
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Feedback from participant 11 
 
Other Comments: 
 
Q26: Please outline any difficulties you may have experienced in following Risk 
Register-BPM approach presented in the video. 
Q27: Does the Risk Register-BPM approach used include any elements that are missing 
or not relevant to the Manging security risks domain? If yes, please name them. 
 
I am currently engaged in the design of a cyber security monitoring system for a major 
EU agency and we are using an approach which tries to capture the information you 
have captured here using an EA / MODAF / UML based method. One of the things that 
we have found to be very useful is to take into consideration the customer ‘Feared 
Events’. These tend to be high level and help people to think about the risks without the 
constraints of current infrastructure / people / process / technology. It also helps in 
stopping people ‘solutionising’ (sorry – horrible word) too early in the process. This 
type of approach also helps people consider the risks introduced by process and people, 
as opposed to being purely technology focussed, which is a real problem in my 
experience. It is important for the security system design team to understand where the 
risks are derived from so that they can be effectively mitigated in the solution. Another 
useful question is to identify the organisations ‘crown jewels’ so that you know what is 
of most value to the customer. It is always useful to gain as many perspectives from as 
many different sources as practical.  
 
Q28: To what extent do you feel that Risk Register-BPM approach can be used as a 
valuable of tool to complement using a risk register to manager security risks? 
  I think it would be an improvement on what currently exists. We are often presented with 
a risk register during consult / system design phases which tend to be a cut and paste of 
the last one with no real thought into the actual risk. It would be more likely to be a 
living document than a risk register which tend to ignored after the initial project 
implementation.  
 
Q 29: Do you anticipate any problems with adopting the risk register- BPM approach .if 
yes please provide them in in details.  
 
The supporting functions such as training and system management of implementing such 
a system at scale should not be under estimated. Systemic change is always difficult. 
Typically, the change management function within the organisation would look after the 
living document so system change in that area would be required.  
  
Q30: Any other comments or feedback? 
I always find modelling to be very useful and I like the way that the BPM is linked to the 
register. Maintaining this link would be quite difficult though and would need change / 
configuration management to ensure successful use. To be effective it would also need to be 
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linked to the security system design documentation to measure how well the identified risks 
are mitigated (or not) as the systems capability (in terms of people, process and technology) 
change over time.   
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